Corporate liability standards: When should corporations be held criminally liable?

American Criminal Law Review

Volumn 37, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 1239-

  Khanna, V S ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0042260485     PISSN: 01640364     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (13)

1. See John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 447-48 (1981) (suggesting institutional and practical reasons for the continuation of corporate criminal liability); Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime: Individualism, Collectivism, and Accountability, 11 SYDNEY L. REV. 468, 504-07 (1988) (suggesting corporate criminal liability for corporations that hide their wrongdoing); Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609, 618-622 (1998) (arguing that the law's expressive function may provide a justification for corporate criminal liability); Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1231-42 (1979) (noting that desert theory and perhaps consequentialism may provide a justification for corporate criminal liability) [hereinafter Developments]. For a more general discussion of corporate liability, see generally Daniel Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319 (1996) (arguing against corporate criminal liability and also in favor of strict vicarious liability); V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477 (1996) (arguing corporate criminal liability should be replaced with corporate civil liability); Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984).
2. See John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 447-48 (1981) (suggesting institutional and practical reasons for the continuation of corporate criminal liability); Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime: Individualism, Collectivism, and Accountability, 11 SYDNEY L. REV. 468, 504-07 (1988) (suggesting corporate criminal liability for corporations that hide their wrongdoing); Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609, 618-622 (1998) (arguing that the law's expressive function may provide a justification for corporate criminal liability); Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1231-42 (1979) (noting that desert theory and perhaps consequentialism may provide a justification for corporate criminal liability) [hereinafter Developments]. For a more general discussion of corporate liability, see generally Daniel Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319 (1996) (arguing against corporate criminal liability and also in favor of strict vicarious liability); V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477 (1996) (arguing corporate criminal liability should be replaced with corporate civil liability); Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984).
3. See John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 447-48 (1981) (suggesting institutional and practical reasons for the continuation of corporate criminal liability); Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime: Individualism, Collectivism, and Accountability, 11 SYDNEY L. REV. 468, 504-07 (1988) (suggesting corporate criminal liability for corporations that hide their wrongdoing); Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609, 618-622 (1998) (arguing that the law's expressive function may provide a justification for corporate criminal liability); Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1231-42 (1979) (noting that desert theory and perhaps consequentialism may provide a justification for corporate criminal liability) [hereinafter Developments]. For a more general discussion of corporate liability, see generally Daniel Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319 (1996) (arguing against corporate criminal liability and also in favor of strict vicarious liability); V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477 (1996) (arguing corporate criminal liability should be replaced with corporate civil liability); Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984).
4. See John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 447-48 (1981) (suggesting institutional and practical reasons for the continuation of corporate criminal liability); Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime: Individualism, Collectivism, and Accountability, 11 SYDNEY L. REV. 468, 504-07 (1988) (suggesting corporate criminal liability for corporations that hide their wrongdoing); Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609, 618-622 (1998) (arguing that the law's expressive function may provide a justification for corporate criminal liability); Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1231-42 (1979) (noting that desert theory and perhaps consequentialism may provide a justification for corporate criminal liability) [hereinafter Developments]. For a more general discussion of corporate liability, see generally Daniel Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319 (1996) (arguing against corporate criminal liability and also in favor of strict vicarious liability); V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477 (1996) (arguing corporate criminal liability should be replaced with corporate civil liability); Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984).
5. See John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 447-48 (1981) (suggesting institutional and practical reasons for the continuation of corporate criminal liability); Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime: Individualism, Collectivism, and Accountability, 11 SYDNEY L. REV. 468, 504-07 (1988) (suggesting corporate criminal liability for corporations that hide their wrongdoing); Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609, 618-622 (1998) (arguing that the law's expressive function may provide a justification for corporate criminal liability); Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1231-42 (1979) (noting that desert theory and perhaps consequentialism may provide a justification for corporate criminal liability) [hereinafter Developments]. For a more general discussion of corporate liability, see generally Daniel Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319 (1996) (arguing against corporate criminal liability and also in favor of strict vicarious liability); V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477 (1996) (arguing corporate criminal liability should be replaced with corporate civil liability); Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984).
6. See John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 447-48 (1981) (suggesting institutional and practical reasons for the continuation of corporate criminal liability); Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime: Individualism, Collectivism, and Accountability, 11 SYDNEY L. REV. 468, 504-07 (1988) (suggesting corporate criminal liability for corporations that hide their wrongdoing); Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609, 618-622 (1998) (arguing that the law's expressive function may provide a justification for corporate criminal liability); Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1231-42 (1979) (noting that desert theory and perhaps consequentialism may provide a justification for corporate criminal liability) [hereinafter Developments]. For a more general discussion of corporate liability, see generally Daniel Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319 (1996) (arguing against corporate criminal liability and also in favor of strict vicarious liability); V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477 (1996) (arguing corporate criminal liability should be replaced with corporate civil liability); Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984).
7. See John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 447-48 (1981) (suggesting institutional and practical reasons for the continuation of corporate criminal liability); Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime: Individualism, Collectivism, and Accountability, 11 SYDNEY L. REV. 468, 504-07 (1988) (suggesting corporate criminal liability for corporations that hide their wrongdoing); Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609, 618-622 (1998) (arguing that the law's expressive function may provide a justification for corporate criminal liability); Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1231-42 (1979) (noting that desert theory and perhaps consequentialism may provide a justification for corporate criminal liability) [hereinafter Developments]. For a more general discussion of corporate liability, see generally Daniel Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319 (1996) (arguing against corporate criminal liability and also in favor of strict vicarious liability); V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477 (1996) (arguing corporate criminal liability should be replaced with corporate civil liability); Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984).
8. See RICHARD S. GRUNER, CORPORATE CRIME AND SENTENCING § 3.4.2, at 198-203 & § 4.1-.2, at 263-84 (1994) (discussing how agent's mens rea is attributed to the corporation); Pamela Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1121-48 (1991) (equating corporate mens rea with "corporate ethos"); Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141, 1197-1201 (1983) (equating corporate mens rea with "reactive fault"); see generally Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997) (discussing problems with strict liability and negligence and how reliance on composite or mixed liability regimes could yield improvements in deterrence); V.S. Khanna, Is the Notion of Corporate Fault A Faulty Notion?: The Case of Corporate Mens Rea, 79 B.U. L. REV. 355 (1999) (arguing that corporate mens rea is a flawed liability standard relative to strict liability or certain negligence rules and that a composite liability regime mixing strict liability or negligence with certain elements of corporate mens rea is more desirable); William S. Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L.J. 647 (1994) (critiquing some methods of finding corporate mens rea and proposing a constructive model of corporate culpability).
9. See RICHARD S. GRUNER, CORPORATE CRIME AND SENTENCING § 3.4.2, at 198-203 & § 4.1-.2, at 263-84 (1994) (discussing how agent's mens rea is attributed to the corporation); Pamela Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1121-48 (1991) (equating corporate mens rea with "corporate ethos"); Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141, 1197-1201 (1983) (equating corporate mens rea with "reactive fault"); see generally Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997) (discussing problems with strict liability and negligence and how reliance on composite or mixed liability regimes could yield improvements in deterrence); V.S. Khanna, Is the Notion of Corporate Fault A Faulty Notion?: The Case of Corporate Mens Rea, 79 B.U. L. REV. 355 (1999) (arguing that corporate mens rea is a flawed liability standard relative to strict liability or certain negligence rules and that a composite liability regime mixing strict liability or negligence with certain elements of corporate mens rea is more desirable); William S. Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L.J. 647 (1994) (critiquing some methods of finding corporate mens rea and proposing a constructive model of corporate culpability).
10. See RICHARD S. GRUNER, CORPORATE CRIME AND SENTENCING § 3.4.2, at 198-203 & § 4.1-.2, at 263-84 (1994) (discussing how agent's mens rea is attributed to the corporation); Pamela Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1121-48 (1991) (equating corporate mens rea with "corporate ethos"); Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141, 1197-1201 (1983) (equating corporate mens rea with "reactive fault"); see generally Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997) (discussing problems with strict liability and negligence and how reliance on composite or mixed liability regimes could yield improvements in deterrence); V.S. Khanna, Is the Notion of Corporate Fault A Faulty Notion?: The Case of Corporate Mens Rea, 79 B.U. L. REV. 355 (1999) (arguing that corporate mens rea is a flawed liability standard relative to strict liability or certain negligence rules and that a composite liability regime mixing strict liability or negligence with certain elements of corporate mens rea is more desirable); William S. Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L.J. 647 (1994) (critiquing some methods of finding corporate mens rea and proposing a constructive model of corporate culpability).
11. See RICHARD S. GRUNER, CORPORATE CRIME AND SENTENCING § 3.4.2, at 198-203 & § 4.1-.2, at 263-84 (1994) (discussing how agent's mens rea is attributed to the corporation); Pamela Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1121-48 (1991) (equating corporate mens rea with "corporate ethos"); Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141, 1197-1201 (1983) (equating corporate mens rea with "reactive fault"); see generally Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997) (discussing problems with strict liability and negligence and how reliance on composite or mixed liability regimes could yield improvements in deterrence); V.S. Khanna, Is the Notion of Corporate Fault A Faulty Notion?: The Case of Corporate Mens Rea, 79 B.U. L. REV. 355 (1999) (arguing that corporate mens rea is a flawed liability standard relative to strict liability or certain negligence rules and that a composite liability regime mixing strict liability or negligence with certain elements of corporate mens rea is more desirable); William S. Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L.J. 647 (1994) (critiquing some methods of finding corporate mens rea and proposing a constructive model of corporate culpability).
12. See RICHARD S. GRUNER, CORPORATE CRIME AND SENTENCING § 3.4.2, at 198-203 & § 4.1-.2, at 263-84 (1994) (discussing how agent's mens rea is attributed to the corporation); Pamela Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1121-48 (1991) (equating corporate mens rea with "corporate ethos"); Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141, 1197-1201 (1983) (equating corporate mens rea with "reactive fault"); see generally Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997) (discussing problems with strict liability and negligence and how reliance on composite or mixed liability regimes could yield improvements in deterrence); V.S. Khanna, Is the Notion of Corporate Fault A Faulty Notion?: The Case of Corporate Mens Rea, 79 B.U. L. REV. 355 (1999) (arguing that corporate mens rea is a flawed liability standard relative to strict liability or certain negligence rules and that a composite liability regime mixing strict liability or negligence with certain elements of corporate mens rea is more desirable); William S. Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L.J. 647 (1994) (critiquing some methods of finding corporate mens rea and proposing a constructive model of corporate culpability).
13. See RICHARD S. GRUNER, CORPORATE CRIME AND SENTENCING § 3.4.2, at 198-203 & § 4.1-.2, at 263-84 (1994) (discussing how agent's mens rea is attributed to the corporation); Pamela Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1121-48 (1991) (equating corporate mens rea with "corporate ethos"); Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141, 1197-1201 (1983) (equating corporate mens rea with "reactive fault"); see generally Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997) (discussing problems with strict liability and negligence and how reliance on composite or mixed liability regimes could yield improvements in deterrence); V.S. Khanna, Is the Notion of Corporate Fault A Faulty Notion?: The Case of Corporate Mens Rea, 79 B.U. L. REV. 355 (1999) (arguing that corporate mens rea is a flawed liability standard relative to strict liability or certain negligence rules and that a composite liability regime mixing strict liability or negligence with certain elements of corporate mens rea is more desirable); William S. Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L.J. 647 (1994) (critiquing some methods of finding corporate mens rea and proposing a constructive model of corporate culpability).