Multi-attribute decision-making in individual and social choice

Mathematical social sciences

Volumn 40, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 327-339

  Bossert, Walter ^a   Peters, Hans ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^b MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

C78; D71; D81

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042027090     PISSN: 01654896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(99)00051-7     Document Type: Article

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