Composition of government budget, non-single peakedness, and majority voting

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 3, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 471-481

  Bearse, Peter ^a   Glomm, Gerhard ^b   Janeba, Eckhard ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT GREENSBORO   (United States)

^b INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042432896     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1097-3923.00079     Document Type: Article

References (8)

1. BESLEY, T., and S. COATE (1991) Public provision of private goods and the redistribution of income, American Economic Review, 81, 979-984.
2. ENELOW, J., and M. HINICH (1984) The Spatial Theory of Voting: An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3. EPPLE, D., and R. ROMANO (1996) Ends against the middle: Determining public service provision when there are private alternatives, Journal of Public Economics, 62, 297-325.
4. GLOMM, G., and B. RAVIKUMAR (1998) Opting out of publicly provided services: A majority voting result, Social Choice and Welfare, 15, 187-193.
5. IRELAND, N. J. (1990) The mix of social and private provision of goods and services, Journal of Public Economics, 43, 201-219.
6. MUELLER, D. (1979) Public Choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
7. PEROTTI, R. (1993) Political equilibrium, income distribution, and growth, Review of Economic Studies, 60, 755-776.
8. STIGLITZ, J. E. (1974) The demand for education in public and private school systems, Journal of Public Economics, 3, 349-385.