Vertical Support, Horizontal Linkages, and Regional Disparities in China: Typology, Incentive Structure, and Operational Logic

Issues and Studies

Volumn 37, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 121-148

  Chung, Jae H O ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Horizontal networks; Interregional cooperation; Local protectionism; Regional disparities; State capacity

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042194777     PISSN: 10132511     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (128)

1. See Richard J. Samuels, The Politics of Regional Policy in Japan: Localities Incorporated? (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), 9-17; Gernot Grabher, ed., The Embedded Firm: On the Socioeconomics of Industrial Networks (London: Routledge, 1993); and Anna Lee Saxenian, Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994).
2. See Richard J. Samuels, The Politics of Regional Policy in Japan: Localities Incorporated? (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), 9-17; Gernot Grabher, ed., The Embedded Firm: On the Socioeconomics of Industrial Networks (London: Routledge, 1993); and Anna Lee Saxenian, Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994).
3. See Richard J. Samuels, The Politics of Regional Policy in Japan: Localities Incorporated? (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), 9-17; Gernot Grabher, ed., The Embedded Firm: On the Socioeconomics of Industrial Networks (London: Routledge, 1993); and Anna Lee Saxenian, Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994).
4. See John Williamson, ed., Economic Consequences of Soviet Disintegration (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1993), chaps. 4-5; and Gernot Grabher and David Stark, eds., Restructuring Networks in Post-Socialism: Legacies, Linkages, and Localities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
5. See John Williamson, ed., Economic Consequences of Soviet Disintegration (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1993), chaps. 4-5; and Gernot Grabher and David Stark, eds., Restructuring Networks in Post-Socialism: Legacies, Linkages, and Localities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
6. See Benjamin Higgins and Donald J. Savoie, Regional Development Theories and Their Application (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1997), chaps. 2, 5, 8; and Chris Pickvance, "Mediating Institutions in the Transition from State Socialism: The case of Local Government," in Grabher and Stark, Restructuring Networks in Port-Socialism, 305-23.
7. See Benjamin Higgins and Donald J. Savoie, Regional Development Theories and Their Application (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1997), chaps. 2, 5, 8; and Chris Pickvance, "Mediating Institutions in the Transition from State Socialism: The case of Local Government," in Grabher and Stark, Restructuring Networks in Port-Socialism, 305-23.
8. Beijing's concern for regional disparities was a political gesture during much of the 1980's. No explicit concern was expressed in Zhao Ziyang's (jiuwujiL, ) speech to the National People's Congress in May 1984. The Seventh Five-Year Plan for 1986-90 had as its key priority the development of the eastern region although Beijing did consider some support for the "old, minorities, border, and poor" regions. See Zhengfu gongzuo baogao (Government work report) (Hong Kong: Sanlian, 1984), 15-16 and Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan diqige wunian jihua 1986-90 (The seventh five-year plan for the national economic and social development in the PRC) (Beijing: Renmin chubansche, 1986), 91-108. It was only in the 1990's that priorities gradually shifted towards "regionally coordinated economic development" (quyu jingji xietiao fazhan -hfjkogjkjfel[) and toward providing more support for the inland region. See Guanyu quomin jingji he shehui fazhan jiuwu jihua he 2010-nian yuanjing mubiao gangyao de baogao (Report on the ninth five- year plan for the national economic and social development and the long-term goal for 2010) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1996), 21-22, 99-103 and Xu Goudi, "Study of the Principal Path Toward a Regionally Coordinated Economic Development for the Tenth Five-Year Plan and 2020," Jingji yanjiu cankao (References for Economics Research), no. 1282 (May 4, 1999): 2-13.
9. Beijing's concern for regional disparities was a political gesture during much of the 1980's. No explicit concern was expressed in Zhao Ziyang's (jiuwujiL, ) speech to the National People's Congress in May 1984. The Seventh Five-Year Plan for 1986-90 had as its key priority the development of the eastern region although Beijing did consider some support for the "old, minorities, border, and poor" regions. See Zhengfu gongzuo baogao (Government work report) (Hong Kong: Sanlian, 1984), 15-16 and Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan diqige wunian jihua 1986-90 (The seventh five-year plan for the national economic and social development in the PRC) (Beijing: Renmin chubansche, 1986), 91-108. It was only in the 1990's that priorities gradually shifted towards "regionally coordinated economic development" (quyu jingji xietiao fazhan -hfjkogjkjfel[) and toward providing more support for the inland region. See Guanyu quomin jingji he shehui fazhan jiuwu jihua he 2010-nian yuanjing mubiao gangyao de baogao (Report on the ninth five- year plan for the national economic and social development and the long-term goal for 2010) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1996), 21-22, 99-103 and Xu Goudi, "Study of the Principal Path Toward a Regionally Coordinated Economic Development for the Tenth Five-Year Plan and 2020," Jingji yanjiu cankao (References for Economics Research), no. 1282 (May 4, 1999): 2-13.
10. Beijing's concern for regional disparities was a political gesture during much of the 1980's. No explicit concern was expressed in Zhao Ziyang's (jiuwujiL, ) speech to the National People's Congress in May 1984. The Seventh Five-Year Plan for 1986-90 had as its key priority the development of the eastern region although Beijing did consider some support for the "old, minorities, border, and poor" regions. See Zhengfu gongzuo baogao (Government work report) (Hong Kong: Sanlian, 1984), 15-16 and Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan diqige wunian jihua 1986-90 (The seventh five-year plan for the national economic and social development in the PRC) (Beijing: Renmin chubansche, 1986), 91-108. It was only in the 1990's that priorities gradually shifted towards "regionally coordinated economic development" (quyu jingji xietiao fazhan -hfjkogjkjfel[) and toward providing more support for the inland region. See Guanyu quomin jingji he shehui fazhan jiuwu jihua he 2010-nian yuanjing mubiao gangyao de baogao (Report on the ninth five-year plan for the national economic and social development and the long-term goal for 2010) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1996), 21-22, 99-103 and Xu Goudi, "Study of the Principal Path Toward a Regionally Coordinated Economic Development for the Tenth Five-Year Plan and 2020," Jingji yanjiu cankao (References for Economics Research), no. 1282 (May 4, 1999): 2-13.
11. Beijing's concern for regional disparities was a political gesture during much of the 1980's. No explicit concern was expressed in Zhao Ziyang's (jiuwujiL, ) speech to the National People's Congress in May 1984. The Seventh Five-Year Plan for 1986-90 had as its key priority the development of the eastern region although Beijing did consider some support for the "old, minorities, border, and poor" regions. See Zhengfu gongzuo baogao (Government work report) (Hong Kong: Sanlian, 1984), 15-16 and Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan diqige wunian jihua 1986-90 (The seventh five-year plan for the national economic and social development in the PRC) (Beijing: Renmin chubansche, 1986), 91-108. It was only in the 1990's that priorities gradually shifted towards "regionally coordinated economic development" (quyu jingji xietiao fazhan -hfjkogjkjfel[) and toward providing more support for the inland region. See Guanyu quomin jingji he shehui fazhan jiuwu jihua he 2010-nian yuanjing mubiao gangyao de baogao (Report on the ninth five- year plan for the national economic and social development and the long-term goal for 2010) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1996), 21-22, 99-103 and Xu Goudi, "Study of the Principal Path Toward a Regionally Coordinated Economic Development for the Tenth Five-Year Plan and 2020," Jingji yanjiu cankao (References for Economics Research), no. 1282 (May 4, 1999): 2-13.
12. For details of these measures, see Jae Ho Chung, "Regional Disparities, Policy Choices, and State Capacity in China," China Perspectives, no. 31 (September-October 2000): 37-41.
13. For the cases of Britain and Germany in this regard, see Jeffrey J. Anderson, The Territorial Imperative: Pluralism, Corporatism, and Economic Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 61-97.
14. In Chinese terms, "economic stimuli", "direct control" (zhijie kongzhi), and "public location" (gonggong quwei) belong to vertical policy support. See Chen Yao, Guojia zhongxibu fazhan zhengce yanjiu, (Study of China's policy of developing the central and western regions) (Beijing: Jingji guanli chubanshe, 2000), 74-77.
15. For such variations, see Jae Ho Chung, ed., Cities in China: Recipes for Economic Development in the Reform Era (London: Routledge, 1999).
16. See Gary Miller, Managerial Dilemma: The Political Economy of Hierarchy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), chaps. 4-6.
17. See Wei Wei, Zhongguo jingji fazhanzhong de quyu chadao yu quyu xietiao (Regional disparities and coordination in China's economic development) (Hefei: Anhui renmin chubanshe, 1995), 75.
18. Development Research Center of the State Council, Zhongguo quyu xietiao fazhan zhanlue (Strategies for China's coordinated regional development) (Beijing: Zhongguo jingji chubanshe, 1994), 16-17.
19. Despite the rhetoric, quite a large portion of funds was provided by the central government to support local economic development. See Christine P.W. Wong, "The Maoist Model Reconsidered: Local Self-Reliance and the Financing of Rural Industrialization," in New Perspectives on the Cultural Revolution, ed. William Joseph, Christine P.W. Wong, and David Zweig (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), 183-96.
20. Some Chinese sources suggest that Beijing attempted to establish interregional cooperative networks on at least three occasions in 1954, 1961, and 1970, with little accomplishment to note. See Zhang Wanqing, Quyu hezuo yu jingji wangluo (Interregional cooperation and economic linkages) (Beijing: Jingji kexue chubanshe, 1987), 26. For horizontal cooperation in the realm of materials allocation since the 1950s, the value amounted to 3 billion yuan in 1980. See Dangdai Zhongguo de wuzi liutong (Materials circulation in contemporary China) (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1993), 132-35. For the geographical limitations of such "lateral exchanges," see Dorothy J. Solinger, "Urban Reform and Relational Contracting in Post-Mao China," in China's Transition from Socialism: Statist Legacies and Market Reforms 1980-1990 (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 119.
21. Some Chinese sources suggest that Beijing attempted to establish interregional cooperative networks on at least three occasions in 1954, 1961, and 1970, with little accomplishment to note. See Zhang Wanqing, Quyu hezuo yu jingji wangluo (Interregional cooperation and economic linkages) (Beijing: Jingji kexue chubanshe, 1987), 26. For horizontal cooperation in the realm of materials allocation since the 1950s, the value amounted to 3 billion yuan in 1980. See Dangdai Zhongguo de wuzi liutong (Materials circulation in contemporary China) (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1993), 132-35. For the geographical limitations of such "lateral exchanges," see Dorothy J. Solinger, "Urban Reform and Relational Contracting in Post-Mao China," in China's Transition from Socialism: Statist Legacies and Market Reforms 1980-1990 (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 119.
22. Some Chinese sources suggest that Beijing attempted to establish interregional cooperative networks on at least three occasions in 1954, 1961, and 1970, with little accomplishment to note. See Zhang Wanqing, Quyu hezuo yu jingji wangluo (Interregional cooperation and economic linkages) (Beijing: Jingji kexue chubanshe, 1987), 26. For horizontal cooperation in the realm of materials allocation since the 1950s, the value amounted to 3 billion yuan in 1980. See Dangdai Zhongguo de wuzi liutong (Materials circulation in contemporary China) (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1993), 132-35. For the geographical limitations of such "lateral exchanges," see Dorothy J. Solinger, "Urban Reform and Relational Contracting in Post-Mao China," in China's Transition from Socialism: Statist Legacies and Market Reforms 1980-1990 (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 119.
23. Thomas Lyons, Economic Integration and Planning in Communist China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 51, 174.
24. Wu Zhe, Qingxie de guotu: Zhongguo quyu jingji bupingheng fazhan de xianshi yu qushi (Uneven regional economic development in China: Realities and trends) (Beijing: Zhongguo jingji chubanshe, 1995), 101.
25. For Beijing's near-total control over fiscal and material allocation during the pre-reform era, see Michel Oksenberg and James Tong, "The Evolution of Central-Provincial Fiscal Relations in China, 1971-1984: The Formal System," The China Quarterly, no. 125 (March 1991): I-12; and Penelope B. Prime, "Central-Provincial Investment and Finance: The Cultural Revolution and Its Legacy in Jiangsu Province," in Joseph, Wong, and Zweig, New Perspectives on the Cultural Revolution, 197-215.
26. For Beijing's near-total control over fiscal and material allocation during the pre-reform era, see Michel Oksenberg and James Tong, "The Evolution of Central-Provincial Fiscal Relations in China, 1971-1984: The Formal System," The China Quarterly, no. 125 (March 1991): I-12; and Penelope B. Prime, "Central-Provincial Investment and Finance: The Cultural Revolution and Its Legacy in Jiangsu Province," in Joseph, Wong, and Zweig, New Perspectives on the Cultural Revolution, 197-215.
27. Other discriminate arrangements included variant foriegn exchange retention rates, different FDI project approval limits, and selective sectoral deregulation. As a results, 87 percent of all foreign investment committed during 1985-95 went to the coastal region. See Sang Baichuan, Quyu kaifang zhanlue lun: Qingxie zhengce yu quanfangwei kaifang (On the strategy of regional opening: Discriminate policies and omnidirectional opening) (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 1996), 40-50; and Chen Dongsheng, Kuashiji de Zhongguo quyu fazhan (Regional development for the next century) (Beijing: Jingji guanli chubanshe, 1999), 203-4.
28. Other discriminate arrangements included variant foriegn exchange retention rates, different FDI project approval limits, and selective sectoral deregulation. As a results, 87 percent of all foreign investment committed during 1985-95 went to the coastal region. See Sang Baichuan, Quyu kaifang zhanlue lun: Qingxie zhengce yu quanfangwei kaifang (On the strategy of regional opening: Discriminate policies and omnidirectional opening) (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 1996), 40-50; and Chen Dongsheng, Kuashiji de Zhongguo quyu fazhan (Regional development for the next century) (Beijing: Jingji guanli chubanshe, 1999), 203-4.
29. For details, see Woo Tun-oy, "Regional Economic Development and Disparities," in The China Review 1996, ed. Maurice Brosseau, Suzanne Pepper, and Tsang Shu-ki (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1996), 283-84; Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang, The Political Economy of Uneven Development: The Case of China (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 42-50; and Zhang Dunfu and Jia Chenglin, Zhongguo quyujingji chadao yu xietiao fazhan (Regional disparities and coordinated development in China) (Beijing; Zhongguo qinggongye chubanshe, 2001), 8-16.
30. For details, see Woo Tun-oy, "Regional Economic Development and Disparities," in The China Review 1996, ed. Maurice Brosseau, Suzanne Pepper, and Tsang Shu-ki (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1996), 283-84; Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang, The Political Economy of Uneven Development: The Case of China (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 42-50; and Zhang Dunfu and Jia Chenglin, Zhongguo quyujingji chadao yu xietiao fazhan (Regional disparities and coordinated development in China) (Beijing; Zhongguo qinggongye chubanshe, 2001), 8-16.
31. For details, see Woo Tun-oy, "Regional Economic Development and Disparities," in The China Review 1996, ed. Maurice Brosseau, Suzanne Pepper, and Tsang Shu-ki (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1996), 283-84; Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang, The Political Economy of Uneven Development: The Case of China (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 42-50; and Zhang Dunfu and Jia Chenglin, Zhongguo quyujingji chadao yu xietiao fazhan (Regional disparities and coordinated development in China) (Beijing; Zhongguo qinggongye chubanshe, 2001), 8-16.
32. For Beijing's dilemma in this regard, see Barry Naughton, "The Decline of Central Control over Investment in Post-Mao China," in Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China, ed. David M. Lampton (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987), 76-77.
33. Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1996 (Statistical yearbook of China 1996) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1996), 22-23, 223.
34. Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1997, 233, 248.
35. Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2000, 255.
36. Ding Xianjiao, "Development and Changes in the Realm of Basic Construction Investment," Zhongguo caizheng (China Finance), October 1999, 11-12; and Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2000, 167.
37. Ding Xianjiao, "Development and Changes in the Realm of Basic Construction Investment," Zhongguo caizheng (China Finance), October 1999, 11-12; and Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2000, 167.
38. Wan Donghua and Qin Hongyu, "Actively Promote the Growth of Non-State Investment," Jingji yanjiu cankao, no. 1322 (September 4, 1999): 17-18.
39. Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2000, 257, 261.
40. See Dangdai Zhongguo caizheng (Contemporary China's finance) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1988), vol. 1:309-11; and Jae Ho Chung, "Beijing Confronting the Provinces: The 1994 Tax-Sharing Reform and Its Implications for Central-Provincial Relations in China," China Information 9, no. 2/3 (Winter 1994/95): 7-16.
41. See Dangdai Zhongguo caizheng (Contemporary China's finance) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1988), vol. 1:309-11; and Jae Ho Chung, "Beijing Confronting the Provinces: The 1994 Tax-Sharing Reform and Its Implications for Central-Provincial Relations in China," China Information 9, no. 2/3 (Winter 1994/95): 7-16.
42. See Wang Yiming, Zhongguo quyu jingji zhengce yanjiu (Study of China's regional economic policy) (Beijing: Zhongguo jihua chubanshe, 1998), 28-41.
43. See Gui Shiyong ed., Zhongguo jihua tizhi gaige (Reform of China's plan system) (Beijing: Znongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe, 1994), 9, 10, 60; Dangdai Zhongguo de wuzi liutong 103-4; and Wu Shaojun, Guojia fazhan jihua gailun (Introduction to state development planning) (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 1999), 84-87.
44. See Gui Shiyong ed., Zhongguo jihua tizhi gaige (Reform of China's plan system) (Beijing: Znongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe, 1994), 9, 10, 60; Dangdai Zhongguo de wuzi liutong 103-4; and Wu Shaojun, Guojia fazhan jihua gailun (Introduction to state development planning) (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 1999), 84-87.
45. See Gui Shiyong ed., Zhongguo jihua tizhi gaige (Reform of China's plan system) (Beijing: Znongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe, 1994), 9, 10, 60; Dangdai Zhongguo de wuzi liutong 103-4; and Wu Shaojun, Guojia fazhan jihua gailun (Introduction to state development planning) (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 1999), 84-87.
46. Lu Jiang, Neimao daili chutan (A preliminary discussion of the internal trade agency system) (Beijing: Zhongguo wuzi chubanshe, 1995), 17-23, 45-49.
47. See Shaun Breslin, China in the 1980s: Centre-Province Relations in a Reforming Socialist State (London: Macmillan, 1996), 106-7.
48. See "Learning the Rules of Foreign Trade," China New Analysis, no. 1464 (July 15, 1992): 1-9.
49. Zhongguo duiwai kaifang diqu touzi huanjing he zhengce (Investment environments and policies for China's open areas) (Beijing: Yunnan renmin chubanshe 1993), 184, 217; Liu Baorong and Liao Jiasheng, eds., Zhongguo yanbian kaifang yu zhoubian guojia shichang (The opening of China's border areas and the neighboring markets) (Beijing: Falü chubanshe, 1993).
50. Zhongguo duiwai kaifang diqu touzi huanjing he zhengce (Investment environments and policies for China's open areas) (Beijing: Yunnan renmin chubanshe 1993), 184, 217; Liu Baorong and Liao Jiasheng, eds., Zhongguo yanbian kaifang yu zhoubian guojia shichang (The opening of China's border areas and the neighboring markets) (Beijing: Falü chubanshe, 1993).
51. See Chen, Guojia zhongxibu fazhan zhengce yanjiu, 164-65; "State Council's Notice on Certain Policy Measures in Implementing the 'Develop the West' Program," at 〈http:// www.peopledaily.com.cn/GB/channell3/21/20001228/364518.html〉; and Yao Huaishan and Hu Kaidu, Qiangzhan shuangying shangji (Taking advantage of the win-win opportunities) (Beijing: Qiye guanli chubanshe, 2000), 28, 63, 64, 69.
52. See Chen, Guojia zhongxibu fazhan zhengce yanjiu, 164-65; "State Council's Notice on Certain Policy Measures in Implementing the 'Develop the West' Program," at 〈http:// www.peopledaily.com.cn/GB/channell3/21/20001228/364518.html〉; and Yao Huaishan and Hu Kaidu, Qiangzhan shuangying shangji (Taking advantage of the win-win opportunities) (Beijing: Qiye guanli chubanshe, 2000), 28, 63, 64, 69.
53. See Chen, Guojia zhongxibu fazhan zhengce yanjiu, 164-65; "State Council's Notice on Certain Policy Measures in Implementing the 'Develop the West' Program," at 〈http:// www.peopledaily.com.cn/GB/channell3/21/20001228/364518.html〉; and Yao Huaishan and Hu Kaidu, Qiangzhan shuangying shangji (Taking advantage of the win-win opportunities) (Beijing: Qiye guanli chubanshe, 2000), 28, 63, 64, 69.
54. According to an interesting survey conducted in 1995 with eighty-four leading cadres, policy experts, and academics, only 5 percent of those representing the coastal region supported the provision of more preferential policies for the inland, while the comparable figure representing the inland region amounted to 83 percent. See State Planning Commission, Woguo diqu jingji xietiao fazhan yanjiu (Study of regionally coordinated economic development in China) (Beijing: Gaige chubanshe, 1996), 128.
55. The idea of canceling the preferential policies granted to the coastal region for the sake of bestowing them on the inland created political outcry and eventually failed to be put into effect. For active resistance by Hainan and Shenzhen against such proposals and for the so-called "special zones debates" (tequ zhi zheng), see Ma Licheng and Ling Zhijun, Jiaofeng: Dangdai Zhongguo sanci sixiang jiefang shilu (Sword-crossing: Records of three ideological liberations in contemporary China) (Beijing: Jinri Zhongguo chubanshe, 1998), 359-405. In fact, the major trend since 1993 has been one of abolition of development zones in the coastal region, the number of which was sharply reduced from over three thousand to about five hundred in late 1993. See Zhongguo gaige kaifang dashiji (Chronicles of China's reform and opening in the last fifteen Years) (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 1994), 225, 238, 240.
56. The idea of canceling the preferential policies granted to the coastal region for the sake of bestowing them on the inland created political outcry and eventually failed to be put into effect. For active resistance by Hainan and Shenzhen against such proposals and for the so-called "special zones debates" (tequ zhi zheng), see Ma Licheng and Ling Zhijun, Jiaofeng: Dangdai Zhongguo sanci sixiang jiefang shilu (Sword-crossing: Records of three ideological liberations in contemporary China) (Beijing: Jinri Zhongguo chubanshe, 1998), 359-405. In fact, the major trend since 1993 has been one of abolition of development zones in the coastal region, the number of which was sharply reduced from over three thousand to about five hundred in late 1993. See Zhongguo gaige kaifang dashiji (Chronicles of China's reform and opening in the last fifteen Years) (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 1994), 225, 238, 240.
57. See, for instance, Jingji ribao (Economic Daily) (Beijing), March 12, 1986 and Renmin ribao (People's Daily), August 6, 1989.
58. See, for instance, Jingji ribao (Economic Daily) (Beijing), March 12, 1986 and Renmin ribao (People's Daily), August 6, 1989.
59. World Tibet Network News (on Internet), September 21, 1994 and Liaowang (Outlook), no. 558 (September 26, 1994): 14-23.
60. World Tibet Network News (on Internet), September 21, 1994 and Liaowang (Outlook), no. 558 (September 26, 1994): 14-23.
61. See Yasheng Huang, "China's Cadre Transfer Policy Toward Tibet in the 1980s," Modern China 21, no. 2 (April 1995): 184-204. For a similar project at the provincial level, see Jae Ho Chung, "The Political Economy of Development and Inequality in Shandong," in China's Provinces in Reform: Class, Community and Political Culture, ed. David S.G. Goodman (London: Routledge, 1997), 146-47.
62. See Yasheng Huang, "China's Cadre Transfer Policy Toward Tibet in the 1980s," Modern China 21, no. 2 (April 1995): 184-204. For a similar project at the provincial level, see Jae Ho Chung, "The Political Economy of Development and Inequality in Shandong," in China's Provinces in Reform: Class, Community and Political Culture, ed. David S.G. Goodman (London: Routledge, 1997), 146-47.
63. Interviews in Jinan (;f rfj), Qingdao, and Dalian; and Shandong Provincial Leading Group on Aiding the Three Gorges Dam Region, "Report on Supporting the Refugees in the Three Gorges Dam Region" (January 6, 1997, in Chinese), 1-3.
64. For these dyadic pairs, see Xu Bingwen et al., Zhongguo xibie diqu fazhan zhanlue gailun (Introduction to the development strategies of China's northwest) (Beijing: Jingji quanli chubanshe, 1992), 247; and Wang, Zhongguo quyujingji zhengce yanjiu, 46.
65. For these dyadic pairs, see Xu Bingwen et al., Zhongguo xibie diqu fazhan zhanlue gailun (Introduction to the development strategies of China's northwest) (Beijing: Jingji quanli chubanshe, 1992), 247; and Wang, Zhongguo quyujingji zhengce yanjiu, 46.
66. Dangdai Zhongguo de wuzi liutong, 132-35.
67. See Zhang, Quyu hezuo yu jingji wangluo, 34-50, 100-117; and Wang, Zhongguo quyu jingji zhengce yanjiu, 153. For a detailed discussion of the Shanghai Economic Zone, see Lynn T. White III, Unstately Power: Local Causes of China's Economic Reforms (Armonk N.Y.: ME. Sharpe, 1998), 373-88.
68. See Zhang, Quyu hezuo yu jingji wangluo, 34-50, 100-117; and Wang, Zhongguo quyu jingji zhengce yanjiu, 153. For a detailed discussion of the Shanghai Economic Zone, see Lynn T. White III, Unstately Power: Local Causes of China's Economic Reforms (Armonk N.Y.: ME. Sharpe, 1998), 373-88.
69. See Zhang, Quyu hezuo yu jingji wangluo, 34-50, 100-117; and Wang, Zhongguo quyu jingji zhengce yanjiu, 153. For a detailed discussion of the Shanghai Economic Zone, see Lynn T. White III, Unstately Power: Local Causes of China's Economic Reforms (Armonk N.Y.: ME. Sharpe, 1998), 373-88.
70. This view was first presented by Dorothy J. Solinger, "Uncertain Paternalism: Tensions in Recent Regional Restructuring in China," International Regional Science Review 11, no. 1 (1987): 35. Data on Shandong's donations to Tibet, for instance, are also in support of the view. Immediately after Beijing's administrative order, the province offered a free aid of 76 million yuan and investments totaling 8.5 million yuan for twenty-three projects in 1994. Shandong's support for Tibet during the subsequent two years of 1995-96, however, dropped to 53 million yuan. Interviews in Jinan.
71. See Xu et al., Zhongguo xibei diqu fazhan zhanlue gailun, 254; Zhongguo zhengfu jigou minglu (Directory of government organization in China) (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 1996), vol. 1:8-9; Zhongyang zhengfu zuzhi jigou (Organizations of the central government) (Beijing: Gaige chubanshe, 1998), 113-14; and Chen Yao, Xibu kaifa dazhanlue yu xinsilu (The grand strategy and new thinking for the development of the west) (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 2000), 264-65.
72. See Xu et al., Zhongguo xibei diqu fazhan zhanlue gailun, 254; Zhongguo zhengfu jigou minglu (Directory of government organization in China) (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 1996), vol. 1:8-9; Zhongyang zhengfu zuzhi jigou (Organizations of the central government) (Beijing: Gaige chubanshe, 1998), 113-14; and Chen Yao, Xibu kaifa dazhanlue yu xinsilu (The grand strategy and new thinking for the development of the west) (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 2000), 264-65.
73. See Xu et al., Zhongguo xibei diqu fazhan zhanlue gailun, 254; Zhongguo zhengfu jigou minglu (Directory of government organization in China) (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 1996), vol. 1:8-9; Zhongyang zhengfu zuzhi jigou (Organizations of the central government) (Beijing: Gaige chubanshe, 1998), 113-14; and Chen Yao, Xibu kaifa dazhanlue yu xinsilu (The grand strategy and new thinking for the development of the west) (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 2000), 264-65.
74. See Xu et al., Zhongguo xibei diqu fazhan zhanlue gailun, 254; Zhongguo zhengfu jigou minglu (Directory of government organization in China) (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 1996), vol. 1:8-9; Zhongyang zhengfu zuzhi jigou (Organizations of the central government) (Beijing: Gaige chubanshe, 1998), 113-14; and Chen Yao, Xibu kaifa dazhanlue yu xinsilu (The grand strategy and new thinking for the development of the west) (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 2000), 264-65.
75. The Dalian case is illustrative in this regard. As of January 1997, Dalian was assigned to support five cities and counties in Guizhou (Zunyi fgggf and Liupanshui hjfkdh), Hubei (Xingshan), Tibet (Naqu jdk), and Liaoning (Chaoyang jkdl). Without close monitoring and specific incentives Dalian would either resist the heavy burden or simply offer token donations. Interviews in Dalian. For Shenzhen's resistance to imposed donations, see South China Morning Post International Weekly, July 13, 1996 and February 8, 1997.
76. For the problems associated with the lack of interdependence and information asymmetry in horizontal cooperation, see Miller, Managerial Dilemma, 57. The information on the pairing of Shandong with Qinghai is from interviews in Jinan in 1999.
77. These networks are sarcastically dubbed as "the fat helping the skinny" (choufei bushou). While interregional support networks are generally compared to "brotherhood" (xiongdi qingfen), it is often pointed out that "brothers, too, have to settle accounts" (xiongdi zhijian ye yao suanzhang A,). See Chen Yongjun, Zhongguo diqu zhi jian shichang fengsuo wenti yanjiu (Study of market enclosure among China's regions) (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1994), 94.
78. Under the new scheme, nine coastal provinces (Fujian, Liaoning, Shandong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Guangdong, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Beijing) were newly paired with nine inland provinces (in corresponding order, Ningxia, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Sichuan, Shaanxi, Guangxi, Yunnan, Gansu, and Neimenggu); and four coastal open cities of Dalian, Qingdao, Shenzhen, and Ningbo were paired with Guizhou. See Ming Pao, October 14, 1996; and "The Current Situation of the National Poverty Alleviation Work," Jingji yanjiu cankao, no. 1001 (January 1, 1997): 8.
79. Under the new scheme, nine coastal provinces (Fujian it, Liaoning, Shandong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Guangdong, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Beijing) were newly paired with nine inland provinces (in corresponding order, Ningxia, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Sichuan, Shaanxi, Guangxi, Yunnan, Gansu, and Neimenggu); and four coastal open cities of Dalian, Qingdao, Shenzhen, and Ningbo were paired with Guizhou. See Ming Pao, October 14, 1996; and "The Current Situation of the National Poverty Alleviation Work," Jingji yanjiu cankao, no. 1001 (January 1, 1997): 8.
80. See Yongnian Zheng, "Perforated Sovereignty: Provincial Dynamism and China's Foreign Trade," The Pacific Review 7, no. 3 (1994): 313-14; and Pak K. Lee, "Local Economic Protectionism in China's Economic Reform," Development Policy Review 16, no. 3 (September 1998): 281-303.
81. See Yongnian Zheng, "Perforated Sovereignty: Provincial Dynamism and China's Foreign Trade," The Pacific Review 7, no. 3 (1994): 313-14; and Pak K. Lee, "Local Economic Protectionism in China's Economic Reform," Development Policy Review 16, no. 3 (September 1998): 281-303.
82. In 1987, the number of these linkages was estimated to be less than one hundred. Currently, the number should reach at least several hundred, not including those among villages and enterprises. For the 1987 figure, see Zhang, Quyu hezuo yu jingji wangluo, 27, 271-80. For a more updated list, see Zhongguo hengxiang jingji nianjian 1992 (1992 yearbook on China's horizontal economic linkages) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1993).
83. In 1987, the number of these linkages was estimated to be less than one hundred. Currently, the number should reach at least several hundred, not including those among villages and enterprises. For the 1987 figure, see Zhang, Quyu hezuo yu jingji wangluo, 27, 271-80. For a more updated list, see Zhongguo hengxiang jingji nianjian 1992 (1992 yearbook on China's horizontal economic linkages) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1993).
84. A 1996 report by the State Planning Commission indicated that horizontal cooperative linkages were formed predominantly among western localities (xixi hezuo ÄÄ-a-ft)- See Woguo diqu jingji xietiao fazhan yanjiu, 24.
85. See South China Morning Post, May 20 and August 23, 1994; Xu, Zhongguo xibei diqu fazhan zhanlue gailun, 9-10; Zhongguo daxinan zai jueqi (The rise of China's southwest) (Nanning: Guangxi jiaoyu chubanshe, 1994), 14, 55; Yongnian Zheng, "Institutional Change, Local Developmentalism, and Economic Growth: The Making of Semi-Federalism in Reform China" (Doctoral dissertation, Princeton University, 1995) (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1995), 234-51.
86. See South China Morning Post, May 20 and August 23, 1994; Xu, Zhongguo xibei diqu fazhan zhanlue gailun, 9-10; Zhongguo daxinan zai jueqi (The rise of China's southwest) (Nanning: Guangxi jiaoyu chubanshe, 1994), 14, 55; Yongnian Zheng, "Institutional Change, Local Developmentalism, and Economic Growth: The Making of Semi-Federalism in Reform China" (Doctoral dissertation, Princeton University, 1995) (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1995), 234-51.
87. See South China Morning Post, May 20 and August 23, 1994; Xu, Zhongguo xibei diqu fazhan zhanlue gailun, 9-10; Zhongguo daxinan zai jueqi (The rise of China's southwest) (Nanning: Guangxi jiaoyu chubanshe, 1994), 14, 55; Yongnian Zheng, "Institutional Change, Local Developmentalism, and Economic Growth: The Making of Semi-Federalism in Reform China" (Doctoral dissertation, Princeton University, 1995) (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1995), 234-51.
88. See South China Morning Post, May 20 and August 23, 1994; Xu, Zhongguo xibei diqu fazhan zhanlue gailun, 9-10; Zhongguo daxinan zai jueqi (The rise of China's southwest) (Nanning: Guangxi jiaoyu chubanshe, 1994), 14, 55; Yongnian Zheng, "Institutional Change, Local Developmentalism, and Economic Growth: The Making of Semi-Federalism in Reform China" (Doctoral dissertation, Princeton University, 1995) (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1995), 234-51.
89. See Chen, Xibu kaifa dazhanlue yu xinsilu, 264-74; Yao and Hu, Qiangzhan shuangying shangji, 28-29, 68-69; and Lin Jiabin, "Retrospect and Prospect for Regional Development in the Era of Reform and Opening," Jingjiyanjiu cankao, no. 1249 (January 25, 1999): 30.
90. See Chen, Xibu kaifa dazhanlue yu xinsilu, 264-74; Yao and Hu, Qiangzhan shuangying shangji, 28-29, 68-69; and Lin Jiabin, "Retrospect and Prospect for Regional Development in the Era of Reform and Opening," Jingjiyanjiu cankao, no. 1249 (January 25, 1999): 30.
91. See Chen, Xibu kaifa dazhanlue yu xinsilu, 264-74; Yao and Hu, Qiangzhan shuangying shangji, 28-29, 68-69; and Lin Jiabin, "Retrospect and Prospect for Regional Development in the Era of Reform and Opening," Jingjiyanjiu cankao, no. 1249 (January 25, 1999): 30.
92. For discussions of the most successful case, the Regional Economic Coordination Association of Southwest China, see Zheng, "Institutional Change, Local Developmentalism, and Economic Growth," 222-51; and Chen Dongsheng, Xibu jingji jueqi zhi lu (The road to boosting the economy of the western region) (Shanghai: Shanghai yuandong chubanshe, 1996), 193-96.
93. For discussions of the most successful case, the Regional Economic Coordination Association of Southwest China, see Zheng, "Institutional Change, Local Developmentalism, and Economic Growth," 222-51; and Chen Dongsheng, Xibu jingji jueqi zhi lu (The road to boosting the economy of the western region) (Shanghai: Shanghai yuandong chubanshe, 1996), 193-96.
94. Interviews in Jinan; "Governors of Henan, Shaanxi, and Shandong Discuss How to Revive the Economies Along the Yellow River," Liaowang zhoukan (Outlook Weekly) (Overseas edition), June 24, 1991, 14-15; and The "Westward" Strategy Task Force Group, "On Jointly Developing the Yellow River Economic Cooperation Zone," Jingji yanjiu cankao, no. 835 (March 2, 1996): 22-28.
95. Interviews in Jinan; "Governors of Henan, Shaanxi, and Shandong Discuss How to Revive the Economies Along the Yellow River," Liaowang zhoukan (Outlook Weekly) (Overseas edition), June 24, 1991, 14-15; and The "Westward" Strategy Task Force Group, "On Jointly Developing the Yellow River Economic Cooperation Zone," Jingji yanjiu cankao, no. 835 (March 2, 1996): 22-28.
96. The dyadic cooperation between Yunnan and Guangdong was later expanded to a multi-member network encompassing Guangxi, Guizhou, the Ministry of Electrical Power, and the Development Bank. See Chen, Xibu jingji jueqi zhi lu, 194. For other dyadic networks, see South China Morning Post, July 7, 1995; Chen, Xibu jingji jueqi zhi lu, 195-96; and Gao Yufang, Quyu jingji fazhan yu woguo shehuizhuyi shichang jingji (Regional economic development and the socialist market economy in China) (Wuhan: Hubei jiaoyu chubanshe, 1995), 177.
97. The dyadic cooperation between Yunnan and Guangdong was later expanded to a multi- member network encompassing Guangxi, Guizhou, the Ministry of Electrical Power, and the Development Bank. See Chen, Xibu jingji jueqi zhi lu, 194. For other dyadic networks, see South China Morning Post, July 7, 1995; Chen, Xibu jingji jueqi zhi lu, 195-96; and Gao Yufang, Quyu jingji fazhan yu woguo shehuizhuyi shichang jingji (Regional economic development and the socialist market economy in China) (Wuhan: Hubei jiaoyu chubanshe, 1995), 177.
98. The dyadic cooperation between Yunnan and Guangdong was later expanded to a multi- member network encompassing Guangxi, Guizhou, the Ministry of Electrical Power, and the Development Bank. See Chen, Xibu jingji jueqi zhi lu, 194. For other dyadic networks, see South China Morning Post, July 7, 1995; Chen, Xibu jingji jueqi zhi lu, 195-96; and Gao Yufang, Quyu jingji fazhan yu woguo shehuizhuyi shichang jingji (Regional economic development and the socialist market economy in China) (Wuhan: Hubei jiaoyu chubanshe, 1995), 177.
99. The dyadic cooperation between Yunnan and Guangdong was later expanded to a multi- member network encompassing Guangxi, Guizhou, the Ministry of Electrical Power, and the Development Bank. See Chen, Xibu jingji jueqi zhi lu, 194. For other dyadic networks, see South China Morning Post, July 7, 1995; Chen, Xibu jingji jueqi zhi lu, 195-96; and Gao Yufang, Quyu jingji fazhan yu woguo shehuizhuyi shichang jingji (Regional economic development and the socialist market economy in China) (Wuhan: Hubei jiaoyu chubanshe, 1995), 177.
100. See Gao, Quyu jingji fazhan yu woguo shehuizhuyi shichang jingji, 168-70; Chen, Zhongguo diqujian shichang fengsuo wenti yanjiu, 40-41; Anjali Kumar, "Economic Reform and the Internal Division of Labor in China: Production, Trade, and Marketing," in China Deconstructs: Politics, Trade, and Regionalism, ed. David S.G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (London: Routledge, 1994), 109-22; and Lance L.P. Gore, "The Communist Legacy in Post-Mao Economic Growth," The China Journal, no. 41 (January 1999): 35-47.
101. See Gao, Quyu jingji fazhan yu woguo shehuizhuyi shichang jingji, 168-70; Chen, Zhongguo diqujian shichang fengsuo wenti yanjiu, 40-41; Anjali Kumar, "Economic Reform and the Internal Division of Labor in China: Production, Trade, and Marketing," in China Deconstructs: Politics, Trade, and Regionalism, ed. David S.G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (London: Routledge, 1994), 109-22; and Lance L.P. Gore, "The Communist Legacy in Post-Mao Economic Growth," The China Journal, no. 41 (January 1999): 35-47.
102. See Gao, Quyu jingji fazhan yu woguo shehuizhuyi shichang jingji, 168-70; Chen, Zhongguo diqujian shichang fengsuo wenti yanjiu, 40-41; Anjali Kumar, "Economic Reform and the Internal Division of Labor in China: Production, Trade, and Marketing," in China Deconstructs: Politics, Trade, and Regionalism, ed. David S.G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (London: Routledge, 1994), 109-22; and Lance L.P. Gore, "The Communist Legacy in Post-Mao Economic Growth," The China Journal, no. 41 (January 1999): 35-47.
103. See Gao, Quyu jingji fazhan yu woguo shehuizhuyi shichang jingji, 168-70; Chen, Zhongguo diqujian shichang fengsuo wenti yanjiu, 40-41; Anjali Kumar, "Economic Reform and the Internal Division of Labor in China: Production, Trade, and Marketing," in China Deconstructs: Politics, Trade, and Regionalism, ed. David S.G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (London: Routledge, 1994), 109-22; and Lance L.P. Gore, "The Communist Legacy in Post-Mao Economic Growth," The China Journal, no. 41 (January 1999): 35-47.
104. Interviews in Jinan in 1999; for the Huaihai Zone, see Zhang, Quyu hezuo yu jingji wangluo, 71-83; and for the Pan-Bohai Zone, see Sang, Quyu kaifang zhanlue lun, 225-35.
105. Interviews in Jinan in 1999; for the Huaihai Zone, see Zhang, Quyu hezuo yu jingji wangluo, 71-83; and for the Pan-Bohai Zone, see Sang, Quyu kaifang zhanlue lun, 225-35.
106. For county-level cooperative linkages, see Zhongguo hengxiangjingji nianjian 1992, 178-82. Fo r interfirm networks, see Xu, Zhongguo xibei diqu fazhan zhanlue gailun, 256-60; and for intertownship and intervillage networks, see Zhu Fengchi et al., Zhongguo fan pinkun yanjiu (Study of China's anti-poverty campaign) (Beijing: Zhongguo jihua chubanshe, 1996), 138-47.
107. For county-level cooperative linkages, see Zhongguo hengxiangjingji nianjian 1992, 178- 82. Fo r interfirm networks, see Xu, Zhongguo xibei diqu fazhan zhanlue gailun, 256-60; and for intertownship and intervillage networks, see Zhu Fengchi et al., Zhongguo fan pinkun yanjiu (Study of China's anti-poverty campaign) (Beijing: Zhongguo jihua chubanshe, 1996), 138-47.
108. For county-level cooperative linkages, see Zhongguo hengxiangjingji nianjian 1992, 178- 82. Fo r interfirm networks, see Xu, Zhongguo xibei diqu fazhan zhanlue gailun, 256-60; and for intertownship and intervillage networks, see Zhu Fengchi et al., Zhongguo fan pinkun yanjiu (Study of China's anti-poverty campaign) (Beijing: Zhongguo jihua chubanshe, 1996), 138-47.
109. For this project, see China Daily, April 24, 1995; "A Ministry of Agriculture's Guide to the Pilot Project on the East-West Cooperation Among the TVEs," Zhongguo dalu yanjiu (Mainland China Studies) (Taipei) 39, no. 10 (October 1996): 106-8; and Chen, Guojia zhongxibu fazhan zhengce yanjiu, 170.
110. For this project, see China Daily, April 24, 1995; "A Ministry of Agriculture's Guide to the Pilot Project on the East-West Cooperation Among the TVEs," Zhongguo dalu yanjiu (Mainland China Studies) (Taipei) 39, no. 10 (October 1996): 106-8; and Chen, Guojia zhongxibu fazhan zhengce yanjiu, 170.
111. For this project, see China Daily, April 24, 1995; "A Ministry of Agriculture's Guide to the Pilot Project on the East-West Cooperation Among the TVEs," Zhongguo dalu yanjiu (Mainland China Studies) (Taipei) 39, no. 10 (October 1996): 106-8; and Chen, Guojia zhongxibu fazhan zhengce yanjiu, 170.
112. Chen Wenshan, Zhongguo jingji tequ yanjiu (Study of China's special economic zones) (Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 1996), 142-43.
113. See Qingdao nianjian 1992 (Qingdao yearbook 1992) (Qingdao: Zhongguo baike quanshu chubanshe, 1993), 70-71; interviews in Jinan, Qingdao, and Dalian in 1998 and 1999; for Henan's case, see Liu Menglin, ed., Henan zhuwai gongzuo huiguyu zhanwang (Retrospect and prospects for Henan's external liaison work) (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1994), 8; and for Hunan's measure, see South China Morning Post, January 19, 1996.
114. See Qingdao nianjian 1992 (Qingdao yearbook 1992) (Qingdao: Zhongguo baike quanshu chubanshe, 1993), 70-71; interviews in Jinan, Qingdao, and Dalian in 1998 and 1999; for Henan's case, see Liu Menglin, ed., Henan zhuwai gongzuo huiguyu zhanwang (Retrospect and prospects for Henan's external liaison work) (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1994), 8; and for Hunan's measure, see South China Morning Post, January 19, 1996.
115. See Qingdao nianjian 1992 (Qingdao yearbook 1992) (Qingdao: Zhongguo baike quanshu chubanshe, 1993), 70-71; interviews in Jinan, Qingdao, and Dalian in 1998 and 1999; for Henan's case, see Liu Menglin, ed., Henan zhuwai gongzuo huiguyu zhanwang (Retrospect and prospects for Henan's external liaison work) (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1994), 8; and for Hunan's measure, see South China Morning Post, January 19, 1996.
116. See, for instance, Chen, Guojia zhongxibu fazhan zhengce yanjiu, 159-77; and Chen, Xibu jingji jueqi zhi lu, 193-96.
117. See, for instance, Chen, Guojia zhongxibu fazhan zhengce yanjiu, 159-77; and Chen, Xibu jingji jueqi zhi lu, 193-96.
118. Most important in this regard was Beijing's decision in 1999 to allocate 60 percent or more of foreign government loans and 70 percent of state investment to the inland region. The inland region's share in foreign government loans to China rose from 33.6 percent in the 1980s to 44.8 percent in 1993. In the 1996 foreign-loans plan, the inland region was allotted 47 percent of the foreign government loans as well as 40 percent of the commercial loans. The figure rose to 60 percent in 2000. Beginning in 1996, the central government appropriated "poverty-alleviation funds" reserved for Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Shandong, and Liaoning and granted them to the inland region. See Chen, Guojia zhongxibu fazhan zhengce yanjiu, 164; Chen, Xibu kaifa dazhanlue yu xinsilu, 266; Chen, Xibu jingji jueqi zhi lu, 187; Woguo diqu jingji xietiao fazhan yanjiu, 112-13; and Huan Guoyu, "Trends and Policies of Regional Economic Development in China," Jingji yanjiu cankao, no. 1071 (August 1, 1997): 3.
119. Most important in this regard was Beijing's decision in 1999 to allocate 60 percent or more of foreign government loans and 70 percent of state investment to the inland region. The inland region's share in foreign government loans to China rose from 33.6 percent in the 1980s to 44.8 percent in 1993. In the 1996 foreign-loans plan, the inland region was allotted 47 percent of the foreign government loans as well as 40 percent of the commercial loans. The figure rose to 60 percent in 2000. Beginning in 1996, the central government appropriated "poverty-alleviation funds" reserved for Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Shandong, and Liaoning and granted them to the inland region. See Chen, Guojia zhongxibu fazhan zhengce yanjiu, 164; Chen, Xibu kaifa dazhanlue yu xinsilu, 266; Chen, Xibu jingji jueqi zhi lu, 187; Woguo diqu jingji xietiao fazhan yanjiu, 112-13; and Huan Guoyu, "Trends and Policies of Regional Economic Development in China," Jingji yanjiu cankao, no. 1071 (August 1, 1997): 3.
120. Most important in this regard was Beijing's decision in 1999 to allocate 60 percent or more of foreign government loans and 70 percent of state investment to the inland region. The inland region's share in foreign government loans to China rose from 33.6 percent in the 1980s to 44.8 percent in 1993. In the 1996 foreign-loans plan, the inland region was allotted 47 percent of the foreign government loans as well as 40 percent of the commercial loans. The figure rose to 60 percent in 2000. Beginning in 1996, the central government appropriated "poverty-alleviation funds" reserved for Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Shandong, and Liaoning and granted them to the inland region. See Chen, Guojia zhongxibu fazhan zhengce yanjiu, 164; Chen, Xibu kaifa dazhanlue yu xinsilu, 266; Chen, Xibu jingji jueqi zhi lu, 187; Woguo diqu jingji xietiao fazhan yanjiu, 112-13; and Huan Guoyu, "Trends and Policies of Regional Economic Development in China," Jingji yanjiu cankao, no. 1071 (August 1, 1997): 3.
121. Most important in this regard was Beijing's decision in 1999 to allocate 60 percent or more of foreign government loans and 70 percent of state investment to the inland region. The inland region's share in foreign government loans to China rose from 33.6 percent in the 1980s to 44.8 percent in 1993. In the 1996 foreign-loans plan, the inland region was allotted 47 percent of the
122. Most important in this regard was Beijing's decision in 1999 to allocate 60 percent or more of foreign government loans and 70 percent of state investment to the inland region. The inland region's share in foreign government loans to China rose from 33.6 percent in the 1980s to 44.8 percent in 1993. In the 1996 foreign-loans plan, the inland region was allotted 47 percent of the foreign government loans as well as 40 percent of the commercial loans. The figure rose to 60 percent in 2000. Beginning in 1996, the central government appropriated "poverty-alleviation funds" reserved for Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Shandong, and Liaoning and granted them to the inland region. See Chen, Guojia zhongxibu fazhan zhengce yanjiu, 164; Chen, Xibu kaifa dazhanlue yu xinsilu, 266; Chen, Xibu jingji jueqi zhi lu, 187; Woguo diqu jingji xietiao fazhan yanjiu, 112-13; and Huan Guoyu, "Trends and Policies of Regional Economic Development in China," Jingji yanjiu cankao, no. 1071 (August 1, 1997): 3.
123. The largest room for improvement is found in the area of "fiscal transfers" (caizheng zhuanyi zhifu), the lion's share of which was still dependent on "tax rebates" for the individual provincial remitters. See Chung, "Regional Disparities, Policy Choices, and State Capacity in China," 45.
124. In reality, a regime at one point relies on multiple alternatives but the relative weight to each of them may vary as the center's capacity changes. See Anderson, The Territorial Imperative, 62-65, 81-83.
125. As of 1996, over 2,600 government units were involved in the information-related sector and 38,000 firms were in the business of providing information and information consultancy. See Development Research Center of the State Council, "The Current Situation and Problems of Developing Information Resources in China," Jingji yanjiu cankao, no. 1143 (March 8, 1998): 8. For the state of government-run information networks and information sharing, see ibid., 7; Dangdai Zhongguo de wuzi liutong, 173-79; and China Daily, April 5, 1999.
126. As of 1996, over 2,600 government units were involved in the information-related sector and 38,000 firms were in the business of providing information and information consultancy. See Development Research Center of the State Council, "The Current Situation and Problems of Developing Information Resources in China," Jingji yanjiu cankao, no. 1143 (March 8, 1998): 8. For the state of government-run information networks and information sharing, see ibid., 7; Dangdai Zhongguo de wuzi liutong, 173-79; and China Daily, April 5, 1999.
127. As of 1996, over 2,600 government units were involved in the information-related sector and 38,000 firms were in the business of providing information and information consultancy. See Development Research Center of the State Council, "The Current Situation and Problems of Developing Information Resources in China," Jingji yanjiu cankao, no. 1143 (March 8, 1998): 8. For the state of government-run information networks and information sharing, see ibid., 7; Dangdai Zhongguo de wuzi liutong, 173-79; and China Daily, April 5, 1999.
128. As of 1996, over 2,600 government units were involved in the information-related sector and 38,000 firms were in the business of providing information and information consultancy. See Development Research Center of the State Council, "The Current Situation and Problems of Developing Information Resources in China," Jingji yanjiu cankao, no. 1143 (March 8, 1998): 8. For the state of government-run information networks and information sharing, see ibid., 7; Dangdai Zhongguo de wuzi liutong, 173-79; and China Daily, April 5, 1999.