The making of a transnational capitalist society: The court of justice, social policy, and individual rights under the European community's legal order

Harvard International Law Journal

Volumn 37, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 307-

  Ball, Carlos A ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042539999     PISSN: 00178063     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (5)

1. See Joseph Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2413-14 (1991) [hereinafter Weiler, Transformation of Europe]. See also IAN BROWNLIE, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 555 (1990) ("[i]n general, treaties do not create direct rights and obligations for private individuals").
2. See Joseph Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2413-14 (1991) [hereinafter Weiler, Transformation of Europe]. See also IAN BROWNLIE, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 555 (1990) ("[i]n general, treaties do not create direct rights and obligations for private individuals").
3. See Joseph Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2413-14 (1991) [hereinafter Weiler, Transformation of Europe]. See also IAN BROWNLIE, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 555 (1990) ("[i]n general, treaties do not create direct rights and obligations for private individuals").
4. The Court has stated that the European Community is "a Community based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its Member States nor its institutions can avoid a review of the question whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic constitutional charter, the Treaty." Case 294/83, Parti écologiste "Les Verts" v. Parliament, 1986 E.C.R. 1339, 1365. See also Case 2/88, Zwartveld, 1990 E.C.R. 3365, 3372 (1990) (reaffirming that the Community's legal order is a constitutional one).
5. The Court pointed out in Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1986 E.C.R. 1, 12: [T]he Community constitutes a new legal order of international law, for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals . . . . Community law therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage. As Professor Weiler has stated, "[T]he Community's 'operating system' is no longer governed by