Rethinking the developmental state model: Divided Leviathan and subnational comparisons in India

Comparative Politics

Volumn 35, Issue 4, 2003, Pages

  Sinha, Aseema ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0042074369     PISSN: 00104159     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/4150190     Document Type: Review

References (66)

1. The word "state" has multiple usages in this article. State with a small s refers to the general concept of the state. Indian provinces are also called states and are referred to as provinces or regional states. The federal government is usually referred to as the central state or center.
2. For the idea of a big push, a classic statist idea, see P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, "Problems of Industrialization of Eastern and Southeastern Europe," Economic Journal, 53 (June-September 1943), 202-11; Allyn Young, "Increasing Returns and Economic Progress," Economic Journal, 38 (December 1928), 527-42.
3. For the idea of a big push, a classic statist idea, see P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, "Problems of Industrialization of Eastern and Southeastern Europe," Economic Journal, 53 (June-September 1943), 202-11; Allyn Young, "Increasing Returns and Economic Progress," Economic Journal, 38 (December 1928), 527-42.
4. Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982). Also see Meredith Woo-Cumings, ed., The Developmental State (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).
5. See Alice Amsden, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Johnson; and Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
6. See Alice Amsden, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Johnson; and Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
7. World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (Washington, D. C.: Oxford University Press, 1993).
8. Anne O Krueger, "The Political Economy of the Rent Seeking Society," American Economic Review 64 (June 1974), 291-303.
9. Pranab Bardhan, quoted in Dani Rodrik, "The Paradoxes of the Successful State," European Economic Review, 41 (April 1997), 434.
10. Between 1960 and 1986 India's aggregate performance was one of slow growth, 3.5 percent per annum (1.8 percent per capita per annum). The perception that the central state is responsible for India's developmental failure cuts across contending approaches. See Pranab Bardhan, The Political Economy of Development (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984); Lloyd I. Rudolph and Suzanne Hoeber Rudolph, In the Pursuit of Lakshmi (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); and Isher Ahluwalia, Industrial Growth in India: Stagnation since the Mid-Sixties (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985).
11. Between 1960 and 1986 India's aggregate performance was one of slow growth, 3.5 percent per annum (1.8 percent per capita per annum). The perception that the central state is responsible for India's developmental failure cuts across contending approaches. See Pranab Bardhan, The Political Economy of Development (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984); Lloyd I. Rudolph and Suzanne Hoeber Rudolph, In the Pursuit of Lakshmi (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); and Isher Ahluwalia, Industrial Growth in India: Stagnation since the Mid-Sixties (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985).
12. Between 1960 and 1986 India's aggregate performance was one of slow growth, 3.5 percent per annum (1.8 percent per capita per annum). The perception that the central state is responsible for India's developmental failure cuts across contending approaches. See Pranab Bardhan, The Political Economy of Development (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984); Lloyd I. Rudolph and Suzanne Hoeber Rudolph, In the Pursuit of Lakshmi (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); and Isher Ahluwalia, Industrial Growth in India: Stagnation since the Mid-Sixties (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985).
13. Aziz Hanifa, "Bureaucracy Is a Major Threat to India's Economic Ambitions," India Abroad, Dec. 14, 2001, p, 38.
14. See E. A. G. Robinson, ed., Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1960); John Lewis, India's Political Economy: Governance and Reform (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995); Richard E. Feinberg et al., eds., Economic Reform in Three Giants (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1990).
15. See E. A. G. Robinson, ed., Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1960); John Lewis, India's Political Economy: Governance and Reform (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995); Richard E. Feinberg et al., eds., Economic Reform in Three Giants (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1990).
16. See E. A. G. Robinson, ed., Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1960); John Lewis, India's Political Economy: Governance and Reform (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995); Richard E. Feinberg et al., eds., Economic Reform in Three Giants (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1990).
17. This framework is applicable to the politics of development in any large state (for example, Russia, China, and Brazil) but also to small states with significant territorial differentiation (for example, Italy).
18. Systematic regional variation in industrial development under a state-led policy regime challenges received economic and political models of dirigiste societies for two reasons. First, explicit policy instruments designed to prevent regional inequalities were present. Second, industry was a central subject, and regional differences are counterintuitive in this policy domain. Although the focus of this article is on the dirigiste period of India's developmental trajectory (1955-1991), its conclusions are relevant for less directive (market-based) systems and periods (post-1991 India). Regional choices and local institutional variation refract such policy transitions as well. For reasons of space it is not possible to elaborate on this point. See Aseema Sinha, "Ideas, Interests and Institutions in Policy Change in India: A Comparison of West Bengal and Gujarat" (unpublished).
19. Richard Locke, Remaking the Italian Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), in a similar vein challenges the national model framework of comparative political economy. Also see Gary Herrigel, Industrial Constructions: The Sources of German Industrial Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
20. Richard Locke, Remaking the Italian Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), in a similar vein challenges the national model framework of comparative political economy. Also see Gary Herrigel, Industrial Constructions: The Sources of German Industrial Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
21. Amiya Bagchi, "Reflections on Patterns of Regional Growth during British Rule," Bengal Past and Present (January-June 1976), 247-89.
22. See Claude Markovits, "Bombay as a Business Centre in the Colonial Period," in Sujata Patel and Alice Thorner, eds., Bombay: Metaphor for Modern India (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1996).
23. Amiya K. Bagchi, Private Investment in India 1900-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972); T. R. Sharma, Location of Industries in India (Bombay: Hind Kitab Limited, 1946).
24. Amiya K. Bagchi, Private Investment in India 1900-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972); T. R. Sharma, Location of Industries in India (Bombay: Hind Kitab Limited, 1946).
25. Computed from Registrar of Newspapers for India, Press in India, 1965 (Delhi: Government of India, 1965).
26. "In fact, Maharashtra excluding this [Bombay city] region, is industrially as backward as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar or Rajasthan." A. R. Kamat, "Politico-Economic Developments in Maharashtra: A Review of Post-Independence Period," Economic and Political Weekly, 15 (October 1980), 1671.
27. Discretionary transfers refer to central public sector allocation. Other central transfers such as the Finance Commission transfers were not discretionary but were governed by statutory rules.
28. Debdas Banerjee and Anjan Ghosh, "Indian Planning and Regional Disparity in Growth," in A. K. Bagchi, ed., Economy, Society and Polity: Essays in the Political Economy of Indian Planning (Calcutta: Oxford University Press, 1988).
29. Douglas Arnold, "Legislators, Bureaucrats and Locational Decisions," in Mathew McCubbins and Terry Sullivan, eds., Congress: Structure and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 524, makes a similar point about regulatory policy in the United States.
30. George Tsebelis, Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). Also see Peter Evans et al., eds., Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
31. George Tsebelis, Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). Also see Peter Evans et al., eds., Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
32. See Elizabeth Remick, "Building Local States," Comparative Politics, 34 (July 2002).
33. See R. Fernandez and Dani Rodrik, "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," in Federico Sturzenegger and Mariano Tommasi, eds., The Political Economy of Reform (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1998); Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991); and Douglass North, "Institutions and Credible Commitment," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 149 (March 1993), 11-23.
34. See R. Fernandez and Dani Rodrik, "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," in Federico Sturzenegger and Mariano Tommasi, eds., The Political Economy of Reform (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1998); Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991); and Douglass North, "Institutions and Credible Commitment," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 149 (March 1993), 11-23.
35. See R. Fernandez and Dani Rodrik, "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," in Federico Sturzenegger and Mariano Tommasi, eds., The Political Economy of Reform (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1998); Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991); and Douglass North, "Institutions and Credible Commitment," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 149 (March 1993), 11-23.
36. Interview with N. Vittal, Gujarat government official, December 1997. License-raj refers to an elaborate central regulatory system whereby the central government had the legal power to grant approval of investment applications (called licenses), determine location, circumscribe technological choices, and shape ownership patterns.
37. Interview with a retired Industry Secretary of Gujarat, Chennai, September 16, 1997.
38. Interview with an Industry Department official, April 29, 1997.
39. Each regional government has an office in New Delhi; some regularly lobby the central government.
40. Interview with a Gujarat Industrial Investment Corporation official, New Delhi, December 1997.
41. Government of West Bengal, Report of the Administrative Reforms Committee (Calcutta: Government of West Bengal, 1983), pp. 25-26.
42. Jyoti Basu, Chief Minister's Letters to the Central Government (Calcutta: Government of West Bengal, 1981, 1982).
43. Interview with a Madras-based industrialist, Business India, Jan. 23-Feb. 5, 1989, p. 56.
44. "Special Feature on Tamil Nadu," The Hindu, June 21, 1984, p. 29. Suresh Krishna reported in an interview that in the 1970s and 1980s the state government did not lobby the center for central or private investment. Interview with Suresh Krishna, Chennai, September 1997.
45. For reasons of space, analysis is limited to information provision. For a comparative examination of eleven other subnational institutional indicators, see Aseema Sinha, "Divided Leviathan: Comparing Developmental States in India" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 2000).
46. The library of iNDEXTb contains numerous reports about feasible projects and sectoral information.
47. West Bengal did not have a similar agency until 1994, while Tamil Nadu's government established Guidance, a similar organization, in 1992.
48. Interviews with about forty-five investors in West Bengal and about thirty-five investors in Tamil Nadu.
49. The classic study is Andrew Shonfield, Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power (London: Oxford University Press, 1965). Also see Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985); and Peter Hall, Governing the Economy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). For a recent study that relies on national frameworks, see Peter Hall and David Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
50. The classic study is Andrew Shonfield, Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power (London: Oxford University Press, 1965). Also see Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985); and Peter Hall, Governing the Economy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). For a recent study that relies on national frameworks, see Peter Hall and David Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
51. The classic study is Andrew Shonfield, Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power (London: Oxford University Press, 1965). Also see Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985); and Peter Hall, Governing the Economy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). For a recent study that relies on national frameworks, see Peter Hall and David Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
52. The classic study is Andrew Shonfield, Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power (London: Oxford University Press, 1965). Also see Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985); and Peter Hall, Governing the Economy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). For a recent study that relies on national frameworks, see Peter Hall and David Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
53. See Judith Tendler, Good Government in the Tropics (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Richard Snyder, Politics after Neoliberalism: Re-Regulation in Mexico (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); and Dali L. Yang, Beyond Beijing: Liberalization and the Regions in China (London: Routledge, 1997).
54. See Judith Tendler, Good Government in the Tropics (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Richard Snyder, Politics after Neoliberalism: Re-Regulation in Mexico (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); and Dali L. Yang, Beyond Beijing: Liberalization and the Regions in China (London: Routledge, 1997).
55. See Judith Tendler, Good Government in the Tropics (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Richard Snyder, Politics after Neoliberalism: Re-Regulation in Mexico (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); and Dali L. Yang, Beyond Beijing: Liberalization and the Regions in China (London: Routledge, 1997).
56. One exception is Daniel Treisman, After the Deluge: Regional Crisis and Political Consolidation in Russia (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001).
57. Victor Nee and David Stark with Mark Selden, eds., Remaking the Economic Institutions of Socialism: China and Eastern Europe (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989).
58. See Jean Oi, Rural China Takes Off: The Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Alfred Montero, "Delegative Dilemmas and Horizontal Logics: Subnational Industrial Policy in Spain and Brazil," Studies in Comparative International Development, 36 (Fall 2001), 58-89; and Snyder, Politics after Neoliberalism.
59. See Jean Oi, Rural China Takes Off: The Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Alfred Montero, "Delegative Dilemmas and Horizontal Logics: Subnational Industrial Policy in Spain and Brazil," Studies in Comparative International Development, 36 (Fall 2001), 58-89; and Snyder, Politics after Neoliberalism.
60. See Jean Oi, Rural China Takes Off: The Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Alfred Montero, "Delegative Dilemmas and Horizontal Logics: Subnational Industrial Policy in Spain and Brazil," Studies in Comparative International Development, 36 (Fall 2001), 58-89; and Snyder, Politics after Neoliberalism.
61. See Shankkar Aiyar and A. K. Menon, "Ransom State," India Today, May 27, 2002, pp. 35-39.
62. Similar methodological modifications are implicitly suggested by Atul Kohli, The State and Poverty in India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Subrata Mitra, Power, Protest, and Participation: Local Elites and the Politics of Development in India (London: Routledge, 1992); Locke; and Herrigel. A few rare discussions of the cross-national bias in comparative politics are Juan Linz and Armando de Miguel, "Within-Nation Differences and Comparisons: The Eight Spains," in Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan, eds., Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); George M. Fridrickson, The Comparative Imagination: On the History of Racism, Nationalism, and Social Movements (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); and Richard Snyder, "Scaling Down: The Subnational Comparative Method," Studies in Comparative and International Development, 36 (Spring 2001), 93-111.
63. Similar methodological modifications are implicitly suggested by Atul Kohli, The State and Poverty in India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Subrata Mitra, Power, Protest, and Participation: Local Elites and the Politics of Development in India (London: Routledge, 1992); Locke; and Herrigel. A few rare discussions of the cross-national bias in comparative politics are Juan Linz and Armando de Miguel, "Within-Nation Differences and Comparisons: The Eight Spains," in Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan, eds., Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); George M. Fridrickson, The Comparative Imagination: On the History of Racism, Nationalism, and Social Movements (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); and Richard Snyder, "Scaling Down: The Subnational Comparative Method," Studies in Comparative and International Development, 36 (Spring 2001), 93-111.
64. Similar methodological modifications are implicitly suggested by Atul Kohli, The State and Poverty in India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Subrata Mitra, Power, Protest, and Participation: Local Elites and the Politics of Development in India (London: Routledge, 1992); Locke; and Herrigel. A few rare discussions of the cross-national bias in comparative politics are Juan Linz and Armando de Miguel, "Within-Nation Differences and Comparisons: The Eight Spains," in Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan, eds., Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); George M. Fridrickson, The Comparative Imagination: On the History of Racism, Nationalism, and Social Movements (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); and Richard Snyder, "Scaling Down: The Subnational Comparative Method," Studies in Comparative and International Development, 36 (Spring 2001), 93-111.
65. Similar methodological modifications are implicitly suggested by Atul Kohli, The State and Poverty in India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Subrata Mitra, Power, Protest, and Participation: Local Elites and the Politics of Development in India (London: Routledge, 1992); Locke; and Herrigel. A few rare discussions of the cross-national bias in comparative politics are Juan Linz and Armando de Miguel, "Within-Nation Differences and Comparisons: The Eight Spains," in Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan, eds., Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); George M. Fridrickson, The Comparative Imagination: On the History of Racism, Nationalism, and Social Movements (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); and Richard Snyder, "Scaling Down: The Subnational Comparative Method," Studies in Comparative and International Development, 36 (Spring 2001), 93-111.
66. Similar methodological modifications are implicitly suggested by Atul Kohli, The State and Poverty in India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Subrata Mitra, Power, Protest, and Participation: Local Elites and the Politics of Development in India (London: Routledge, 1992); Locke; and Herrigel. A few rare discussions of the cross-national bias in comparative politics are Juan Linz and Armando de Miguel, "Within-Nation Differences and Comparisons: The Eight Spains," in Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan, eds., Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); George M. Fridrickson, The Comparative Imagination: On the History of Racism, Nationalism, and Social Movements (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); and Richard Snyder, "Scaling Down: The Subnational Comparative Method," Studies in Comparative and International Development, 36 (Spring 2001), 93-111.