Weak states and pluralism: The case of Moldova

East European Politics and Societies

Volumn 17, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 454-482+576

  Way, Lucan A ^a  

^a TEMPLE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Democratization; Elite networks; Moldova; Post Soviet politics; Weak states

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042026311     PISSN: 08883254     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0888325403255309     Document Type: Article

References (86)

1. Infotag, 12 September 1996.
2. In the late 1990s, Moldova had one of the two or three lowest levels of gross national product (GNP) per capita (at purchasing power parity) in the former Soviet Union. Relative to other post-Soviet republics, it also suffered the second worst economic decline in the 1990s (Georgia had a slightly worse drop in production) (World Bank Development Indicators, CD-ROM database).
3. Moldova's population has the highest share of rural residents in the former Soviet Union outside of Central Asia.
4. In 1984, Moldova had the lowest proportion of population with a higher education than any other Soviet republic - although its level of literacy is greater than many Central Asian republics. William Crowther, "Moldova; Caught between Nation and Empire," in I. Bremmer and R. Taras, eds., New States New Politics: Building Post-Soviet Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996), 338.
5. In 1996, the court ruled against an effort by President Snegur to fire a general without parliamentary approval. In 2002, the court ruled against an effort by the Communists to subordinate local governments to central control.
6. Following the downfall of Moldovan Party Secretary Semion Grossu in November to December 1989 at the hands of Gorbachev, Glavlit, the government censorship agency, more or less ceased to function (2002 author interview with Nicolae Negru, independent journalist, member of Writer's Union in late 1980s [all author interviews took place between 31 January and 15 February 2002]).
7. Infotag, 27 April 2001, According to the National Committee for the Freedom of the Press, approximately one-third of journalists working for National Radio and Television were fired after the Communist victory.
8. For example, Robert Moser, summarizing a recent volume on the Russian transition, argues that problems with Russian democracy "arose primarily from poor elite decisions and institutional design." See Moser, "Introduction," in Z. Barany and R. Moser, eds., Russian Politics: Challenges of Democratization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 10.
9. Easter Gerald, "Preference for Presidentialism," World Politics 49 (1997): 2.
10. For example, Snegur supporters manipulated election laws in 1991 in such a way that eliminated his most serious opponent and made him the only candidate in 1991. A law passed in January 1992 dictated a steep fine and up to two years in a corrective labor camp for slandering the president or chairman of parliament." Similarly, a 1995 press law, changed in 1999, included provisions that bans stories that "damage a person's honor and dignity." Simultaneously, the Moldovan Constitution forbids "disputing or defaming the State and the people." It is unclear why, if leaders were so committed to democracy, they would have pushed through such legal provisions.
11. Hugh Seton Watson, Eastern Europe between the Wars, 1918-1941 (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986), 196-216.
12. As in Ukraine, tax audits and fines have been used by incumbents to intimidate and discredit potential sources of opposition (2002 author interviews with Anatol Golea, Infotag News Agency, former press secretary for President Lucinschi; Vasile Nedelciuc, parliamentary deputy 1990 to 2001; Viorel Ciubotaru, former official in Moldovan Popular Front, former advisor to President Snegur). On Ukraine, see Keith Darden, "Blackmail as a Tool of State Domination: Ukraine under Kuchma," East European Constitutional Review 10 (Spring/Summer 2001): 67-71.
13. In the 1996 presidential elections, which pitted the incumbent president against the head of Parliament against the prime minister, all sides allegedly met, showed each other what they had on one another, and agreed to a "cease fire." (2002 author interview with Ala Mindicanu, leader, Women's Christian Democratic League.)
14. Infotag, 10 April 1998.
15. 2002 author interviews with Alexandru Mosanu, former head of Parliament; Ion Safronie, press secretary for the Constitutional Court
16. See Postanovlenie o konstitutsionnsosti ukazov Prezidenta Respubliki Moldova No. 116-II i 117-II ot 7 Aprelia 1997 goda. According to the Constitutional Court press secretary, judges agreed that the creation of the Anti-Corruption Department was an effort by Lucinschi to create his own political police, "But here in Moldova, this is not some jungle" (Safronie interview).
17. 2002 author interviews with Safronie; Veaceslav P. Untila, former head of Road Police; Valeriu Matei, parliamentary deputy 1990 to 2001. See also Basapres, 2 November 1999.
18. See Alexei's Chernaia Kniga Korruptsii (Black Book of Corruption). In mid-1999, following a political battle between the nationalist deputy Valeriu Matei and Lucinschi, Alexel publicly accused Matei of providing cover for firms that supposedly had stolen money from the government. A court later ruled the accusations unjustified. ("Hotarire în numele Legii," 24 September, 1999. Court decision of the Buiucani district municipal court.) It also appears that Alexei was able to use Lucinschi's connections to Russian media to publicize various accusations. Alexei brought charges publicized in a TV show broadcast by NTV against the head of Parliament, who had begun opposing Lucinschi's efforts to strengthen the presidency. (Basapres, 2 November 1999).
19. See Alexei's Chernaia Kniga Korruptsii (Black Book of Corruption). In mid-1999, following a political battle between the nationalist deputy Valeriu Matei and Lucinschi, Alexel publicly accused Matei of providing cover for firms that supposedly had stolen money from the government. A court later ruled the accusations unjustified. ("Hotarire în numele Legii," 24 September, 1999. Court decision of the Buiucani district municipal court.) It also appears that Alexei was able to use Lucinschi's connections to Russian media to publicize various accusations. Alexei brought charges publicized in a TV show broadcast by NTV against the head of Parliament, who had begun opposing Lucinschi's efforts to strengthen the presidency. (Basapres, 2 November 1999).
20. Darden, "Blackmail."
21. This account is taken from interviews with Nedelciuc, Mindicanu, and Matei.
22. Marc Morjé Howard, "Free Not to Participate: The Weakness of Civil Society in PostCommunist Europe," Studies in Public Policy 325 (2000).
23. See "Moldova," in A. Karatnycky, A. Motyl, and A. Schnetzer, eds., Nations in Transit 2001 (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2001).
24. Andrew Janos, East Central Europe in the Modern World: The Politics of Borderlands from Pre- to Post-Communism (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000).
25. In particular, Western Influence may be behind the country's relatively liberal citizenship law (2002 author interview with Arcadie Barbarosie, Institute for Public Policy). In addition, the government in Moldova made moves to eliminate the death penalty in response to OSCE pressures. See AFP, 6 July 2000.
26. Between 1990 and 1998, the total amount of democratic assistance given to all post-Soviet countries combined was roughly $400 million. Thomas A. Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), 41.
27. The importance of elite cohesion in the preservation of authoritarian rule was noted in Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter's Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). See also Easter, "Preference for Presidentialism," and Philip Roeder, "Obstacles to Authori tarianism," in R. Anderson et al., eds., Postcommunism and the Theory of Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).
28. The importance of elite cohesion in the preservation of authoritarian rule was noted in Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter's Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). See also Easter, "Preference for Presidentialism," and Philip Roeder, "Obstacles to Authoritarianism," in R. Anderson et al., eds., Postcommunism and the Theory of Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).
29. The importance of elite cohesion in the preservation of authoritarian rule was noted in Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter's Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). See also Easter, "Preference for Presidentialism," and Philip Roeder, "Obstacles to Authoritarianism," in R. Anderson et al., eds., Postcommunism and the Theory of Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).
30. In this sense, my analysis is consistent with the approach of Philip Roeder, "Obstacles to Authoritarianism," In R. Anderson et al., eds., Postcommunism and the Theory of Democracy.
31. In Russia, Yeltsin was succeeded by his former prime minister. The most serious challenge to Yeltsin's rule came in the early 1990s from the head of the Russian parliament and his vice president.
32. Cibotaru, close to Snegur at the time, feels that the election was only free in certain select parts of the country. (2002 author interview with Viorel Cibotaru, former Ministry of Defense official.)
33. He was accused of purging the government administration of anyone opposed to the Agrarian Party (Basapress, 6 December 1995; Infotag, 12 September 1996). Many worried that his administrative resources would give Sangheli's supporters greater opportunity to steal votes (Basapress, 18 November 1996; Infotag, 8 November 1996; Infotag, 26 June 1996; Infotag, 1 December 1996). Accordingly, a large number of parliamentarians attempted to block local nongovernmental organizations from acting as observers on election day - a move that was interpreted as an effort to facilitate election falsification by local authorities (Basapress, 29 October 1996).
34. 2002 author interview with anonymous Sangheli official.
35. Snegur and other members of the elite were highly sensitive to criticism (Cibotaru interview). A law passed in January 1992 and suspended in 1996 dictated a steep fine and up to two years in a corrective labor camp for slandering the president or chairman of Parliament. Similarly, a 1995 press law, changed in 1999, included provisions that bans stories that "damage a person's honor and dignity." Simultaneously, the Moldovan Constitution forbids "disputing or defaming the State and the people."
36. Vladimir Socor, "Moldova," RFE/RL Research Report, 2 October 1992.
37. ITAR-Tass, 2 September, 1992; Krasnaya zvezda, 9 September 1992.
38. Kommersant Moldavy, 7 December 2001.
39. RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 3, no. 243, 16 December 1999.
40. Cibotaru Interview.
41. 2002 author interview with anonymous Snegur official; Cibotaru interview.
42. Chisinau, Moldova, Basapress, 28 June 1996.
43. In September 1993, the vice head of the military refused to step down when the prime minister fired him (Chisinau, Moldova, Basapress, 21 September, 1993) and only complied when the president seconded the measure (Chisinau, Moldova, Basapress, 28 September 1993).
44. Roeder, "Obstacles to Authoritarianism."
45. See Moser, "Introduction"; and Guillermo O'Donnell, Counterpoints (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1999).
46. See Moser, "Introduction"; and Guillermo O'Donnell, Counterpoints (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1999).
47. Darden, "Blackmail," makes a similar point.
48. See O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule; Easter, "Prefrence for Presidentialisme Roeder, "Obstacles to Authoritarianism."
49. See O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule; Easter, "Prefrence for Presidentialisme Roeder, "Obstacles to Authoritarianism."
50. See O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule; Easter, "Prefrence for Presidentialisme Roeder, "Obstacles to Authoritarianism."
51. Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," in O'Donnell and Schmitter, eds., Transition from Authoritarian Rule, pt. 3, 47-63.
52. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
53. Multiple independent candidates were allowed to run in 373 of 380 electoral districts. Charles King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture (Palo Alto, CA: Hoover, 2000), 146.
54. Ciubotaru interview.
55. King, The Moldovans, 151. Ethnic Moldovans controlled all of the leading positions in parliament and eighteen of twenty positions in the new government, William Crowther, "Nationalism and Political Transformation in Moldova," in D. Dyer, ed., Studies in Moldovan: The History, Culture, Language and Contemporary Politics of the People of Moldova (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1996).
56. King, The Moldovans, 151. Ethnic Moldovans controlled all of the leading positions in parliament and eighteen of twenty positions in the new government, William Crowther, "Nationalism and Political Transformation in Moldova," in D. Dyer, ed., Studies in Moldovan: The History, Culture, Language and Contemporary Politics of the People of Moldova (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1996).
57. Matei interview. The declaration called for the "liquidation of the political and legal consequences" of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact as well as other language that left Moldova's ultimate status as an independent country open to review. When I asked him why more centrists parliamentarians did not oppose such language, he claimed that, "No one noticed.... Does everyone understand Joyce?"
58. Crowther, "The Moldovan National Movement," 36-37.
59. Cibotaru interview; 2002 author interview with Nicolae Chirtoaca, former national security advisor to Snegur.
60. Cibotaru interview; 2002 author interview with Mircea Snegur, president of Moldova 1991 to 96.
61. Crowther, "The Moldovan National Movement," 37.
62. Socor, "Moldova."
63. 2002 author interviews with Alexandru Muravschi, parliamentary deputy 1994 to 2001, deputy minister of economy under Sturza government February to November 1999; Ion Gutu, parliamentary deputy, 1990-, minister of economy under Sangheli.
64. See Lucan Way, "Pluralism by Default: The Challenges of Authoritarian State Building in Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine," Studies in Public Policy 375 (2003).
65. 2002 author interview with Nicolae Andronic, parliamentary deputy 1990 to 2001; Nezavisimaia Moldova, 12 July 1994.
66. Martin Shefter, "The Emergence of the Political Machine: An Alternate View," in Willis D. Hawley et al., eds., Theoretical Perspectives on Urban Politics (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1976). The types of rents mentioned in Moldova by observers and politicians include bribes from foreign companies doing business in the country, arms sales, the sale of confiscated material obtained at customs, the illegal export of cigarettes and wine, assistance in the export of metals from Transnistr, and the sale of legal amnesty to businessmen. See Victor Popa et al., Corupţia Političa: Context şi emnificaţii (Chişinau, Moldova: Cartier administrative, 2001).
67. Martin Shefter, "The Emergence of the Political Machine: An Alternate View," in Willis D. Hawley et al., eds., Theoretical Perspectives on Urban Politics (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1976). The types of rents mentioned in Moldova by observers and politicians include bribes from foreign companies doing business in the country, arms sales, the sale of confiscated material obtained at customs, the illegal export of cigarettes and wine, assistance in the export of metals from Transnistr, and the sale of legal amnesty to businessmen. See Victor Popa et al., Corupţia Političa: Context şi emnificaţii (Chişinau, Moldova: Cartier administrative, 2001).
68. 2002 author interviews with Mosanu; Golea; Dumitru Diacov, parliamentarian 1994 to 2001, head of Parliament 1998 to 2001. For example, in the 1998 election, he actively promoted a number of independent candidates and threw his support behind a wide range of blocks, including Furnica and Speranda, in addition to the Bloc for Democratic and Prosperous Moldova, which had been specifically created as a propresidential party (Diacov interview).
69. Interviews with Diacov; Golea; Muravschi.
70. Diacov interview.
71. Clearly, anti-institutional divide-and-rule strategies do not by themselves undermine authoritarian rule and have been a core strategy of autocrats since time immemorial. However, the Moldovan case highlights the difficulties that such a strategy presents when autocrats try to build authoritarian institutions without a core base of loyal supporters.
72. For this interpretation of the resistance to party building by Lucinschi, see Moldavskie vedemosti, 7 February 1998, 1, 2.
73. See John P. Willerton, Patronage and Politics in the USSR (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1992).
74. Pauline Jones Luong, Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia: Power, Perceptions, and Pacts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
75. Kathleen Collins, "Clans, Pacts, and Politics: Understanding Transition in Central Asia." Ph.D. diss., Department of Political Science, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, 1999.
76. Thus, Snegur resisted any implication of criticism of Grossu in my interview with the former president.
77. Willerton, Patronage and Politics, 116-17.
78. Lucan Way, "Bureaucracy by Default: Budgetary Politics and the Public Dimension of the State in Post-Soviet Ukraine," chap 2. Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 2001.
79. This is apparently how competing leaders in parliament and government utilized security services to collect kompromat on one another (Chirtoaca interview). As noted above, Lucinschi seems to have made particular use of "his person," Alexei, to orchestrate his use of kompromat against political enemies. Similarly, when trying to oust the head of the military, Snegur was able to remove General Creanga from his office using "his" people In the army (Chirtoaca interview).
80. Snegur interview.
81. 2002 author interview with Valerii Garev, secretary of the Communist Party of Moldova.
82. Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1991).
83. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidation (Baltimore; Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 16.
84. Timothy Frye, "The Perils of Polarization; Economic Performance in the Post-Communist World" (Paper prepared for delivery at the 2001 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 30 August to 2 September), 2.
85. Trud, 6 May 1997.
86. In Moldova, President Lucinschi reportedly convinced eight independent deputies in parliament to pull support from Prime Minister Sturza in part because he was perceived as getting too popular. In a similar vein, President Kuchma in Ukraine fired Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko in part because the prime minister was gaining in popularity for having managed the country's first period of growth In ten years.