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2
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84914948568
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Ruben Lee, “The Legal Foundation for Competition in EC Capital Markets: The Gap between Rhetoric and Reality,” in this issue. See also Hideki Kanda, “Comment on Ruben Lee,” in this issue.
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3
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84914891479
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Niels Thygesen, “Why Is Economic and Monetary Union an Important Objective for Europe?,” in this issue. See also Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, “The EMU and Fiscal Policy in the New European Community: An Issue for Economic Federalism,” in t
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6
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84914901245
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See Klaus J. Hopt, “Labor Representation on Corporate Boards: Impacts and Problems for Corporate Governance and Economic Integration in Europe,” See also Mark J. Roe, “German ‘Populism’ and the Large Public Corporation,” in this issue.
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14
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84914919618
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See Federalist No. 10 (James Madison).
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17
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84914923970
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Not only in legislative choice between local and national regulation, but also in judicial interpretation of legislation. A combination of dissatisfaction with rent-seeking regulations and an appreciation of limits on the power of competition to undermine regulation has led courts in the United States to the use of antitrust laws to oust local regulation. See, 112 S. Ct. 2169
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(1992)
FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co.
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18
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84900300770
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A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism
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and other cases discussed in
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(1986)
Harvard Law Review
, vol.99
, pp. 713-789
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Wiley1
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19
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84914947896
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See Federalist No. 10 (James Madison).
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24
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56949095290
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Regulatory Reform in the European Community
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Papers & Proceedings
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(1992)
Am. Econ. Rev.
, vol.82
, pp. 98
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Neven1
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26
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84914912704
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See Stanislaw Soltysinski, “Polish Law on National Investments Funds and Their Privatization (1993); An Overview,” in the conference proceedings
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27
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84914905582
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Robert D. Cooler, “Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law,” in this issue.
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28
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84914892141
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See note 5 above.
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29
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0003951050
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This does not make environmental policy immune to interest group capture, however. The large gains from having a Community-wide policy, in order to pursue effects across national borders, imply large gains to interest groups with the power to charge a price for assenting to particular rules. For evidence that this has happened in the United States, see
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(1981)
Clean Coal/Dirty Air
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Ackerman1
Hassler2
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30
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85005250932
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Environmental Regulation Whose Self-Interests Are Being Protected?
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(1985)
Economic Inquiry
, vol.23
, pp. 551
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Pashigian1
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31
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84914901401
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Eddy Wymeersch, “Equality of Shareholders, Especially vis-à-vis Institutional Investors?,” in the conference proceedings.
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32
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84914926065
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On which see Anne Houtman, “Maastricht, Competition Policy and the New Industrial Policy,” in the conference proceedings.
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33
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84914944084
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On this subject see Gérard Hertig, “Imperfect Mutual Recognition for EC Financial Services,” in this issue.
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34
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0001109824
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European Monetary Unification
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See, doubting that savings in transactions costs justify the costs of poor adjustment to shocks, given low labor mobility and low fiscal insurance transfers
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(1993)
J. Econ. Lit.
, vol.31
, pp. 1321-1357
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Eichengreen1
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35
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85022491513
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Economic and Monetary Union in Europe
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See, same thoughts, adding that in lieu of establishing a central EC bank, Maastricht demands a contractionary fiscal policy and a bureaucracy that will hinder interregional flows of capital: “If the price of monetary union is the adoption of inappropriate fiscal policy, then it is probably a price that is not worth paying”.
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(1992)
Journal of Economic Perspectives
, vol.6
, pp. 31-52
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Bean1
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36
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84914926530
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Easier said than done. Calculating the costs of taxation is difficult business, made more complex by the fact that taxation for social insurance, at least in the United States, is not all “taxation.” Unemployment benefits are paid from funds that depend in large measure on experience-rated taxes. To the extent these ratings are accurate, there is no net transfer among employers and regions and no corresponding deadweight loss, only a smoothing of employees' income stream over time.
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37
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84926271511
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From the Gold Clause Cases to the Gold Commission A Half Century of American Monetary Law
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For a concise history of the United States currency system, see
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(1983)
The University of Chicago Law Review
, vol.50
, pp. 504
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Dam1
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38
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0346237035
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The Legal Tender Cases
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For a concise history of the United States currency system, see
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(1981)
Sup. Ct. Rev.
, pp. 367
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Dam1
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40
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84914950033
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For discussions of competition among markets, see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 292-96.
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