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Volumn 29, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 271-290

Toward a theory of reinsurance and retrocession

Author keywords

C72; G22; Reinsurance; Retrocession; Strategic market game

Indexed keywords


EID: 0042366360     PISSN: 01676687     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-6687(01)00087-7     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (8)

References (13)
  • 1
    • 84885902394 scopus 로고
    • The core of a reinsurance market
    • Baton B., Lemaire J. The core of a reinsurance market. Astin Bulletin. 12(1):1981a;57-71.
    • (1981) Astin Bulletin , vol.12 , Issue.1 , pp. 57-71
    • Baton, B.1    Lemaire, J.2
  • 2
    • 0010051416 scopus 로고
    • The bargaining set of a reinsurance market
    • Baton B., Lemaire J. The bargaining set of a reinsurance market. Astin Bulletin. 12(2):1981b;101-114.
    • (1981) Astin Bulletin , vol.12 , Issue.2 , pp. 101-114
    • Baton, B.1    Lemaire, J.2
  • 3
    • 0001096696 scopus 로고
    • Equilibrium in a reinsurance market
    • Borch K. Equilibrium in a reinsurance market. Econometrica. 30:1962;424-444.
    • (1962) Econometrica , vol.30 , pp. 424-444
    • Borch, K.1
  • 5
    • 49349123588 scopus 로고
    • A theory of money and financial institutions. 28. The non-cooperative equilibria of a closed trading economy with market supply and bidding strategies
    • Dubey P., Shubik M. A theory of money and financial institutions. 28. The non-cooperative equilibria of a closed trading economy with market supply and bidding strategies. Journal of Economic Theory. 17:1978;1-20.
    • (1978) Journal of Economic Theory , vol.17 , pp. 1-20
    • Dubey, P.1    Shubik, M.2
  • 6
    • 0042363200 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Insurance Information Institute, Insurance Information Institute, New York
    • Insurance Information Institute, 1996. Fact Book, 1997 - Property/Casualty Insurance Facts. Insurance Information Institute, New York.
    • (1996) Fact Book, 1997 - Property/Casualty Insurance Facts
  • 7
    • 0008183610 scopus 로고
    • Risk aversion and the negotiation of insurance contracts
    • Kihlstrom R., Roth A. Risk aversion and the negotiation of insurance contracts. The Journal of Risk and Insurance. 49(4):1982;372-387.
    • (1982) The Journal of Risk and Insurance , vol.49 , Issue.4 , pp. 372-387
    • Kihlstrom, R.1    Roth, A.2
  • 8
    • 0012682187 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • What is insurance? Lessons from the captive insurance tax controversy
    • Porat M.M., Powers M.R. What is insurance? Lessons from the captive insurance tax controversy. Risk Management and Insurance Review. 2(2):1999;72-80.
    • (1999) Risk Management and Insurance Review , vol.2 , Issue.2 , pp. 72-80
    • Porat, M.M.1    Powers, M.R.2
  • 10
    • 0032583018 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • On the tradeoff between the law of large numbers and oligopoly in insurance
    • Powers M.R., Shubik M. On the tradeoff between the law of large numbers and oligopoly in insurance. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics. 23(2):1998;141-156.
    • (1998) Insurance: Mathematics and Economics , vol.23 , Issue.2 , pp. 141-156
    • Powers, M.R.1    Shubik, M.2
  • 12
    • 0010015508 scopus 로고
    • Insurance market games: Scale effects and public policy
    • Yale University, New Haven, CT
    • Powers, M.R., Shubik, M., Yao, S.T., 1994. Insurance market games: scale effects and public policy. Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1076. Yale University, New Haven, CT.
    • (1994) Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper , vol.1076
    • Powers, M.R.1    Shubik, M.2    Yao, S.T.3


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.