Optimal assignment of principalship in teams

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 44, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 105-127

  Li, Shuhe ^a   Zhang, Weiying ^b  

^a CITY UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

^b Peking University   (China)

Author keywords

D2; D8; L2; Monitoring; Partnership; Principal agent; Team

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042367305     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(00)00148-7     Document Type: Article

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