Justice Frank Murphy and American labor law

Michigan Law Review

Volumn 100, Issue 7, 2002, Pages 1900-1926

  St Antoine, Theodore J ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0042370154     PISSN: 00262234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1556079     Document Type: Article

References (169)

1. Archibald Cox, The Influence of Mr. Justice Murphy on Labor Law, 48 MICH. L. REV. 767, 767 (1950).
2. SIDNEY FINE, FRANK MURPHY: THE DETROIT YEARS 2-5, 14 (1975).
3. Id. at 17, 36.
4. Id. at 36, 358-59, 455-56.
5. Id. at 6-14, 17, 84-89.
6. Id. at 10-12. Murphy did not attend Catholic schools (there were none in Harbor Beach), and it was only after he became mayor of Detroit that he found support for his views on the welfare state in the social encyclicals of the Popes. Id. at 254-55.
7. Id. at 18; see also id. at 19-28.
8. Id. at 26.
9. Id. at 27.
10. Id. at 34.
11. Id. at 48.
12. Id. at 58.
13. Id. at 117.
14. Id. at 167.
15. Id. at 220-21.
16. Id. at 387.
17. Id. at 439.
18. SIDNEY FINE, FRANK MURPHY: THE NEW DEAL YEARS 20, 231 (1979).
19. Id. at 250-51.
20. Id. at 298-99, 303.
21. Id. at 319-22.
22. Id. at 323-25.
23. Id. at 508-11.
24. Id. at 528.
25. SIDNEY FINE, FRANK MURPHY: THE WASHINGTON YEARS 32-34, 54-56 (1984) [hereinafter FINE (1984)].
26. Id. at 141-42.
27. Id. at 133.
28. Id. at 137.
29. The flu or bronchitis may have been partly psychosomatic. My senior partner during my active practice in Washington, D.C., was J. Albert Woll, who headed the Commercial Frauds Section at Justice during Murphy's year there. Woll visited Murphy in his bachelor's apartment in the Washington Hotel at the time of the Supreme Court nomination and was convinced that Murphy was exaggerating if not feigning his ailments, hoping against hope he could stave off the dreaded move to the "Marble Palace." Conversations with J. Albert Woll, Senior Partner, Woll, Mayer & St. Antoine (circa 1960).
30. FINE (1984), supra note 25, at 142-43.
31. Id. at 161-63.
32. Id. at 161-62.
33. Conversation with John H. Pickering, in Ann Arbor, Mich. (Oct. 13, 2001).
34. FINE (1984), supra note 25, at 162-63.
35. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
36. Id. at 94-95.
37. Id. at 91-92 (quoting ALA. CODE § 3448 (1923)).
38. Cox, supra note 1, at 777.
39. E.g., Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077 (Mass. 1896); LUDWIG TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING § 111 (1940); cf. Am. Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184 (1921). Under the common law tort theories of the time, labor activities like strikes and picketing could be enjoined if they had "unlawful objectives" or employed "unlawful means," very broadly defined. See e.g., United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. Fitzgerald, 130 N.E. 86, 87 (Mass. 1921); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 775 (1939). But cf. Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 478 (1937) ("Members of a union might . . . make known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Ferderal Constitution.") (dictum). The introduction of anti-injunction statutes, like the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 101-115 (1994)), and similar state laws, affected the availability of equitable remedies, but that is not our concern.
40. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 95.
41. Id. at 96-97.
42. Id. at 98-99 (citing O'Rourke v. Birmingham, 168 So. 206 (Ala. Ct. App. 1936), cert. denied, 168 So. 209 (Ala. 1936)).
43. Id. at 102. In Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106, 113 (1940), decided the same day as Thornhill, Justice Murphy elaborated: "[Publicizing the facts of a labor dispute in a peaceful way through appropriate means, whether by pamphlet, by word of mouth or by banner, must now be regarded as within that liberty of communication which is secured to every person by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a State."
44. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 104-05; cf. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
45. Cafeteria Employees Union, Local 302 v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293, 294-96 (1943); Bakery & Pastry Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 772-75 (1942); AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 325-26 (1941).
46. Carpenters & Joiners Union, Local 213 v. Ritter's Café, 315 U.S. 722, 726-27 (1942) (emphasis added).
47. Milk Wagon Drivers Union, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 292 (1941).
48. 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
49. Id. at 502.
50. Id. at 495.
51. Id. at 502.
52. See, e.g., Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 277 (1915) (upholding statute condemning speech that encourages violations of law).
53. Theodore J. St. Antoine, Free Speech or Economic Weapon? The Persisting Problem of Picketing, 16 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 883 (1982). My approach was anticipated by Francis E. Jones, Jr., Free Speech: Pickets on the Grass, Alas! - Amidst Confusion, a Constant Principle, 29 S. CAL. L. REV. 137, 157 (1956) ("Picketing, like any other speech, is protected by the Constitution - as a means; however, like other speech, it will not be protected when used for the purpose of accomplishing an unlawful end."). For a vigorous exposition of the contrary point of view, see CHARLES O. GREGORY & HAROLD A. KATZ, LABOR AND THE LAW 289-329 (3d ed. 1979). See generally E. Merrick Dodd, Picketing and Free Speech: A Dissent, 56 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1943); Edgar A. Jones, Jr., Picketing and Coercion: A Reply, 39 VA. L. REV. 1063 (1953).
54. Theodore J. St. Antoine, Free Speech or Economic Weapon? The Persisting Problem of Picketing, 16 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 883 (1982). My approach was anticipated by Francis E. Jones, Jr., Free Speech: Pickets on the Grass, Alas! - Amidst Confusion, a Constant Principle, 29 S. CAL. L. REV. 137, 157 (1956) ("Picketing, like any other speech, is protected by the Constitution - as a means; however, like other speech, it will not be protected when used for the purpose of accomplishing an unlawful end."). For a vigorous exposition of the contrary point of view, see CHARLES O. GREGORY & HAROLD A. KATZ, LABOR AND THE LAW 289-329 (3d ed. 1979). See generally E. Merrick Dodd, Picketing and Free Speech: A Dissent, 56 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1943); Edgar A. Jones, Jr., Picketing and Coercion: A Reply, 39 VA. L. REV. 1063 (1953).
55. Theodore J. St. Antoine, Free Speech or Economic Weapon? The Persisting Problem of Picketing, 16 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 883 (1982). My approach was anticipated by Francis E. Jones, Jr., Free Speech: Pickets on the Grass, Alas! - Amidst Confusion, a Constant Principle, 29 S. CAL. L. REV. 137, 157 (1956) ("Picketing, like any other speech, is protected by the Constitution - as a means; however, like other speech, it will not be protected when used for the purpose of accomplishing an unlawful end."). For a vigorous exposition of the contrary point of view, see CHARLES O. GREGORY & HAROLD A. KATZ, LABOR AND THE LAW 289-329 (3d ed. 1979). See generally E. Merrick Dodd, Picketing and Free Speech: A Dissent, 56 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1943); Edgar A. Jones, Jr., Picketing and Coercion: A Reply, 39 VA. L. REV. 1063 (1953).
56. Theodore J. St. Antoine, Free Speech or Economic Weapon? The Persisting Problem of Picketing, 16 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 883 (1982). My approach was anticipated by Francis E. Jones, Jr., Free Speech: Pickets on the Grass, Alas! - Amidst Confusion, a Constant Principle, 29 S. CAL. L. REV. 137, 157 (1956) ("Picketing, like any other speech, is protected by the Constitution - as a means; however, like other speech, it will not be protected when used for the purpose of accomplishing an unlawful end."). For a vigorous exposition of the contrary point of view, see CHARLES O. GREGORY & HAROLD A. KATZ, LABOR AND THE LAW 289-329 (3d ed. 1979). See generally E. Merrick Dodd, Picketing and Free Speech: A Dissent, 56 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1943); Edgar A. Jones, Jr., Picketing and Coercion: A Reply, 39 VA. L. REV. 1063 (1953).
57. Theodore J. St. Antoine, Free Speech or Economic Weapon? The Persisting Problem of Picketing, 16 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 883 (1982). My approach was anticipated by Francis E. Jones, Jr., Free Speech: Pickets on the Grass, Alas! - Amidst Confusion, a Constant Principle, 29 S. CAL. L. REV. 137, 157 (1956) ("Picketing, like any other speech, is protected by the Constitution - as a means; however, like other speech, it will not be protected when used for the purpose of accomplishing an unlawful end."). For a vigorous exposition of the contrary point of view, see CHARLES O. GREGORY & HAROLD A. KATZ, LABOR AND THE LAW 289-329 (3d ed. 1979). See generally E. Merrick Dodd, Picketing and Free Speech: A Dissent, 56 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1943); Edgar A. Jones, Jr., Picketing and Coercion: A Reply, 39 VA. L. REV. 1063 (1953).
58. Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776 (1942) (Douglas, J., concurring). But cf. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 23 ("[A]ll speech is necessarily 'speech plus.'").
59. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
60. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949) (barring sound trucks); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (regulating parades).
61. Milk Wagon Drivers Union, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 293 (1941).
62. Cox, supra note 1, at 786 ("Nor can we seek to judge between appeals to reason and bare slogans arousing prejudice or emotion."). Picketing in certain situations might create a clear and present danger that a substantive evil would occur, while an oral or written communication delivered far from the scene or phrased in abstract terms might not. But that is a function of the immediacy and concreteness of the message rather than something inherent in the mode of communication. Speech other than picketing has been similarly analyzed. See also NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 678-79 (1959) (holding that a labor council's notice to its affiliated unions of a decision to picket a job site was "a signal in the nature of an order to the members of the affiliated unions to leave the job"); Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911) (examining the status of an unfair list used to "signal" a boycott by unionized employees acting in concert); cf. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that advocacy cannot be forbidden except when it is an "incitement to imminent lawless action"); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (holding that statute prohibiting advocacy of overthrow of government was limited to advocacy of specific acts and did not cover advocacy of overthrow as abstract doctrine); Archibald Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4 VAND. L. REV. 574, 601 (1951) ("[T]he Court cannot long distinguish between the picket line and the unfair list. . . .").
63. Cox, supra note 58, at 595, 602; see also Cox, supra note 1, at 787-93.
64. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
65. Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act forbids so-called secondary boycotts, whereby a union forces a neutral or secondary party not to deal with the union's primary target in a labor dispute. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(4)(B) (1994); see, e.g., Denver Bldg., 341 U.S. at 677-78 (picketing against general contractor to force him to dismiss nonunion sub-contractor). See generally Howard Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1363 (1962). For historical background, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies in American Law, 1880-1930, 66 TEXAS L. REV. 919 (1988). Another unlawful end would be getting an employer to force his employees to join a union. See, e.g., Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 285-86 (1957).
66. Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act forbids so-called secondary boycotts, whereby a union forces a neutral or secondary party not to deal with the union's primary target in a labor dispute. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(4)(B) (1994); see, e.g., Denver Bldg., 341 U.S. at 677-78 (picketing against general contractor to force him to dismiss nonunion sub-contractor). See generally Howard Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1363 (1962). For historical background, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies in American Law, 1880-1930, 66 TEXAS L. REV. 919 (1988). Another unlawful end would be getting an employer to force his employees to join a union. See, e.g., Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 285-86 (1957).
67. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 99 (1940); see also cases cited supra note 45.
68. 377 U.S. 58 (1964). Justice Black, concurring, believed Congress intended to proscribe secondary consumer picketing like that in Tree Fruits, but he would have found the statute so construed unconstitutional. Id. at 76. (Black, J., concurring); cf. Police Dep't of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (invalidating ordinance on basis of Equal Protection Clause - although the First Amendment was "intertwined" - because it forbade picketing next to a school but exempted peaceful picketing during a labor dispute there).
69. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 909 (1982) (picketing in support of black boycott of white merchants to promote desegregation).
70. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
71. 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
72. Id. at 616.
73. E.g., IBEW Local 501 v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 705 (1951), cited in Safeco, 447 U.S. at 616.
74. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 616-17 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 618 (Stevens, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 617-18.
76. Id. at 619 (emphasis added).
77. Cf. Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 775 (1942) (Douglas, J., concurring) (querying whether a state "can prohibit picketing when it is effective but may not prohibit it when it is ineffective").
78. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 622-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
79. ARCHIBALD COX, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 47 (1980); cf. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 576 (1988) ("We do not suggest that communications by labor unions are never of the commercial speech variety and thereby entitled to a lesser degree of constitutional protection.").
80. 310 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1940). Even the more conservative and scholarly Justice Frankfurter was ready to concede, "Peaceful picketing is the workingman's means of communication." Milk Wagon Drivers Union, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 293 (1941).
81. See supra note 33.
82. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
83. 485 U.S. 568 (1988).
84. Id. at 570, 573 (quoting 273 N.L.R.B. 1431, 1432 (1985) (internal quotation omitted)). The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit had denied enforcement. 796 F.2d 1328 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
85. DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 575. There were no dissents. Justices O'Connor and Scalia concurred in the judgment. Justice Kennedy did not participate. For Justice White the handbills did not appear "typical commercial speech" advertising the price or merits of a product since they "pressed the merits of unionism to the community" and "the dangers of inadequate wages to the economy." But even as commercial speech the handbills would present "serious constitutional issues." Id. at 576.
86. Id. at 580 (quoting Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 311 n.17 (1979) (quoting Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 465 (1950)) (internal quotation omitted); see also NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 619 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) (internal quotation omitted)).
87. DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 580.
88. Id. at 588.
89. See, e.g., Brown & Root v. La. State AFL-CIO, 10 F.3d 316 (1994) (lobbying); cf. Sequoia Constr., Inc. v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local Union No. 12, 136 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2021 (D. Nev. 1990) (leaflets and newspaper article). See generally Thomas C. Kohler, Setting the Conditions for Self-Rule: Unions, Associations, Our First Amendment Discourse and the Problem of DeBartolo, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 149; James Gray Pope, Labor-Community Coalitions and Boycotts: The Old Labor Law, the New Unionism, and the Living Constitution, 69 TEXAS L. REV. 889 (1991).
90. See, e.g., Brown & Root v. La. State AFL-CIO, 10 F.3d 316 (1994) (lobbying); cf. Sequoia Constr., Inc. v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local Union No. 12, 136 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2021 (D. Nev. 1990) (leaflets and newspaper article). See generally Thomas C. Kohler, Setting the Conditions for Self-Rule: Unions, Associations, Our First Amendment Discourse and the Problem of DeBartolo, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 149; James Gray Pope, Labor-Community Coalitions and Boycotts: The Old Labor Law, the New Unionism, and the Living Constitution, 69 TEXAS L. REV. 889 (1991).
91. NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 470-74 (1941).
92. Id. at 476-77 (quoting NLRB order).
93. Id. at 477.
94. Id. at 479.
95. Id. at 477.
96. Id. at 480.
97. Cox, supra note 1, at 784.
98. NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941).
99. E.g., NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1946); NLRB v. Am. Tube Bending Co., 134 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1943); Jacksonville Paper Co. v. NLRB, 137 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1943).
100. Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1994): "The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit."
101. E.g., J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 292, 302-03 (2d Cir. 1967); Daniel Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 805, 811 (4th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Kropp Forge Co., 178 F.2d 822, 828-29 (7th Cir. 1949). But cf. Surprenant Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 756, 758-60 (6th Cir. 1965); Wellington Mill Div., West Point Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 579, 583 (4th Cir. 1964).
102. 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969).
103. Kinney Drugs, Inc. v. NLRB, 74 F.3d 1419, 1429 (2d Cir. 1996).
104. DTR Indus. v. NLRB, 39 F. 3d 106 (6th Cir. 1994).
105. Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. NLRB, 36 F.3d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
106. See supra text accompanying note 87.
107. See Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. NLRB, 365 F.2d 898, 909-10 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
108. To preclude conflicts of interest, the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments added to § 9(b) of the NLRA a requirement that guards could not be represented by a union admitting employees other than guards to membership. Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, tit. I (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1994)).
109. 155 F.2d 567 (7th Cir. 1946), vacated by 331 U.S. 398 (1947).
110. 146 F.2d 718 (6th Cir. 1944), vacated by 331 U.S. 416 (1947). 105. 331 U.S. 416, 420 (1947); see also Atkins, 331 U.S. at 401.
111. Atkins, 331 U.S. at 403-14.
112. Jones & Laughlin, 331 U.S. at 422-26.
113. Id. at 423-24.
114. Atkins, 331 U.S. at 414-15.
115. See supra note 102.
116. NLRA § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994), overturning NLRB v. Hearst Publ'g, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
117. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980) (5-4 decision).
118. NLRB v. Kentucky River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706 (2001) (5-4 decision); NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571 (1994) (5-4 decision). See generally David M. Rabban, Can American Labor Law Accommodate Collective Bargaining by Professional Employees?, 99 YALE L.J. 689 (1990); David M. Rabban, Distinguishing Excluded Managers from Covered Professionals under the NLRA, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1775 (1989).
119. NLRB v. Kentucky River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706 (2001) (5-4 decision); NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571 (1994) (5-4 decision). See generally David M. Rabban, Can American Labor Law Accommodate Collective Bargaining by Professional Employees?, 99 YALE L.J. 689 (1990); David M. Rabban, Distinguishing Excluded Managers from Covered Professionals under the NLRA, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1775 (1989).
120. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
121. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth (1994).
122. Steele, 323 U.S. at 198.
123. Id. at 202-03.
124. Id. at 204.
125. Id. at 208 (Murphy, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 208, 209.
127. 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1994)).
128. Railway Labor Act Amendments of 1934, ch. 691, 48 Stat. 1185 (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-152 (1994)).
129. 78 Stat. 241, 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994)). For different accounts of the legislative struggle, see Herbert Hill, Black Workers, Organized Labor, and Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act: Legislative History and Litigation Record, in RACE IN AMERICA: THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 263, 265-71 (Herbert Hill & James E. Jones, Jr. eds., 1993); Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431, 437-47 (1965).
130. 78 Stat. 241, 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994)). For different accounts of the legislative struggle, see Herbert Hill, Black Workers, Organized Labor, and Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act: Legislative History and Litigation Record, in RACE IN AMERICA: THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 263, 265-71 (Herbert Hill & James E. Jones, Jr. eds., 1993); Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431, 437-47 (1965).
131. Cox, supra note 1, at 773.
132. Id. at 774.
133. Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955) (mem.); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953) ("wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative"). See generally THE CHANGING LAW OF FAIR REPRESENTATION (Jean T. McKelvey ed., 1985).
134. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190, 191 (1967).
135. United Steelworkers v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 372-73 (1990).
136. Local 12, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966); Metal Workers Local 1 (Hughes Tool Co.), 147 N.LR.B. 1573 (1964); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). Board dissenters argued that the listing of employee rights in § 7 of the original NLRA of 1935 was unchanged by the 1947 amendments. Section 7 could not have contained an implied fair-representation duty binding on labor organizations, therefore, since only employers (who by themselves have no such duty) were subject in 1935 to the Act's unfair labor practice provisions.
137. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1994).
138. Ry. Employes' [sic] Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 232 (1956) (holding RLA § 2, Eleventh not unconstitutional on its face).
139. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
140. Id. at 764.
141. Id. at 785 (Black, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 799-801 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
143. It is only fair to mention that I drafted the amicus brief for the AFL-CIO in Street. 137. Street, 367 U.S. at 818 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
144. See supra text accompanying notes 85-91.
145. Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 447 (1984); see also Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988) (employees subject to NLRA); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (public sector employees).
146. See generally Roger C. Hartley, Constitutional Values and the Adjudication of Taft-Hartley Act Dues Objector Cases, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1989). Other federal and state statutes expressly limit a union's political contributions and expenditures. See generally Robert M. Cohan, Comment, Of Politics, Pipefitters, and Section 610: Union Political Contributions in Modern Context, 51 TEXAS L. REV. 936 (1973).
147. See generally Roger C. Hartley, Constitutional Values and the Adjudication of Taft-Hartley Act Dues Objector Cases, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1989). Other federal and state statutes expressly limit a union's political contributions and expenditures. See generally Robert M. Cohan, Comment, Of Politics, Pipefitters, and Section 610: Union Political Contributions in Modern Context, 51 TEXAS L. REV. 936 (1973).
148. 321 U.S. 590 (1944).
149. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 7(a), 52 Stat. 1060, 1063, § 7(a) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) (1994)).
150. TCI, 321 U.S. at 592.
151. Id. at 596.
152. Id. at 604 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 605 (Jackson, J., concurring).
153. 325 U.S. 161 (1945).
154. Id. at 166 (quoting 53 F. Supp. 935, 950 (D. Va. 1944) (internal quotation omitted)).
155. Id. at 167 (quoting TCI, 321 U.S. at 602 (internal quotation omitted)).
156. Id. at 195.
157. 328 U.S. 680 (1946).
158. Id. at 691-92 (quoting TCI, 321 U.S. at 598 (internal quotation omitted)).
159. Mt. Clemens, 328 U.S. at 691.
160. Cox, supra note 1, at 807-08.
161. Id. at 808.
162. Id. at 809.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 810.
165. 61 Stat. 84, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251, 254 (1994). Section 4 of the Act provides that, in the absence of custom, practice, or contract to the contrary, the FLSA's minimum wage and overtime requirements do not apply to an employee's time spent in (1) "walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of performance of the principal activity or activities" and (2) "activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to said principal activity or activities." 29 U.S.C. § 254(a).
166. Cox, supra note 1, at 810.
167. FINE (1984), supra note 25, at 595.
168. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
169. For Justice Murphy, of course, it might have to be a living, breathing, vital principle - free speech, nondiscrimination, or something of equally practical meaning - and not an arid, abstract "formality" of legal doctrine. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. As Attorney General, also, Murphy gained a reputation for placing principle before political or other factional interests. See supra text accompanying note 25.