Bundling new products with old to signal quality, with application to the sequencing of new products

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 21, Issue 8, 2003, Pages 1179-1200

  Choi, Jay Pil ^a  

^a MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bundling; Experience goods; Informational leverage; Timing of product introductions

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION; PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT; QUALITY CONTROL;

EXPERIENCE GOODS;

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT;

EID: 0042014233     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-7187(03)00077-8     Document Type: Article

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