Metademocracy: The changing structure of legitimacy in statutory interpretation

Harvard Law Review

Volumn 108, Issue 3, 1995, Pages 593-663

  Schacter, Jane S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0042461187     PISSN: 0017811X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1341917     Document Type: Article

References (470)

1. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 31 (1988); cf. Jerry Mashaw, As If Republican Interpretation, 97 YALE L.J. 1685, 1686 (1988) ("Any theory of statutory interpretation is at base a theory about constitutional law. It must at the very least assume a set of legitimate institutional roles and legitimate institutional procedures that inform interpretation.").
2. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 31 (1988); cf. Jerry Mashaw, As If Republican Interpretation, 97 YALE L.J. 1685, 1686 (1988) ("Any theory of statutory interpretation is at base a theory about constitutional law. It must at the very least assume a set of legitimate institutional roles and legitimate institutional procedures that inform interpretation.").
3. See Edward O. Correia, A Legislative Conception of Legislative Supremacy, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1129, 1132-39 (1992); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319, 319-22 (1989); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 281-82 (1989).
4. See Edward O. Correia, A Legislative Conception of Legislative Supremacy, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1129, 1132-39 (1992); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319, 319-22 (1989); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 281-82 (1989).
5. See Edward O. Correia, A Legislative Conception of Legislative Supremacy, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1129, 1132-39 (1992); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319, 319-22 (1989); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 281-82 (1989).
6. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 533 (1947).
7. See Farber, supra note 2, at 284; Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 407, 415 (1989).
8. See Farber, supra note 2, at 284; Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 407, 415 (1989).
9. For a standard incantation, see Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986), which asserts that the court's "role is to interpret the intent of Congress in enacting [the statute], not to make a freewheeling policy choice."
10. See infra p. 600 (discussing the canons of construction and their place in a regime of interpretive originalism).
11. Reed Dickerson distinguishes between legislative intent and purpose: "[I]n general, legal usage of the word 'intent' coincides with the particular immediate purpose that the statute is intended to directly express and immediately accomplish, whereas the word 'purpose' refers primarily to an ulterior purpose that the legislature intends the statute to accomplish or help to accomplish." REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 88 (1975).
12. Justice Scalia, in declaring his strong normative commitment to legislative supremacy, rejects the primacy of legislative intent and argues for a text-based interpretation of statutes. As part of his "new textualism," Justice Scalia vigorously challenges the legitimacy and relevance of legislative history. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623 (1990). I discuss Justice Scalia's positions below at pp. 641-43.
13. See infra p. 598.
14. See Eskridge, supra note 8, at 623 n.11.
15. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
16. For more comprehensive exegeses of the history of statutory interpretation, see William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 802-43 (1985); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Twentieth-Century Statutory Interpretation in a Nutshell, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1731, 1732-53 (1993); and John C. Yoo, Note, Marshall's Plan: The Early Supreme Court and Statutory Interpretation, 101 YALE L.J. 1607, 1608-29 (1992).
17. For more comprehensive exegeses of the history of statutory interpretation, see William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 802-43 (1985); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Twentieth-Century Statutory Interpretation in a Nutshell, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1731, 1732-53 (1993); and John C. Yoo, Note, Marshall's Plan: The Early Supreme Court and Statutory Interpretation, 101 YALE L.J. 1607, 1608-29 (1992).
18. For more comprehensive exegeses of the history of statutory interpretation, see William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 802-43 (1985); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Twentieth-Century Statutory Interpretation in a Nutshell, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1731, 1732-53 (1993); and John C. Yoo, Note, Marshall's Plan: The Early Supreme Court and Statutory Interpretation, 101 YALE L.J. 1607, 1608-29 (1992).
19. Canonical works on traditional pluralist theory include ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT (1967); ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY (1982) [hereinafter DAHL, DILEMMAS]; ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956) [hereinafter DAHL, DEMOCRATIC THEORY]; and DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951). For Dahl's reflections on how his early writings about pluralist theory have been oversimplified and sometimes mischaracterized, see DAHL, DILEMMAS, supra, at 207-09. Good overviews of pluralist theory appear in DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 186-220 (1987); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1468-70 (1989); and Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1542-47 (1988).
20. Canonical works on traditional pluralist theory include ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT (1967); ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY (1982) [hereinafter DAHL, DILEMMAS]; ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956) [hereinafter DAHL, DEMOCRATIC THEORY]; and DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951). For Dahl's reflections on how his early writings about pluralist theory have been oversimplified and sometimes mischaracterized, see DAHL, DILEMMAS, supra, at 207-09. Good overviews of pluralist theory appear in DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 186-220 (1987); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1468-70 (1989); and Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1542-47 (1988).
21. Canonical works on traditional pluralist theory include ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT (1967); ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY (1982) [hereinafter DAHL, DILEMMAS]; ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956) [hereinafter DAHL, DEMOCRATIC THEORY]; and DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951). For Dahl's reflections on how his early writings about pluralist theory have been oversimplified and sometimes mischaracterized, see DAHL, DILEMMAS, supra, at 207-09. Good overviews of pluralist theory appear in DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 186-220 (1987); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1468-70 (1989); and Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1542-47 (1988).
22. Canonical works on traditional pluralist theory include ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT (1967); ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY (1982) [hereinafter DAHL, DILEMMAS]; ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956) [hereinafter DAHL, DEMOCRATIC THEORY]; and DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951). For Dahl's reflections on how his early writings about pluralist theory have been oversimplified and sometimes mischaracterized, see DAHL, DILEMMAS, supra, at 207-09. Good overviews of pluralist theory appear in DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 186-220 (1987); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1468-70 (1989); and Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1542-47 (1988).
23. Canonical works on traditional pluralist theory include ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT (1967); ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY (1982) [hereinafter DAHL, DILEMMAS]; ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956) [hereinafter DAHL, DEMOCRATIC THEORY]; and DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951). For Dahl's reflections on how his early writings about pluralist theory have been oversimplified and sometimes mischaracterized, see DAHL, DILEMMAS, supra, at 207-09. Good overviews of pluralist theory appear in DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 186-220 (1987); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1468-70 (1989); and Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1542-47 (1988).
24. Canonical works on traditional pluralist theory include ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT (1967); ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY (1982) [hereinafter DAHL, DILEMMAS]; ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956) [hereinafter DAHL, DEMOCRATIC THEORY]; and DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951). For Dahl's reflections on how his early writings about pluralist theory have been oversimplified and sometimes mischaracterized, see DAHL, DILEMMAS, supra, at 207-09. Good overviews of pluralist theory appear in DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 186-220 (1987); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1468-70 (1989); and Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1542-47 (1988).
25. Canonical works on traditional pluralist theory include ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT (1967); ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY (1982) [hereinafter DAHL, DILEMMAS]; ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956) [hereinafter DAHL, DEMOCRATIC THEORY]; and DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951). For Dahl's reflections on how his early writings about pluralist theory have been oversimplified and sometimes mischaracterized, see DAHL, DILEMMAS, supra, at 207-09. Good overviews of pluralist theory appear in DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 186-220 (1987); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1468-70 (1989); and Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1542-47 (1988).
26. Canonical works on traditional pluralist theory include ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT (1967); ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY (1982) [hereinafter DAHL, DILEMMAS]; ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956) [hereinafter DAHL, DEMOCRATIC THEORY]; and DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951). For Dahl's reflections on how his early writings about pluralist theory have been oversimplified and sometimes mischaracterized, see DAHL, DILEMMAS, supra, at 207-09. Good overviews of pluralist theory appear in DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 186-220 (1987); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1468-70 (1989); and Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1542-47 (1988).
27. See Sullivan, supra note 13, at 1469; Sunstein, supra note 4, at 446-50. This idea of "equilibrium" has become controversial as a normative matter, see infra p. 637 (discussing public choice theory); p. 620 (discussing civic republican theory), but the pluralist focus on interest groups continues to have great purchase at the level of description. Although a debate now rages about the virtues of the pluralist conception, scholars with widely divergent ideological views nevertheless analyze American democracy in terms of interest group activity. See Rubin, supra note 14, at 9-10.
28. There is a strong parallel here to formalist theories about the separation of powers. See generally Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1522-29 (1991) (discussing "formalist" and "functionalist" approaches to separation of powers questions).
29. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term - Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 24, 112 (1992) ("All the Justices seek to distinguish the judicial enterprise from politics; none seeks to 'legislate from the bench.'").
30. On the subject of political malfunction, John Hart Ely's "representation reinforcement" theory elaborates on the famous "footnote four" from United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), and reflects a classic exposition of the idea that the Constitution requires the Court to police the operation of the democratic process. See JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 73-88, 101-04 (1980); infra pp. 619-20.
31. Examples of such reforms include voting rights reform, campaign reform, and term limits. See The Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1988); Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified in scattered chapters of the United States Code); Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified in scattered chapters of the United States Code); see also Beth Donovan, House Takes First Big Step in Overhauling System, 51 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3246, 3246 (1993) (discussing proposed campaign finance reform legislation); Robert Reinhold, Move to Limit Terms Gathers Steam After Winning in 14 States, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1992, at B8 (discussing initiatives that would impose term limits on elected officials).
32. Examples of such reforms include voting rights reform, campaign reform, and term limits. See The Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1988); Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified in scattered chapters of the United States Code); Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified in scattered chapters of the United States Code); see also Beth Donovan, House Takes First Big Step in Overhauling System, 51 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3246, 3246 (1993) (discussing proposed campaign finance reform legislation); Robert Reinhold, Move to Limit Terms Gathers Steam After Winning in 14 States, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1992, at B8 (discussing initiatives that would impose term limits on elected officials).
33. Rhetoric aside, growing evidence confirms the intuition of many lawyers that courts do not live up to their professed commitment to the essentialist idea. Nicholas Zeppos's empirical analysis of authority relied on in Supreme Court decisions that interpret federal statutes reveals that the Court, in fact, employs a far more eclectic interpretive methodology. See Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1091-1120 (1992) (reporting that the Court looked not only to legislative authority in interpreting statutes, but also to other informal sources such as law review articles, agency handbooks, and informal executive statements).
34. For an example, see the remarks of Judge Patricia Wald, who has acknowledged that "[i]t is inevitable that judges will be called on to interpret ambiguities at the margin of any statutory scheme," Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the Unites States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 309 (1990), but has nevertheless argued that "the nearly universal view among federal judges is that when we are called upon to interpret statutes, it is our primary responsibility, within constitutional limits, to subordinate our wishes to the will of Congress because the legislators' collective intention, however discerned, trumps the will of the court," id. at 281.
35. One recent commentator went so far as to say that "[originalism] now has no serious defenders in the academy." Zeppos, supra note 19, at 1087; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1507 (1987) ("Scholars from a variety of viewpoints agree that the idea of legislative intent is incoherent and that judges have substantial lawmaking discretion in applying statutes." (citations omitted)); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Substance of the New Legal Process, 77 CAL. L. REV. 919, 928-39 (1989) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (1988) and describing several alternative approaches to statutory interpretation).
36. One recent commentator went so far as to say that "[originalism] now has no serious defenders in the academy." Zeppos, supra note 19, at 1087; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1507 (1987) ("Scholars from a variety of viewpoints agree that the idea of legislative intent is incoherent and that judges have substantial lawmaking discretion in applying statutes." (citations omitted)); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Substance of the New Legal Process, 77 CAL. L. REV. 919, 928-39 (1989) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (1988) and describing several alternative approaches to statutory interpretation).
37. One recent commentator went so far as to say that "[originalism] now has no serious defenders in the academy." Zeppos, supra note 19, at 1087; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1507 (1987) ("Scholars from a variety of viewpoints agree that the idea of legislative intent is incoherent and that judges have substantial lawmaking discretion in applying statutes." (citations omitted)); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Substance of the New Legal Process, 77 CAL. L. REV. 919, 928-39 (1989) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (1988) and describing several alternative approaches to statutory interpretation).
38. One recent commentator went so far as to say that "[originalism] now has no serious defenders in the academy." Zeppos, supra note 19, at 1087; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1507 (1987) ("Scholars from a variety of viewpoints agree that the idea of legislative intent is incoherent and that judges have substantial lawmaking discretion in applying statutes." (citations omitted)); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Substance of the New Legal Process, 77 CAL. L. REV. 919, 928-39 (1989) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (1988) and describing several alternative approaches to statutory interpretation).
39. See Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930). The central idea of Radin's critique is communicated by the pithy title of a recent article by Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They," Not an "It": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992).
40. See Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930). The central idea of Radin's critique is communicated by the pithy title of a recent article by Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They," Not an "It": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992).
41. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950). The canons of construction comprise a large and unwieldy amalgam of principles covering ideas as mundane as punctuation and as majestic as enduring constitutional norms. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 454. See generally Symposium, A Reevaluation of the Canons of Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND. L. REV. 529 (1992) (discussing judicial reliance on a wide variety of statutory canons). Llewellyn aligned several canons with counter-canons that can be invoked to reach a contrary result. See Llewellyn, supra, at 401-06. The classic examples are, perhaps, the canon that statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed and its opposite that remedial statutes should be broadly construed. See id. at 401.
42. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950). The canons of construction comprise a large and unwieldy amalgam of principles covering ideas as mundane as punctuation and as majestic as enduring constitutional norms. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 454. See generally Symposium, A Reevaluation of the Canons of Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND. L. REV. 529 (1992) (discussing judicial reliance on a wide variety of statutory canons). Llewellyn aligned several canons with counter-canons that can be invoked to reach a contrary result. See Llewellyn, supra, at 401-06. The classic examples are, perhaps, the canon that statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed and its opposite that remedial statutes should be broadly construed. See id. at 401.
43. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1073 (1989) (commenting on the indeterminacy of judicial application of the statutory canons); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 596 (1992) (stating that the substantive canons "represent value choices by the Court"); Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 563-72 (1992) (discussing the conflict between legislatures and courts over the use of canons of interpretation that further contested policy objectives).
44. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1073 (1989) (commenting on the indeterminacy of judicial application of the statutory canons); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 596 (1992) (stating that the substantive canons "represent value choices by the Court"); Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 563-72 (1992) (discussing the conflict between legislatures and courts over the use of canons of interpretation that further contested policy objectives).
45. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1073 (1989) (commenting on the indeterminacy of judicial application of the statutory canons); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 596 (1992) (stating that the substantive canons "represent value choices by the Court"); Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 563-72 (1992) (discussing the conflict between legislatures and courts over the use of canons of interpretation that further contested policy objectives).
46. See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989) (Scalia, J., writing for the majority) ("What is of paramount importance is that Congress be able to legislate against a background of clear interpretive rules, so that it may know the effect of the language it adopts."). This proposition is, of course, highly questionable. See Robert A. Katzmann, Bridging the Statutory Gulf Between Court and Congress: A Challenge for Positive Political Theory, 80 GEO. L.J. 653, 662-65 (1992) (arguing that legislators are ignorant about courts' interpretive norms); Abner J. Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 627, 629 (1987) ("When I was in Congress, the only 'canons' we talked about were the ones the Pentagon bought that could not shoot straight.").
47. See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989) (Scalia, J., writing for the majority) ("What is of paramount importance is that Congress be able to legislate against a background of clear interpretive rules, so that it may know the effect of the language it adopts."). This proposition is, of course, highly questionable. See Robert A. Katzmann, Bridging the Statutory Gulf Between Court and Congress: A Challenge for Positive Political Theory, 80 GEO. L.J. 653, 662-65 (1992) (arguing that legislators are ignorant about courts' interpretive norms); Abner J. Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 627, 629 (1987) ("When I was in Congress, the only 'canons' we talked about were the ones the Pentagon bought that could not shoot straight.").
48. See Llewellyn, supra note 23, at 401-06.
49. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). After many years and the deaths of both of its authors, the celebrated "tentative edition" of The Legal Process has been published by Foundation Press with an introduction by Professors Eskridge and Frickey. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Introduction to HART & SACKS, supra.
50. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). After many years and the deaths of both of its authors, the celebrated "tentative edition" of The Legal Process has been published by Foundation Press with an introduction by Professors Eskridge and Frickey. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Introduction to HART & SACKS, supra.
51. For accounts that chronicle the relationship between realism and legal process in more detail, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960, at 169-268 (1992); Blatt, cited above in note 12, at 826-34; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 709-23 (1991).
52. For accounts that chronicle the relationship between realism and legal process in more detail, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960, at 169-268 (1992); Blatt, cited above in note 12, at 826-34; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 709-23 (1991).
53. For accounts that chronicle the relationship between realism and legal process in more detail, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960, at 169-268 (1992); Blatt, cited above in note 12, at 826-34; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 709-23 (1991).
54. See HART & SACKS, supra note 27, at 1374, 1376. For another leading work in the legal process tradition, see J. WILLARD HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 1-65 (1982).
55. See HART & SACKS, supra note 27, at 1374, 1376. For another leading work in the legal process tradition, see J. WILLARD HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 1-65 (1982).
56. HART & SACKS, supra note 27, at 1380. For an earlier realist effort to reconstruct statutory interpretation in this same vein, see Max Radin, A Short Way With Statutes, 56 HARV. L. REV. 388, 394-99 (1942).
57. HART & SACKS, supra note 27, at 1380. For an earlier realist effort to reconstruct statutory interpretation in this same vein, see Max Radin, A Short Way With Statutes, 56 HARV. L. REV. 388, 394-99 (1942).
58. HART & SACKS, supra note 27, at 1374 (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 1374, 1376.
60. Id. at 1374. This focus on purpose represents a judicial attempt to honor what the court concludes the legislative intent would have been had the legislature expressly contemplated and resolved the question at hand.
61. I argue that the approach I call "complementing politics" is strongly rooted in the Hart and Sacks approach. See infra p. 630. The themes of at least two other metademocratic approaches also appear in The Legal Process. See HART & SACKS, supra note 27, at 1312-13 (evoking themes evident in the "preserving politics" approach by noting the relevance of administrative agency construction of statutes and suggesting a contextual approach to determining when deference should be given to such a construction); id. at 1209 (evoking themes evident in the "disciplining politics" approach by discussing "policies of clear statement" and characterizing such policies as judicial statements to the legislature that "if you mean this, you must say so plainly"). For an extended discussion of the links between contemporary interpretive methodology and Hart and Sacks, see Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 27, at cxxv-cxxxiv.
62. HART & SACKS, supra note 27, at 1194. This notion is distinguished from pure essentialism by the characteristic caveat that followed it in the text: "What the legislature has thus enacted should not be frustrated or defeated. What it has not thus enacted should be declared to be the law, if at all, only upon the court's independent responsibility and not upon the pretense of legislative responsibility." Id.
63. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 21, at 1544-45.
64. See id.
65. Terminology in this area can be dense and difficult. In a recent exploration of postmodern theory and statutory interpretation, Peter Schanck distilled from "post-structuralism" and "neo-pragmatism" the shared idea that I mean to invoke here with the term "postmodernism": "That our perspectives on the world are culturally and linguistically conditioned, that reality is never transparent to us, and that the content of our knowledge depends on our different situations." Peter C. Schanck, Understanding Postmodern Thought and Its implications for Statutory Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2505, 2515 (1992). Schanck's article offers a lucid exposition of various schools of postmodern thought and their potential role in statutory construction. Other helpful discussions about postmodern legal theory can be found in J.M. Balkin, What Is a Postmodern Constitutionalism?, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1966, 1967-76 (1992); Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 877-80 (1990); and Margaret J. Radin & Frank Michelman, Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Critical Legal Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1019, 1029-58 (1991).
66. Terminology in this area can be dense and difficult. In a recent exploration of postmodern theory and statutory interpretation, Peter Schanck distilled from "post-structuralism" and "neo-pragmatism" the shared idea that I mean to invoke here with the term "postmodernism": "That our perspectives on the world are culturally and linguistically conditioned, that reality is never transparent to us, and that the content of our knowledge depends on our different situations." Peter C. Schanck, Understanding Postmodern Thought and Its implications for Statutory Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2505, 2515 (1992). Schanck's article offers a lucid exposition of various schools of postmodern thought and their potential role in statutory construction. Other helpful discussions about postmodern legal theory can be found in J.M. Balkin, What Is a Postmodern Constitutionalism?, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1966, 1967-76 (1992); Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 877-80 (1990); and Margaret J. Radin & Frank Michelman, Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Critical Legal Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1019, 1029-58 (1991).
67. Terminology in this area can be dense and difficult. In a recent exploration of postmodern theory and statutory interpretation, Peter Schanck distilled from "post-structuralism" and "neo-pragmatism" the shared idea that I mean to invoke here with the term "postmodernism": "That our perspectives on the world are culturally and linguistically conditioned, that reality is never transparent to us, and that the content of our knowledge depends on our different situations." Peter C. Schanck, Understanding Postmodern Thought and Its implications for Statutory Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2505, 2515 (1992). Schanck's article offers a lucid exposition of various schools of postmodern thought and their potential role in statutory construction. Other helpful discussions about postmodern legal theory can be found in J.M. Balkin, What Is a Postmodern Constitutionalism?, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1966, 1967-76 (1992); Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 877-80 (1990); and Margaret J. Radin & Frank Michelman, Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Critical Legal Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1019, 1029-58 (1991).
68. Terminology in this area can be dense and difficult. In a recent exploration of postmodern theory and statutory interpretation, Peter Schanck distilled from "post-structuralism" and "neo-pragmatism" the shared idea that I mean to invoke here with the term "postmodernism": "That our perspectives on the world are culturally and linguistically conditioned, that reality is never transparent to us, and that the content of our knowledge depends on our different situations." Peter C. Schanck, Understanding Postmodern Thought and Its implications for Statutory Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2505, 2515 (1992). Schanck's article offers a lucid exposition of various schools of postmodern thought and their potential role in statutory construction. Other helpful discussions about postmodern legal theory can be found in J.M. Balkin, What Is a Postmodern Constitutionalism?, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1966, 1967-76 (1992); Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 877-80 (1990); and Margaret J. Radin & Frank Michelman, Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Critical Legal Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1019, 1029-58 (1991).
69. One observer argues: For realists, the object of the law is to achieve not consistency but socially desirable consequences. What is most objectionable to realists about positivism is not its claim that citizens have a moral obligation to obey the law's commands but what they consider to be the rationalization and self-deception of unwarranted claims to objectivity. What is historically ironic about this particular attack of realists on positivism is that it is the same objection now made by poststructuralists to legal realism: that realists claim to see objective "social needs" and "social effects" of laws. FREDRIC G. GALE, POLITICAL LITERACY: RHETORIC, IDEOLOGY AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 58-59 (1994). For comparative general analyses of the realist critique and contemporary critical theory, see Gary Minda, The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1908s, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 632-41 (1989); and Joseph W. Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 532-42 (1988) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986)). See generally Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1219-59 (1985) (discussing legal realism and various strands of contemporary legal theory).
70. One observer argues: For realists, the object of the law is to achieve not consistency but socially desirable consequences. What is most objectionable to realists about positivism is not its claim that citizens have a moral obligation to obey the law's commands but what they consider to be the rationalization and self-deception of unwarranted claims to objectivity. What is historically ironic about this particular attack of realists on positivism is that it is the same objection now made by poststructuralists to legal realism: that realists claim to see objective "social needs" and "social effects" of laws. FREDRIC G. GALE, POLITICAL LITERACY: RHETORIC, IDEOLOGY AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 58-59 (1994). For comparative general analyses of the realist critique and contemporary critical theory, see Gary Minda, The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1908s, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 632-41 (1989); and Joseph W. Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 532-42 (1988) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986)). See generally Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1219-59 (1985) (discussing legal realism and various strands of contemporary legal theory).
71. One observer argues: For realists, the object of the law is to achieve not consistency but socially desirable consequences. What is most objectionable to realists about positivism is not its claim that citizens have a moral obligation to obey the law's commands but what they consider to be the rationalization and self-deception of unwarranted claims to objectivity. What is historically ironic about this particular attack of realists on positivism is that it is the same objection now made by poststructuralists to legal realism: that realists claim to see objective "social needs" and "social effects" of laws. FREDRIC G. GALE, POLITICAL LITERACY: RHETORIC, IDEOLOGY AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 58-59 (1994). For comparative general analyses of the realist critique and contemporary critical theory, see Gary Minda, The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1908s, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 632-41 (1989); and Joseph W. Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 532-42 (1988) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986)). See generally Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1219-59 (1985) (discussing legal realism and various strands of contemporary legal theory).
72. One observer argues: For realists, the object of the law is to achieve not consistency but socially desirable consequences. What is most objectionable to realists about positivism is not its claim that citizens have a moral obligation to obey the law's commands but what they consider to be the rationalization and self-deception of unwarranted claims to objectivity. What is historically ironic about this particular attack of realists on positivism is that it is the same objection now made by poststructuralists to legal realism: that realists claim to see objective "social needs" and "social effects" of laws. FREDRIC G. GALE, POLITICAL LITERACY: RHETORIC, IDEOLOGY AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 58-59 (1994). For comparative general analyses of the realist critique and contemporary critical theory, see Gary Minda, The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1908s, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 632-41 (1989); and Joseph W. Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 532-42 (1988) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986)). See generally Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1219-59 (1985) (discussing legal realism and various strands of contemporary legal theory).
73. One observer argues: For realists, the object of the law is to achieve not consistency but socially desirable consequences. What is most objectionable to realists about positivism is not its claim that citizens have a moral obligation to obey the law's commands but what they consider to be the rationalization and self-deception of unwarranted claims to objectivity. What is historically ironic about this particular attack of realists on positivism is that it is the same objection now made by poststructuralists to legal realism: that realists claim to see objective "social needs" and "social effects" of laws. FREDRIC G. GALE, POLITICAL LITERACY: RHETORIC, IDEOLOGY AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 58-59 (1994). For comparative general analyses of the realist critique and contemporary critical theory, see Gary Minda, The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1908s, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 632-41 (1989); and Joseph W. Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 532-42 (1988) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986)). See generally Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1219-59 (1985) (discussing legal realism and various strands of contemporary legal theory).
74. Some commentators go so far as to assert that postmodernism "has emerged to become as dominant in legal theory as any paradigm was in the past." Schanck, supra note 38, at 2507; see also James A. Gardner, The Ambiguity of Legal Dreams: A Communitarian Defense of Judicial Restraint, 71 N.C. L. REV. 805, 817 n.22 (1993) ("[A]spects of postmodern philosophy ... have by now thoroughly infiltrated academic legal analysis."). These claims seem extravagant in positing postmodernism as a new orthodoxy, but persuasive insofar as they suggest that positivism and formalism are contested terrain for an increasingly broad group of legal scholars. See Gary Minda, Jurisprudence at Century's End, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 27, 56, 57 (1993) (arguing that "[p]ostmoderns have redefined the benchmark for evaluating the cogency of reasoning and the validity of the evidence," but that "the tension between foundational and antifoundational approaches will probably continue to structure debates between jurisprudential writers").
75. Some commentators go so far as to assert that postmodernism "has emerged to become as dominant in legal theory as any paradigm was in the past." Schanck, supra note 38, at 2507; see also James A. Gardner, The Ambiguity of Legal Dreams: A Communitarian Defense of Judicial Restraint, 71 N.C. L. REV. 805, 817 n.22 (1993) ("[A]spects of postmodern philosophy ... have by now thoroughly infiltrated academic legal analysis."). These claims seem extravagant in positing postmodernism as a new orthodoxy, but persuasive insofar as they suggest that positivism and formalism are contested terrain for an increasingly broad group of legal scholars. See Gary Minda, Jurisprudence at Century's End, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 27, 56, 57 (1993) (arguing that "[p]ostmoderns have redefined the benchmark for evaluating the cogency of reasoning and the validity of the evidence," but that "the tension between foundational and antifoundational approaches will probably continue to structure debates between jurisprudential writers").
76. Some commentators go so far as to assert that postmodernism "has emerged to become as dominant in legal theory as any paradigm was in the past." Schanck, supra note 38, at 2507; see also James A. Gardner, The Ambiguity of Legal Dreams: A Communitarian Defense of Judicial Restraint, 71 N.C. L. REV. 805, 817 n.22 (1993) ("[A]spects of postmodern philosophy ... have by now thoroughly infiltrated academic legal analysis."). These claims seem extravagant in positing postmodernism as a new orthodoxy, but persuasive insofar as they suggest that positivism and formalism are contested terrain for an increasingly broad group of legal scholars. See Gary Minda, Jurisprudence at Century's End, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 27, 56, 57 (1993) (arguing that "[p]ostmoderns have redefined the benchmark for evaluating the cogency of reasoning and the validity of the evidence," but that "the tension between foundational and antifoundational approaches will probably continue to structure debates between jurisprudential writers").
77. See supra note 13.
78. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 1-11 (1991); Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 167 (1988).
79. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 1-11 (1991); Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 167 (1988).
80. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 14-16 (1990); Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988).
81. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 14-16 (1990); Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988).
82. See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 191-226 (1990); Bartlett, supra note 38, at 830 (exploring feminist critiques of traditional legal methodology).
83. See, e.g., PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 3-132 (1991); Derrick Bell & Erin Edmonds, Students as Teachers, Teachers as Learners, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2025 (1993); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REV. 461 (1993); Gerald Torres, Critical Race Theory: The Decline of the Universalist Ideal and the Hope of Plural Justice - Some Observations and Questions of an Emerging Phenomenon, 75 MINN. L. REV. 993 (1991).
84. See, e.g., PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 3-132 (1991); Derrick Bell & Erin Edmonds, Students as Teachers, Teachers as Learners, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2025 (1993); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REV. 461 (1993); Gerald Torres, Critical Race Theory: The Decline of the Universalist Ideal and the Hope of Plural Justice - Some Observations and Questions of an Emerging Phenomenon, 75 MINN. L. REV. 993 (1991).
85. See, e.g., PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 3-132 (1991); Derrick Bell & Erin Edmonds, Students as Teachers, Teachers as Learners, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2025 (1993); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REV. 461 (1993); Gerald Torres, Critical Race Theory: The Decline of the Universalist Ideal and the Hope of Plural Justice - Some Observations and Questions of an Emerging Phenomenon, 75 MINN. L. REV. 993 (1991).
86. See, e.g., PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 3-132 (1991); Derrick Bell & Erin Edmonds, Students as Teachers, Teachers as Learners, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2025 (1993); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REV. 461 (1993); Gerald Torres, Critical Race Theory: The Decline of the Universalist Ideal and the Hope of Plural Justice - Some Observations and Questions of an Emerging Phenomenon, 75 MINN. L. REV. 993 (1991).
87. See, e.g., Minda, supra note 39, at 656 (discussing the critical legal studies project of "transforming the social and legal structures which deny real democratic decisionmaking and justice"); Radin & Michelman, supra note 38, at 1028-43. See generally THE POLITICS OF LAW (David Kairys ed., ad ed. 1990) (containing essays exploring the relevance of critical theory to multiple areas of law).
88. See, e.g., Minda, supra note 39, at 656 (discussing the critical legal studies project of "transforming the social and legal structures which deny real democratic decisionmaking and justice"); Radin & Michelman, supra note 38, at 1028-43. See generally THE POLITICS OF LAW (David Kairys ed., ad ed. 1990) (containing essays exploring the relevance of critical theory to multiple areas of law).
89. See, e.g., Minda, supra note 39, at 656 (discussing the critical legal studies project of "transforming the social and legal structures which deny real democratic decisionmaking and justice"); Radin & Michelman, supra note 38, at 1028-43. See generally THE POLITICS OF LAW (David Kairys ed., ad ed. 1990) (containing essays exploring the relevance of critical theory to multiple areas of law).
90. This skepticism is evidenced, for example, by such recent phenomena as the call for term limits, see Thomas Galvin, Big Chunk of 103rd Congress May Have Limited Tenure, CONG. Q., Oct. 31, 1992, at 3493, 3493-94; the challenge to male domination of politics captured by the idea of a "year of the woman," see LINDA WITT, KAREN PAGET & GLENNA MATTHEWS, RUNNING AS A WOMAN: GENDER AND POWER IN AMERICAN POLITICS 6-7 (1994); the ascent of Ross Perot and his anti-institutional politics, see Richard L. Berke, Perot Bloc Is Here to Stay, Clinton Pollster Finds, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1993, at A1; and increasing discontent with a process widely perceived to protect "special interests," see Thomas H. Boggs, Jr., All Interests Are Special, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1993, at A17.
91. This skepticism is evidenced, for example, by such recent phenomena as the call for term limits, see Thomas Galvin, Big Chunk of 103rd Congress May Have Limited Tenure, CONG. Q., Oct. 31, 1992, at 3493, 3493-94; the challenge to male domination of politics captured by the idea of a "year of the woman," see LINDA WITT, KAREN PAGET & GLENNA MATTHEWS, RUNNING AS A WOMAN: GENDER AND POWER IN AMERICAN POLITICS 6-7 (1994); the ascent of Ross Perot and his anti-institutional politics, see Richard L. Berke, Perot Bloc Is Here to Stay, Clinton Pollster Finds, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1993, at A1; and increasing discontent with a process widely perceived to protect "special interests," see Thomas H. Boggs, Jr., All Interests Are Special, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1993, at A17.
92. This skepticism is evidenced, for example, by such recent phenomena as the call for term limits, see Thomas Galvin, Big Chunk of 103rd Congress May Have Limited Tenure, CONG. Q., Oct. 31, 1992, at 3493, 3493-94; the challenge to male domination of politics captured by the idea of a "year of the woman," see LINDA WITT, KAREN PAGET & GLENNA MATTHEWS, RUNNING AS A WOMAN: GENDER AND POWER IN AMERICAN POLITICS 6-7 (1994); the ascent of Ross Perot and his anti-institutional politics, see Richard L. Berke, Perot Bloc Is Here to Stay, Clinton Pollster Finds, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1993, at A1; and increasing discontent with a process widely perceived to protect "special interests," see Thomas H. Boggs, Jr., All Interests Are Special, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1993, at A17.
93. This skepticism is evidenced, for example, by such recent phenomena as the call for term limits, see Thomas Galvin, Big Chunk of 103rd Congress May Have Limited Tenure, CONG. Q., Oct. 31, 1992, at 3493, 3493-94; the challenge to male domination of politics captured by the idea of a "year of the woman," see LINDA WITT, KAREN PAGET & GLENNA MATTHEWS, RUNNING AS A WOMAN: GENDER AND POWER IN AMERICAN POLITICS 6-7 (1994); the ascent of Ross Perot and his anti-institutional politics, see Richard L. Berke, Perot Bloc Is Here to Stay, Clinton Pollster Finds, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1993, at A1; and increasing discontent with a process widely perceived to protect "special interests," see Thomas H. Boggs, Jr., All Interests Are Special, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1993, at A17.
94. ELY, supra note 17, at 152.
95. See, e.g., SAMUEL MERMIN, LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 268 (2d ed. 1982); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 288 (1988); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction and Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647, 666 (1992). For a theory about how courts might account for strategic behavior in searching for legislative intent, see McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 21-29 (1994). For perspectives on this problem outside the domain of statutory interpretation, see MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 22-72 (2d ed. 1985); ELY, supra note 17, at 131-33; and THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 92-126 (2d ed. 1979).
96. See, e.g., SAMUEL MERMIN, LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 268 (2d ed. 1982); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 288 (1988); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction and Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647, 666 (1992). For a theory about how courts might account for strategic behavior in searching for legislative intent, see McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 21-29 (1994). For perspectives on this problem outside the domain of statutory interpretation, see MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 22-72 (2d ed. 1985); ELY, supra note 17, at 131-33; and THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 92-126 (2d ed. 1979).
97. See, e.g., SAMUEL MERMIN, LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 268 (2d ed. 1982); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 288 (1988); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction and Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647, 666 (1992). For a theory about how courts might account for strategic behavior in searching for legislative intent, see McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 21-29 (1994). For perspectives on this problem outside the domain of statutory interpretation, see MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 22-72 (2d ed. 1985); ELY, supra note 17, at 131-33; and THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 92-126 (2d ed. 1979).
98. See, e.g., SAMUEL MERMIN, LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 268 (2d ed. 1982); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 288 (1988); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction and Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647, 666 (1992). For a theory about how courts might account for strategic behavior in searching for legislative intent, see McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 21-29 (1994). For perspectives on this problem outside the domain of statutory interpretation, see MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 22-72 (2d ed. 1985); ELY, supra note 17, at 131-33; and THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 92-126 (2d ed. 1979).
99. See, e.g., SAMUEL MERMIN, LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 268 (2d ed. 1982); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 288 (1988); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction and Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647, 666 (1992). For a theory about how courts might account for strategic behavior in searching for legislative intent, see McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 21-29 (1994). For perspectives on this problem outside the domain of statutory interpretation, see MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 22-72 (2d ed. 1985); ELY, supra note 17, at 131-33; and THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 92-126 (2d ed. 1979).
100. See, e.g., SAMUEL MERMIN, LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 268 (2d ed. 1982); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 288 (1988); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction and Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647, 666 (1992). For a theory about how courts might account for strategic behavior in searching for legislative intent, see McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 21-29 (1994). For perspectives on this problem outside the domain of statutory interpretation, see MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 22-72 (2d ed. 1985); ELY, supra note 17, at 131-33; and THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 92-126 (2d ed. 1979).
101. See Eskridge, supra note 49, at 288; Macey & Miller, supra note 49, at 666.
102. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 629 n.7 (1987) (arguing that congressional failure to amend statutes in light of judicial construction entitles the Court to "assume that [its] interpretation was correct"); United Steel Workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 216 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("[I]f the Court has misperceived the political will, it has the assurance that because the question is statutory Congress may set a different course if it so chooses.").
103. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962).
104. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 357-67 (1991).
105. See, e.g., DICKERSON, supra note 7, at 181-82; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 98-103 (1988); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 1021-22 (1992). But see Eskridge, supra note 53, at 332-36 (examining only Supreme Court
106. See, e.g., DICKERSON, supra note 7, at 181-82; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 98-103 (1988); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 1021-22 (1992). But see Eskridge, supra note 53, at 332-36 (examining only Supreme Court decisions, but finding that the rate at which Congress overrides statutory interpretations of the Supreme Court may be higher than previously thought). See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 91-119 (1982) (discussing the "burden of inertia").
107. See, e.g., DICKERSON, supra note 7, at 181-82; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 98-103 (1988); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 1021-22 (1992). But see Eskridge, supra note 53, at 332-36 (examining only Supreme Court decisions, but finding that the rate at which Congress overrides statutory interpretations of the Supreme Court may be higher than previously thought). See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 91-119 (1982) (discussing the "burden of inertia").
108. See Katzmann, supra note 25, at 662 (1992); Abner J, Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. REV. 587, 609 (1983). See generally Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps for Legislators and Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1045, 1076-77 (1991) (discussing why formal mechanisms for legislative oversight are often ineffective).
109. See Katzmann, supra note 25, at 662 (1992); Abner J, Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. REV. 587, 609 (1983). See generally Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps for Legislators and Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1045, 1076-77 (1991) (discussing why formal mechanisms for legislative oversight are often ineffective).
110. See John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, Limitation of Statutes: Strategic Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 565, 566 (1992); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877-79 (1975).
111. See John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, Limitation of Statutes: Strategic Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 565, 566 (1992); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877-79 (1975).
112. See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Brief Introductory Analysis of the Congressional Response to Judicial Interpretation, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 923, 923-28 (1993) (describing the ongoing process in the context of civil rights legislation).
113. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469, 523-24 (1985).
114. Recent scholarship about statutory interpretation has been abundant and diverse. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 54; DICKERSON, supra note 7; RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 313-54 (1986); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 56-93 (1988); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 247-312 (1990); SUNSTEIN, supra note 43, at 111-233 (1990); Aleinikoff, supra note 1; Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 845-47 (1992); Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 584-585 (1985); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983); Eskridge, supra note 21, at 1479-82; Eskridge, supra note 8, at 623-25; Eskridge, supra note 53, at 332-35; Eskridge, supra note 24, at 1007-10; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423 (1988); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 452-56 (1989); Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 242-56 (1992); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986); Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 841-45 (1991); Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 283-88 (1985); William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 543-46 (1988); Sunstein, supra note 4, at 408-13; Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2105-19 (1990); Wald, supra note 20, at 279-86; Zeppos, supra note 19, at 1120-35; Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1295-99 (1990).
115. Recent scholarship about statutory interpretation has been abundant and diverse. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 54; DICKERSON, supra note 7; RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 313-54 (1986); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 56-93 (1988); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 247-312 (1990); SUNSTEIN, supra note 43, at 111-233 (1990); Aleinikoff, supra note 1; Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 845-47 (1992); Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 584-585 (1985); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983); Eskridge, supra note 21, at 1479-82; Eskridge, supra note 8, at 623-25; Eskridge, supra note 53, at 332-35; Eskridge, supra note 24, at 1007-10; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423 (1988); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 452-56 (1989); Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 242-56 (1992); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986); Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 841-45 (1991); Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 283-88 (1985); William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 543-46 (1988); Sunstein, supra note 4, at 408-13; Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2105-19 (1990); Wald, supra note 20, at 279-86; Zeppos, supra note 19, at 1120-35; Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1295-99 (1990).
116. Recent scholarship about statutory interpretation has been abundant and diverse. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 54; DICKERSON, supra note 7; RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 313-54 (1986); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 56-93 (1988); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 247-312 (1990); SUNSTEIN, supra note 43, at 111-233 (1990); Aleinikoff, supra note 1; Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 845-47 (1992); Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 584-585 (1985); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983); Eskridge, supra note 21, at 1479-82; Eskridge, supra note 8, at 623-25; Eskridge, supra note 53, at 332-35; Eskridge, supra note 24, at 1007-10; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423 (1988); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 452-56 (1989); Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 242-56 (1992); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986); Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 841-45 (1991); Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 283-88 (1985); William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 543-46 (1988); Sunstein, supra note 4, at 408-13; Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2105-19 (1990); Wald, supra note 20, at 279-86; Zeppos, supra note 19, at 1120-35; Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1295-99 (1990).
117. Recent scholarship about statutory interpretation has been abundant and diverse. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 54; DICKERSON, supra note 7; RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 313-54 (1986); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 56-93 (1988); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 247-312 (1990); SUNSTEIN, supra note 43, at 111-233 (1990); Aleinikoff, supra note 1; Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 845-47 (1992); Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 584-585 (1985); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983); Eskridge, supra note 21, at 1479-82; Eskridge, supra note 8, at 623-25; Eskridge, supra note 53, at 332-35; Eskridge, supra note 24, at 1007-10; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423 (1988); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 452-56 (1989); Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 242-56 (1992); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986); Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 841-45 (1991); Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 283-88 (1985); William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 543-46 (1988); Sunstein, supra note 4, at 408-13; Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2105-19 (1990); Wald, supra note 20, at 279-86; Zeppos, supra note 19, at 1120-35; Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1295-99 (1990).
118. Recent scholarship about statutory interpretation has been abundant and diverse. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 54; DICKERSON, supra note 7; RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 313-54 (1986); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 56-93 (1988); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 247-312 (1990); SUNSTEIN, supra note 43, at 111-233 (1990); Aleinikoff, supra note 1; Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 845-47 (1992); Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 584-585 (1985); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983); Eskridge, supra note 21, at 1479-82; Eskridge, supra note 8, at 623-25; Eskridge, supra note 53, at 332-35; Eskridge, supra note 24, at 1007-10; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423 (1988); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 452-56 (1989); Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 242-56 (1992); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986); Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 841-45 (1991); Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 283-88 (1985); William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 543-46 (1988); Sunstein, supra note 4, at 408-13; Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2105-19 (1990); Wald, supra note 20, at 279-86; Zeppos, supra note 19, at 1120-35; Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1295-99 (1990).
119. Recent scholarship about statutory interpretation has been abundant and diverse. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 54; DICKERSON, supra note 7; RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 313-54 (1986); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 56-93 (1988); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 247-312 (1990); SUNSTEIN, supra note 43, at 111-233 (1990); Aleinikoff, supra note 1; Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 845-47 (1992); Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 584-585 (1985); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983); Eskridge, supra note 21, at 1479-82; Eskridge, supra note 8, at 623-25; Eskridge, supra note 53, at 332-35; Eskridge, supra note 24, at 1007-10; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423 (1988); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 452-56 (1989); Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 242-56 (1992); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986); Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 841-45 (1991); Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 283-88 (1985); William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 543-46 (1988); Sunstein, supra note 4, at 408-13; Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2105-19 (1990); Wald, supra note 20, at 279-86; Zeppos, supra note 19, at 1120-35; Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1295-99 (1990).
120. Recent scholarship about statutory interpretation has been abundant and diverse. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 54; DICKERSON, supra note 7; RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 313-54 (1986); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 56-93 (1988); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 247-312 (1990); SUNSTEIN, supra note 43, at 111-233 (1990); Aleinikoff, supra note 1; Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 845-47 (1992); Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 584-585 (1985); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983); Eskridge, supra note 21, at 1479-82; Eskridge, supra note 8, at 623-25; Eskridge, supra note 53, at 332-35; Eskridge, supra note 24, at 1007-10; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423 (1988); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 452-56 (1989); Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 242-56 (1992); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986); Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 841-45 (1991); Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 283-88 (1985); William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 543-46 (1988); Sunstein, supra note 4, at 408-13; Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2105-19 (1990); Wald, supra note 20, at 279-86; Zeppos, supra note 19, at 1120-35; Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1295-99 (1990).
121. Recent scholarship about statutory interpretation has been abundant and diverse. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 54; DICKERSON, supra note 7; RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 313-54 (1986); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 56-93 (1988); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 247-312 (1990); SUNSTEIN, supra note 43, at 111-233 (1990); Aleinikoff, supra note 1; Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 845-47 (1992); Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 584-585 (1985); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983); Eskridge, supra note 21, at 1479-82; Eskridge, supra note 8, at 623-25; Eskridge, supra note 53, at 332-35; Eskridge, supra note 24, at 1007-10; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423 (1988); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 452-56 (1989); Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 242-56 (1992); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986); Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 841-45 (1991); Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 283-88 (1985); William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 543-46 (1988); Sunstein, supra note 4, at 408-13; Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2105-19 (1990); Wald, supra note 20, at 279-86; Zeppos, supra note 19, at 1120-35; Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1295-99 (1990).
122. Recent scholarship about statutory interpretation has been abundant and diverse. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 54; DICKERSON, supra note 7; RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 313-54 (1986); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 56-93 (1988); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 247-312 (1990); SUNSTEIN, supra note 43, at 111-233 (1990); Aleinikoff, supra note 1; Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 845-47 (1992); Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 584-585 (1985); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983); Eskridge, supra note 21, at 1479-82; Eskridge, supra note 8, at 623-25; Eskridge, supra note 53, at 332-35; Eskridge, supra note 24, at 1007-10; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423 (1988); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 452-56 (1989); Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 242-56 (1992); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986); Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 841-45 (1991); Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 283-88 (1985); William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 543-46 (1988); Sunstein, supra note 4, at 408-13; Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2105-19 (1990); Wald, supra note 20, at 279-86; Zeppos, supra note 19, at 1120-35; Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1295-99 (1990).
123. Recent scholarship about statutory interpretation has been abundant and diverse. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 54; DICKERSON, supra note 7; RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 313-54 (1986); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 56-93 (1988); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 247-312 (1990); SUNSTEIN, supra note 43, at 111-233 (1990); Aleinikoff, supra note 1; Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 845-47 (1992); Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 584-585 (1985); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983); Eskridge, supra note 21, at 1479-82; Eskridge, supra note 8, at 623-25; Eskridge, supra note 53, at 332-35; Eskridge, supra note 24, at 1007-10; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423 (1988); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 452-56 (1989); Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 242-56 (1992); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986); Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 841-45 (1991); Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 283-88 (1985); William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 543-46 (1988); Sunstein, supra note 4, at 408-13; Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2105-19 (1990); Wald, supra note 20, at 279-86; Zeppos, supra note 19, at 1120-35; Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1295-99 (1990).
124. Recent scholarship about statutory interpretation has been abundant and diverse. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 54; DICKERSON, supra note 7; RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 313-54 (1986); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 56-93 (1988); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 247-312 (1990); SUNSTEIN, supra note 43, at 111-233 (1990); Aleinikoff, supra note 1; Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 845-47 (1992); Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 584-585 (1985); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983); Eskridge, supra note 21, at 1479-82; Eskridge, supra note 8, at 623-25; Eskridge, supra note 53, at 332-35; Eskridge, supra note 24, at 1007-10; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423 (1988); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 452-56 (1989); Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 242-56 (1992); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986); Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 841-45 (1991); Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 283-88 (1985); William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 543-46 (1988); Sunstein, supra note 4, at 408-13; Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2105-19 (1990); Wald, supra note 20, at 279-86; Zeppos, supra note 19, at 1120-35; Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1295-99 (1990).
125. Recent scholarship about statutory interpretation has been abundant and diverse. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 54; DICKERSON, supra note 7; RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 313-54 (1986); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 56-93 (1988); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 247-312 (1990); SUNSTEIN, supra note 43, at 111-233 (1990); Aleinikoff, supra note 1; Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 845-47 (1992); Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 584-585 (1985); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983); Eskridge, supra note 21, at 1479-82; Eskridge, supra note 8, at 623-25; Eskridge, supra note 53, at 332-35; Eskridge, supra note 24, at 1007-10; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423 (1988); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 452-56 (1989); Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 242-56 (1992); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986); Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 841-45 (1991); Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 283-88 (1985); William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 543-46 (1988); Sunstein, supra note 4, at 408-13; Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2105-19 (1990); Wald, supra note 20, at 279-86; Zeppos, supra note 19, at 1120-35; Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1295-99 (1990).
126. Recent scholarship about statutory interpretation has been abundant and diverse. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 54; DICKERSON, supra note 7; RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 313-54 (1986); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 56-93 (1988); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 247-312 (1990); SUNSTEIN, supra note 43, at 111-233 (1990); Aleinikoff, supra note 1; Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 845-47 (1992); Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 584-585 (1985); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983); Eskridge, supra note 21, at 1479-82; Eskridge, supra note 8, at 623-25; Eskridge, supra note 53, at 332-35; Eskridge, supra note 24, at 1007-10; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423 (1988); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 452-56 (1989); Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 242-56 (1992); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986); Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 841-45 (1991); Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 283-88 (1985); William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 543-46 (1988); Sunstein, supra note 4, at 408-13; Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2105-19 (1990); Wald, supra note 20, at 279-86; Zeppos, supra note 19, at 1120-35; Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1295-99 (1990).
127. Recent scholarship about statutory interpretation has been abundant and diverse. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 54; DICKERSON, supra note 7; RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 313-54 (1986); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 56-93 (1988); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 247-312 (1990); SUNSTEIN, supra note 43, at 111-233 (1990); Aleinikoff, supra note 1; Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 845-47 (1992); Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 584-585 (1985); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983); Eskridge, supra note 21, at 1479-82; Eskridge, supra note 8, at 623-25; Eskridge, supra note 53, at 332-35; Eskridge, supra note 24, at 1007-10; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423 (1988); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 452-56 (1989); Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 242-56 (1992); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986); Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 841-45 (1991); Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 283-88 (1985); William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 543-46 (1988); Sunstein, supra note 4, at 408-13; Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2105-19 (1990); Wald, supra note 20, at 279-86; Zeppos, supra note 19, at 1120-35; Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1295-99 (1990).
128. Recent scholarship about statutory interpretation has been abundant and diverse. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 54; DICKERSON, supra note 7; RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 313-54 (1986); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 56-93 (1988); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 247-312 (1990); SUNSTEIN, supra note 43, at 111-233 (1990); Aleinikoff, supra note 1; Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 845-47 (1992); Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 584-585 (1985); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983); Eskridge, supra note 21, at 1479-82; Eskridge, supra note 8, at 623-25; Eskridge, supra note 53, at 332-35; Eskridge, supra note 24, at 1007-10; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423 (1988); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 452-56 (1989); Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 242-56 (1992); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986); Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 841-45 (1991); Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 283-88 (1985); William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 543-46 (1988); Sunstein, supra note 4, at 408-13; Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2105-19 (1990); Wald, supra note 20, at 279-86; Zeppos, supra note 19, at 1120-35; Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1295-99 (1990).
129. Recent scholarship about statutory interpretation has been abundant and diverse. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 54; DICKERSON, supra note 7; RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 313-54 (1986); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 56-93 (1988); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 247-312 (1990); SUNSTEIN, supra note 43, at 111-233 (1990); Aleinikoff, supra note 1; Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 845-47 (1992); Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 584-585 (1985); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983); Eskridge, supra note 21, at 1479-82; Eskridge, supra note 8, at 623-25; Eskridge, supra note 53, at 332-35; Eskridge, supra note 24, at 1007-10; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423 (1988); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 452-56 (1989); Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 242-56 (1992); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986); Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 841-45 (1991); Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 283-88 (1985); William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 543-46 (1988); Sunstein, supra note 4, at 408-13; Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2105-19 (1990); Wald, supra note 20, at 279-86; Zeppos, supra note 19, at 1120-35; Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1295-99 (1990).
130. In Part III, I consider why democracy should continue to be the norm guiding interpretation.
131. This framework is suggested in JOHN ARTHUR, DEMOCRACY: THEORY AND PRACTICE at xi (1992).
132. See id. at xiii.
133. Id. at xi. An argument that interpretive method can "enhance or diminish the qualities of the democratic process," and that interpretive rules should be "evaluated according to their consequences," is made in Ferejohn & Weingast, cited above in note 56, at 565, 573-74. Ferejohn and Weingast, however, limit their consideration to a public choice-inspired analysis of the interaction between courts, agencies, and legislatures, and stress that a court should use rules that accord priority to the enacting legislature, as opposed to the current legislature. See id. at 579-82.
134. The four approaches I discuss represent the clearest examples of metademocracy that have thus far emerged. It may well be that different metademocratic models will be advanced or that other existing approaches can be restated in metademocractic terms.
135. For heuristic purposes, I have divided these approaches into four categories. However, there is overlap between them.
136. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
137. See infra Part II.C.1.
138. Justice Antonin Scalia and Judge Frank Easterbrook figure prominently in my "disciplinarian" model, but the views they espouse have not been broadly adopted by the courts on which they serve. As sitting judges, of course, they are better situated to affect the development of the law than the scholars in whose company I place them, and particularly in Justice Scalia's case, the mere fact that Scalia holds these views has galvanized considerable discussion and debate among both judges and scholars.
139. I invoke concepts of left, right, and center in a limited sense. I associate "reconstructionist" approaches with the left because they are principally concerned with rectifying social subordination and exclusion. I associate "disciplinarian" approaches with the right because they reflect a skepticism about the legislative and regulatory processes that may be seen as expressing a preference for private ordering. I locate "complementarian" approaches between the two because they are rooted in neither of these broad substantive goals, but instead in ideas about structure and process.
140. See infra Part II.C.2.
141. See infra Part II.C.3.
142. See infra Part H.C.4.
143. Nicholas Zeppos summarizes the traditional distinction between these approaches with the idea that "the resort to public values or consequentialist concerns, so much a part of dynamic theories, is off limits to the textualist judge." Zeppos, supra note 19, at 1084-85.
144. See infra Parts II.C.1, II.C.4.
145. See infra Part II.C.1.
146. 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
147. Braschi involved a New York state rent control statute, see N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 8581 (McKinney 1987), and a New York City regulation supplementing that statute with additional protections against eviction, see N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2204.6(d) (1987). See Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 52. The term "family" is used in the local regulation but not in the state statute. See id. In the Braschi decision, the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions each used principles of statutory construction to interpret the city regulation and essentially treated it as a statute. See id. at 51-52, 56 (Bellacosa, J., concurring), 57-58 (Simons, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, in order to adapt the case for this discussion, the modified case I present eliminates the regulation and features only a single rent control statute that uses the term "family."
148. Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 52.
149. Id.
150. While not applicable in all interpretive cases, the Chevron doctrine is far from inconsequential. Given the increasingly sprawling character of the federal bureaucracy, the Chevron question is raised in a substantial body of cases involving statutory interpretation and is regularly cited as one of the most influential decisions in decades. See Merrill, supra note 54, at 971; Sunstein, supra note 59, at 2074-75.
151. For a wide-ranging argument against equating democracy with majoritarianism, see Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term - Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 74-77 (1989).
152. There are interesting parallels here with some federalism doctrines, which may also be understood to allocate authority between federal and state governments in a way that preserves and maximizes political accountability. See, e.g., Ann Althouse, Variations on a Theory of Normative Federalism: A Supreme Court Dialogue, 42 DUKE L.J. 979, 985-89, 1015-19 (1993) (characterizing Justice O'Connor's approach to two federalism cases as an attempt to prevent government officials from "effac[ing] the lines of accountability" and to "devise mechanisms for exposing government officials to the judgment of the electorate"). For an analysis of federalism-based rules of statutory interpretation, see Eskridge & Frickey, cited above in note 24, at 619-29.
153. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
154. See Merrill, supra note 54, at 980-85 (demonstrating the Supreme Court's uneven record in according Chevron deference).
155. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 307-08 (1988); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 518-19; Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron -The Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEO WASH L. REV. 821, 822-23 (1990); infra Part II.C.1; see also Diver, supra note 59, at 584-85 (offering a pre-Chevron argument for a rule of deference to an agency's interpretation of a statutory text).
156. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 307-08 (1988); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 518-19; Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron -The Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEO WASH L. REV. 821, 822-23 (1990); infra Part II.C.1; see also Diver, supra note 59, at 584-85 (offering a pre-Chevron argument for a rule of deference to an agency's interpretation of a statutory text).
157. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 307-08 (1988); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 518-19; Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron -The Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEO WASH L. REV. 821, 822-23 (1990); infra Part II.C.1; see also Diver, supra note 59, at 584-85 (offering a pre-Chevron argument for a rule of deference to an agency's interpretation of a statutory text).
158. See Merrill, supra note 54, at 971-72; Scalia, supra note 85, at 512; Sunsteip, supra note 59, at 2074. Chevron and the problem it addresses have spawned a large and divided commentary. See, in addition to the sources cited above in note 85, Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 373 (1986); Clark Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretations of Statutes: An Analysis of Chevron's Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255, 256-68 (1988); and Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official With Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 351-53 (1990).
159. See Merrill, supra note 54, at 971-72; Scalia, supra note 85, at 512; Sunsteip, supra note 59, at 2074. Chevron and the problem it addresses have spawned a large and divided commentary. See, in addition to the sources cited above in note 85, Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 373 (1986); Clark Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretations of Statutes: An Analysis of Chevron's Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255, 256-68 (1988); and Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official With Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 351-53 (1990).
160. See Merrill, supra note 54, at 971-72; Scalia, supra note 85, at 512; Sunsteip, supra note 59, at 2074. Chevron and the problem it addresses have spawned a large and divided commentary. See, in addition to the sources cited above in note 85, Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 373 (1986); Clark Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretations of Statutes: An Analysis of Chevron's Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255, 256-68 (1988); and Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official With Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 351-53 (1990).
161. Sunstein, supra note 59, at 2075.
162. For an earlier perspective on this question, see Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 HARV. L. REV. 239, 249-57 (1955).
163. See Diver, supra note 59, at 550-52; Merrill, supra note 54, at 972 (noting that a "multiple factors regime" predated Chevron and that "the factors tended to be invoked unevenly"). Compare NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 130-31 (1944) (deferring to the agency interpretation) with Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 490 (1947) (reaching the same conclusion as the agency but according no weight to the agency's view).
164. Merrill argues that there was "no unifying theory." Merrill, supra note 54, at 972.
165. See Diver, supra note 59, at 574-75.
166. See id. at 577-78.
167. See, e.g., JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 6-46 (1938).
168. See Merrill, supra note 54, at 978-79 (noting the shifting rationale); Silberman, supra note 85, at 824.
169. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. The Court also described a permissible interpretation as one that represents a "reasonable accommodation" of competing interests. Id. at 865.
170. Merrill, supra note 54, at 977.
171. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
172. There is overlap with the disciplinarian model on this point. See infra Part II.C.4.
173. See Merrill, supra note 54, at 980-93.
174. This reconceptualization of administrative agencies is part of a larger trend. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1711-90 (1975) (outlining an "interest representation" model of administrative law).
175. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66 (citation omitted).
176. See Pierce, supra note 85, at 307-08; Silberman, supra note 85, at 827; Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 308-09 (1986).
177. This idea creates an obvious bind for those who, like most current members of the Supreme Court, claim to support both essentialism and Chevron deference. Attempting, perhaps, to soften this blow, the Court invoked the fiction that Congress, by virtue of an ambiguous statutory command, may be deemed to have implicitly delegated the question to the agency. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. The Court, however, offered no means of distinguishing such "implicit delegations" from unintended ambiguity, and the thin reed of support provided by this device cannot alone ward off the larger implications of the Court's reasoning for statutory interpretation. See Merrill, supra note 54, at 995-96.
178. This notion is consistent with other developments in administrative law that reflect the treatment of agencies as mini-legislative arenas. See Stewart, supra note 100, at 1791-97.
179. On the question of whether presidential accountability for agency choices is meaningful, see Farina, cited above in note 59, at 502-11.
180. There may be some indirect criticism of the legislative process in the sense that adoption of a strong rule of deference can be seen as creating an incentive for Congress to legislate more clearly. Under the Chevron approach, Congress must do so to retain its authority and to avoid the Court's announced willingness to let the agency fill statutory gaps, even those that might have been left inadvertently. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 58, at 523-24.
181. See, e.g., Farina, supra note 59, at 508-09.
182. For works exploring the application of republicanism in regulatory and administrative law, see SUNSTEIN, cited above in note 43, at 1-233; and Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1576 (1992). For divergent perspectives on the republican revival, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What Is Republicanism, And Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1695, 1733-35 (1989); Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 801-98 (1993); and the Symposium cited above in note 43.
183. For works exploring the application of republicanism in regulatory and administrative law, see SUNSTEIN, cited above in note 43, at 1-233; and Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1576 (1992). For divergent perspectives on the republican revival, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What Is Republicanism, And Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1695, 1733-35 (1989); Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 801-98 (1993); and the Symposium cited above in note 43.
184. For works exploring the application of republicanism in regulatory and administrative law, see SUNSTEIN, cited above in note 43, at 1-233; and Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1576 (1992). For divergent perspectives on the republican revival, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What Is Republicanism, And Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1695, 1733-35 (1989); Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 801-98 (1993); and the Symposium cited above in note 43.
185. This term is used by Anthony D. Taibi, Race Consciousness, Communitarianism, and Banking Regulation, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1103, 1103.
186. See Sunstein, supra note 13, at 1541-42; Sunstein, supra note 4, at 462-502. The work of William Eskridge pursues similar themes. See Eskridge, supra note 21, at 1482-97; Eskridge, supra note 24, at 1009-10.
187. Little work that focuses specifically on the applicability of feminism and critical race theory to statutory interpretation has thus far emerged, and I therefore draw upon general work in the critical discourses. There are two notable exceptions. See Naomi R. Cahn, John O. Calmore, Mary I. Coombs, Dwight L. Greene, Geoffrey C. Miller, Jeremy Paul & Laura W. Stein, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Contemporary Proceedings, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1754, 1757-66, 1774-83, 1788-98 (1993) (applying critical discourses to the hypothetical posed in Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616 (1949)); Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, Translating Yonnodio by Precedent and Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DUKE L.J. 625, 649-56 (applying critical race theory to a case interpreting the word "tribe" in a statute concerning Indian tribes). The most sustained analysis of postmodernism and statutory interpretation appears in Schanck, cited above in note 38.
188. Little work that focuses specifically on the applicability of feminism and critical race theory to statutory interpretation has thus far emerged, and I therefore draw upon general work in the critical discourses. There are two notable exceptions. See Naomi R. Cahn, John O. Calmore, Mary I. Coombs, Dwight L. Greene, Geoffrey C. Miller, Jeremy Paul & Laura W. Stein, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Contemporary Proceedings, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1754, 1757-66, 1774-83, 1788-98 (1993) (applying critical discourses to the hypothetical posed in Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616 (1949)); Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, Translating Yonnodio by Precedent and Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DUKE L.J. 625, 649-56 (applying critical race theory to a case interpreting the word "tribe" in a statute concerning Indian tribes). The most sustained analysis of postmodernism and statutory interpretation appears in Schanck, cited above in note 38.
189. Little work that focuses specifically on the applicability of feminism and critical race theory to statutory interpretation has thus far emerged, and I therefore draw upon general work in the critical discourses. There are two notable exceptions. See Naomi R. Cahn, John O. Calmore, Mary I. Coombs, Dwight L. Greene, Geoffrey C. Miller, Jeremy Paul & Laura W. Stein, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Contemporary Proceedings, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1754, 1757-66, 1774-83, 1788-98 (1993) (applying critical discourses to the hypothetical posed in Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616 (1949)); Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, Translating Yonnodio by Precedent and Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DUKE L.J. 625, 649-56 (applying critical race theory to a case interpreting the word "tribe" in a statute concerning Indian tribes). The most sustained analysis of postmodernism and statutory interpretation appears in Schanck, cited above in note 38.
190. In this respect, as well as others, there is substantial overlap between the reconstructionist and complementarian views, especially with complementarians who advocate a "practical reasoning" approach. See infra note 224.
191. This theme is explored in MINOW, cited above in note 44, at 60-65; Bartlett, cited above in note 38, at 872-87; and Margaret J. Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699, 1719-20 (1990).
192. See MINOW, supra note 44, at 60-62; WILLIAMS, supra note 45, at 85-90, 110-30; Bartlett, supra note 38, at 872-87; Torres & Milun, supra note 111, at 657-59. Several writers have explored the ways in which such epistemological pluralism can lead to problematic gender or race essentialism. See, e.g., ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN 3 (1988) ("Any attempt to talk about all women in terms of something we have in common undermines attempts to talk about the differences among us, and vice-versa."); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 (1990) (contesting the notion that "a unitary, 'essential' women's experience can be isolated and described independently of race, class, sexual orientation, and other realities of experience").
193. See MINOW, supra note 44, at 60-62; WILLIAMS, supra note 45, at 85-90, 110-30; Bartlett, supra note 38, at 872-87; Torres & Milun, supra note 111, at 657-59. Several writers have explored the ways in which such epistemological pluralism can lead to problematic gender or race essentialism. See, e.g., ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN 3 (1988) ("Any attempt to talk about all women in terms of something we have in common undermines attempts to talk about the differences among us, and vice-versa."); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 (1990) (contesting the notion that "a unitary, 'essential' women's experience can be isolated and described independently of race, class, sexual orientation, and other realities of experience").
194. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
195. See ELY, supra note 17, at 75-77.
196. See id. at 135-83.
197. See id. at 105-79.
198. For critiques challenging the process orientation of Ely's work, see Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1063-65, 1096-97 (1981); Richard D. Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory - And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223, 236-57 (1981); and Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1065-77 (1980). For analyses pursuing the notion of political malfunction but challenging aspects of Ely's approach, see NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 198-215 (1994); and Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 718-46 (1985). For several contemporary reappraisals of Ely's thesis, see Symposium, Democracy and Distrust: Ten Years Later, 77 VA. L. REV. 631 (1991).
199. For critiques challenging the process orientation of Ely's work, see Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1063-65, 1096-97 (1981); Richard D. Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory - And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223, 236-57 (1981); and Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1065-77 (1980). For analyses pursuing the notion of political malfunction but challenging aspects of Ely's approach, see NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 198-215 (1994); and Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 718-46 (1985). For several contemporary reappraisals of Ely's thesis, see Symposium, Democracy and Distrust: Ten Years Later, 77 VA. L. REV. 631 (1991).
200. For critiques challenging the process orientation of Ely's work, see Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1063-65, 1096-97 (1981); Richard D. Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory - And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223, 236-57 (1981); and Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1065-77 (1980). For analyses pursuing the notion of political malfunction but challenging aspects of Ely's approach, see NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 198-215 (1994); and Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 718-46 (1985). For several contemporary reappraisals of Ely's thesis, see Symposium, Democracy and Distrust: Ten Years Later, 77 VA. L. REV. 631 (1991).
201. For critiques challenging the process orientation of Ely's work, see Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1063-65, 1096-97 (1981); Richard D. Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory - And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223, 236-57 (1981); and Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1065-77 (1980). For analyses pursuing the notion of political malfunction but challenging aspects of Ely's approach, see NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 198-215 (1994); and Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 718-46 (1985). For several contemporary reappraisals of Ely's thesis, see Symposium, Democracy and Distrust: Ten Years Later, 77 VA. L. REV. 631 (1991).
202. For critiques challenging the process orientation of Ely's work, see Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1063-65, 1096-97 (1981); Richard D. Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory - And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223, 236-57 (1981); and Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1065-77 (1980). For analyses pursuing the notion of political malfunction but challenging aspects of Ely's approach, see NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 198-215 (1994); and Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 718-46 (1985). For several contemporary reappraisals of Ely's thesis, see Symposium, Democracy and Distrust: Ten Years Later, 77 VA. L. REV. 631 (1991).
203. For critiques challenging the process orientation of Ely's work, see Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1063-65, 1096-97 (1981); Richard D. Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory - And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223, 236-57 (1981); and Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1065-77 (1980). For analyses pursuing the notion of political malfunction but challenging aspects of Ely's approach, see NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 198-215 (1994); and Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 718-46 (1985). For several contemporary reappraisals of Ely's thesis, see Symposium, Democracy and Distrust: Ten Years Later, 77 VA. L. REV. 631 (1991).
204. Both Sunstein and Eskridge have written extensively in the area of statutory interpretation, and both have engaged themes that animate all four metademocratic approaches. In this Article, I discuss Sunstein's work within the reconstructionist rubric and Eskridge's work within both the reconstructionist and complementarian frameworks.
205. See Eskridge, supra note 21, at 1479, 1482-83; Sunstein, supra note 4, at 412.
206. See Eskridge, supra note 21, at 1480; Sunstein, supra note 4, at 411.
207. See Eskridge, supra note 21, at 1496-97 (describing a continuum of circumstances in which text can provide determinate answers); Sunstein, supra note 4, at 441 (arguing that the claim that statutory meaning is indeterminate is "wildly overstated").
208. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 460; see also Eskridge, supra note 24, at 1007-08 (discussing the role of public values).
209. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713, 1718 (1988).
210. Sunstein, supra note 13, at 1550.
211. See id. at 1543; cf. Eskridge & Peller, supra note 28, at 747-48 (arguing that law can shape preferences and thus be "both formative and transformative").
212. Sunstein, supra note 13, at 1583.
213. Id. at 1582.
214. Mashaw, supra note 1, at 1688.
215. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 449.
216. See id. at 468-88.
217. See Eskridge, supra note 53, at 411-14.
218. Eskridge, supra note 24, at 1009, 1063-68.
219. For a discussion of the kinds of discrimination and disadvantage that gay men and lesbians continue to face, see Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283, 298-99 (1994). For a comprehensive and detailed overview, see LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993).
220. For a discussion of the kinds of discrimination and disadvantage that gay men and lesbians continue to face, see Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283, 298-99 (1994). For a comprehensive and detailed overview, see LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993).
221. See Eskridge, supra note 21, at 1481; Sunstein, supra note 4, at 504.
222. See infra note 224.
223. Arguing for an interpretive preference in favor of disadvantaged groups, for example, Eskridge appeals to the judiciary's "historical role of protecting marginalized minorities," Eskridge, supra note 24, at 1092, and asks courts to use their interpretive power to "serve as the 'conscience' of the nation's pluralism by bringing attention to interests that go unrepresented in Washington and values that are overlooked," Eskridge, supra note 53, at 413, The complementarian account likewise relies upon courts' distance from the political process as the justification for a judicial role in deliberating about competing interpretations and in choosing the "best" one. For further analysis of the relationship between the reconstructionist and complementarian accounts, see note 224 below.
224. Schanck, supra note 38, at 2509; see also MINOW, supra note 44, at 60-65 (arguing that all observers see from a perspective and that although law aspires to impartiality, it is riddled with subjectivity); Bartlett, supra note 38, at 877 (characterizing postmodernism as a rejection of essentialist thinking that questions even the possibility of knowledge); Allan C. Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: The Politics of Interpretation, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1173, 1184 (1992) (describing postmodernism as a "flat rejection of universal knowledge and an outright denial of essential truths").
225. Some scholars associated with postmodern approaches take issue with the idea that collapsing the distinction between legislation and interpretation necessarily creates a "rogue judge" problem. See J.M. Balkin, Ideology as Constraint, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1141-42 (1991) (reviewing ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE (1990)). Theories of conventionalism suggest that, quite the contrary, the "social construction of the subject" means that interpreters are, and can only be, products of their socialization. Id. at 1137. Seen from this vantage point, ideology supplies, rather than eliminates, constraints on the interpreter. See STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 13-33 (1989); Balkin, supra, at 1138, 1148-53.
226. Some scholars associated with postmodern approaches take issue with the idea that collapsing the distinction between legislation and interpretation necessarily creates a "rogue judge" problem. See J.M. Balkin, Ideology as Constraint, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1141-42 (1991) (reviewing ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE (1990)). Theories of conventionalism suggest that, quite the contrary, the "social construction of the subject" means that interpreters are, and can only be, products of their socialization. Id. at 1137. Seen from this vantage point, ideology supplies, rather than eliminates, constraints on the interpreter. See STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 13-33 (1989); Balkin, supra, at 1138, 1148-53.
227. Some scholars associated with postmodern approaches take issue with the idea that collapsing the distinction between legislation and interpretation necessarily creates a "rogue judge" problem. See J.M. Balkin, Ideology as Constraint, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1141-42 (1991) (reviewing ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE (1990)). Theories of conventionalism suggest that, quite the contrary, the "social construction of the subject" means that interpreters are, and can only be, products of their socialization. Id. at 1137. Seen from this vantage point, ideology supplies, rather than eliminates, constraints on the interpreter. See STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 13-33 (1989); Balkin, supra, at 1138, 1148-53.
228. See MINOW, supra note 44, at 60-65; WILLIAMS, supra note 45, at 87, 108, 110, 112-13, 121; Torres & Milun, supra note in, at 655.
229. MINOW, supra note 44, at 389. In a similar vein, Katherine Bartlett argues that "[t]ruth is partial in that the individual perspectives that yield and judge truth are necessarily incomplete. No individual can understand except from some limited perspective." Bartlett, supra note 38, at 881.
230. See Hutchinson, supra note 139, at 1175-97; Radin, supra note 113, at 1720.
231. WILLIAMS, supra note 45, at 130.
232. Hutchinson, supra note 139, at 1209.
233. See Bartlett, supra note 38, at 872-87; Radin, supra note 113, at 1720; sources cited supra note 114.
234. Hutchinson, supra note 139, at 1208.
235. Torres & Milun, supra note 111, at 649 n.79 (quoting Gerald Torres & Donald P. Brewster, Judges and Juries: Separate Moments in the Same Phenomenon, 4 LAW & INEQ. J. 171, 181 (1986)). For more general work that explores the link between democracy and diversity, see ANNE PHILLIPS, DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE (1993); FEMINIST INTERPRETATIONS AND POLITICAL THEORY (Mary L. Stanley & Carole Pateman eds., 1991) Iris M. Young, Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship, 99 ETHICS 250, 258-67 (1989).
236. Torres & Milun, supra note 111, at 649 n.79 (quoting Gerald Torres & Donald P. Brewster, Judges and Juries: Separate Moments in the Same Phenomenon, 4 LAW & INEQ. J. 171, 181 (1986)). For more general work that explores the link between democracy and diversity, see ANNE PHILLIPS, DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE (1993); FEMINIST INTERPRETATIONS AND POLITICAL THEORY (Mary L. Stanley & Carole Pateman eds., 1991) Iris M. Young, Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship, 99 ETHICS 250, 258-67 (1989).
237. Torres & Milun, supra note 111, at 649 n.79 (quoting Gerald Torres & Donald P. Brewster, Judges and Juries: Separate Moments in the Same Phenomenon, 4 LAW & INEQ. J. 171, 181 (1986)). For more general work that explores the link between democracy and diversity, see ANNE PHILLIPS, DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE (1993); FEMINIST INTERPRETATIONS AND POLITICAL THEORY (Mary L. Stanley & Carole Pateman eds., 1991) Iris M. Young, Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship, 99 ETHICS 250, 258-67 (1989).
238. Torres & Milun, supra note 111, at 649 n.79 (quoting Gerald Torres & Donald P. Brewster, Judges and Juries: Separate Moments in the Same Phenomenon, 4 LAW & INEQ. J. 171, 181 (1986)). For more general work that explores the link between democracy and diversity, see ANNE PHILLIPS, DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE (1993); FEMINIST INTERPRETATIONS AND POLITICAL THEORY (Mary L. Stanley & Carole Pateman eds., 1991) Iris M. Young, Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship, 99 ETHICS 250, 258-67 (1989).
239. Bartlett, supra note 38, at 882.
240. Torres & Milun, supra note in, at 631; see also MINOW, supra note 44, at 52, 66-70, 112-13 (arguing for legal methodologies that search out the views of disempowered minorities).
241. Hutchinson, supra note 139, at 1177; see also Allan C. Hutchinson, Democracy and Determinacy: An Essay on Legal Interpretation, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 541, 573-76 (1989) (arguing that democratic participation should take the place of legal doctrine).
242. Radin, supra note 113, at 1724.
243. Martha Minow offers an extended analysis of how the law's failure to acknowledge and to understand differences acts to stabilize social inequality. See MINOW, supra note 44, at 53-78.
244. See Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee, 447 F. Supp. 940 (D. Mass. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979); see also MINOW, supra note 44, at 351-56, 384 (analyzing the same case in a similar way).
245. See 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1988).
246. See Torres & Milun, supra note in, at 633.
247. See id. at 633, 651.
248. Id. at 635.
249. Id. at 630.
250. Id. at 632.
251. Torres expands on this theme: "There must be strong democratic support for group difference and, from those differences, complex equalities." Torres, supra note 45, at 1006.
252. For another work within the critical discourses that urges courts to acknowledge and account for the way culturally dominant perspectives can skew or truncate statutory law, see Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1824-43 (1990), which analyzes assumptions made about women's "interest" in contested job opportunities under Title VII and the way interpretation creates meaning and power. Cf. Heidi A. Sorensen, Note, A New Gay Rights Agenda? Dynamic Statutory Interpretation and Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 81 GEO. L.J. 2105, 2107-39 (1993) (arguing for "dynamic" interpretation of facially neutral statutes - in the areas of immigration, criminal, family, and employment law - that otherwise discriminate against gay men and lesbians).
253. For another work within the critical discourses that urges courts to acknowledge and account for the way culturally dominant perspectives can skew or truncate statutory law, see Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1824-43 (1990), which analyzes assumptions made about women's "interest" in contested job opportunities under Title VII and the way interpretation creates meaning and power. Cf. Heidi A. Sorensen, Note, A New Gay Rights Agenda? Dynamic Statutory Interpretation and Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 81 GEO. L.J. 2105, 2107-39 (1993) (arguing for "dynamic" interpretation of facially neutral statutes - in the areas of immigration, criminal, family, and employment law - that otherwise discriminate against gay men and lesbians).
254. See Sunstein, supra note 13, at 1554.
255. See Mashaw, supra note 1, at 1688.
256. See Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97 YALE L.J. 1609, 1610-13 (1988) (critiquing republican assumptions); Toni M. Massaro, Equality and Freedom of Expression: The Hate Speech Dilemma, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 219 n.48 (1991) ("Critical race theorists are fairly skeptical about the usefulness of this sort of redemption-through-dialogue.").
257. See Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97 YALE L.J. 1609, 1610-13 (1988) (critiquing republican assumptions); Toni M. Massaro, Equality and Freedom of Expression: The Hate Speech Dilemma, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 219 n.48 (1991) ("Critical race theorists are fairly skeptical about the usefulness of this sort of redemption-through-dialogue.").
258. Torres & Milun, supra note 111, at 657. For an argument that the civic republican attempt to accommodate diversity, but also to pursue a singular notion of the good, is not persuasive, see Sullivan, cited above in note 125, at 1722-23.
259. MINOW, supra note 44, at 53.
260. DWORKIN, supra note 59, at 342.
261. See infra p. 640.
262. The phrase is drawn from PETER BACHRACH, THE THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC ELITISM: A CRITIQUE at xi (1967).
263. See, e.g., JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 269-96 (5th ed. 3d impression 1981). For a lucid exploration of theories of democratic elitism, see HELD, cited above in note 13, at 145-85; and MARTIN EDELMAN, DEMOCRATIC THEORIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 57-65 (1984). For classic critiques, see BACHRACH, cited above in note 170, at 65-106; and CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 1-44 (1970).
264. See, e.g., JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 269-96 (5th ed. 3d impression 1981). For a lucid exploration of theories of democratic elitism, see HELD, cited above in note 13, at 145-85; and MARTIN EDELMAN, DEMOCRATIC THEORIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 57-65 (1984). For classic critiques, see BACHRACH, cited above in note 170, at 65-106; and CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 1-44 (1970).
265. See, e.g., JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 269-96 (5th ed. 3d impression 1981). For a lucid exploration of theories of democratic elitism, see HELD, cited above in note 13, at 145-85; and MARTIN EDELMAN, DEMOCRATIC THEORIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 57-65 (1984). For classic critiques, see BACHRACH, cited above in note 170, at 65-106; and CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 1-44 (1970).
266. A classic version of elite-based theory was advanced by Joseph Schumpeter, who saw the competition among elites for political leadership as central to democracy. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 171, at 269-73. He argued that democratic principles are vindicated by popular choice of leaders to make policy and resisted the notion that elected officials can or should locate and vindicate any particular popular will. See id. at 284-85. David Held uses the phrase "competitive elitism" to describe a number of theories, including Schumpeter's. See HELD, supra note 13, at 143-85.
267. EDELMAN, supra note 171, at 61 (discussing Schumpeter's arguments).
268. Schumpeter (and other theorists of competitive elitism) are generally seen as supporters, not critics, of pluralist democracy. Insofar as the paradigm of competitive elitism depends upon interest groups to support or oppose leaders in elections, it both legitimates and limits interest group influence. Within this paradigm, interest groups play an important role in electing officials, but they cease to play a role once the ongoing process of governing begins.
269. Although elected judges have a clearer claim to democratic legitimacy on a majoritarian account than do appointed judges, it is nevertheless problematic to equate judicial election with broad policymaking latitude. Traditional conceptions of the rule of law and judicial independence are generally applied to elected judges. See Joseph Grodin, Developing a Consensus of Constraint: A Judge's Perspective on Judicial Retention Elections, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1969, 1974-77 (1988); Robert S. Thompson, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, Judicial Elections, and the California Supreme Court: Defining the Terms of the Debate, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 809, 813, 828-40 (1986).
270. Although elected judges have a clearer claim to democratic legitimacy on a majoritarian account than do appointed judges, it is nevertheless problematic to equate judicial election with broad policymaking latitude. Traditional conceptions of the rule of law and judicial independence are generally applied to elected judges. See Joseph Grodin, Developing a Consensus of Constraint: A Judge's Perspective on Judicial Retention Elections, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1969, 1974-77 (1988); Robert S. Thompson, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, Judicial Elections, and the California Supreme Court: Defining the Terms of the Debate, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 809, 813, 828-40 (1986).
271. For a discussion of the related Platonic notion that leaders have better "internalized the norms of civic virtue, tolerance, and other democratic values," see Howard M. Leichter, Political Accountability: Political Accountability in Health Care Rationing: In Search of a New Jerusalem, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1939, 1955-56 (1992).
272. John Arthur uses this phrase to describe the work of Schumpeter and a number of others who, Arthur believes, "maintain that the case for democracy rests not on its capacity to express the 'will of the people' but rather on the effects it has on the citizens who live under it and the type of laws that can be expected to result from democratic processes." ARTHUR, supra note 61, at xii.
273. For an example of an article critiquing one complementarian theory - Dworkin's - as elitist, see Allan C. Hutchinson, Indiana Dworkin and Law's Empire, 96 YALE L.J. 637, 650-53, 654-56, 660-62 (1987) (reviewing RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986)).
274. Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
275. Id. at 51.
276. Id. at 52.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 53-54.
279. See id. at 55.
280. See supra pp. 601-02.
281. See HORWITZ, supra note 28, at 253-58.
282. See supra p. 628.
283. See HORWITZ, supra note 28, at 254-55.
284. In a sense, all metademocratic approaches internalize some version of Hart-and-Sacks style institutional competence ideas by defining a characteristic judicial stance toward politics. For a contemporary theory of institutional competence that stresses the importance of assessing such competence in a comparative, as opposed to single-institutional sense, see KOMESAR, cited above in note 119, at 3-13.
285. Hurst says the following about the important institutional limitations on the legislature: Legislatures are pragmatically-minded bodies, their members typically pressed by more business than they have time to handle, buffeted by competing outside interests, as practicing politicians never far from the thought of reelection and the bearing on reelection of the positions they take. They never sit to pass laws out of a planned design to create a single, comprehensive scheme of legal order. Only rarely and after unusual, sustained activity by interested groups do they adopt systematized patterns of law for broad sectors of community life, such as the Uniform Commercial Code. Normally they act for limited, or at least specialized ends. The legislative process is cumbersome; inertia or delay figure more easily in it than the pain of choosing policy; normally legislatures act only when outside interests exert effective pressure on them to do something. HURST, supra note 29, at 52; see also MERMIN, supra note 49, at 265-70 (arguing that courts should be "realistic" about statutory intepretation).
286. See HURST, supra note 29, at 52.
287. Id. at 65.
288. Id.
289. Hurst finds it critical that courts recognize that statutory text "derives its vitality" from both the past and the future. Id. at 41, 45-46. Whereas strictly originalist accounts focus judicial attention on the past alone, Hurst stresses the need for judicial consideration of the future as well, meaning the direction and experience of the statute as actually implemented. Hart and Sacks sounded a similar theme. See HART & SACKS, supra note 27, at 1379.
290. By contrast, at least one theory that might be considered within the framework of complementing politics expressly rejects the idea of a shifting temporal frame. Inspired by public choice analysis, Ferejohn and Weingast argue that a court serves democracy by favoring the interpretation of the enacting rather than the sitting legislature. They nevertheless appeal, in complementarian fashion, to the goal of promoting the efficacy of statutory law, based on the idea that "if courts provide greater durability to statutes, legislators will invest more in statutory production. Politically sensitive courts thus enhance both democratic values and law." Ferejohn & Weingast, supra note 56, at 566, 582; see also Landes & Posner, supra note 56, at 892-94 (arguing that judges should stabilize the pluralist political process by enforcing legislative bargains).
291. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 59, at 87; Eskridge, supra note 21, at 1480. Along the same lines, Aleinikoff argues that statutory interpretation should be "nautical" (i.e., dynamic), rather than "archeological" (i.e., historical and static). See Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 46-66.
292. Eskridge, supra note 21, at 1481.
293. See Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 46-50, 57-61; Eskridge, supra note 21, at 1504-05.
294. CALABRESI, supra note 54, at 164.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 95-98.
297. Id.
298. DWORKIN, supra note 59, at 335.
299. Id. at 338, 345.
300. Id. at 338.
301. Id. at 337.
302. Dworkin rejects what he calls "speaker's meaning" theories. Id. at 317-27.
303. Id. at 345.
304. Id. at 228-38.
305. See id. at 164-67.
306. Id. at 338.
307. Id. at 346.
308. See generally RICHARD POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 454-69 (1990) (offering "a pragmatist manifesto" for law); Symposium an the Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1990) (collecting essays that explore the meaning and possibilities of legal pragmatism).
309. See generally RICHARD POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 454-69 (1990) (offering "a pragmatist manifesto" for law); Symposium an the Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1990) (collecting essays that explore the meaning and possibilities of legal pragmatism).
310. For arguments that Dworkin is, in fact, a pragmatist, see Margaret J. Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699, 1722-23 (1990); and Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409, 412-20 (1990).
311. For arguments that Dworkin is, in fact, a pragmatist, see Margaret J. Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699, 1722-23 (1990); and Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409, 412-20 (1990).
312. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 59, passim.]
313. Posner's recent work disavows his earlier view that the role of judges is to enforce the interest group bargain reflected in the statute. See POSNER, supra note 213, at 276-78.
314. Foundationalism is defined as a theory that "seeks an objective ground ('foundation') that will reliably guide the interpretation of all statutes in all situations." Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 59, at 324-25.
315. See id. at 330-31, 335-37, 341-42.
316. See POSNER, supra note 213, at 298 ("[T]he problem is that there are no techniques for generating objective interpretations of difficult texts."); id. at 454, 459.
317. See id. at 142. Posner encourages judges to be "creative," see id., and to find "the most reasonable result in the circumstances," id. at 130, but at the same time urges them to include appropriate consideration of "statutory language" and "other conventional materials of judicial decision making" within the definition of reasonableness, id. at 131. He insists that judges operate in a "framework in which the judge is in some sense subordinate to the framers of constitutional statutes, and, of course, of the Constitution itself." Id. at 142. Posner's view of pragmatism touts flexibility but simultaneously seeks to retain a sense of constraint and limitation.
318. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 59, at 383.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 384.
321. Complementarian accounts of this kind occasionally lean toward reconstructionism, especially when they target inequality as a corrosive force in the community. The principal difference between the complementarian and reconstructionist perspectives, however, is the vision of democracy each model pursues. The reconstructionists seek to transform through compensatory interpretation. Sunstein, for example, offers interpretive principles designed to compensate for the absence in contemporary politics of a central attribute of republican democracy - "undominated dialogue" among deliberating and diverse political equals. By contrast, accounts casting courts in the role of "complementing politics" seek more modestly to improve the status quo. These accounts seek to realize the best intentions ascribable to the legislature and the highest potential of the statute in a way that the legislature itself is institutionally unsuited to do. This distinction between the complementarian and reconstructionist perspectives echoes the contrast between moderate and more expressly transformative brands of contemporary pragmatism in legal theory. See Mari J. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness Problem, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1763, 1768-71 (1990); Radin, supra note 214, at 1720-26; Joseph W. Singer, Property and Coercion in Federal Indian Law: The Conflict Between Critical and Complacent Pragmatism, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1821, 1821-26 (1990).
322. Complementarian accounts of this kind occasionally lean toward reconstructionism, especially when they target inequality as a corrosive force in the community. The principal difference between the complementarian and reconstructionist perspectives, however, is the vision of democracy each model pursues. The reconstructionists seek to transform through compensatory interpretation. Sunstein, for example, offers interpretive principles designed to compensate for the absence in contemporary politics of a central attribute of republican democracy - "undominated dialogue" among deliberating and diverse political equals. By contrast, accounts casting courts in the role of "complementing politics" seek more modestly to improve the status quo. These accounts seek to realize the best intentions ascribable to the legislature and the highest potential of the statute in a way that the legislature itself is institutionally unsuited to do. This distinction between the complementarian and reconstructionist perspectives echoes the contrast between moderate and more expressly transformative brands of contemporary pragmatism in legal theory. See Mari J. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness Problem, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1763, 1768-71 (1990); Radin, supra note 214, at 1720-26; Joseph W. Singer, Property and Coercion in Federal Indian Law: The Conflict Between Critical and Complacent Pragmatism, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1821, 1821-26 (1990).
323. POSNER, supra note 213, at 131.
324. Id. at 465.
325. Id. at 300. Posner recognizes that so direct an appeal to judicial discretion may smack of casting the judge as the "village wise man," but he nevertheless subjects judges to the bounds of "reasonableness." Id. at 131. In turn, he defines "reasonableness" to include "sensitivity to the limits of judicial knowledge and to the desirability of stability in law." Id.
326. Id. at 142.
327. See DWORKIN, supra note 59, at 226, 244, 378, 410, 411.
328. See supra note 214.
329. See POSNER, supra note 213, at 301.
330. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 59, at 333-35.
331. See DWORKIN, supra note 59, at 313-37; POSNER, supra note 213, at 142, 469; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 59, at 383. For a variation on the partnership theme, see William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 543, 579-627 (1988).
332. This is not true of Professor Jonathan Macey, whose work I also count within the disciplinarian model. While he advocates disciplining politics based on his assumptions about the legislative process, he makes no claim to judicial restraint. Indeed, he explicitly argues that judges should take a more active role in making law more "public-regarding." See Macey, supra note 59, at 227, 266-68. Macey's views about statutory interpretation, in fact, reveal some fault lines in the rough labels of "left" and "right" I have assigned, respectively, to the reconstructionist and disciplinarian models. His call for reducing the power of parochial interests in the lawmaking process shares common ground with some of Sunstein's republican proposals. See supra p. 620-21; infra pp. 660-62.
333. For an exception, see Lewis A. Kernhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1, 10-56 (1993) (applying public choice theory to judicial decisionmaking).
334. See, e.g., FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 42, at 88-115; Eskridge, supra note 49, at 295-338; Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 123, 133-60 (1989); Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2205-12 (1990). See generally Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, supra note 42 (containing essays exploring the relevance of public choice theory to legal theory); Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 87-101 (1991) (arguing against the proposition that courts should attempt to ameliorate the excess influence of interest groups).
335. See, e.g., FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 42, at 88-115; Eskridge, supra note 49, at 295-338; Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 123, 133-60 (1989); Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2205-12 (1990). See generally Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, supra note 42 (containing essays exploring the relevance of public choice theory to legal theory); Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 87-101 (1991) (arguing against the proposition that courts should attempt to ameliorate the excess influence of interest groups).
336. See, e.g., FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 42, at 88-115; Eskridge, supra note 49, at 295-338; Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 123, 133-60 (1989); Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2205-12 (1990). See generally Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, supra note 42 (containing essays exploring the relevance of public choice theory to legal theory); Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 87-101 (1991) (arguing against the proposition that courts should attempt to ameliorate the excess influence of interest groups).
337. See, e.g., FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 42, at 88-115; Eskridge, supra note 49, at 295-338; Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 123, 133-60 (1989); Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2205-12 (1990). See generally Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, supra note 42 (containing essays exploring the relevance of public choice theory to legal theory); Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 87-101 (1991) (arguing against the proposition that courts should attempt to ameliorate the excess influence of interest groups).
338. See Mashaw, supra note 236, at 126; Shepsle, supra note 22, at 240-41 & n.2 (providing a more detailed typology).
339. Not all those who see value in public choice theory or who utilize aspects of interest group or decision theory necessarily accept the idea that legislator or interest group behavior is venal or that motivation is even relevant to the question of how institutional structures and incentives affect decisionmaking processes. See KOMESAR, supra note 119, at 56-65; Farber & Frickey, supra note 59, at 468-70. Moreover, some argue that statutory interpretation should be affirmatively directed at enabling the interest group process by enforcing the bargain won by the winning coalition. See Landes & Posner, supra note 56, at 877-80 (Posner has since renounced this view, see supra note 216); McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 708-27 (1992) (arguing that statutes should be interpreted like incomplete contracts).
340. Traces of interest group theory can be found in aspects of the complementarian and reconstructionist models to the extent that these approaches accept some of the descriptive claims of public choice theory, but complementarians and reconstructionists reject the means employed by disciplinarians to remedy these public choice evils.
341. See Shepsle, supra note 22, at 240-41.
342. See, e.g., FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 42, at 13-17; Macey, supra note 59, at 230-33; Mashaw, supra note 236, at 127.
343. See Macey, supra note 59, at 241.
344. "When economists describe special interest legislation as 'rent-seeking,' they mean that the legislation is not justified on a cost-benefit basis: it costs the public more than it benefits the special interest, so society as a whole is worse off." FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 42, at 34. The term is frequently used more colloquially and refers pejoratively to strategic, self-interested behavior.
345. See id. at 12-37.
346. Arrow's theorem is a mathematical proof that "in certain situations, majority rule cannot produce a definitive decision." Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1991). For explication, see KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 46-60 (2d ed. 1963); FARBER & FRICKEY, cited above in note 42, at 38-62; Pildes & Anderson, cited above in note 236, at 2131-35; and Shepsle, cited above in note 22, at 241-49.
347. Arrow's theorem is a mathematical proof that "in certain situations, majority rule cannot produce a definitive decision." Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1991). For explication, see KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 46-60 (2d ed. 1963); FARBER & FRICKEY, cited above in note 42, at 38-62; Pildes & Anderson, cited above in note 236, at 2131-35; and Shepsle, cited above in note 22, at 241-49.
348. For an extended argument challenging the claim that Arrow's theorem or associated problems of cycling and agenda manipulation undermine the coherence and "democratic" character of legislative lawmaking, see Pildes & Anderson, cited above in note 236, at 2166-75.
349. Mashaw, supra note 236, at 126.
350. Shepsle, supra note 22, at 249; see also Ferejohn & Weingast, supra note 56, at 568 (arguing that, under public choice theory, "democratic laws will exhibit internal chaos and contradiction and will be arbitrary in their effects"). For a strong dissent, see Pildes & Anderson, cited above in note 236, at 2197-2205, who challenge the claim that collective legislative choice cannot capture and reflect meaningfully democratic outcomes.
351. Easterbrook, supra note 59, at 547.
352. Civic republicanism may be seen as harnessing principles of interest group theory to support the opposite result - an interpretation that favors a traditionally disadvantaged group whose interests are chronically ignored or subverted in the legislative process. See supra p. 605-06.
353. Easterbrook invokes principles from both interest group and decision theory. See Easterbrook, supra note 59, at 540-41. Macey argues from interest group theory alone. Macey, supra note 59, at 227-33.
354. Easterbrook, supra note 59, at 552.
355. Easterbrook would require that the statute either clearly resolve the question at issue or explicitly empower courts to do so. See id.
356. See id. at 541-44.
357. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power of the Judiciary, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 87, 92-94 (1984); Easterbrook, supra note 59, at 544.
358. See supra pp. 627-36.
359. See Macey, supra note 59, at 261.
360. Id. at 252.
361. Id. at 265. Macey also calls for the selective use of legislative history, abandonment of the traditional canon that calls for liberal construction of remedial statutes (on the grounds that it is often a cover for special interest deals), and as a corollary, the expanded use of the canon that urges narrow construction of statutes that depart from the common law. See id. at 265-66.
362. Id. at 265.
363. Id. at 266.
364. See id. at 267.
365. For analyses of Justice Scalia's approach, see Eskridge, cited above in note 8, at 623 n.11, 623-25, 641, 666; William D. Popkin, An "Internal" Critique of Justice Scalia's Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1133, 1133-40 (1992); and Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1597, 1597-99 (1991).
366. For analyses of Justice Scalia's approach, see Eskridge, cited above in note 8, at 623 n.11, 623-25, 641, 666; William D. Popkin, An "Internal" Critique of Justice Scalia's Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1133, 1133-40 (1992); and Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1597, 1597-99 (1991).
367. At times, Justice Scalia has embraced the notion that the risk of undue domination of the political process by powerful, organized groups merits consideration in statutory interpretation, but he has generally used public choice insights in a more indirect way. The groups he would count as powerful are controversial. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 677 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing, in a case interpreting Title VII to permit a voluntary affirmative action program, that politicians have an incentive to "accommodat[e] the demands of organized groups" and that white males like the claimant are "predominantly unknown, unaffluent, unorganized . . . [and] suffer . . . injustice at the hands of a Court fond of thinking of itself as the champion of the politically impotent").
368. Professor Aleinikoff argues that Scalia's textualism is a "political strategy for disciplining both judges and legislators." Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 32. Scalia invokes metaphors that are strongly suggestive of his disciplinarian approach. In one essay about the dangers of judicial discretion and the value of rule-based jurisprudence, he uses the metaphor of parenting. In arguing that courts must seem even-handed, he points out that children will accept an arbitrary restriction (like no television) from parents as long as the rule applies to everyone equally. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (1989).
369. His dissenting opinions in Mistretta v. United States and Morrison v. Olson, for example, focus on legislative incentives and on Congress's characteristic tendency to avoid politically sensitive decisions. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413, 417-22 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697, 703-15 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
370. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 414-22; Morrison, 467 U.S. at 731.
371. See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 681 (arguing that legislators are tempted to delegate "thorny 'no win' political issues" in order to avoid them); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (arguing that pressure by "lawyer-lobbyist[s]" may drive the drafting of legislative history); cf. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 677 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that legislators have a political incentive to "accomodat[e] the demands of organized groups to achieve concrete, numerical improvement in the economic status of particular groups"). See generally Farber & Frickey, supra note 59, at 437-38 (characterizing Justice Scalia's assault on legislative history as bearing an "obvious" relationship to public choice theory).
372. See In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1341-44 (7th Cir. 1989).
373. Scalia energetically opposes any search for congressional "intent" on the grounds that it is not the task of a court "to enter the minds of the Members of Congress - who need have nothing in mind in order for their votes to be both lawful and effective - but rather to give fair and reasonable meaning to the text of the United States Code, adopted by various Congresses at various times." Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For other decisions in which Justice Scalia has asserted this view, see, for example, Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 615 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 403 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 97 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia has not entirely foreclosed resort to legislative history in circumstances that present sufficient statutory ambiguity but seems reluctant to find such circumstances presented. See Eskridge, supra note 8, at 658 n.144.
374. See Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 98-99; Mortier, 501 U.S. at 615.
375. Farber & Frickey, supra note 59, at 437-38.
376. When forced to choose between loyalty to a general concept of originalism and to his conception of proper democratic processes, Scalia leans decidedly toward the latter. In Mortier, for example, the issue was whether a federal statute preempted local regulation of pesticides. The majority opinion considered the legislative history - three separate committee reports - to be divided and so construed the statute not to preempt the local law. See Mortier, 501 U.S. at 605. Scalia concurred, but objected to the use of legislative history at all. See id. at 617 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Ironically, Scalia argued that all three reports indicated that the committees did, in fact, assume that the federal law would preempt state and local regulation. See id. Despite this reading of the reports, Scalia's institutional commitment to ignoring legislative history trumped any sense he had that the unanimity he found in the reports compelled a judicial interpretation consistent with the reports. Scalia's formalist rigor can be understood as a belief that such textualism will force the legislature to be more attentive to its draftsmanship.
377. See Eskridge, supra note 8, at 627 (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987)).
378. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 25; Eskridge, supra note 8, at 660-84; Wald, supra note 20, at 300-03; Zeppos, supra note 263, at 1623-33. Judge Wald notes that "only very occasionally in my experience do litigants come before the federal appellate judicial system with claims that are clearly foreclosed by the plain language of the governing statute." Wald, supra note 20, at 301.
379. Easterbrook, supra note 255, at 91.
380. For example, in Chisom v. Roemer, the issue was whether the term "representative" in § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988), embraced elected judges. Appealing to the text, the purpose, the legislative history, and other provisions in the Act, the Supreme Court found that it did. Focusing on the text, Scalia reached the opposite result. He stated, "There is little doubt that the ordinary meaning of 'representatives' does not include judges." Chisom, 501 U.S. at 410 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Significantly, however, Scalia admitted that an elected judge could fall within one meaning of the word "representative," though that was not what Scalia considered the "ordinary" meaning of the term. See id. The clear implication is that the Court needs to exercise its own independent judgment about which meaning is to be deemed the "ordinary" one.
381. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 404.
382. As Professor Eskridge has pointed out, the canons of construction are, like legislative history, not subject to bicameralism and presentment. See Eskridge, supra note 8, at 679-81. Thus the formalist objection Scalia poses to legislative history as an illegitimate species of lawmaking might likewise be applied to judicial use of canons of construction, whether denominated "established" or not.
383. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 56, at 879 ("[T]He limits of human foresight, the ambiguities of language, and the high cost of legislative deliberation combine to assure that most legislation will be enacted in a seriously incomplete form, with many areas of uncertainty left to be resolved by the courts."); Wald, supra note 20, at 309; cf. Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 96-99 (1985) (making a comparable observation in administrative law that "[t]he high transactions costs of legislating specifically suggests that legislative activity directed to the modification of administration mandates will be infrequent").
384. See, e.g., Ferejohn & Weingast, supra note 56, at 572 ("Judge Easterbrook and Justice Scalia, for example, in counseling narrow readings of statutes, would require the legislature to enact statutes with a level of detail and specificity (and foresight) that threatens to impair its authority to formulate legislation on the wide variety of issues confronting the modern administrative state.").
385. Easterbrook, supra note 59, at 549.
386. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 114 S. Ct. 1588, 1591-92 (1994) (using "plain meaning" analysis in ruling that municipal waste facilities do not fall within the exemption provided by an environmental statute).
387. See Blatt, supra note 12, at 802-15; Yoo, supra note 12, at 1608-15.
388. For historical analysis of the Supreme Court's use of the concept of democracy and an argument that the Court's invocation of the democratic idea as the principal legitimating concept in constitutional law is a creature of the twentieth century, see Morton J. Horwitz, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term - Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 57-65 (1993).
389. David Held notes that "[d]emocracy has been defended on the grounds that it achieves one or more of the following fundamental values or goods: equality, liberty, moral self-development, the common interest, private interests, social utility, the satisfaction of wants, [and] efficient decisions." HELD, supra note 13, at 3.
390. See R. SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES: INTERPRETING WELFARE RIGHTS 65-255 (1994) (exploring the role of statutory interpretation in the evolution of programs relating to welfare rights, education of people with disabilities, and food stamps).
391. The phrase is from Alan Rosenthal & Rod Forth, The Assembly Line: Law Production in the American States, 3 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 265 (1978).
392. See WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, THE TERMS OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 10-22 (3d ed. 1993) (discussing the idea of democracy as an "essentially contested concept").
393. On the intractability of any search for a single, consensus model of democracy, see HELD, cited above in note 13, at 1-9, who argues that theorists with different political values affix the label of democracy to what they advocate; HENRY B. MAYO, AN INTRODUCTION TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 23-24 (1960); and Jack H. Nagel, Review Symposium, 53 J. POL. 215, 215-16 (1991) (reviewing ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989)), who notes that Dahl uses the term "polyarchy" to reserve the label democracy for the system that matches his normative vision. For reflections on this debate within the context of legal theory, see Chemerinsky, cited above in note 81, at 74-87, who explores different conceptions of democracy in constitutional theory; Horwitz, cited above in note 285, at 63-65, who discusses the way in which competing ideas about democracy have come to structure the core debates in American constitutional theory; and Thomas W. Simon, Suspect Class Democracy: A Social
394. On the intractability of any search for a single, consensus model of democracy, see HELD, cited above in note 13, at 1-9, who argues that theorists with different political values affix the label of democracy to what they advocate; HENRY B. MAYO, AN INTRODUCTION TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 23-24 (1960); and Jack H. Nagel, Review Symposium, 53 J. POL. 215, 215-16 (1991) (reviewing ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989)), who notes that Dahl uses the term "polyarchy" to reserve the label democracy for the system that matches his normative vision. For reflections on this debate within the context of legal theory, see Chemerinsky, cited above in note 81, at 74-87, who explores different conceptions of democracy in constitutional theory; Horwitz, cited above in note 285, at 63-65, who discusses the way in which competing ideas about democracy have come to structure the core debates in American constitutional theory; and Thomas W. Simon, Suspect Class Democracy: A Social Theory, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 107, 114-22 (1990), who explores different conceptions of democracy in the context of equal protection doctrine.
395. On the intractability of any search for a single, consensus model of democracy, see HELD, cited above in note 13, at 1-9, who argues that theorists with different political values affix the label of democracy to what they advocate; HENRY B. MAYO, AN INTRODUCTION TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 23-24 (1960); and Jack H. Nagel, Review Symposium, 53 J. POL. 215, 215-16 (1991) (reviewing ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989)), who notes that Dahl uses the term "polyarchy" to reserve the label democracy for the system that matches his normative vision. For reflections on this debate within the context of legal theory, see Chemerinsky, cited above in note 81, at 74-87, who explores different conceptions of democracy in constitutional theory; Horwitz, cited above in note 285, at 63-65, who discusses the way in which competing ideas about democracy have come to structure the core debates in American constitutional theory; and Thomas W. Simon, Suspect Class Democracy: A Social Theory, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 107, 114-22 (1990), who explores different conceptions of democracy in the context of equal protection doctrine.
396. On the intractability of any search for a single, consensus model of democracy, see HELD, cited above in note 13, at 1-9, who argues that theorists with different political values affix the label of democracy to what they advocate; HENRY B. MAYO, AN INTRODUCTION TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 23-24 (1960); and Jack H. Nagel, Review Symposium, 53 J. POL. 215, 215-16 (1991) (reviewing ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989)), who notes that Dahl uses the term "polyarchy" to reserve the label democracy for the system that matches his normative vision. For reflections on this debate within the context of legal theory, see Chemerinsky, cited above in note 81, at 74-87, who explores different conceptions of democracy in constitutional theory; Horwitz, cited above in note 285, at 63-65, who discusses the way in which competing ideas about democracy have come to structure the core debates in American constitutional theory; and Thomas W. Simon, Suspect Class Democracy: A Social Theory, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 107, 114-22 (1990), who explores different conceptions of democracy in the context of equal protection doctrine.
397. For a discussion of the problems with treating courts as per se undemocratic, see KOMESAR, cited above in note 119, at 266-69.
398. On the importance of revealing unstated norms, see MINOW, cited above in note 44, at 51-53, 74-78.
399. For discussion of "constitutive" theories of law, see ALAN HUNT, EXPLORATIONS IN LAW AND SOCIETY: TOWARD A CONSTITUTIVE THEORY OF LAW 15-16 (1993); Robert W. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE, supra note 46, at 418-24; and Frank Munger, Sociology of Law for a Postliberal Society, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 89, 101-05 (1993). For related perspectives on the more general law and society tradition, see HUNT, cited above, at 36-57; Stewart Macaulay, Law and the Behavioral Sciences: Is There Any There There?, 6 LAW & POL'Y. 149, 150-56, 163-83 (1984); David Trubek, Back to the Future: The Short, Happy Life of the Law and Society Movement, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 2, 24-31, 48-54 (1990).
400. For discussion of "constitutive" theories of law, see ALAN HUNT, EXPLORATIONS IN LAW AND SOCIETY: TOWARD A CONSTITUTIVE THEORY OF LAW 15-16 (1993); Robert W. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE, supra note 46, at 418-24; and Frank Munger, Sociology of Law for a Postliberal Society, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 89, 101-05 (1993). For related perspectives on the more general law and society tradition, see HUNT, cited above, at 36-57; Stewart Macaulay, Law and the Behavioral Sciences: Is There Any There There?, 6 LAW & POL'Y. 149, 150-56, 163-83 (1984); David Trubek, Back to the Future: The Short, Happy Life of the Law and Society Movement, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 2, 24-31, 48-54 (1990).
401. For discussion of "constitutive" theories of law, see ALAN HUNT, EXPLORATIONS IN LAW AND SOCIETY: TOWARD A CONSTITUTIVE THEORY OF LAW 15-16 (1993); Robert W. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE, supra note 46, at 418-24; and Frank Munger, Sociology of Law for a Postliberal Society, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 89, 101-05 (1993). For related perspectives on the more general law and society tradition, see HUNT, cited above, at 36-57; Stewart Macaulay, Law and the Behavioral Sciences: Is There Any There There?, 6 LAW & POL'Y. 149, 150-56, 163-83 (1984); David Trubek, Back to the Future: The Short, Happy Life of the Law and Society Movement, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 2, 24-31, 48-54 (1990).
402. For discussion of "constitutive" theories of law, see ALAN HUNT, EXPLORATIONS IN LAW AND SOCIETY: TOWARD A CONSTITUTIVE THEORY OF LAW 15-16 (1993); Robert W. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE, supra note 46, at 418-24; and Frank Munger, Sociology of Law for a Postliberal Society, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 89, 101-05 (1993). For related perspectives on the more general law and society tradition, see HUNT, cited above, at 36-57; Stewart Macaulay, Law and the Behavioral Sciences: Is There Any There There?, 6 LAW & POL'Y. 149, 150-56, 163-83 (1984); David Trubek, Back to the Future: The Short, Happy Life of the Law and Society Movement, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 2, 24-31, 48-54 (1990).
403. For discussion of "constitutive" theories of law, see ALAN HUNT, EXPLORATIONS IN LAW AND SOCIETY: TOWARD A CONSTITUTIVE THEORY OF LAW 15-16 (1993); Robert W. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE, supra note 46, at 418-24; and Frank Munger, Sociology of Law for a Postliberal Society, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 89, 101-05 (1993). For related perspectives on the more general law and society tradition, see HUNT, cited above, at 36-57; Stewart Macaulay, Law and the Behavioral Sciences: Is There Any There There?, 6 LAW & POL'Y. 149, 150-56, 163-83 (1984); David Trubek, Back to the Future: The Short, Happy Life of the Law and Society Movement, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 2, 24-31, 48-54 (1990).
404. See supra pp. 603-06.
405. Michael W. McCann, Reform Litigation on Trial, 17 J. LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 715, 733 (1992).
406. Guido Calabresi's proposal for judicially declared statutory obsolescence, see supra p. 632, has been an especially attractive target for critiques of this kind. See Archibald Cox, Book Review, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1463, 1470-74 (1982) (reviewing GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES); Samuel Estreicher, Judicial Nullification: Guido Calabresi's Uncommon Common Law for a Statutory Age, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1165-67 (1982) (same); Abner J. Mikva, The Shifting Sands of Legal Topography, 96 HARV. L. REV. 534, 541-43 (1982) (same).
407. Guido Calabresi's proposal for judicially declared statutory obsolescence, see supra p. 632, has been an especially attractive target for critiques of this kind. See Archibald Cox, Book Review, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1463, 1470-74 (1982) (reviewing GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES); Samuel Estreicher, Judicial Nullification: Guido Calabresi's Uncommon Common Law for a Statutory Age, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1165-67 (1982) (same); Abner J. Mikva, The Shifting Sands of Legal Topography, 96 HARV. L. REV. 534, 541-43 (1982) (same).
408. Guido Calabresi's proposal for judicially declared statutory obsolescence, see supra p. 632, has been an especially attractive target for critiques of this kind. See Archibald Cox, Book Review, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1463, 1470-74 (1982) (reviewing GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES); Samuel Estreicher, Judicial Nullification: Guido Calabresi's Uncommon Common Law for a Statutory Age, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1165-67 (1982) (same); Abner J. Mikva, The Shifting Sands of Legal Topography, 96 HARV. L. REV. 534, 541-43 (1982) (same).
409. Guido Calabresi's proposal for judicially declared statutory obsolescence, see supra p. 632, has been an especially attractive target for critiques of this kind. See Archibald Cox, Book Review, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1463, 1470-74 (1982) (reviewing GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES); Samuel Estreicher, Judicial Nullification: Guido Calabresi's Uncommon Common Law for a Statutory Age, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1165-67 (1982) (same); Abner J. Mikva, The Shifting Sands of Legal Topography, 96 HARV. L. REV. 534, 541-43 (1982) (same).
410. For discussions of the divergent ideas about democracy held by different contemporary judges, see Joan Biskupic, Scalia Takes a Narrow View in Seeking Congress' Will, CONG. Q., Mar. 24, 1990, at 913, 915-18; Abner J. Mikva, Foreword: Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 167, 169 (1988); Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 375-76.
411. For discussions of the divergent ideas about democracy held by different contemporary judges, see Joan Biskupic, Scalia Takes a Narrow View in Seeking Congress' Will, CONG. Q., Mar. 24, 1990, at 913, 915-18; Abner J. Mikva, Foreword: Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 167, 169 (1988); Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 375-76.
412. For discussions of the divergent ideas about democracy held by different contemporary judges, see Joan Biskupic, Scalia Takes a Narrow View in Seeking Congress' Will, CONG. Q., Mar. 24, 1990, at 913, 915-18; Abner J. Mikva, Foreword: Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 167, 169 (1988); Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 375-76.
413. See generally Diver, supra note 59, at 583-85 (assessing as comparatively weak the judiciary's policymaking skills and resources).
414. This idea can be seen as a variant of what Mark Tushnet calls the "lawyer as astrophysicist" problem that reflects the persistent professional hubris that compels lawyers to think that they are competent in all disciplines, regardless of training or expertise. Mark Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1338 n.140 (1979).
415. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
416. See Shepsle, supra note 22, at 252-54.
417. See supra pp. 616-17. For a more general reference to the perceived constitutional problems with "nonoriginalist judicial review," see Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2 (1985).
418. See Eskridge, supra note 8, at 653-55, 671 (setting out Justice Scalia's arguments about bicameralism and presentment).
419. See Macey, supra note 59, at 242-44.
420. See Sunstein, supra note 13, at 1541; supra note 234 (discussing similarities between Macey and civic republicans).
421. For work in critical race theory that is grounded in constitutional values, see, for example, Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Original Understandings, 1991 DUKE L.J. 39, 99, who argues for an understanding of how race "shapes our legal world and is already included in the Constitution"; and Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 334 (1987), who calls for incorporation of "victim's consciousness" as part of a "radical constitutionalism."
422. For work in critical race theory that is grounded in constitutional values, see, for example, Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Original Understandings, 1991 DUKE L.J. 39, 99, who argues for an understanding of how race "shapes our legal world and is already included in the Constitution"; and Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 334 (1987), who calls for incorporation of "victim's consciousness" as part of a "radical constitutionalism."
423. See DWORKIN, supra note 59, at 411-12; Eskridge, supra note 21, at 1523-24, 1529-38.
424. See Eskridge, supra note 24, at 1019-34; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 24, at 595, 598-611; Sunstein, supra note 4, at 468-74. As distinguished from other canons that reflect linguistic conventions, see Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 59, at 639-46; Ross, supra note 24, at 563, or matters of substantive regulatory policy that do not implicate constitutional norms, see ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 59, at 655-58; Ross, supra note 24, at 563, such canons reflect constitutionally inspired values. Textualism is sometimes justified as the only methodology that is consistent with the constitutional command that legislative law be made only when Article I's bicameralism and presentment requirements have been satisfied. The argument is that using legislative history to interpret a statute potentially usurps the statute itself and thus undermines the requirement that both houses of Congress and the president explicitly approve the text of the statute. See Eskridge, supra note 8, at 648-50, 653-54; Popkin, supra note 263, at 1162-63. While strongly advocating textualism, however, Justice Scalia nevertheless allows a role for some canons of construction. See Eskridge, supra note 8, at 663-66 (citing and discussing Scalia). It may well be that canons of construction of any type - constitutional or otherwise - can be justified in separation of powers terms as inherent or ancillary aspects of a court's interpretive and lawmaking power under Article III. See Yoo, supra note 12, at 1612 (arguing that Alexander Hamilton regarded interpretive canons as "inherent in the judicial function"). See generally Eskridge, supra note 21, at 1498-1501 (arguing that Article III invests residual lawmaking power in courts). While the canons, as a whole, have been much maligned and often branded illegitimate, it does not appear that the canons have ever been seriously attacked as beyond a court's Article III power.
425. Neil Komesar's work on comparative institutional analysis explores this subject in detail. See KOMESAR, supra note 119, at 123-50, 153-95, 232-70.
426. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 24, at 595-96; Sunstein, supra note 4, at 452.
427. See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 236, at 49-59; David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 944-47 (1992).
428. The same is true for textualism if it is treated as a species of essentialism and not, as I have argued, as a variant of metademocracy. See supra pp. 637-46.
429. This is, in fact, an argument made in support of the Chevron principle. See Diver, supra note 59, at 583-85; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias in Agency Decisionmaking: Lessons from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 481, 516 (1990).
430. Examples of areas in which judges are frequently called upon to develop and apply ideas about democracy in the constitutional domain include campaign finance, reapportionment, voting rights, the First Amendment, and Carolene Products-style equal protection analysis. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 13-2 to -16, at 1063-95, §§ 13-27 to -31, at 1132-53, § 16-6, at 1451-54 (2d ed. 1988). Judges are likewise called upon to address issues of comparable complexity and systemic import in complex litigation, public law litigation, and litigation in highly technical areas. See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1296-1302 (1976); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 854-59 (1984); Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1355, 1365-76 (1991).
431. Examples of areas in which judges are frequently called upon to develop and apply ideas about democracy in the constitutional domain include campaign finance, reapportionment, voting rights, the First Amendment, and Carolene Products-style equal protection analysis. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 13-2 to -16, at 1063-95, §§ 13-27 to -31, at 1132-53, § 16-6, at 1451-54 (2d ed. 1988). Judges are likewise called upon to address issues of comparable complexity and systemic import in complex litigation, public law litigation, and litigation in highly technical areas. See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1296-1302 (1976); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 854-59 (1984); Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1355, 1365-76 (1991).
432. Examples of areas in which judges are frequently called upon to develop and apply ideas about democracy in the constitutional domain include campaign finance, reapportionment, voting rights, the First Amendment, and Carolene Products-style equal protection analysis. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 13-2 to -16, at 1063-95, §§ 13-27 to -31, at 1132-53, § 16-6, at 1451-54 (2d ed. 1988). Judges are likewise called upon to address issues of comparable complexity and systemic import in complex litigation, public law litigation, and litigation in highly technical areas. See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1296-1302 (1976); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 854-59 (1984); Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1355, 1365-76 (1991).
433. See generally KOMESAR, supra note 119, at 268-69 (arguing that conceptions of judicial legitimacy that require elimination of controversy among judges are misguided).
434. Cf. Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 14 (1984) ("If traditional legal theorists are correct about the importance of determinacy to the rule of law, then - by their own criteria - the rule of law has never existed anywhere."). For critiques of the traditional rule of law that stress the virtues of pragmatism, deliberation, and hermeneutics, see Martha Minow, Partial Justice: Law and Minorities, in THE FATE OF LAW 15, 36-40 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1991); Margaret J. Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 818 (1989).
435. Cf. Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 14 (1984) ("If traditional legal theorists are correct about the importance of determinacy to the rule of law, then - by their own criteria - the rule of law has never existed anywhere."). For critiques of the traditional rule of law that stress the virtues of pragmatism, deliberation, and hermeneutics, see Martha Minow, Partial Justice: Law and Minorities, in THE FATE OF LAW 15, 36-40 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1991); Margaret J. Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 818 (1989).
436. Cf. Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 14 (1984) ("If traditional legal theorists are correct about the importance of determinacy to the rule of law, then - by their own criteria - the rule of law has never existed anywhere."). For critiques of the traditional rule of law that stress the virtues of pragmatism, deliberation, and hermeneutics, see Martha Minow, Partial Justice: Law and Minorities, in THE FATE OF LAW 15, 36-40 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1991); Margaret J. Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 818 (1989).
437. See supra note 19 (noting that essentialism among contemporary judges seems to be largely rhetorical).
438. Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353, 406 (1989).
439. See id. at 406-12; see also HURST, supra note 29, at 33 (recognizing the limitations of legislative intent as a benchmark for statutory intepretation, yet defending the utility of a "fiction" that "reminds all who deal with a statute that they are operating in a field of law in which they are not free to define public policy simply according to their own judgment").
440. Zeppos, supra note 318, at 386.
441. See id.
442. See id.; Zeppos, supra note 19, at 1122-24, 1131-34.
443. Cf. David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 737 (1987) (defending the importance of judicial candor because "[a] requirement that judges give reasons for their decisions - grounds of decision that can be debated, attacked, and defended - serves a vital function in constraining the judiciary's exercise of power").
444. Some scholars suggest that accountability is not meaningful at all. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 81, at 80-82 (challenging on multiple grounds the assumption that majoritarian institutions are meaningfully accountable to voters); Popkin, supra note 263, at 1169 (arguing, among other things, that chronic incumbency advantage weakens accountability-based theories).
445. See supra pp. 613-18.
446. See Sunstein, supra note 13, at 1543-44, 1552-53; supra pp. 638-39. For more detailed analyses of these inequalities, see KOMESAR, cited above in note 119, at 65-89; and Ackerman, cited above in note 119, at 718-31.
447. See Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 788 (1987); Pildes & Anderson, supra note 236, at 2137; supra pp. 618-26; cf. JOSHUA COHEN & JOEL ROGERS, ON DEMOCRACY 47-71 (1983) (exploring ways in which capitalist distribution of resources impairs workers' ability to exercise formal and procedural democratic rights).
448. See Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 788 (1987); Pildes & Anderson, supra note 236, at 2137; supra pp. 618-26; cf. JOSHUA COHEN & JOEL ROGERS, ON DEMOCRACY 47-71 (1983) (exploring ways in which capitalist distribution of resources impairs workers' ability to exercise formal and procedural democratic rights).
449. See generally Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 296, 336-37 (1990) (suggesting that calls for judicial candor may generate new rationalizations for identical results).
450. Cf. id. at 304-07 (discussing cognitive complexity of decision structures); Zeppos, supra note 318, at 406-12 (same).
451. The transition to metademocracy might well mean more than a new set of doctrines for resolving the same, static sample of cases. The dynamics of the adjudication process are likely to influence who would benefit from a transition to metademocratic rules. See KOMESAR, supra note 119, at 137-38 & n.13. It could be, for example, that interest groups that more frequently litigate statutory claims - those who go to court more, and with more resources, see Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95, 97-101 (1974) - might make greater use of the metademocratic opportunity than others. Or, it might be the case that the changes in interpretive methodology contemplated by metademocracy would create new incentives to litigate and would draw new participants into the adjudicative process. See KOMESAR, supra note 119, at 137-38 & n.13.
452. See generally Alan R. Romero, Note, Interpretive Directions in Statutes, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 211, 215-17 (1994) (discussing interpretive directions in several statutes); Ross, supra note 24, at 566-78 (same). Because even interpretive rules need interpretation, the legislature surely could not displace the courts in fashioning interpretive rules. See FISH, supra note 140, at 121 (arguing that interpretive rules "are in need of interpretation and cannot themselves serve as constraints on interpretation"); Romero, supra, at 246-47 (arguing that legislatively enacted interpretive directions may be one factor courts consider but may not control judicial interpretion of ambiguous statutes). But legislators can enter and seek to influence the metademocratic debate. It is conceivable that legislators, confronted with metademocracy, might attempt to enact broad and general metademocratic rules of their own, much as several states have enacted general interpretive guidelines or definitions. See id. at 213-14 (discussing statutory provisions that guide judicial interpretation in various ways). This seems unlikely, however, given a general legislative reticence to take up controversial issues in a largely abstract context. In any event, were legislators so inclined, it is at least possible that broad legislative attempts to constrain categorically the courts' interpretive methodology would create separation of powers problems. See id. at 221-25; Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 VA. L. REV. 1, 11 n.47 (1993) (suggesting that a legislative limitation on the forms of legislative history that a court may consider in statutory construction "arguably violates separation of powers principles").
453. See generally Alan R. Romero, Note, Interpretive Directions in Statutes, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 211, 215-17 (1994) (discussing interpretive directions in several statutes); Ross, supra note 24, at 566-78 (same). Because even interpretive rules need interpretation, the legislature surely could not displace the courts in fashioning interpretive rules. See FISH, supra note 140, at 121 (arguing that interpretive rules "are in need of interpretation and cannot themselves serve as constraints on interpretation"); Romero, supra, at 246-47 (arguing that legislatively enacted interpretive directions may be one factor courts consider but may not control judicial interpretion of ambiguous statutes). But legislators can enter and seek to influence the metademocratic debate. It is conceivable that legislators, confronted with metademocracy, might attempt to enact broad and general metademocratic rules of their own, much as several states have enacted general interpretive guidelines or definitions. See id. at 213-14 (discussing statutory provisions that guide judicial interpretation in various ways). This seems unlikely, however, given a general legislative reticence to take up controversial issues in a largely abstract context. In any event, were legislators so inclined, it is at least possible that broad legislative attempts to constrain categorically the courts' interpretive methodology would create separation of powers problems. See id. at 221-25; Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 VA. L. REV. 1, 11 n.47 (1993) (suggesting that a legislative limitation on the forms of legislative history that a court may consider in statutory construction "arguably violates separation of powers principles").
454. 3 (arguing for appointment of openly gay or lesbian federal judges based on, among other things, the belief that they will bring new and needed perspectives to the bench). These will be difficult questions to study because longtime "outsiders" might well fear that employing an approach that looks "different" will call into question the legitimacy of their efforts or will brand them as somehow not "real" or "competent." Nevertheless, the question is worthy of study in a context sensitive to these questions.
455. 3 (arguing for appointment of openly gay or lesbian federal judges based on, among other things, the belief that they will bring new and needed perspectives to the bench). These will be difficult questions to study because longtime "outsiders" might well fear that employing an approach that looks "different" will call into question the legitimacy of their efforts or will brand them as somehow not "real" or "competent." Nevertheless, the question is worthy of study in a context sensitive to these questions.
456. Some scholars have already completed critical analysis that is useful in evaluating individual metademocratic approaches. See Eskridge, supra note 53, at 418-55; Merrill, supra note 54, at 1034-41; Pildes & Anderson, supra note 236, at 2128-43. There is also interesting work being done under the rubric of "positive political theory." This idea eludes easy definition but applies social science insights about the political process to legal analysis and aims toward what two of its proponents call "non-normative, rational-choice theories of political institutions." Daniel A. Farber & Phillip P. Frickey, Foreword: Positive Political Theory in the Nineties, 80 GEO. L.J. 457, 462 (1992) (emphasis deleted). See generally Symposium, Regulating Regulation: The Political Economy of Administrative Procedures and Regulatory Instruments, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1994) (using positive political theory to analyze the regulatory implementation of legislation). The idea, at least for Farber and Frickey, is to harness some of the tools of institutional analysis developed in the context of public choice theory without necessarily carrying forward its distinctly bleak characterizations of politics and politicians. Along similar lines, see Ferejohn & Weingast, cited above in note 56, at 581-82.
457. Some scholars have already completed critical analysis that is useful in evaluating individual metademocratic approaches. See Eskridge, supra note 53, at 418-55; Merrill, supra note 54, at 1034-41; Pildes & Anderson, supra note 236, at 2128-43. There is also interesting work being done under the rubric of "positive political theory." This idea eludes easy definition but applies social science insights about the political process to legal analysis and aims toward what two of its proponents call "non-normative, rational-choice theories of political institutions." Daniel A. Farber & Phillip P. Frickey, Foreword: Positive Political Theory in the Nineties, 80 GEO. L.J. 457, 462 (1992) (emphasis deleted). See generally Symposium, Regulating Regulation: The Political Economy of Administrative Procedures and Regulatory Instruments, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1994) (using positive political theory to analyze the regulatory implementation of legislation). The idea, at least for Farber and Frickey, is to harness some of the tools of institutional analysis developed in the context of public choice theory without necessarily carrying forward its distinctly bleak characterizations of politics and politicians. Along similar lines, see Ferejohn & Weingast, cited above in note 56, at 581-82.
458. Mashaw, supra note 236, at 152.
459. See supra pp. 650-55.
460. See supra pp. 655-59.
461. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 411-12 (arguing that disputes about statutory meaning are often disputes about the appropriate norms governing interpretation).
462. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 184-91 (1991) (deferring to the agency's interpretation of a federal family planning statute to uphold a rule banning abortion counseling, instead of applying the previously declared exception to Chevron); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1988) (declining to defer to the agency's interpretation of a Medicare reimbursement statute where that interpretation was expressed solely as a "litigating position[]" in an agency brief).
463. See, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987) (interpreting the Immigration and Nationality Act to require a less stringent standard of proof for aliens based in part on the canon favoring aliens in deportation statutes); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976) (interpreting property on an Indian reservation to be exempt from a county property tax statute and invoking the canon favoring liberal construction of statutes enacted for the benefit of Indian tribes). For a discussion of current canons that can be understood in terms of chronic political and social power disparity and that therefore reflect implicit reconstructionism in the courts, see SUNSTEIN, cited above in note 43, at 61-64, 166-67, 183; Eskridge, cited above in note 24, at 1032-34.
464. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 114 S. Ct. 1588, 1591-94 (1994) (relying on the text of an environmental statute to conclude that certain waste was subject to regulation and rejecting contrary evidence in the legislative history, as well as a contrary interpretation by the Environmental Protection Agency); West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 86-102 (1991) (using a text-based approach to construe statutory attorney fee-shifting provision to exclude fees for services rendered by experts to attorneys, notwithstanding language in the legislative history indicating a congressional intent that prevailing plaintiffs be made whole).
465. See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 403-04 (1991) (interpreting the Voting Rights Act's application to elected "representatives" as covering elected judges based on the overarching statutory purpose and policy considerations); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 585-92 (1983) (construing a broadly written tax statute that provides deduction for contributions to "charitable" or "educational" institutions to bar deductions for contributions to discriminatory school based on the Court's interpretation of the overarching statutory purpose and a contemporary understanding of "charitable" as excluding overtly discriminatory entities).
466. "Progressive," as used here, means "broadening and equalizing . . . the possession and enjoyment of what are commonly perceived as basic goods in American society." GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 4 (1991) (discussing the conflict between "[p]olitical and social change"). Rosenberg goes on to elaborate the "basic goods" as follows; "political goods such as participation in the political process and freedom of speech and association; legal goods such as equal and non-discriminatory treatment of all people; material goods; and self-respect, the opportunity for every individual to lead a satisfying and worthy life." Id.
467. Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
468. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 42, at 8 (noting the potential complementarity between civic republicanism and public choice theory).
469. Neil Komesar captures the substance of these dual problems with the terms "minoritarian bias" (the power of the few over the many) and "majoritarian bias" (the power of the many over the few). For a "two force model" in law that can identify and address both phenomena, see KOMESAR, cited above in note 119, at 65-89.
470. See Schacter, supra note 135, at 298-300 (discussing the ways in which gay men and lesbians are subordinated and stigmatized). Among other factors, the continuing invisibility of the many gay men and lesbians who remain in the closet poses a formidable barrier to this kind of interest group influence, for it conceals the full membership of the group and undermines political organization and mobilization.