When and why did FSLIC resolve insolvent thrifts?

Journal of Banking and Finance

Volumn 23, Issue 6, 1999, Pages 955-990

  Guo, Lin ^a  

^a SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bank regulation; C41; Capital forbearance; Deposit insurance; G21; G22; G28; G33; Hazards model; Insolvency resolution

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042096371     PISSN: 03784266     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0378-4266(98)00120-4     Document Type: Article

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