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0042109284
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163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that a state may require railway companies to segregate their passenger cars by race)
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163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that a state may require railway companies to segregate their passenger cars by race).
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2
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0042109285
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Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
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Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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3
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0042109283
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See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (prohibiting segregated public schools)
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See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (prohibiting segregated public schools).
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4
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0042109286
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note
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See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (holding that state or federal race-conscious laws are permissible but that they will be subjected to strict scrutiny by the Court and allowed only when they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling government interests). For an example of a racial classification that survived strict scrutiny, see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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5
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0043111172
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note
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163 U.S. at 550-52; see also infra Part II.B.3. The Court wrote in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, that Plessy had been overruled by Brown on the "basis of facts, or an understanding of facts, changed from those which furnished the claimed justifications for the earlier constitutional resolutions." 505 U.S. 833, 836 (1992). However, Brown did not repudiate Plessy's holding that it was permissible for a state to classify its citizens based on race. In Brown, the Court found that even if segregated educational facilities were equal, segregation in educational institutions was impermissible because of the psychological effect of the segregation on African-American children. 347 U.S. at 493-95. This is not a repudiation of racial classification, it is a finding that a particular use of racial classification (segregation of educational facilities) is impermissible because of its adverse effect.
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