Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and an American conception of national security

Diplomatic History

Volumn 25, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 1-32

  Kennedy, Ross A ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0041911118     PISSN: 01452096     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0145-2096.00247     Document Type: Article

References (311)

1. Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson: Revolution, War, and Peace (Arlington Heights, 1979), 6-7. See also Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism during World War I (Wilmington, 1991) and Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective (New York, 1987); Frederick S. Calhoun, Power and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy (Kent, 1986); John Milton Cooper, Jr., The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, MA, 1983); David M. Esposito, The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson: American War Aims in World War I (Westport, 1996); Thomas Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (New York, 1992); N. Gordon Levin, Jr., Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution (New York, 1968); Klaus Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 1918-1919 (Chapel Hill, 1985); and Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, 1994). For an interesting evaluation of The Papers of Woodrow Wilson see Dewey W. Grantham, "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson. A Preliminary Appraisal," in The Wilson Era: Essays in Honor of Arthur S. Link, ed. John Milton Cooper, Jr., and Charles E. Neu (Arlington Heights, 1991), 281-301.
2. Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson: Revolution, War, and Peace (Arlington Heights, 1979), 6-7. See also Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism during World War I (Wilmington, 1991) and Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective (New York, 1987); Frederick S. Calhoun, Power and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy (Kent, 1986); John Milton Cooper, Jr., The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, MA, 1983); David M. Esposito, The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson: American War Aims in World War I (Westport, 1996); Thomas Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (New York, 1992); N. Gordon Levin, Jr., Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution (New York, 1968); Klaus Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 1918-1919 (Chapel Hill, 1985); and Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, 1994). For an interesting evaluation of The Papers of Woodrow Wilson see Dewey W. Grantham, "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson. A Preliminary Appraisal," in The Wilson Era: Essays in Honor of Arthur S. Link, ed. John Milton Cooper, Jr., and Charles E. Neu (Arlington Heights, 1991), 281-301.
3. Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson: Revolution, War, and Peace (Arlington Heights, 1979), 6-7. See also Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism during World War I (Wilmington, 1991) and Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective (New York, 1987); Frederick S. Calhoun, Power and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy (Kent, 1986); John Milton Cooper, Jr., The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, MA, 1983); David M. Esposito, The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson: American War Aims in World War I (Westport, 1996); Thomas Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (New York, 1992); N. Gordon Levin, Jr., Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution (New York, 1968); Klaus Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 1918-1919 (Chapel Hill, 1985); and Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, 1994). For an interesting evaluation of The Papers of Woodrow Wilson see Dewey W. Grantham, "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson. A Preliminary Appraisal," in The Wilson Era: Essays in Honor of Arthur S. Link, ed. John Milton Cooper, Jr., and Charles E. Neu (Arlington Heights, 1991), 281-301.
4. Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson: Revolution, War, and Peace (Arlington Heights, 1979), 6-7. See also Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism during World War I (Wilmington, 1991) and Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective (New York, 1987); Frederick S. Calhoun, Power and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy (Kent, 1986); John Milton Cooper, Jr., The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, MA, 1983); David M. Esposito, The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson: American War Aims in World War I (Westport, 1996); Thomas Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (New York, 1992); N. Gordon Levin, Jr., Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution (New York, 1968); Klaus Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 1918-1919 (Chapel Hill, 1985); and Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, 1994). For an interesting evaluation of The Papers of Woodrow Wilson see Dewey W. Grantham, "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson. A Preliminary Appraisal," in The Wilson Era: Essays in Honor of Arthur S. Link, ed. John Milton Cooper, Jr., and Charles E. Neu (Arlington Heights, 1991), 281-301.
5. Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson: Revolution, War, and Peace (Arlington Heights, 1979), 6-7. See also Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism during World War I (Wilmington, 1991) and Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective (New York, 1987); Frederick S. Calhoun, Power and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy (Kent, 1986); John Milton Cooper, Jr., The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, MA, 1983); David M. Esposito, The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson: American War Aims in World War I (Westport, 1996); Thomas Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (New York, 1992); N. Gordon Levin, Jr., Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution (New York, 1968); Klaus Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 1918-1919 (Chapel Hill, 1985); and Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, 1994). For an interesting evaluation of The Papers of Woodrow Wilson see Dewey W. Grantham, "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson. A Preliminary Appraisal," in The Wilson Era: Essays in Honor of Arthur S. Link, ed. John Milton Cooper, Jr., and Charles E. Neu (Arlington Heights, 1991), 281-301.
6. Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson: Revolution, War, and Peace (Arlington Heights, 1979), 6-7. See also Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism during World War I (Wilmington, 1991) and Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective (New York, 1987); Frederick S. Calhoun, Power and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy (Kent, 1986); John Milton Cooper, Jr., The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, MA, 1983); David M. Esposito, The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson: American War Aims in World War I (Westport, 1996); Thomas Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (New York, 1992); N. Gordon Levin, Jr., Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution (New York, 1968); Klaus Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 1918-1919 (Chapel Hill, 1985); and Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, 1994). For an interesting evaluation of The Papers of Woodrow Wilson see Dewey W. Grantham, "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson. A Preliminary Appraisal," in The Wilson Era: Essays in Honor of Arthur S. Link, ed. John Milton Cooper, Jr., and Charles E. Neu (Arlington Heights, 1991), 281-301.
7. Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson: Revolution, War, and Peace (Arlington Heights, 1979), 6-7. See also Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism during World War I (Wilmington, 1991) and Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective (New York, 1987); Frederick S. Calhoun, Power and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy (Kent, 1986); John Milton Cooper, Jr., The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, MA, 1983); David M. Esposito, The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson: American War Aims in World War I (Westport, 1996); Thomas Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (New York, 1992); N. Gordon Levin, Jr., Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution (New York, 1968); Klaus Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 1918-1919 (Chapel Hill, 1985); and Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, 1994). For an interesting evaluation of The Papers of Woodrow Wilson see Dewey W. Grantham, "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson. A Preliminary Appraisal," in The Wilson Era: Essays in Honor of Arthur S. Link, ed. John Milton Cooper, Jr., and Charles E. Neu (Arlington Heights, 1991), 281-301.
8. Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson: Revolution, War, and Peace (Arlington Heights, 1979), 6-7. See also Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism during World War I (Wilmington, 1991) and Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective (New York, 1987); Frederick S. Calhoun, Power and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy (Kent, 1986); John Milton Cooper, Jr., The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, MA, 1983); David M. Esposito, The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson: American War Aims in World War I (Westport, 1996); Thomas Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (New York, 1992); N. Gordon Levin, Jr., Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution (New York, 1968); Klaus Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 1918-1919 (Chapel Hill, 1985); and Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, 1994). For an interesting evaluation of The Papers of Woodrow Wilson see Dewey W. Grantham, "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson. A Preliminary Appraisal," in The Wilson Era: Essays in Honor of Arthur S. Link, ed. John Milton Cooper, Jr., and Charles E. Neu (Arlington Heights, 1991), 281-301.
9. Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson: Revolution, War, and Peace (Arlington Heights, 1979), 6-7. See also Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism during World War I (Wilmington, 1991) and Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective (New York, 1987); Frederick S. Calhoun, Power and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy (Kent, 1986); John Milton Cooper, Jr., The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, MA, 1983); David M. Esposito, The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson: American War Aims in World War I (Westport, 1996); Thomas Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (New York, 1992); N. Gordon Levin, Jr., Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution (New York, 1968); Klaus Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 1918-1919 (Chapel Hill, 1985); and Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, 1994). For an interesting evaluation of The Papers of Woodrow Wilson see Dewey W. Grantham, "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson. A Preliminary Appraisal," in The Wilson Era: Essays in Honor of Arthur S. Link, ed. John Milton Cooper, Jr., and Charles E. Neu (Arlington Heights, 1991), 281-301.
10. Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson: Revolution, War, and Peace (Arlington Heights, 1979), 6-7. See also Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism during World War I (Wilmington, 1991) and Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective (New York, 1987); Frederick S. Calhoun, Power and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy (Kent, 1986); John Milton Cooper, Jr., The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, MA, 1983); David M. Esposito, The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson: American War Aims in World War I (Westport, 1996); Thomas Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (New York, 1992); N. Gordon Levin, Jr., Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution (New York, 1968); Klaus Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 1918-1919 (Chapel Hill, 1985); and Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, 1994). For an interesting evaluation of The Papers of Woodrow Wilson see Dewey W. Grantham, "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson. A Preliminary Appraisal," in The Wilson Era: Essays in Honor of Arthur S. Link, ed. John Milton Cooper, Jr., and Charles E. Neu (Arlington Heights, 1991), 281-301.
11. Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson: Revolution, War, and Peace (Arlington Heights, 1979), 6-7. See also Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism during World War I (Wilmington, 1991) and Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective (New York, 1987); Frederick S. Calhoun, Power and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy (Kent, 1986); John Milton Cooper, Jr., The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, MA, 1983); David M. Esposito, The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson: American War Aims in World War I (Westport, 1996); Thomas Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (New York, 1992); N. Gordon Levin, Jr., Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution (New York, 1968); Klaus Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 1918-1919 (Chapel Hill, 1985); and Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, 1994). For an interesting evaluation of The Papers of Woodrow Wilson see Dewey W. Grantham, "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson. A Preliminary Appraisal," in The Wilson Era: Essays in Honor of Arthur S. Link, ed. John Milton Cooper, Jr., and Charles E. Neu (Arlington Heights, 1991), 281-301.
12. Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson: Revolution, War, and Peace (Arlington Heights, 1979), 6-7. See also Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism during World War I (Wilmington, 1991) and Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective (New York, 1987); Frederick S. Calhoun, Power and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy (Kent, 1986); John Milton Cooper, Jr., The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, MA, 1983); David M. Esposito, The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson: American War Aims in World War I (Westport, 1996); Thomas Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (New York, 1992); N. Gordon Levin, Jr., Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution (New York, 1968); Klaus Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 1918-1919 (Chapel Hill, 1985); and Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, 1994). For an interesting evaluation of The Papers of Woodrow Wilson see Dewey W. Grantham, "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson. A Preliminary Appraisal," in The Wilson Era: Essays in Honor of Arthur S. Link, ed. John Milton Cooper, Jr., and Charles E. Neu (Arlington Heights, 1991), 281-301.
13. "A Memorandum by Herbert Bruce Brougham," 14 December 1914, in Arthur S. Link et al, eds., The Papers of Woodrow Wilson (Princeton, 1966-94), 31:459; "Address to Women in Cincinnati," 26 October 1916, ibid. 38:531. For Wilson's initial impulse to blame Germany for the war see the diary of Edward M. House, 30 August 1914, Papers of Woodrow Wilson 30:462. The Papers of Woodrow Wilson will hereafter be abbreviated PWW. All quotes are from Wilson unless otherwise indicated. Link briefly notes Wilson's view of various European disputes in Revolution, War, and Peace, 23. My interpretation of how Wilson understood the international system has been influenced by Kenneth Waltz's neorealist theory of international politics. For a convenient introduction to the debate over Waltz's theory see Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York, 1986). President Wilson did not develop his ideas in a vacuum, of course; his view of U.S. national security emerged in the context of a national debate over the meaning of the war for America. It is not the purpose of this article to analyze exactly who influenced the president or paralleled his thinking, however. My goal here is only to illuminate the logic and content of Wilson's conception of U.S. national security. Those interested in my interpretation of the debate about American security stimulated by the war should consult the author's doctoral dissertation, "Uncertain Security: American Political Ideology and the Problem of Militarism, 1890-1941" (University of California-Berkeley, 1994), chaps 3-5.
14. "A Memorandum by Herbert Bruce Brougham," 14 December 1914, in Arthur S. Link et al, eds., The Papers of Woodrow Wilson (Princeton, 1966-94), 31:459; "Address to Women in Cincinnati," 26 October 1916, ibid. 38:531. For Wilson's initial impulse to blame Germany for the war see the diary of Edward M. House, 30 August 1914, Papers of Woodrow Wilson 30:462. The Papers of Woodrow Wilson will hereafter be abbreviated PWW. All quotes are from Wilson unless otherwise indicated. Link briefly notes Wilson's view of various European disputes in Revolution, War, and Peace, 23. My interpretation of how Wilson understood the international system has been influenced by Kenneth Waltz's neorealist theory of international politics. For a convenient introduction to the debate over Waltz's theory see Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York, 1986). President Wilson did not develop his ideas in a vacuum, of course; his view of U.S. national security emerged in the context of a national debate over the meaning of the war for America. It is not the purpose of this article to analyze exactly who influenced the president or paralleled his thinking, however. My goal here is only to illuminate the logic and content of Wilson's conception of U.S. national security. Those interested in my interpretation of the debate about American security stimulated by the war should consult the author's doctoral dissertation, "Uncertain Security: American Political Ideology and the Problem of Militarism, 1890-1941" (University of California-Berkeley, 1994), chaps 3-5.
15. "A Memorandum by Herbert Bruce Brougham," 14 December 1914, in Arthur S. Link et al, eds., The Papers of Woodrow Wilson (Princeton, 1966-94), 31:459; "Address to Women in Cincinnati," 26 October 1916, ibid. 38:531. For Wilson's initial impulse to blame Germany for the war see the diary of Edward M. House, 30 August 1914, Papers of Woodrow Wilson 30:462. The Papers of Woodrow Wilson will hereafter be abbreviated PWW. All quotes are from Wilson unless otherwise indicated. Link briefly notes Wilson's view of various European disputes in Revolution, War, and Peace, 23. My interpretation of how Wilson understood the international system has been influenced by Kenneth Waltz's neorealist theory of international politics. For a convenient introduction to the debate over Waltz's theory see Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York, 1986). President Wilson did not develop his ideas in a vacuum, of course; his view of U.S. national security emerged in the context of a national debate over the meaning of the war for America. It is not the purpose of this article to analyze exactly who influenced the president or paralleled his thinking, however. My goal here is only to illuminate the logic and content of Wilson's conception of U.S. national security. Those interested in my interpretation of the debate about American security stimulated by the war should consult the author's doctoral dissertation, "Uncertain Security: American Political Ideology and the Problem of Militarism, 1890-1941" (University of California-Berkeley, 1994), chaps 3-5.
16. "A Memorandum by Herbert Bruce Brougham," 14 December 1914, in Arthur S. Link et al, eds., The Papers of Woodrow Wilson (Princeton, 1966-94), 31:459; "Address to Women in Cincinnati," 26 October 1916, ibid. 38:531. For Wilson's initial impulse to blame Germany for the war see the diary of Edward M. House, 30 August 1914, Papers of Woodrow Wilson 30:462. The Papers of Woodrow Wilson will hereafter be abbreviated PWW. All quotes are from Wilson unless otherwise indicated. Link briefly notes Wilson's view of various European disputes in Revolution, War, and Peace, 23. My interpretation of how Wilson understood the international system has been influenced by Kenneth Waltz's neorealist theory of international politics. For a convenient introduction to the debate over Waltz's theory see Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York, 1986). President Wilson did not develop his ideas in a vacuum, of course; his view of U.S. national security emerged in the context of a national debate over the meaning of the war for America. It is not the purpose of this article to analyze exactly who influenced the president or paralleled his thinking, however. My goal here is only to illuminate the logic and content of Wilson's conception of U.S. national security. Those interested in my interpretation of the debate about American security stimulated by the war should consult the author's doctoral dissertation, "Uncertain Security: American Political Ideology and the Problem of Militarism, 1890-1941" (University of California-Berkeley, 1994), chaps 3-5.
17. "A Memorandum by Herbert Bruce Brougham," 14 December 1914, in Arthur S. Link et al, eds., The Papers of Woodrow Wilson (Princeton, 1966-94), 31:459; "Address to Women in Cincinnati," 26 October 1916, ibid. 38:531. For Wilson's initial impulse to blame Germany for the war see the diary of Edward M. House, 30 August 1914, Papers of Woodrow Wilson 30:462. The Papers of Woodrow Wilson will hereafter be abbreviated PWW. All quotes are from Wilson unless otherwise indicated. Link briefly notes Wilson's view of various European disputes in Revolution, War, and Peace, 23. My interpretation of how Wilson understood the international system has been influenced by Kenneth Waltz's neorealist theory of international politics. For a convenient introduction to the debate over Waltz's theory see Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York, 1986). President Wilson did not develop his ideas in a vacuum, of course; his view of U.S. national security emerged in the context of a national debate over the meaning of the war for America. It is not the purpose of this article to analyze exactly who influenced the president or paralleled his thinking, however. My goal here is only to illuminate the logic and content of Wilson's conception of U.S. national security. Those interested in my interpretation of the debate about American security stimulated by the war should consult the author's doctoral dissertation, "Uncertain Security: American Political Ideology and the Problem of Militarism, 1890-1941" (University of California-Berkeley, 1994), chaps 3-5.
18. "A Memorandum by Herbert Bruce Brougham," 14 December 1914, in Arthur S. Link et al, eds., The Papers of Woodrow Wilson (Princeton, 1966-94), 31:459; "Address to Women in Cincinnati," 26 October 1916, ibid. 38:531. For Wilson's initial impulse to blame Germany for the war see the diary of Edward M. House, 30 August 1914, Papers of Woodrow Wilson 30:462. The Papers of Woodrow Wilson will hereafter be abbreviated PWW. All quotes are from Wilson unless otherwise indicated. Link briefly notes Wilson's view of various European disputes in Revolution, War, and Peace, 23. My interpretation of how Wilson understood the international system has been influenced by Kenneth Waltz's neorealist theory of international politics. For a convenient introduction to the debate over Waltz's theory see Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York, 1986). President Wilson did not develop his ideas in a vacuum, of course; his view of U.S. national security emerged in the context of a national debate over the meaning of the war for America. It is not the purpose of this article to analyze exactly who influenced the president or paralleled his thinking, however. My goal here is only to illuminate the logic and content of Wilson's conception of U.S. national security. Those interested in my interpretation of the debate about American security stimulated by the war should consult the author's doctoral dissertation, "Uncertain Security: American Political Ideology and the Problem of Militarism, 1890-1941" (University of California-Berkeley, 1994), chaps 3-5.
19. House Diary, 30 August 1914, PWW 30:462; Bryan to Wilson, 19 September 1914, ibid. 31:56; "Address in New York," 27 January 1916, ibid. 36:15, 13; "Address in Pittsburgh," 29 January 1916, ibid. 36:30; House Diary, 30 August 1914, ibid. 30:462. See also "A Colloquy with a Group of Antipreparedness Leaders," 8 May 1916, ibid. 36:642-43.
20. House Diary, 30 August 1914, PWW 30:462; Bryan to Wilson, 19 September 1914, ibid. 31:56; "Address in New York," 27 January 1916, ibid. 36:15, 13; "Address in Pittsburgh," 29 January 1916, ibid. 36:30; House Diary, 30 August 1914, ibid. 30:462. See also "A Colloquy with a Group of Antipreparedness Leaders," 8 May 1916, ibid. 36:642-43.
21. House Diary, 30 August 1914, PWW 30:462; Bryan to Wilson, 19 September 1914, ibid. 31:56; "Address in New York," 27 January 1916, ibid. 36:15, 13; "Address in Pittsburgh," 29 January 1916, ibid. 36:30; House Diary, 30 August 1914, ibid. 30:462. See also "A Colloquy with a Group of Antipreparedness Leaders," 8 May 1916, ibid. 36:642-43.
22. House Diary, 30 August 1914, PWW 30:462; Bryan to Wilson, 19 September 1914, ibid. 31:56; "Address in New York," 27 January 1916, ibid. 36:15, 13; "Address in Pittsburgh," 29 January 1916, ibid. 36:30; House Diary, 30 August 1914, ibid. 30:462. See also "A Colloquy with a Group of Antipreparedness Leaders," 8 May 1916, ibid. 36:642-43.
23. House Diary, 30 August 1914, PWW 30:462; Bryan to Wilson, 19 September 1914, ibid. 31:56; "Address in New York," 27 January 1916, ibid. 36:15, 13; "Address in Pittsburgh," 29 January 1916, ibid. 36:30; House Diary, 30 August 1914, ibid. 30:462. See also "A Colloquy with a Group of Antipreparedness Leaders," 8 May 1916, ibid. 36:642-43.
24. House Diary, 30 August 1914, PWW 30:462; Bryan to Wilson, 19 September 1914, ibid. 31:56; "Address in New York," 27 January 1916, ibid. 36:15, 13; "Address in Pittsburgh," 29 January 1916, ibid. 36:30; House Diary, 30 August 1914, ibid. 30:462. See also "A Colloquy with a Group of Antipreparedness Leaders," 8 May 1916, ibid. 36:642-43.
25. "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, PWW 40:536; "Address to the League to Enforce Peace," 27 May 1916, ibid. 37:114; "Address in Milwaukee," 31 January 1916, ibid. 36:57; "Acceptance Speech," 2 September 1916, ibid. 38:136; "Address to Women in Cincinnati," 26 October 1916, ibid., 531. On the war's shock to the U.S. economy see Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914-1915 (Princeton, 1960), 91-104, 616-25. For Wilson's concern about ethnic divisions in the United States see Cooper, Warrior and the Priest, 273.
26. "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, PWW 40:536; "Address to the League to Enforce Peace," 27 May 1916, ibid. 37:114; "Address in Milwaukee," 31 January 1916, ibid. 36:57; "Acceptance Speech," 2 September 1916, ibid. 38:136; "Address to Women in Cincinnati," 26 October 1916, ibid., 531. On the war's shock to the U.S. economy see Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914-1915 (Princeton, 1960), 91-104, 616-25. For Wilson's concern about ethnic divisions in the United States see Cooper, Warrior and the Priest, 273.
27. "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, PWW 40:536; "Address to the League to Enforce Peace," 27 May 1916, ibid. 37:114; "Address in Milwaukee," 31 January 1916, ibid. 36:57; "Acceptance Speech," 2 September 1916, ibid. 38:136; "Address to Women in Cincinnati," 26 October 1916, ibid., 531. On the war's shock to the U.S. economy see Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914-1915 (Princeton, 1960), 91-104, 616-25. For Wilson's concern about ethnic divisions in the United States see Cooper, Warrior and the Priest, 273.
28. "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, PWW 40:536; "Address to the League to Enforce Peace," 27 May 1916, ibid. 37:114; "Address in Milwaukee," 31 January 1916, ibid. 36:57; "Acceptance Speech," 2 September 1916, ibid. 38:136; "Address to Women in Cincinnati," 26 October 1916, ibid., 531. On the war's shock to the U.S. economy see Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914-1915 (Princeton, 1960), 91-104, 616-25. For Wilson's concern about ethnic divisions in the United States see Cooper, Warrior and the Priest, 273.
29. "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, PWW 40:536; "Address to the League to Enforce Peace," 27 May 1916, ibid. 37:114; "Address in Milwaukee," 31 January 1916, ibid. 36:57; "Acceptance Speech," 2 September 1916, ibid. 38:136; "Address to Women in Cincinnati," 26 October 1916, ibid., 531. On the war's shock to the U.S. economy see Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914-1915 (Princeton, 1960), 91-104, 616-25. For Wilson's concern about ethnic divisions in the United States see Cooper, Warrior and the Priest, 273.
30. "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, PWW 40:536; "Address to the League to Enforce Peace," 27 May 1916, ibid. 37:114; "Address in Milwaukee," 31 January 1916, ibid. 36:57; "Acceptance Speech," 2 September 1916, ibid. 38:136; "Address to Women in Cincinnati," 26 October 1916, ibid., 531. On the war's shock to the U.S. economy see Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914-1915 (Princeton, 1960), 91-104, 616-25. For Wilson's concern about ethnic divisions in the United States see Cooper, Warrior and the Priest, 273.
31. "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, PWW 40:536; "Address to the League to Enforce Peace," 27 May 1916, ibid. 37:114; "Address in Milwaukee," 31 January 1916, ibid. 36:57; "Acceptance Speech," 2 September 1916, ibid. 38:136; "Address to Women in Cincinnati," 26 October 1916, ibid., 531. On the war's shock to the U.S. economy see Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914-1915 (Princeton, 1960), 91-104, 616-25. For Wilson's concern about ethnic divisions in the United States see Cooper, Warrior and the Priest, 273.
32. Wilson to Robert Lansing, with enclosure, 5 August 1915, PWW 34:92, 95-96; "Address in Pittsburgh," 29 January 1916, ibid. 36:39; "Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy," 13 June 1916, ibid. 37:214-15 "A Colloquy with a Group of Antipreparedness Leaders," 8 May 1916, ibid. 36:642.
33. Wilson to Robert Lansing, with enclosure, 5 August 1915, PWW 34:92, 95-96; "Address in Pittsburgh," 29 January 1916, ibid. 36:39; "Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy," 13 June 1916, ibid. 37:214-15 "A Colloquy with a Group of Antipreparedness Leaders," 8 May 1916, ibid. 36:642.
34. Wilson to Robert Lansing, with enclosure, 5 August 1915, PWW 34:92, 95-96; "Address in Pittsburgh," 29 January 1916, ibid. 36:39; "Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy," 13 June 1916, ibid. 37:214-15 "A Colloquy with a Group of Antipreparedness Leaders," 8 May 1916, ibid. 36:642.
35. Wilson to Robert Lansing, with enclosure, 5 August 1915, PWW 34:92, 95-96; "Address in Pittsburgh," 29 January 1916, ibid. 36:39; "Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy," 13 June 1916, ibid. 37:214-15 "A Colloquy with a Group of Antipreparedness Leaders," 8 May 1916, ibid. 36:642.
36. "Address in Omaha," 8 September 1919, PWW 63:101; "Address in Kansas City," 6 September 1919, ibid., 69; "Address in Portland," 15 September 1919, ibid., 279; "Address in Kansas City," 6 September 1919, ibid., 69. See also "Address in St. Louis," 5 September 1919, ibid. 63:46-47.
37. "Address in Omaha," 8 September 1919, PWW 63:101; "Address in Kansas City," 6 September 1919, ibid., 69; "Address in Portland," 15 September 1919, ibid., 279; "Address in Kansas City," 6 September 1919, ibid., 69. See also "Address in St. Louis," 5 September 1919, ibid. 63:46-47.
38. "Address in Omaha," 8 September 1919, PWW 63:101; "Address in Kansas City," 6 September 1919, ibid., 69; "Address in Portland," 15 September 1919, ibid., 279; "Address in Kansas City," 6 September 1919, ibid., 69. See also "Address in St. Louis," 5 September 1919, ibid. 63:46-47.
39. "Address in Omaha," 8 September 1919, PWW 63:101; "Address in Kansas City," 6 September 1919, ibid., 69; "Address in Portland," 15 September 1919, ibid., 279; "Address in Kansas City," 6 September 1919, ibid., 69. See also "Address in St. Louis," 5 September 1919, ibid. 63:46-47.
40. "Address in Omaha," 8 September 1919, PWW 63:101; "Address in Kansas City," 6 September 1919, ibid., 69; "Address in Portland," 15 September 1919, ibid., 279; "Address in Kansas City," 6 September 1919, ibid., 69. See also "Address in St. Louis," 5 September 1919, ibid. 63:46-47.
41. "Draft of a Peace Note," ca. 25 November 1916, PWW 40:71; "Unpublished Prolegomenon to a Peace Note," ca. 25 November 1916, ibid., 68-69, passim. William Jennings Bryan expressed similar thoughts to Wilson early in the war. See Bryan to Wilson, 19 September 1914, ibid. 31:56.
42. "Draft of a Peace Note," ca. 25 November 1916, PWW 40:71; "Unpublished Prolegomenon to a Peace Note," ca. 25 November 1916, ibid., 68-69, passim. William Jennings Bryan expressed similar thoughts to Wilson early in the war. See Bryan to Wilson, 19 September 1914, ibid. 31:56.
43. "Draft of a Peace Note," ca. 25 November 1916, PWW 40:71; "Unpublished Prolegomenon to a Peace Note," ca. 25 November 1916, ibid., 68-69, passim. William Jennings Bryan expressed similar thoughts to Wilson early in the war. See Bryan to Wilson, 19 September 1914, ibid. 31:56.
44. "Unpublished Prolegomenon to a Peace Note," ca. 25 November 1916, PWW 40:69; "Address to the League to Enforce Peace," 27 May 1916, ibid. 37:115. For Wilson's view of America's war with Mexico see Knock, To End All Wars, 9.
45. "Unpublished Prolegomenon to a Peace Note," ca. 25 November 1916, PWW 40:69; "Address to the League to Enforce Peace," 27 May 1916, ibid. 37:115. For Wilson's view of America's war with Mexico see Knock, To End All Wars, 9.
46. "Unpublished Prolegomenon to a Peace Note," ca. 25 November 1916, PWW 40:69; "Address to the League to Enforce Peace," 27 May 1916, ibid. 37:115. For Wilson's view of America's war with Mexico see Knock, To End All Wars, 9.
47. "A Memorandum by Herbert Bruce Brougham," 14 December 1914, PWW 31:459. See also Wilson to Edward M. House, 22 June 1916, ibid. 37:281-82; "A Colloquy with Members of the American Neutral Conference," 30 August 1916, ibid. 38:115-16; "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, ibid. 40:536. Early in the war, Wilson did express some concern that if the Allies won the war, Russia might dominate Europe. See House to Wilson, 22 August 1914, ibid. 30:432; Wilson to House, 25 August 1914, ibid., 450; and House Diary, 28 September 1914, ibid. 31:95. He did not elaborate on this fear, however, and appears to have lost it by the time of his conversation with Brougham.
48. "A Memorandum by Herbert Bruce Brougham," 14 December 1914, PWW 31:459. See also Wilson to Edward M. House, 22 June 1916, ibid. 37:281-82; "A Colloquy with Members of the American Neutral Conference," 30 August 1916, ibid. 38:115-16; "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, ibid. 40:536. Early in the war, Wilson did express some concern that if the Allies won the war, Russia might dominate Europe. See House to Wilson, 22 August 1914, ibid. 30:432; Wilson to House, 25 August 1914, ibid., 450; and House Diary, 28 September 1914, ibid. 31:95. He did not elaborate on this fear, however, and appears to have lost it by the time of his conversation with Brougham.
49. "A Memorandum by Herbert Bruce Brougham," 14 December 1914, PWW 31:459. See also Wilson to Edward M. House, 22 June 1916, ibid. 37:281-82; "A Colloquy with Members of the American Neutral Conference," 30 August 1916, ibid. 38:115-16; "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, ibid. 40:536. Early in the war, Wilson did express some concern that if the Allies won the war, Russia might dominate Europe. See House to Wilson, 22 August 1914, ibid. 30:432; Wilson to House, 25 August 1914, ibid., 450; and House Diary, 28 September 1914, ibid. 31:95. He did not elaborate on this fear, however, and appears to have lost it by the time of his conversation with Brougham.
50. "A Memorandum by Herbert Bruce Brougham," 14 December 1914, PWW 31:459. See also Wilson to Edward M. House, 22 June 1916, ibid. 37:281-82; "A Colloquy with Members of the American Neutral Conference," 30 August 1916, ibid. 38:115-16; "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, ibid. 40:536. Early in the war, Wilson did express some concern that if the Allies won the war, Russia might dominate Europe. See House to Wilson, 22 August 1914, ibid. 30:432; Wilson to House, 25 August 1914, ibid., 450; and House Diary, 28 September 1914, ibid. 31:95. He did not elaborate on this fear, however, and appears to have lost it by the time of his conversation with Brougham.
51. "A Memorandum by Herbert Bruce Brougham," 14 December 1914, PWW 31:459. See also Wilson to Edward M. House, 22 June 1916, ibid. 37:281-82; "A Colloquy with Members of the American Neutral Conference," 30 August 1916, ibid. 38:115-16; "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, ibid. 40:536. Early in the war, Wilson did express some concern that if the Allies won the war, Russia might dominate Europe. See House to Wilson, 22 August 1914, ibid. 30:432; Wilson to House, 25 August 1914, ibid., 450; and House Diary, 28 September 1914, ibid. 31:95. He did not elaborate on this fear, however, and appears to have lost it by the time of his conversation with Brougham.
52. "A Memorandum by Herbert Bruce Brougham," 14 December 1914, PWW 31:459. See also Wilson to Edward M. House, 22 June 1916, ibid. 37:281-82; "A Colloquy with Members of the American Neutral Conference," 30 August 1916, ibid. 38:115-16; "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, ibid. 40:536. Early in the war, Wilson did express some concern that if the Allies won the war, Russia might dominate Europe. See House to Wilson, 22 August 1914, ibid. 30:432; Wilson to House, 25 August 1914, ibid., 450; and House Diary, 28 September 1914, ibid. 31:95. He did not elaborate on this fear, however, and appears to have lost it by the time of his conversation with Brougham.
53. "A Memorandum by Herbert Bruce Brougham," 14 December 1914, PWW 31:459. See also Wilson to Edward M. House, 22 June 1916, ibid. 37:281-82; "A Colloquy with Members of the American Neutral Conference," 30 August 1916, ibid. 38:115-16; "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, ibid. 40:536. Early in the war, Wilson did express some concern that if the Allies won the war, Russia might dominate Europe. See House to Wilson, 22 August 1914, ibid. 30:432; Wilson to House, 25 August 1914, ibid., 450; and House Diary, 28 September 1914, ibid. 31:95. He did not elaborate on this fear, however, and appears to have lost it by the time of his conversation with Brougham.
54. "A Colloquy with a Group of Antipreparedness Leaders," 8 May 1916, PWW 36:648; House Diary, 30 August 1914, ibid. 30:462; Charles Seymour, ed., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, 2 vols., (Boston, 1926), 1:287-88; Wilson to Lansing, with enclosure, 17 April 1916, PWW 36:493, 491-96, passim; Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House 2:50; Wilson to Lansing, with enclosure, 5 August 1915, PWW 34:92. For one of Wilson's strongest protests to the British see U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916, Supplement (Washington, 1929), 421-22. Link's case for Wilson's neutrality is effectively restated in Revolution, War, and Peace, 21-46.
55. "A Colloquy with a Group of Antipreparedness Leaders," 8 May 1916, PWW 36:648; House Diary, 30 August 1914, ibid. 30:462; Charles Seymour, ed., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, 2 vols., (Boston, 1926), 1:287-88; Wilson to Lansing, with enclosure, 17 April 1916, PWW 36:493, 491-96, passim; Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House 2:50; Wilson to Lansing, with enclosure, 5 August 1915, PWW 34:92. For one of Wilson's strongest protests to the British see U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916, Supplement (Washington, 1929), 421-22. Link's case for Wilson's neutrality is effectively restated in Revolution, War, and Peace, 21-46.
56. "A Colloquy with a Group of Antipreparedness Leaders," 8 May 1916, PWW 36:648; House Diary, 30 August 1914, ibid. 30:462; Charles Seymour, ed., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, 2 vols., (Boston, 1926), 1:287-88; Wilson to Lansing, with enclosure, 17 April 1916, PWW 36:493, 491-96, passim; Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House 2:50; Wilson to Lansing, with enclosure, 5 August 1915, PWW 34:92. For one of Wilson's strongest protests to the British see U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916, Supplement (Washington, 1929), 421-22. Link's case for Wilson's neutrality is effectively restated in Revolution, War, and Peace, 21-46.
57. "A Colloquy with a Group of Antipreparedness Leaders," 8 May 1916, PWW 36:648; House Diary, 30 August 1914, ibid. 30:462; Charles Seymour, ed., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, 2 vols., (Boston, 1926), 1:287-88; Wilson to Lansing, with enclosure, 17 April 1916, PWW 36:493, 491-96, passim; Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House 2:50; Wilson to Lansing, with enclosure, 5 August 1915, PWW 34:92. For one of Wilson's strongest protests to the British see U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916, Supplement (Washington, 1929), 421-22. Link's case for Wilson's neutrality is effectively restated in Revolution, War, and Peace, 21-46.
58. "A Colloquy with a Group of Antipreparedness Leaders," 8 May 1916, PWW 36:648; House Diary, 30 August 1914, ibid. 30:462; Charles Seymour, ed., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, 2 vols., (Boston, 1926), 1:287-88; Wilson to Lansing, with enclosure, 17 April 1916, PWW 36:493, 491-96, passim; Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House 2:50; Wilson to Lansing, with enclosure, 5 August 1915, PWW 34:92. For one of Wilson's strongest protests to the British see U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916, Supplement (Washington, 1929), 421-22. Link's case for Wilson's neutrality is effectively restated in Revolution, War, and Peace, 21-46.
59. "A Colloquy with a Group of Antipreparedness Leaders," 8 May 1916, PWW 36:648; House Diary, 30 August 1914, ibid. 30:462; Charles Seymour, ed., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, 2 vols., (Boston, 1926), 1:287-88; Wilson to Lansing, with enclosure, 17 April 1916, PWW 36:493, 491-96, passim; Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House 2:50; Wilson to Lansing, with enclosure, 5 August 1915, PWW 34:92. For one of Wilson's strongest protests to the British see U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916, Supplement (Washington, 1929), 421-22. Link's case for Wilson's neutrality is effectively restated in Revolution, War, and Peace, 21-46.
60. "A Colloquy with a Group of Antipreparedness Leaders," 8 May 1916, PWW 36:648; House Diary, 30 August 1914, ibid. 30:462; Charles Seymour, ed., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, 2 vols., (Boston, 1926), 1:287-88; Wilson to Lansing, with enclosure, 17 April 1916, PWW 36:493, 491-96, passim; Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House 2:50; Wilson to Lansing, with enclosure, 5 August 1915, PWW 34:92. For one of Wilson's strongest protests to the British see U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916, Supplement (Washington, 1929), 421-22. Link's case for Wilson's neutrality is effectively restated in Revolution, War, and Peace, 21-46.
61. "A Colloquy with a Group of Antipreparedness Leaders," 8 May 1916, PWW 36:648; House Diary, 30 August 1914, ibid. 30:462; Charles Seymour, ed., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, 2 vols., (Boston, 1926), 1:287-88; Wilson to Lansing, with enclosure, 17 April 1916, PWW 36:493, 491-96, passim; Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House 2:50; Wilson to Lansing, with enclosure, 5 August 1915, PWW 34:92. For one of Wilson's strongest protests to the British see U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916, Supplement (Washington, 1929), 421-22. Link's case for Wilson's neutrality is effectively restated in Revolution, War, and Peace, 21-46.
62. Seymour, Intimate Papers of Colonel House 2:101-2, 201; Wilson to House, with enclosure, 18 October 1915, PWW House to Wilson, with editorial notes, 15 February 1916, ibid. 36:180; House Diary, 6 March 1916, ibid., 262. For a concise discussion of this episode by Link see Revolution, War, and Peace, 36-38. For another Wilson and Lansing exchange about democracy and autocracy see Lansing to Wilson, 10 December 1916, PWW 40:209; and Wilson to Lansing, with editorial note, 19 December 1916, ibid., 276-77.
63. Seymour, Intimate Papers of Colonel House 2:101-2, 201; Wilson to House, with enclosure, 18 October 1915, PWW House to Wilson, with editorial notes, 15 February 1916, ibid. 36:180; House Diary, 6 March 1916, ibid., 262. For a concise discussion of this episode by Link see Revolution, War, and Peace, 36-38. For another Wilson and Lansing exchange about democracy and autocracy see Lansing to Wilson, 10 December 1916, PWW 40:209; and Wilson to Lansing, with editorial note, 19 December 1916, ibid., 276-77.
64. Seymour, Intimate Papers of Colonel House 2:101-2, 201; Wilson to House, with enclosure, 18 October 1915, PWW House to Wilson, with editorial notes, 15 February 1916, ibid. 36:180; House Diary, 6 March 1916, ibid., 262. For a concise discussion of this episode by Link see Revolution, War, and Peace, 36-38. For another Wilson and Lansing exchange about democracy and autocracy see Lansing to Wilson, 10 December 1916, PWW 40:209; and Wilson to Lansing, with editorial note, 19 December 1916, ibid., 276-77.
65. Seymour, Intimate Papers of Colonel House 2:101-2, 201; Wilson to House, with enclosure, 18 October 1915, PWW House to Wilson, with editorial notes, 15 February 1916, ibid. 36:180; House Diary, 6 March 1916, ibid., 262. For a concise discussion of this episode by Link see Revolution, War, and Peace, 36-38. For another Wilson and Lansing exchange about democracy and autocracy see Lansing to Wilson, 10 December 1916, PWW 40:209; and Wilson to Lansing, with editorial note, 19 December 1916, ibid., 276-77.
66. Seymour, Intimate Papers of Colonel House 2:101-2, 201; Wilson to House, with enclosure, 18 October 1915, PWW House to Wilson, with editorial notes, 15 February 1916, ibid. 36:180; House Diary, 6 March 1916, ibid., 262. For a concise discussion of this episode by Link see Revolution, War, and Peace, 36-38. For another Wilson and Lansing exchange about democracy and autocracy see Lansing to Wilson, 10 December 1916, PWW 40:209; and Wilson to Lansing, with editorial note, 19 December 1916, ibid., 276-77.
67. Seymour, Intimate Papers of Colonel House 2:101-2, 201; Wilson to House, with enclosure, 18 October 1915, PWW House to Wilson, with editorial notes, 15 February 1916, ibid. 36:180; House Diary, 6 March 1916, ibid., 262. For a concise discussion of this episode by Link see Revolution, War, and Peace, 36-38. For another Wilson and Lansing exchange about democracy and autocracy see Lansing to Wilson, 10 December 1916, PWW 40:209; and Wilson to Lansing, with editorial note, 19 December 1916, ibid., 276-77.
68. Seymour, Intimate Papers of Colonel House 2:101-2, 201; Wilson to House, with enclosure, 18 October 1915, PWW House to Wilson, with editorial notes, 15 February 1916, ibid. 36:180; House Diary, 6 March 1916, ibid., 262. For a concise discussion of this episode by Link see Revolution, War, and Peace, 36-38. For another Wilson and Lansing exchange about democracy and autocracy see Lansing to Wilson, 10 December 1916, PWW 40:209; and Wilson to Lansing, with editorial note, 19 December 1916, ibid., 276-77.
69. House Diary, 30 August 1914, PWW 30:462; Eliot to Wilson, 6 August 1914, ibid., 354; Sir Cecil Arthur Spring Rice to Sir Edward Grey, 8 September 1914, ibid. 31:14; House Diary, 22 September 1915, ibid. 34:506; Seymour, Intimate Papers of Colonel House 2:103; House to Wilson, 3 February 1916, PWW 36:123; Wilson to Robert Lansing, 19 December 1916, ibid. 40:276-77. See also "A Memorandum by Herbert Bruce Brougham," 14 December 1914, ibid. 31:458-59; and House Diary, 15 December 1915, ibid. 35:356-59. Wilson on only one occasion expressed a lack of fear about the consequences of a German victory. See House Diary, 4 November 1914, ibid. 31:265.
70. House Diary, 30 August 1914, PWW 30:462; Eliot to Wilson, 6 August 1914, ibid., 354; Sir Cecil Arthur Spring Rice to Sir Edward Grey, 8 September 1914, ibid. 31:14; House Diary, 22 September 1915, ibid. 34:506; Seymour, Intimate Papers of Colonel House 2:103; House to Wilson, 3 February 1916, PWW 36:123; Wilson to Robert Lansing, 19 December 1916, ibid. 40:276-77. See also "A Memorandum by Herbert Bruce Brougham," 14 December 1914, ibid. 31:458-59; and House Diary, 15 December 1915, ibid. 35:356-59. Wilson on only one occasion expressed a lack of fear about the consequences of a German victory. See House Diary, 4 November 1914, ibid. 31:265.
71. House Diary, 30 August 1914, PWW 30:462; Eliot to Wilson, 6 August 1914, ibid., 354; Sir Cecil Arthur Spring Rice to Sir Edward Grey, 8 September 1914, ibid. 31:14; House Diary, 22 September 1915, ibid. 34:506; Seymour, Intimate Papers of Colonel House 2:103; House to Wilson, 3 February 1916, PWW 36:123; Wilson to Robert Lansing, 19 December 1916, ibid. 40:276-77. See also "A Memorandum by Herbert Bruce Brougham," 14 December 1914, ibid. 31:458-59; and House Diary, 15 December 1915, ibid. 35:356-59. Wilson on only one occasion expressed a lack of fear about the consequences of a German victory. See House Diary, 4 November 1914, ibid. 31:265.
72. House Diary, 30 August 1914, PWW 30:462; Eliot to Wilson, 6 August 1914, ibid., 354; Sir Cecil Arthur Spring Rice to Sir Edward Grey, 8 September 1914, ibid. 31:14; House Diary, 22 September 1915, ibid. 34:506; Seymour, Intimate Papers of Colonel House 2:103; House to Wilson, 3 February 1916, PWW 36:123; Wilson to Robert Lansing, 19 December 1916, ibid. 40:276-77. See also "A Memorandum by Herbert Bruce Brougham," 14 December 1914, ibid. 31:458-59; and House Diary, 15 December 1915, ibid. 35:356-59. Wilson on only one occasion expressed a lack of fear about the consequences of a German victory. See House Diary, 4 November 1914, ibid. 31:265.
73. House Diary, 30 August 1914, PWW 30:462; Eliot to Wilson, 6 August 1914, ibid., 354; Sir Cecil Arthur Spring Rice to Sir Edward Grey, 8 September 1914, ibid. 31:14; House Diary, 22 September 1915, ibid. 34:506; Seymour, Intimate Papers of Colonel House 2:103; House to Wilson, 3 February 1916, PWW 36:123; Wilson to Robert Lansing, 19 December 1916, ibid. 40:276-77. See also "A Memorandum by Herbert Bruce Brougham," 14 December 1914, ibid. 31:458-59; and House Diary, 15 December 1915, ibid. 35:356-59. Wilson on only one occasion expressed a lack of fear about the consequences of a German victory. See House Diary, 4 November 1914, ibid. 31:265.
74. House Diary, 30 August 1914, PWW 30:462; Eliot to Wilson, 6 August 1914, ibid., 354; Sir Cecil Arthur Spring Rice to Sir Edward Grey, 8 September 1914, ibid. 31:14; House Diary, 22 September 1915, ibid. 34:506; Seymour, Intimate Papers of Colonel House 2:103; House to Wilson, 3 February 1916, PWW 36:123; Wilson to Robert Lansing, 19 December 1916, ibid. 40:276-77. See also "A Memorandum by Herbert Bruce Brougham," 14 December 1914, ibid. 31:458-59; and House Diary, 15 December 1915, ibid. 35:356-59. Wilson on only one occasion expressed a lack of fear about the consequences of a German victory. See House Diary, 4 November 1914, ibid. 31:265.
75. House Diary, 30 August 1914, PWW 30:462; Eliot to Wilson, 6 August 1914, ibid., 354; Sir Cecil Arthur Spring Rice to Sir Edward Grey, 8 September 1914, ibid. 31:14; House Diary, 22 September 1915, ibid. 34:506; Seymour, Intimate Papers of Colonel House 2:103; House to Wilson, 3 February 1916, PWW 36:123; Wilson to Robert Lansing, 19 December 1916, ibid. 40:276-77. See also "A Memorandum by Herbert Bruce Brougham," 14 December 1914, ibid. 31:458-59; and House Diary, 15 December 1915, ibid. 35:356-59. Wilson on only one occasion expressed a lack of fear about the consequences of a German victory. See House Diary, 4 November 1914, ibid. 31:265.
76. House Diary, 30 August 1914, PWW 30:462; Eliot to Wilson, 6 August 1914, ibid., 354; Sir Cecil Arthur Spring Rice to Sir Edward Grey, 8 September 1914, ibid. 31:14; House Diary, 22 September 1915, ibid. 34:506; Seymour, Intimate Papers of Colonel House 2:103; House to Wilson, 3 February 1916, PWW 36:123; Wilson to Robert Lansing, 19 December 1916, ibid. 40:276-77. See also "A Memorandum by Herbert Bruce Brougham," 14 December 1914, ibid. 31:458-59; and House Diary, 15 December 1915, ibid. 35:356-59. Wilson on only one occasion expressed a lack of fear about the consequences of a German victory. See House Diary, 4 November 1914, ibid. 31:265.
77. House Diary, 30 August 1914, PWW 30:462; Eliot to Wilson, 6 August 1914, ibid., 354; Sir Cecil Arthur Spring Rice to Sir Edward Grey, 8 September 1914, ibid. 31:14; House Diary, 22 September 1915, ibid. 34:506; Seymour, Intimate Papers of Colonel House 2:103; House to Wilson, 3 February 1916, PWW 36:123; Wilson to Robert Lansing, 19 December 1916, ibid. 40:276-77. See also "A Memorandum by Herbert Bruce Brougham," 14 December 1914, ibid. 31:458-59; and House Diary, 15 December 1915, ibid. 35:356-59. Wilson on only one occasion expressed a lack of fear about the consequences of a German victory. See House Diary, 4 November 1914, ibid. 31:265.
78. House Diary, 30 August 1914, PWW 30:462; Eliot to Wilson, 6 August 1914, ibid., 354; Sir Cecil Arthur Spring Rice to Sir Edward Grey, 8 September 1914, ibid. 31:14; House Diary, 22 September 1915, ibid. 34:506; Seymour, Intimate Papers of Colonel House 2:103; House to Wilson, 3 February 1916, PWW 36:123; Wilson to Robert Lansing, 19 December 1916, ibid. 40:276-77. See also "A Memorandum by Herbert Bruce Brougham," 14 December 1914, ibid. 31:458-59; and House Diary, 15 December 1915, ibid. 35:356-59. Wilson on only one occasion expressed a lack of fear about the consequences of a German victory. See House Diary, 4 November 1914, ibid. 31:265.
79. "Address to the League to Enforce Peace," 27 May 1916, PWW 37:114; "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, ibid. 40:536, 538, 539; "Address to the League to Enforce Peace," 27 May 1916, ibid. 37:116; "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, ibid. 40:539, 535. For Wilson's early expressions of these ideas see Stockton Axson, "Brother Woodrow": A Memoir of Woodrow Wilson, ed. Arthur S. Link (Princeton, 1973), 192-96; House Diary, 28 September 1914, PWW 31:94; "A Memorandum by Herbert Bruce Brougham," 14 December 1914, ibid., 458-59; "An Address in Des Moines," 1 February 1916, ibid. 36:80; and "A Colloquy with a Group of Antipreparedness Leaders," 8 May 1916, ibid., 644-46, 648.
80. "Address to the League to Enforce Peace," 27 May 1916, PWW 37:114; "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, ibid. 40:536, 538, 539; "Address to the League to Enforce Peace," 27 May 1916, ibid. 37:116; "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, ibid. 40:539, 535. For Wilson's early expressions of these ideas see Stockton Axson, "Brother Woodrow": A Memoir of Woodrow Wilson, ed. Arthur S. Link (Princeton, 1973),
81. "Address to the League to Enforce Peace," 27 May 1916, PWW 37:114; "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, ibid. 40:536, 538, 539; "Address to the League to Enforce Peace," 27 May 1916, ibid. 37:116; "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, ibid. 40:539, 535. For Wilson's early expressions of these ideas see Stockton Axson, "Brother Woodrow": A Memoir of Woodrow Wilson, ed. Arthur S. Link (Princeton, 1973), 192-96; House Diary, 28 September 1914, PWW 31:94; "A Memorandum by Herbert Bruce Brougham," 14 December 1914, ibid., 458-59; "An Address in Des Moines," 1 February 1916, ibid. 36:80; and "A Colloquy with a Group of Antipreparedness Leaders," 8 May 1916, ibid., 644-46, 648.
82. "Address to the League to Enforce Peace," 27 May 1916, PWW 37:114; "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, ibid. 40:536, 538, 539; "Address to the League to Enforce Peace," 27 May 1916, ibid. 37:116; "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, ibid. 40:539, 535. For Wilson's early expressions of these ideas see Stockton Axson, "Brother Woodrow": A Memoir of Woodrow Wilson, ed. Arthur S. Link (Princeton, 1973), 192-96; House Diary, 28 September 1914, PWW 31:94; "A Memorandum by Herbert Bruce Brougham," 14 December 1914, ibid., 458-59; "An Address in Des Moines," 1 February 1916, ibid. 36:80; and "A Colloquy with a Group of Antipreparedness Leaders," 8 May 1916, ibid., 644-46, 648.
83. "Address to the League to Enforce Peace," 27 May 1916, PWW 37:114; "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, ibid. 40:536, 538, 539; "Address to the League to Enforce Peace," 27 May 1916, ibid. 37:116; "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, ibid. 40:539, 535. For Wilson's early expressions of these ideas see Stockton Axson, "Brother Woodrow": A Memoir of Woodrow Wilson, ed. Arthur S. Link (Princeton, 1973), 192-96; House Diary, 28 September 1914, PWW 31:94; "A Memorandum by Herbert Bruce Brougham," 14 December 1914, ibid., 458-59; "An Address in Des Moines," 1 February 1916, ibid. 36:80; and "A Colloquy with a Group of Antipreparedness Leaders," 8 May 1916, ibid., 644-46, 648.
84. "Address to the League to Enforce Peace," 27 May 1916, PWW 37:114; "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, ibid. 40:536, 538, 539; "Address to the League to Enforce Peace," 27 May 1916, ibid. 37:116; "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, ibid. 40:539, 535. For Wilson's early expressions of these ideas see Stockton Axson, "Brother Woodrow": A Memoir of Woodrow Wilson, ed. Arthur S. Link (Princeton, 1973), 192-96; House Diary, 28 September 1914, PWW 31:94; "A Memorandum by Herbert Bruce Brougham," 14 December 1914, ibid., 458-59; "An Address in Des Moines," 1 February 1916, ibid. 36:80; and "A Colloquy with a Group of Antipreparedness Leaders," 8 May 1916, ibid., 644-46, 648.
85. "Address to the League to Enforce Peace," 27 May 1916, PWW 37:114; "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, ibid. 40:536, 538, 539; "Address to the League to Enforce Peace," 27 May 1916, ibid. 37:116; "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, ibid. 40:539, 535. For Wilson's early expressions of these ideas see Stockton Axson, "Brother Woodrow": A Memoir of Woodrow Wilson, ed. Arthur S. Link (Princeton, 1973), 192-96; House Diary, 28 September 1914, PWW 31:94; "A Memorandum by Herbert Bruce Brougham," 14 December 1914, ibid., 458-59; "An Address in Des Moines," 1 February 1916, ibid. 36:80; and "A Colloquy with a Group of Antipreparedness Leaders," 8 May 1916, ibid., 644-46, 648.
86. "Address to the League to Enforce Peace," 27 May 1916, PWW 37:114; "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, ibid. 40:536, 538, 539; "Address to the League to Enforce Peace," 27 May 1916, ibid. 37:116; "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, ibid. 40:539, 535. For Wilson's early expressions of these ideas see Stockton Axson, "Brother Woodrow": A Memoir of Woodrow Wilson, ed. Arthur S. Link (Princeton, 1973), 192-96; House Diary, 28 September 1914, PWW 31:94; "A Memorandum by Herbert Bruce Brougham," 14 December 1914, ibid., 458-59; "An Address in Des Moines," 1 February 1916, ibid. 36:80; and "A Colloquy with a Group of Antipreparedness Leaders," 8 May 1916, ibid., 644-46, 648.
87. "Address to the League to Enforce Peace," 27 May 1916, PWW 37:114; "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, ibid. 40:536, 538, 539; "Address to the League to Enforce Peace," 27 May 1916, ibid. 37:116; "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, ibid. 40:539, 535. For Wilson's early expressions of these ideas see Stockton Axson, "Brother Woodrow": A Memoir of Woodrow Wilson, ed. Arthur S. Link (Princeton, 1973), 192-96; House Diary, 28 September 1914, PWW 31:94; "A Memorandum by Herbert Bruce Brougham," 14 December 1914, ibid., 458-59; "An Address in Des Moines," 1 February 1916, ibid. 36:80; and "A Colloquy with a Group of Antipreparedness Leaders," 8 May 1916, ibid., 644-46, 648.
88. Arthur Link accurately notes Wilson's concern that a decisive victory for either side in the war would simply sow the seeds for a second world war. He also cogently analyzes Wilson's efforts to mediate an end to the war and to build a lasting peace through collective security. Finally, he suggests that Wilson did have apprehensions about the war leading to German or Russian dominance in Europe. Link does not explain the specific content of these concerns, however, nor does he say anything about how Wilson thought an unstable peace after the war might affect the United States. For the best summary of Link's views see his Revolution, War, and Peace, 4-71. Thomas Knock does quote Wilson statements about a second world war possibly involving America. He also quotes Wilson's 1919 assertion that America would face a future of militarism if collective security failed. But Knock never explains the reasoning behind these fears in any detail, nor does he recognize that they were central to Wilson's whole approach to the war from 1914 on. See his To End All Wars, 66, 97, 261, and vii-x, 4-120, esp. 33. Frederick Calhoun has the same shortcomings in his argument, Power and Principle, 17, 23-27, 119-91, 252-67. Lloyd E. Ambrosius, for his part, does not seem to be aware of Wilson's concerns about the fate of American democracy in a world of persistent power polities. For the main points of his analysis see Wilsonian Statecraft, ix-xv, 1-27, 37, 41-46, 49-50, 74, 77-78, 81, 88, 97-98, 112, 131, passim; see also his Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 8-34, 51-52, 79, 243-44, 249, 290.
89. Arthur Link accurately notes Wilson's concern that a decisive victory for either side in the war would simply sow the seeds for a second world war. He also cogently analyzes Wilson's efforts to mediate an end to the war and to build a lasting peace through collective security. Finally, he suggests that Wilson did have apprehensions about the war leading to German or Russian dominance in Europe. Link does not explain the specific content of these concerns, however, nor does he say anything about how Wilson thought an unstable peace after the war might affect the United States. For the best summary of Link's views see his Revolution, War, and Peace, 4-71. Thomas Knock does quote Wilson statements about a second world war possibly involving America. He also quotes Wilson's 1919 assertion that America would face a future of militarism if collective security failed. But Knock never explains the reasoning behind these fears in any detail, nor does he recognize that they were central to Wilson's whole approach to the war from 1914 on. See his To End All Wars, 66, 97, 261, and vii-x, 4-120, esp. 33. Frederick Calhoun has the same shortcomings in his argument, Power and Principle, 17, 23-27, 119-91, 252-67. Lloyd E. Ambrosius, for his part, does not seem to be aware of Wilson's concerns about the fate of American democracy in a world of persistent power polities. For the main points of his analysis see Wilsonian Statecraft, ix-xv, 1-27, 37, 41-46, 49-50, 74, 77-78, 81, 88, 97-98, 112, 131, passim; see also his Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 8-34, 51-52, 79, 243-44, 249, 290.
90. Arthur Link accurately notes Wilson's concern that a decisive victory for either side in the war would simply sow the seeds for a second world war. He also cogently analyzes Wilson's efforts to mediate an end to the war and to build a lasting peace through collective security. Finally, he suggests that Wilson did have apprehensions about the war leading to German or Russian dominance in Europe. Link does not explain the specific content of these concerns, however, nor does he say anything about how Wilson thought an unstable peace after the war might affect the United States. For the best summary of Link's views see his Revolution, War, and Peace, 4-71. Thomas Knock does quote Wilson statements about a second world war possibly involving America. He also quotes Wilson's 1919 assertion that America would face a future of militarism if collective security failed. But Knock never explains the reasoning behind these fears in any detail, nor does he recognize that they were central to Wilson's whole approach to the war from 1914 on. See his To End All Wars, 66, 97, 261, and vii-x, 4-120, esp. 33. Frederick Calhoun has the same shortcomings in his argument, Power and Principle, 17, 23-27, 119-91, 252-67. Lloyd E. Ambrosius, for his part, does not seem to be aware of Wilson's concerns about the fate of American democracy in a world of persistent power polities. For the main points of his analysis see Wilsonian Statecraft, ix-xv, 1-27, 37, 41-46, 49-50, 74, 77-78, 81, 88, 97-98, 112, 131, passim; see also his Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 8-34, 51-52, 79, 243-44, 249, 290.
91. Arthur Link accurately notes Wilson's concern that a decisive victory for either side in the war would simply sow the seeds for a second world war. He also cogently analyzes Wilson's efforts to mediate an end to the war and to build a lasting peace through collective security. Finally, he suggests that Wilson did have apprehensions about the war leading to German or Russian dominance in Europe. Link does not explain the specific content of these concerns, however, nor does he say anything about how Wilson thought an unstable peace after the war might affect the United States. For the best summary of Link's views see his Revolution, War, and Peace, 4-71. Thomas Knock does quote Wilson statements about a second world war possibly involving America. He also quotes Wilson's 1919 assertion that America would face a future of militarism if collective security failed. But Knock never explains the reasoning behind these fears in any detail, nor does he recognize that they were central to Wilson's whole approach to the war from 1914 on. See his To End All Wars, 66, 97, 261, and vii-x, 4-120, esp. 33. Frederick Calhoun has the same shortcomings in his argument, Power and Principle, 17, 23-27, 119-91, 252-67. Lloyd E. Ambrosius, for his part, does not seem to be aware of Wilson's concerns about the fate of American democracy in a world of persistent power polities. For the main points of his analysis see Wilsonian Statecraft, ix-xv, 1-27, 37, 41-46, 49-50, 74, 77-78, 81, 88, 97-98, 112, 131, passim; see also his Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 8-34, 51-52, 79, 243-44, 249, 290.
92. Arthur Link accurately notes Wilson's concern that a decisive victory for either side in the war would simply sow the seeds for a second world war. He also cogently analyzes Wilson's efforts to mediate an end to the war and to build a lasting peace through collective security. Finally, he suggests that Wilson did have apprehensions about the war leading to German or Russian dominance in Europe. Link does not explain the specific content of these concerns, however, nor does he say anything about how Wilson thought an unstable peace after the war might affect the United States. For the best summary of Link's views see his Revolution, War, and Peace, 4-71. Thomas Knock does quote Wilson statements about a second world war possibly involving America. He also quotes Wilson's 1919 assertion that America would face a future of militarism if collective security failed. But Knock never explains the reasoning behind these fears in any detail, nor does he recognize that they were central to Wilson's whole approach to the war from 1914 on. See his To End All Wars, 66, 97, 261, and vii-x, 4-120, esp. 33. Frederick Calhoun has the same shortcomings in his argument, Power and Principle, 17, 23-27, 119-91, 252-67. Lloyd E. Ambrosius, for his part, does not seem to be aware of Wilson's concerns about the fate of American democracy in a world of persistent power polities. For the main points of his analysis see Wilsonian Statecraft, ix-xv, 1-27, 37, 41-46, 49-50, 74, 77-78, 81, 88, 97-98, 112, 131, passim; see also his Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 8-34, 51-52, 79, 243-44, 249, 290.
93. David Esposito and Tony Smith, in contrast, do outline some of the same aspects of Wilson's national security concerns that I see. Still, Esposito overstates Wilson's anxiety about Russia while connecting the president's fear of militarism only to Germany; he does not realize that Wilson's ideas about militarism were based on a specific understanding of the system of international politics and especially of how arms races developed. Smith, in turn, stresses that Wilson equated peace with democracy and implies that Wilson defined "national security" as simply the avoidance of war. Neither argument is accurate. See Esposito, Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 5, 2-91, passim; and Smith, America's Mission, 87, 85-109, passim. John Milton Cooper, Jr., likewise suggests that Wilson perceived an American interest in a lasting peace but never explains Wilson's definition of that interest in any detail. See Warrior and the Priest, 270-71, 300-301, 310-14.
94. David Esposito and Tony Smith, in contrast, do outline some of the same aspects of Wilson's national security concerns that I see. Still, Esposito overstates Wilson's anxiety about Russia while connecting the president's fear of militarism only to Germany; he does not realize that Wilson's ideas about militarism were based on a specific understanding of the system of international politics and especially of how arms races developed. Smith, in turn, stresses that Wilson equated peace with democracy and implies that Wilson defined "national security" as simply the avoidance of war. Neither argument is accurate. See Esposito, Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 5, 2-91, passim; and Smith, America's Mission, 87, 85-109, passim. John Milton Cooper, Jr., likewise suggests that Wilson perceived an American interest in a lasting peace but never explains Wilson's definition of that interest in any detail. See Warrior and the Priest, 270-71, 300-301, 310-14.
95. David Esposito and Tony Smith, in contrast, do outline some of the same aspects of Wilson's national security concerns that I see. Still, Esposito overstates Wilson's anxiety about Russia while connecting the president's fear of militarism only to Germany; he does not realize that Wilson's ideas about militarism were based on a specific understanding of the system of international politics and especially of how arms races developed. Smith, in turn, stresses that Wilson equated peace with democracy and implies that Wilson defined "national security" as simply the avoidance of war. Neither argument is accurate. See Esposito, Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 5, 2-91, passim; and Smith, America's Mission, 87, 85-109, passim. John Milton Cooper, Jr., likewise suggests that Wilson perceived an American interest in a lasting peace but never explains Wilson's definition of that interest in any detail. See Warrior and the Priest, 270-71, 300-301, 310-14.
96. "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, PWW 40:536-37.
97. See "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, PWW 40:533-39; and Wilson to William Joel Stone, 24 February 1916, ibid. 36:213-14.
98. See "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, PWW 40:533-39; and Wilson to William Joel Stone, 24 February 1916, ibid. 36:213-14.
99. "Address in Pittsburgh," 29 January 1916, PWW 36:27; "A Memorandum by Chandler Parsons Anderson," 13, July 1915, ibid. 33:504; "Address in New York," 31 January 1916, ibid. 36:67. See also Edward M. House to Wilson, 15 January 1916, ibid. 35:485.
100. "Address in Pittsburgh," 29 January 1916, PWW 36:27; "A Memorandum by Chandler Parsons Anderson," 13, July 1915, ibid. 33:504; "Address in New York," 31 January 1916, ibid. 36:67. See also Edward M. House to Wilson, 15 January 1916, ibid. 35:485.
101. "Address in Pittsburgh," 29 January 1916, PWW 36:27; "A Memorandum by Chandler Parsons Anderson," 13, July 1915, ibid. 33:504; "Address in New York," 31 January 1916, ibid. 36:67. See also Edward M. House to Wilson, 15 January 1916, ibid. 35:485.
102. "Address in Pittsburgh," 29 January 1916, PWW 36:27; "A Memorandum by Chandler Parsons Anderson," 13, July 1915, ibid. 33:504; "Address in New York," 31 January 1916, ibid. 36:67. See also Edward M. House to Wilson, 15 January 1916, ibid. 35:485.
103. Most historians stress the role of domestic political factors in Wilson's decision for preparedness. See for example, Esposito, Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 35, 55; and Cooper, Warrior and the Priest, 297-300. Knock emphasizes domestic politics even as he notes Wilson defending preparedness on the grounds of diplomatic credibility. See To End All Wars, 59-63, 66. Other scholars do associate the preparedness decision with Wilson's diplomacy, but only in a vague way. See Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft, 45-46; and David R. Woodward, Trial by Friendship: Anglo-American Relations, 1917-1918 (Lexington, KY, 1993), 19. Frederick Calhoun cites domestic political pressures on Wilson but adds that Wilson feared he might soon have to enter the war. See his Power and Principle, 140-41. Link, for his part, lines up with the domestic political interpretation. See his Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914-1915 (Princeton, 1960), 591-93 and Wilson: Confusion and Crises, 1915-1916 (Princeton, 1964), 15-42, 330-37.
104. Most historians stress the role of domestic political factors in Wilson's decision for preparedness. See for example, Esposito, Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 35, 55; and Cooper, Warrior and the Priest, 297-300. Knock emphasizes domestic politics even as he notes Wilson defending preparedness on the grounds of diplomatic credibility. See To End All Wars, 59-63, 66. Other scholars do associate the preparedness decision with Wilson's diplomacy, but only in a vague way. See Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft, 45-46; and David R. Woodward, Trial by Friendship: Anglo-American Relations, 1917-1918 (Lexington, KY, 1993), 19. Frederick Calhoun cites domestic political pressures on Wilson but adds that Wilson feared he might soon have to enter the war. See his Power and Principle, 140-41. Link, for his part, lines up with the domestic political interpretation. See his Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914-1915 (Princeton, 1960), 591-93 and Wilson: Confusion and Crises, 1915-1916 (Princeton, 1964), 15-42, 330-37.
105. Most historians stress the role of domestic political factors in Wilson's decision for preparedness. See for example, Esposito, Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 35, 55; and Cooper, Warrior and the Priest, 297-300. Knock emphasizes domestic politics even as he notes Wilson defending preparedness on the grounds of diplomatic credibility. See To End All Wars, 59-63, 66. Other scholars do associate the preparedness decision with Wilson's diplomacy, but only in a vague way. See Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft, 45-46; and David R. Woodward, Trial by Friendship: Anglo-American Relations, 1917-1918 (Lexington, KY, 1993), 19. Frederick Calhoun cites domestic political pressures on Wilson but adds that Wilson feared he might soon have to enter the war. See his Power and Principle, 140-41. Link, for his part, lines up with the domestic political interpretation. See his Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914-1915 (Princeton, 1960), 591-93 and Wilson: Confusion and Crises, 1915-1916 (Princeton, 1964), 15-42, 330-37.
106. Most historians stress the role of domestic political factors in Wilson's decision for preparedness. See for example, Esposito, Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 35, 55; and Cooper, Warrior and the Priest, 297-300. Knock emphasizes domestic politics even as he notes Wilson defending preparedness on the grounds of diplomatic credibility. See To End All Wars, 59-63, 66. Other scholars do associate the preparedness decision with Wilson's diplomacy, but only in a vague way. See Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft, 45-46; and David R. Woodward, Trial by Friendship: Anglo-American Relations, 1917-1918 (Lexington, KY, 1993), 19. Frederick Calhoun cites domestic political pressures on Wilson but adds that Wilson feared he might soon have to enter the war. See his Power and Principle, 140-41. Link, for his part, lines up with the domestic political interpretation. See his Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914-1915 (Princeton, 1960), 591-93 and Wilson: Confusion and Crises, 1915-1916 (Princeton, 1964), 15-42, 330-37.
107. Most historians stress the role of domestic political factors in Wilson's decision for preparedness. See for example, Esposito, Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 35, 55; and Cooper, Warrior and the Priest, 297-300. Knock emphasizes domestic politics even as he notes Wilson defending preparedness on the grounds of diplomatic credibility. See To End All Wars, 59-63, 66. Other scholars do associate the preparedness decision with Wilson's diplomacy, but only in a vague way. See Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft, 45-46; and David R. Woodward, Trial by Friendship: Anglo-American Relations, 1917-1918 (Lexington, KY, 1993), 19. Frederick Calhoun cites domestic political pressures on Wilson but adds that Wilson feared he might soon have to enter the war. See his Power and Principle, 140-41. Link, for his part, lines up with the domestic political interpretation. See his Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914-1915 (Princeton, 1960), 591-93 and Wilson: Confusion and Crises, 1915-1916 (Princeton, 1964), 15-42, 330-37.
108. Most historians stress the role of domestic political factors in Wilson's decision for preparedness. See for example, Esposito, Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 35, 55; and Cooper, Warrior and the Priest, 297-300. Knock emphasizes domestic politics even as he notes Wilson defending preparedness on the grounds of diplomatic credibility. See To End All Wars, 59-63, 66. Other scholars do associate the preparedness decision with Wilson's diplomacy, but only in a vague way. See Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft, 45-46; and David R. Woodward, Trial by Friendship: Anglo-American Relations, 1917-1918 (Lexington, KY, 1993), 19. Frederick Calhoun cites domestic political pressures on Wilson but adds that Wilson feared he might soon have to enter the war. See his Power and Principle, 140-41. Link, for his part, lines up with the domestic political interpretation. See his Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914-1915 (Princeton, 1960), 591-93 and Wilson: Confusion and Crises, 1915-1916 (Princeton, 1964), 15-42, 330-37.
109. Most historians stress the role of domestic political factors in Wilson's decision for preparedness. See for example, Esposito, Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 35, 55; and Cooper, Warrior and the Priest, 297-300. Knock emphasizes domestic politics even as he notes Wilson defending preparedness on the grounds of diplomatic credibility. See To End All Wars, 59-63, 66. Other scholars do associate the preparedness decision with Wilson's diplomacy, but only in a vague way. See Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft, 45-46; and David R. Woodward, Trial by Friendship: Anglo-American Relations, 1917-1918 (Lexington, KY, 1993), 19. Frederick Calhoun cites domestic political pressures on Wilson but adds that Wilson feared he might soon have to enter the war. See his Power and Principle, 140-41. Link, for his part, lines up with the domestic political interpretation. See his Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914-1915 (Princeton, 1960), 591-93 and Wilson: Confusion and Crises, 1915-1916 (Princeton, 1964), 15-42, 330-37.
110. Most historians stress the role of domestic political factors in Wilson's decision for preparedness. See for example, Esposito, Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 35, 55; and Cooper, Warrior and the Priest, 297-300. Knock emphasizes domestic politics even as he notes Wilson defending preparedness on the grounds of diplomatic credibility. See To End All Wars, 59-63, 66. Other scholars do associate the preparedness decision with Wilson's diplomacy, but only in a vague way. See Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft, 45-46; and David R. Woodward, Trial by Friendship: Anglo-American Relations, 1917-1918 (Lexington, KY, 1993), 19. Frederick Calhoun cites domestic political pressures on Wilson but adds that Wilson feared he might soon have to enter the war. See his Power and Principle, 140-41. Link, for his part, lines up with the domestic political interpretation. See his Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914-1915 (Princeton, 1960), 591-93 and Wilson: Confusion and Crises, 1915-1916 (Princeton, 1964), 15-42, 330-37.
111. As Link suggests, Wilson did have to seize control of an issue that extreme pro- and anti-preparedness groups increasingly dominated. Nevertheless, Wilson's need to support his diplomacy with implied threats of force seems to me to be the key motive behind his preparedness decision, especially given that he made it soon after the Lusitania crisis with Germany. See "A Press Release," 21 July 1915, PWW 34:3-4. Significantly, by the spring of 1916 Wilson also saw an expanded U.S. Navy as a way for America to ensure its influence in world affairs, particularly vis-à-vis Britain, and to help support a postwar collective security regime. See House to Wilson, 17 May 1916, ibid. 37:64; Wilson to House, 18 May 1916, ibid., 68; House to Wilson, 1 June 1916, ibid., 134-35; House Diary, 23 September 1916, ibid. 38:258; and Link, Confusion and Crises, 337.
112. As Link suggests, Wilson did have to seize control of an issue that extreme pro- and anti-preparedness groups increasingly dominated. Nevertheless, Wilson's need to support his diplomacy with implied threats of force seems to me to be the key motive behind his preparedness decision, especially given that he made it soon after the Lusitania crisis with Germany. See "A Press Release," 21 July 1915, PWW 34:3-4. Significantly, by the spring of 1916 Wilson also saw an expanded U.S. Navy as a way for America to ensure its influence in world affairs, particularly vis-à-vis Britain, and to help support a postwar collective security regime. See House to Wilson, 17 May 1916, ibid. 37:64; Wilson to House, 18 May 1916, ibid., 68; House to Wilson, 1 June 1916, ibid., 134-35; House Diary, 23 September 1916, ibid. 38:258; and Link, Confusion and Crises, 337.
113. As Link suggests, Wilson did have to seize control of an issue that extreme pro- and anti-preparedness groups increasingly dominated. Nevertheless, Wilson's need to support his diplomacy with implied threats of force seems to me to be the key motive behind his preparedness decision, especially given that he made it soon after the Lusitania crisis with Germany. See "A Press Release," 21 July 1915, PWW 34:3-4. Significantly, by the spring of 1916 Wilson also saw an expanded U.S. Navy as a way for America to ensure its influence in world affairs, particularly vis-à-vis Britain, and to help support a postwar collective security regime. See House to Wilson, 17 May 1916, ibid. 37:64; Wilson to House, 18 May 1916, ibid., 68; House to Wilson, 1 June 1916, ibid., 134-35; House Diary, 23 September 1916, ibid. 38:258; and Link, Confusion and Crises, 337.
114. As Link suggests, Wilson did have to seize control of an issue that extreme pro- and anti-preparedness groups increasingly dominated. Nevertheless, Wilson's need to support his diplomacy with implied threats of force seems to me to be the key motive behind his preparedness decision, especially given that he made it soon after the Lusitania crisis with Germany. See "A Press Release," 21 July 1915, PWW 34:3-4. Significantly, by the spring of 1916 Wilson also saw an expanded U.S. Navy as a way for America to ensure its influence in world affairs, particularly vis-à-vis Britain, and to help support a postwar collective security regime. See House to Wilson, 17 May 1916, ibid. 37:64; Wilson to House, 18 May 1916, ibid., 68; House to Wilson, 1 June 1916, ibid., 134-35; House Diary, 23 September 1916, ibid. 38:258; and Link, Confusion and Crises, 337.
115. As Link suggests, Wilson did have to seize control of an issue that extreme pro- and anti-preparedness groups increasingly dominated. Nevertheless, Wilson's need to support his diplomacy with implied threats of force seems to me to be the key motive behind his preparedness decision, especially given that he made it soon after the Lusitania crisis with Germany. See "A Press Release," 21 July 1915, PWW 34:3-4. Significantly, by the spring of 1916 Wilson also saw an expanded U.S. Navy as a way for America to ensure its influence in world affairs, particularly vis-à-vis Britain, and to help support a postwar collective security regime. See House to Wilson, 17 May 1916, ibid. 37:64; Wilson to House, 18 May 1916, ibid., 68; House to Wilson, 1 June 1916, ibid., 134-35; House Diary, 23 September 1916, ibid. 38:258; and Link, Confusion and Crises, 337.
116. As Link suggests, Wilson did have to seize control of an issue that extreme pro- and anti-preparedness groups increasingly dominated. Nevertheless, Wilson's need to support his diplomacy with implied threats of force seems to me to be the key motive behind his preparedness decision, especially given that he made it soon after the Lusitania crisis with Germany. See "A Press Release," 21 July 1915, PWW 34:3-4. Significantly, by the spring of 1916 Wilson also saw an expanded U.S. Navy as a way for America to ensure its influence in world affairs, particularly vis-à-vis Britain, and to help support a postwar collective security regime. See House to Wilson, 17 May 1916, ibid. 37:64; Wilson to House, 18 May 1916, ibid., 68; House to Wilson, 1 June 1916, ibid., 134-35; House Diary, 23 September 1916, ibid. 38:258; and Link, Confusion and Crises, 337.
117. "A Colloquy with a Group of Antipreparedness Leaders," 8 May 1916, PWW 36:643-44; "Address on Preparedness," 4 November 1915, ibid. 35:170, passim. On Wilson's view of the navy see also "Remarks at a Luncheon in New York," 17 May 1915, ibid. 33:209-11; and "Address in St. Louis," 3 February 1916, ibid. 36:119.
118. "A Colloquy with a Group of Antipreparedness Leaders," 8 May 1916, PWW 36:643-44; "Address on Preparedness," 4 November 1915, ibid. 35:170, passim. On Wilson's view of the navy see also "Remarks at a Luncheon in New York," 17 May 1915, ibid. 33:209-11; and "Address in St. Louis," 3 February 1916, ibid. 36:119.
119. "A Colloquy with a Group of Antipreparedness Leaders," 8 May 1916, PWW 36:643-44; "Address on Preparedness," 4 November 1915, ibid. 35:170, passim. On Wilson's view of the navy see also "Remarks at a Luncheon in New York," 17 May 1915, ibid. 33:209-11; and "Address in St. Louis," 3 February 1916, ibid. 36:119.
120. "A Colloquy with a Group of Antipreparedness Leaders," 8 May 1916, PWW 36:643-44; "Address on Preparedness," 4 November 1915, ibid. 35:170, passim. On Wilson's view of the navy see also "Remarks at a Luncheon in New York," 17 May 1915, ibid. 33:209-11; and "Address in St. Louis," 3 February 1916, ibid. 36:119.
121. "Address in Pittsburgh," 29 January 1916, PWW 36:40, 29; "Address on Preparedness," 4 November 1915, ibid. 35:169; "Address in New York," 27 January 1916, ibid. 36:13.
122. "Address in Pittsburgh," 29 January 1916, PWW 36:40, 29; "Address on Preparedness," 4 November 1915, ibid. 35:169; "Address in New York," 27 January 1916, ibid. 36:13.
123. "Address in Pittsburgh," 29 January 1916, PWW 36:40, 29; "Address on Preparedness," 4 November 1915, ibid. 35:169; "Address in New York," 27 January 1916, ibid. 36:13.
124. "War Message," 2 April 1917, PWW 41:520, 524-25, 520. Link gives a brief, compelling analysis of Wilson's decision for war in Revolution, War, and Peace, 47-71.
125. "War Message," 2 April 1917, PWW 41:520, 524-25, 520. Link gives a brief, compelling analysis of Wilson's decision for war in Revolution, War, and Peace, 47-71.
126. "Flag Day Address," 14 June 1917, PWW 42:499, 502-3; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:195; "Address in Baltimore," 6 April 1918, ibid. 47:269.
127. "Flag Day Address," 14 June 1917, PWW 42:499, 502-3; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:195; "Address in Baltimore," 6 April 1918, ibid. 47:269.
128. "Flag Day Address," 14 June 1917, PWW 42:499, 502-3; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:195; "Address in Baltimore," 6 April 1918, ibid. 47:269.
129. "Flag Day Address," 14 June 1917, PWW 42:500-501; "Address to the American Federation of Labor," 12 November 1917, ibid. 45:13; "Flag Day Address," 14 June 1917, ibid. 42:502, 503-4.
130. "Flag Day Address," 14 June 1917, PWW 42:500-501; "Address to the American Federation of Labor," 12 November 1917, ibid. 45:13; "Flag Day Address," 14 June 1917, ibid. 42:502, 503-4.
131. "Flag Day Address," 14 June 1917, PWW 42:500-501; "Address to the American Federation of Labor," 12 November 1917, ibid. 45:13; "Flag Day Address," 14 June 1917, ibid. 42:502, 503-4.
132. Wilson to Edward M. House, with enclosure, 23 August 1917, PWW 44:34; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:198. Ambrosius fails to discuss these perceptions of Germany. See Wilsonian Statecraft, 100-105, 112.
133. Wilson to Edward M. House, with enclosure, 23 August 1917, PWW 44:34; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:198. Ambrosius fails to discuss these perceptions of Germany. See Wilsonian Statecraft, 100-105, 112.
134. Wilson to Edward M. House, with enclosure, 23 August 1917, PWW 44:34; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:198. Ambrosius fails to discuss these perceptions of Germany. See Wilsonian Statecraft, 100-105, 112.
135. "War Message," 2 April 1917, PWW 41:525; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:196; "Address in Baltimore," 6 April 1918, ibid. 47:270. See also "An Interview with Foreign Correspondents," 8 April 1918, ibid., 286-87. Link suggests that Wilson decided to obtain a decisive military victory over Germany only after the Brest-Litovsk treaty of March 1918. The statements by Wilson cited here do not support such an interpretation. One should also note that Wilson's closest advisers in drawing up the Fourteen Points assumed, in January 1918, that "a complete and crushing military victory over the Central Powers" was a "certainty." See "A Memorandum by Sidney Edward Mezes, David Hunter Miller, and Walter Lippmann," 4 January 1918, ibid. 45:465. Klaus Schwabe does not address this issue in any detail but also implies that Wilson only resolved to crush Germany after Brest-Litovsk. See his Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 11-20.
136. "War Message," 2 April 1917, PWW 41:525; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:196; "Address in Baltimore," 6 April 1918, ibid. 47:270. See also "An Interview with Foreign Correspondents," 8 April 1918, ibid., 286-87. Link suggests that Wilson decided to obtain a decisive military victory over Germany only after the Brest-Litovsk treaty of March 1918. The statements by Wilson cited here do not support such an interpretation. One should also note that Wilson's closest advisers in drawing up the Fourteen Points assumed, in January 1918, that "a complete and crushing military victory over the Central Powers" was a "certainty." See "A Memorandum by Sidney Edward Mezes, David Hunter Miller, and Walter Lippmann," 4 January 1918, ibid. 45:465. Klaus Schwabe does not address this issue in any detail but also implies that Wilson only resolved to crush Germany after Brest-Litovsk. See his Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 11-20.
137. "War Message," 2 April 1917, PWW 41:525; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:196; "Address in Baltimore," 6 April 1918, ibid. 47:270. See also "An Interview with Foreign Correspondents," 8 April 1918, ibid., 286-87. Link suggests that Wilson decided to obtain a decisive military victory over Germany only after the Brest-Litovsk treaty of March 1918. The statements by Wilson cited here do not support such an interpretation. One should also note that Wilson's closest advisers in drawing up the Fourteen Points assumed, in January 1918, that "a complete and crushing military victory over the Central Powers" was a "certainty." See "A Memorandum by Sidney Edward Mezes, David Hunter Miller, and Walter Lippmann," 4 January 1918, ibid. 45:465. Klaus Schwabe does not address this issue in any detail but also implies that Wilson only resolved to crush Germany after Brest-Litovsk. See his Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 11-20.
138. "War Message," 2 April 1917, PWW 41:525; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:196; "Address in Baltimore," 6 April 1918, ibid. 47:270. See also "An Interview with Foreign Correspondents," 8 April 1918, ibid., 286-87. Link suggests that Wilson decided to obtain a decisive military victory over Germany only after the Brest-Litovsk treaty of March 1918. The statements by Wilson cited here do not support such an interpretation. One should also note that Wilson's closest advisers in drawing up the Fourteen Points assumed, in January 1918, that "a complete and crushing military victory over the Central Powers" was a "certainty." See "A Memorandum by Sidney Edward Mezes, David Hunter Miller, and Walter Lippmann," 4 January 1918, ibid. 45:465. Klaus Schwabe does not address this issue in any detail but also implies that Wilson only resolved to crush Germany after Brest-Litovsk. See his Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 11-20.
139. "War Message," 2 April 1917, PWW 41:525; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:196; "Address in Baltimore," 6 April 1918, ibid. 47:270. See also "An Interview with Foreign Correspondents," 8 April 1918, ibid., 286-87. Link suggests that Wilson decided to obtain a decisive military victory over Germany only after the Brest-Litovsk treaty of March 1918. The statements by Wilson cited here do not support such an interpretation. One should also note that Wilson's closest advisers in drawing up the Fourteen Points assumed, in January 1918, that "a complete and crushing military victory over the Central Powers" was a "certainty." See "A Memorandum by Sidney Edward Mezes, David Hunter Miller, and Walter Lippmann," 4 January 1918, ibid. 45:465. Klaus Schwabe does not address this issue in any detail but also implies that Wilson only resolved to crush Germany after Brest-Litovsk. See his Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 11-20.
140. "War Message," 2 April 1917, PWW 41:525; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:196; "Address in Baltimore," 6 April 1918, ibid. 47:270. See also "An Interview with Foreign Correspondents," 8 April 1918, ibid., 286-87. Link suggests that Wilson decided to obtain a decisive military victory over Germany only after the Brest-Litovsk treaty of March 1918. The statements by Wilson cited here do not support such an interpretation. One should also note that Wilson's closest advisers in drawing up the Fourteen Points assumed, in January 1918, that "a complete and crushing military victory over the Central Powers" was a "certainty." See "A Memorandum by Sidney Edward Mezes, David Hunter Miller, and Walter Lippmann," 4 January 1918, ibid. 45:465. Klaus Schwabe does not address this issue in any detail but also implies that Wilson only resolved to crush Germany after Brest-Litovsk. See his Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 11-20.
141. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, PWW 45:536; "A Statement," 26 July 1918, ibid. 49:98; "War Message," 2 April 1917, ibid. 41:526. See also "Remarks to the Labor Committee of the Council of National "Defense," 15 May 1917, ibid. 42:297; "A Statement on the Lever Bill," 19 May 1917, ibid., 344-46; and David M. Kennedy, Over Here The First World War and American Society (New York, 1980), 95-143. For Wilson's apprehensions about the war's domestic impact upon America see Arthur S. Link, Wilson: Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace, 1916-1917 (Princeton, 1965), 398-99. There is some controversy over whether or not Wilson actually expressed such fears. For an exchange on this issue see Jerold S. Auerbach, "Woodrow Wilson's 'Prediction' to Frank Cobb: Words Historians Should Doubt Ever Got Spoken, " Journal of American History 54 (December 1967): 608-17; and Link's reply with Auerbach's response, in ibid. (June 1968): 231-38. Link has the better of the argument.
142. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, PWW 45:536; "A Statement," 26 July 1918, ibid. 49:98; "War Message," 2 April 1917, ibid. 41:526. See also "Remarks to the Labor Committee of the Council of National "Defense," 15 May 1917, ibid. 42:297; "A Statement on the Lever Bill," 19 May 1917, ibid., 344-46; and David M. Kennedy, Over Here The First World War and American Society (New York, 1980), 95-143. For Wilson's apprehensions about the war's domestic impact upon America see Arthur S. Link, Wilson: Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace, 1916-1917 (Princeton, 1965), 398-99. There is some controversy over whether or not Wilson actually expressed such fears. For an exchange on this issue see Jerold S. Auerbach, "Woodrow Wilson's 'Prediction' to Frank Cobb: Words Historians Should Doubt Ever Got Spoken, " Journal of American History 54 (December 1967): 608-17; and Link's reply with Auerbach's response, in ibid. (June 1968): 231-38. Link has the better of the argument.
143. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, PWW 45:536; "A Statement," 26 July 1918, ibid. 49:98; "War Message," 2 April 1917, ibid. 41:526. See also "Remarks to the Labor Committee of the Council of National "Defense," 15 May 1917, ibid. 42:297; "A Statement on the Lever Bill," 19 May 1917, ibid., 344-46; and David M. Kennedy, Over Here The First World War and American Society (New York, 1980), 95-143. For Wilson's apprehensions about the war's domestic impact upon America see Arthur S. Link, Wilson: Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace, 1916-1917 (Princeton, 1965), 398-99. There is some controversy over whether or not Wilson actually expressed such fears. For an exchange on this issue see Jerold S. Auerbach, "Woodrow Wilson's 'Prediction' to Frank Cobb: Words Historians Should Doubt Ever Got Spoken, " Journal of American History 54 (December 1967): 608-17; and Link's reply with Auerbach's response, in ibid. (June 1968): 231-38. Link has the better of the argument.
144. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, PWW 45:536; "A Statement," 26 July 1918, ibid. 49:98; "War Message," 2 April 1917, ibid. 41:526. See also "Remarks to the Labor Committee of the Council of National "Defense," 15 May 1917, ibid. 42:297; "A Statement on the Lever Bill," 19 May 1917, ibid., 344-46; and David M. Kennedy, Over Here The First World War and American Society (New York, 1980), 95-143. For Wilson's apprehensions about the war's domestic impact upon America see Arthur S. Link, Wilson: Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace, 1916-1917 (Princeton, 1965), 398-99. There is some controversy over whether or not Wilson actually expressed such fears. For an exchange on this issue see Jerold S. Auerbach, "Woodrow Wilson's 'Prediction' to Frank Cobb: Words Historians Should Doubt Ever Got Spoken, " Journal of American History 54 (December 1967): 608-17; and Link's reply with Auerbach's response, in ibid. (June 1968): 231-38. Link has the better of the argument.
145. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, PWW 45:536; "A Statement," 26 July 1918, ibid. 49:98; "War Message," 2 April 1917, ibid. 41:526. See also "Remarks to the Labor Committee of the Council of National "Defense," 15 May 1917, ibid. 42:297; "A Statement on the Lever Bill," 19 May 1917, ibid., 344-46; and David M. Kennedy, Over Here The First World War and American Society (New York, 1980), 95-143. For Wilson's apprehensions about the war's domestic impact upon America see Arthur S. Link, Wilson: Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace, 1916-1917 (Princeton, 1965), 398-99. There is some controversy over whether or not Wilson actually expressed such fears. For an exchange on this issue see Jerold S. Auerbach, "Woodrow Wilson's 'Prediction' to Frank Cobb: Words Historians Should Doubt Ever Got Spoken, " Journal of American History 54 (December 1967): 608-17; and Link's reply with Auerbach's response, in ibid. (June 1968): 231-38. Link has the better of the argument.
146. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, PWW 45:536; "A Statement," 26 July 1918, ibid. 49:98; "War Message," 2 April 1917, ibid. 41:526. See also "Remarks to the Labor Committee of the Council of National "Defense," 15 May 1917, ibid. 42:297; "A Statement on the Lever Bill," 19 May 1917, ibid., 344-46; and David M. Kennedy, Over Here The First World War and American Society (New York, 1980), 95-143. For Wilson's apprehensions about the war's domestic impact upon America see Arthur S. Link, Wilson: Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace, 1916-1917 (Princeton, 1965), 398-99. There is some controversy over whether or not Wilson actually expressed such fears. For an exchange on this issue see Jerold S. Auerbach, "Woodrow Wilson's 'Prediction' to Frank Cobb: Words Historians Should Doubt Ever Got Spoken, " Journal of American History 54 (December 1967): 608-17; and Link's reply with Auerbach's response, in ibid. (June 1968): 231-38. Link has the better of the argument.
147. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, PWW 45:536; "A Statement," 26 July 1918, ibid. 49:98; "War Message," 2 April 1917, ibid. 41:526. See also "Remarks to the Labor Committee of the Council of National "Defense," 15 May 1917, ibid. 42:297; "A Statement on the Lever Bill," 19 May 1917, ibid., 344-46; and David M. Kennedy, Over Here The First World War and American Society (New York, 1980), 95-143. For Wilson's apprehensions about the war's domestic impact upon America see Arthur S. Link, Wilson: Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace, 1916-1917 (Princeton, 1965), 398-99. There is some controversy over whether or not Wilson actually expressed such fears. For an exchange on this issue see Jerold S. Auerbach, "Woodrow Wilson's 'Prediction' to Frank Cobb: Words Historians Should Doubt Ever Got Spoken, " Journal of American History 54 (December 1967): 608-17; and Link's reply with Auerbach's response, in ibid. (June 1968): 231-38. Link has the better of the argument.
148. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, PWW 45:536; "A Statement," 26 July 1918, ibid. 49:98; "War Message," 2 April 1917, ibid. 41:526. See also "Remarks to the Labor Committee of the Council of National "Defense," 15 May 1917, ibid. 42:297; "A Statement on the Lever Bill," 19 May 1917, ibid., 344-46; and David M. Kennedy, Over Here The First World War and American Society (New York, 1980), 95-143. For Wilson's apprehensions about the war's domestic impact upon America see Arthur S. Link, Wilson: Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace, 1916-1917 (Princeton, 1965), 398-99. There is some controversy over whether or not Wilson actually expressed such fears. For an exchange on this issue see Jerold S. Auerbach, "Woodrow Wilson's 'Prediction' to Frank Cobb: Words Historians Should Doubt Ever Got Spoken, " Journal of American History 54 (December 1967): 608-17; and Link's reply with Auerbach's response, in ibid. (June 1968): 231-38. Link has the better of the argument.
149. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, PWW 45:536; "A Statement," 26 July 1918, ibid. 49:98; "War Message," 2 April 1917, ibid. 41:526. See also "Remarks to the Labor Committee of the Council of National "Defense," 15 May 1917, ibid. 42:297; "A Statement on the Lever Bill," 19 May 1917, ibid., 344-46; and David M. Kennedy, Over Here The First World War and American Society (New York, 1980), 95-143. For Wilson's apprehensions about the war's domestic impact upon America see Arthur S. Link, Wilson: Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace, 1916-1917 (Princeton, 1965), 398-99. There is some controversy over whether or not Wilson actually expressed such fears. For an exchange on this issue see Jerold S. Auerbach, "Woodrow Wilson's 'Prediction' to Frank Cobb: Words Historians Should Doubt Ever Got Spoken, " Journal of American History 54 (December 1967): 608-17; and Link's reply with Auerbach's response, in ibid. (June 1968): 231-38. Link has the better of the argument.
150. "War Message," 2 April 1917, PWW 41:523; Wilson to Edward M. House, with enclosure, 23 August 1917, ibid. 44:34-35; "An Interview with Foreign Correspondents," 8 April 1918, ibid. 47:287; "A Victory of Justice vs. A Victory of Power," New Repubic 16 (5 October 1918): 272. In December 1917 Wilson again stated that the ideas of his "peace without victory" speech still guided his thinking. See "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, PWW 45:198-99.
151. "War Message," 2 April 1917, PWW 41:523; Wilson to Edward M. House, with enclosure, 23 August 1917, ibid. 44:34-35; "An Interview with Foreign Correspondents," 8 April 1918, ibid. 47:287; "A Victory of Justice vs. A Victory of Power," New Repubic 16 (5 October 1918): 272. In December 1917 Wilson again stated that the ideas of his "peace without victory" speech still guided his thinking. See "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, PWW 45:198-99.
152. "War Message," 2 April 1917, PWW 41:523; Wilson to Edward M. House, with enclosure, 23 August 1917, ibid. 44:34-35; "An Interview with Foreign Correspondents," 8 April 1918, ibid. 47:287; "A Victory of Justice vs. A Victory of Power," New Repubic 16 (5 October 1918): 272. In December 1917 Wilson again stated that the ideas of his "peace without victory" speech still guided his thinking. See "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, PWW 45:198-99.
153. "War Message," 2 April 1917, PWW 41:523; Wilson to Edward M. House, with enclosure, 23 August 1917, ibid. 44:34-35; "An Interview with Foreign Correspondents," 8 April 1918, ibid. 47:287; "A Victory of Justice vs. A Victory of Power," New Repubic 16 (5 October 1918): 272. In December 1917 Wilson again stated that the ideas of his "peace without victory" speech still guided his thinking. See "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, PWW 45:198-99.
154. "War Message," 2 April 1917, PWW 41:523; Wilson to Edward M. House, with enclosure, 23 August 1917, ibid. 44:34-35; "An Interview with Foreign Correspondents," 8 April 1918, ibid. 47:287; "A Victory of Justice vs. A Victory of Power," New Repubic 16 (5 October 1918): 272. In December 1917 Wilson again stated that the ideas of his "peace without victory" speech still guided his thinking. See "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, PWW 45:198-99.
155. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, PWW 45:539, 536.
156. "War Message," 2 April 1917, PWW 41:523.
157. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 February 1918, PWW 46:321; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:197; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 February 1918, ibid. 46:321-23. For Wilson's expectation that the defeat of the German army would produce changes in the German government see "A Flag Day Address," 14 June 1917, ibid. 42:502. As several historians point out, Wilson's willingness to negotiate a just peace with a democratized Germany had immediate tactical advantages for the U.S. war effort. His offer encouraged liberal discontent within Germany while rallying leftist support for the war at home and abroad, including, hopefully, in revolutionary Russia. See Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft, 107; Esposito, Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 109-11, 120-21; Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 53-62; Link, Revolution, War, and Peace, 82, 84; and Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 11-20. Fundamentally, however, Wilson's stance followed from his estimation of what kind of conclusion to the war would be most conducive to creating a system of collective security for the world. Knock comes the closest to recognizing this point. See To End All Wars, 142-45.
158. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 February 1918, PWW 46:321; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:197; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 February 1918, ibid. 46:321-23. For Wilson's expectation that the defeat of the German army would produce changes in the German government see "A Flag Day Address," 14 June 1917, ibid. 42:502. As several historians point out, Wilson's willingness to negotiate a just peace with a democratized Germany had immediate tactical advantages for the U.S. war effort. His offer encouraged liberal discontent within Germany while rallying leftist support for the war at home and abroad, including, hopefully, in revolutionary Russia. See Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft, 107; Esposito, Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 109-11, 120-21; Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 53-62; Link, Revolution, War, and Peace, 82, 84; and Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 11-20. Fundamentally, however, Wilson's stance followed from his estimation of what kind of conclusion to the war would be most conducive to creating a system of collective security for the world. Knock comes the closest to recognizing this point. See To End All Wars, 142-45.
159. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 February 1918, PWW 46:321; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:197; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 February 1918, ibid. 46:321-23. For Wilson's expectation that the defeat of the German army would produce changes in the German government see "A Flag Day Address," 14 June 1917, ibid. 42:502. As several historians point out, Wilson's willingness to negotiate a just peace with a democratized Germany had immediate tactical advantages for the U.S. war effort. His offer encouraged liberal discontent within Germany while rallying leftist support for the war at home and abroad, including, hopefully, in revolutionary Russia. See Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft, 107; Esposito, Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 109-11, 120-21; Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 53-62; Link, Revolution, War, and Peace, 82, 84; and Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 11-20. Fundamentally, however, Wilson's stance followed from his estimation of what kind of conclusion to the war would be most conducive to creating a system of collective security for the world. Knock comes the closest to recognizing this point. See To End All Wars, 142-45.
160. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 February 1918, PWW 46:321; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:197; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 February 1918, ibid. 46:321-23. For Wilson's expectation that the defeat of the German army would produce changes in the German government see "A Flag Day Address," 14 June 1917, ibid. 42:502. As several historians point out, Wilson's willingness to negotiate a just peace with a democratized Germany had immediate tactical advantages for the U.S. war effort. His offer encouraged liberal discontent within Germany while rallying leftist support for the war at home and abroad, including, hopefully, in revolutionary Russia. See Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft, 107; Esposito, Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 109-11, 120-21; Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 53-62; Link, Revolution, War, and Peace, 82, 84; and Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 11-20. Fundamentally, however, Wilson's stance followed from his estimation of what kind of conclusion to the war would be most conducive to creating a system of collective security for the world. Knock comes the closest to recognizing this point. See To End All Wars, 142-45.
161. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 February 1918, PWW 46:321; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:197; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 February 1918, ibid. 46:321-23. For Wilson's expectation that the defeat of the German army would produce changes in the German government see "A Flag Day Address," 14 June 1917, ibid. 42:502. As several historians point out, Wilson's willingness to negotiate a just peace with a democratized Germany had immediate tactical advantages for the U.S. war effort. His offer encouraged liberal discontent
162. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 February 1918, PWW 46:321; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:197; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 February 1918, ibid. 46:321-23. For Wilson's expectation that the defeat of the German army would produce changes in the German government see "A Flag Day Address," 14 June 1917, ibid. 42:502. As several historians point out, Wilson's willingness to negotiate a just peace with a democratized Germany had immediate tactical advantages for the U.S. war effort. His offer encouraged liberal discontent within Germany while rallying leftist support for the war at home and abroad, including, hopefully, in revolutionary Russia. See Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft, 107; Esposito, Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 109-11, 120-21; Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 53-62; Link, Revolution, War, and Peace, 82, 84; and Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 11-20. Fundamentally, however, Wilson's stance followed from his estimation of what kind of conclusion to the war would be most conducive to creating a system of collective security for the world. Knock comes the closest to recognizing this point. See To End All Wars, 142-45.
163. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 February 1918, PWW 46:321; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:197; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 February 1918, ibid. 46:321-23. For Wilson's expectation that the defeat of the German army would produce changes in the German government see "A Flag Day Address," 14 June 1917, ibid. 42:502. As several historians point out, Wilson's willingness to negotiate a just peace with a democratized Germany had immediate tactical advantages for the U.S. war effort. His offer encouraged liberal discontent within Germany while rallying leftist support for the war at home and abroad, including, hopefully, in revolutionary Russia. See Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft, 107; Esposito, Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 109-11, 120-21; Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 53-62; Link, Revolution, War, and Peace, 82, 84; and Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 11-20. Fundamentally, however, Wilson's stance followed from his estimation of what kind of conclusion to the war would be most conducive to creating a system of collective security for the world. Knock comes the closest to recognizing this point. See To End All Wars, 142-45.
164. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 February 1918, PWW 46:321; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:197; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 February 1918, ibid. 46:321-23. For Wilson's expectation that the defeat of the German army would produce changes in the German government see "A Flag Day Address," 14 June 1917, ibid. 42:502. As several historians point out, Wilson's willingness to negotiate a just peace with a democratized Germany had immediate tactical advantages for the U.S. war effort. His offer encouraged liberal discontent within Germany while rallying leftist support for the war at home and abroad, including, hopefully, in revolutionary Russia. See Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft, 107; Esposito, Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 109-11, 120-21; Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 53-62; Link, Revolution, War, and Peace, 82, 84; and Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 11-20. Fundamentally, however, Wilson's stance followed from his estimation of what kind of conclusion to the war would be most conducive to creating a system of collective security for the world. Knock comes the closest to recognizing this point. See To End All Wars, 142-45.
165. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 February 1918, PWW 46:321; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:197; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 February 1918, ibid. 46:321-23. For Wilson's expectation that the defeat of the German army would produce changes in the German government see "A Flag Day Address," 14 June 1917, ibid. 42:502. As several historians point out, Wilson's willingness to negotiate a just peace with a democratized Germany had immediate tactical advantages for the U.S. war effort. His offer encouraged liberal discontent within Germany while rallying leftist support for the war at home and abroad, including, hopefully, in revolutionary Russia. See Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft, 107; Esposito, Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 109-11, 120-21; Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 53-62; Link, Revolution, War, and Peace, 82, 84; and Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 11-20. Fundamentally, however, Wilson's stance followed from his estimation of what kind of conclusion to the war would be most conducive to creating a system of collective security for the world. Knock comes the closest to recognizing this point. See To End All Wars, 142-45.
166. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 February 1918, PWW 46:321; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:197; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 February 1918, ibid. 46:321-23. For Wilson's expectation that the defeat of the German army would produce changes in the German government see "A Flag Day Address," 14 June 1917, ibid. 42:502. As several historians point out, Wilson's willingness to negotiate a just peace with a democratized Germany had immediate tactical advantages for the U.S. war effort. His offer encouraged liberal discontent within Germany while rallying leftist support for the war at home and abroad, including, hopefully, in revolutionary Russia. See Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft, 107; Esposito, Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 109-11, 120-21; Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 53-62; Link, Revolution, War, and Peace, 82, 84; and Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 11-20. Fundamentally, however, Wilson's stance followed from his estimation of what kind of conclusion to the war would be most conducive to creating a system of collective security for the world. Knock comes the closest to recognizing this point. See To End All Wars, 142-45.
167. Wilson to Edward M. House, 21 July 1917, PWW 43:238; "War Message," 2 April 1917, ibid. 41:523; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:198, 197 (emphasis added). See also Newton Baker to Wilson, with enclosure, 20 August 1917, ibid. 43:532-34. Wilson's negative view of the war aims of the Allies was probably reinforced by his knowledge of the secret treaties they made with each other dividing up territory. For a good discussion of this issue see Link, Revolution, War, and Pence, 78.
168. Wilson to Edward M. House, 21 July 1917, PWW 43:238; "War Message," 2 April 1917, ibid. 41:523; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:198, 197 (emphasis added). See also Newton Baker to Wilson, with enclosure, 20 August 1917, ibid. 43:532-34. Wilson's negative view of the war aims of the Allies was probably reinforced by his knowledge of the secret treaties they made with each other dividing up territory. For a good discussion of this issue see Link, Revolution, War, and Pence, 78.
169. Wilson to Edward M. House, 21 July 1917, PWW 43:238; "War Message," 2 April 1917, ibid. 41:523; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:198, 197 (emphasis added). See also Newton Baker to Wilson, with enclosure, 20 August 1917, ibid. 43:532-34. Wilson's negative view of the war aims of the Allies was probably reinforced by his knowledge of the secret treaties they made with each other dividing up territory. For a good discussion of this issue see Link, Revolution, War, and Pence, 78.
170. Wilson to Edward M. House, 21 July 1917, PWW 43:238; "War Message," 2 April 1917, ibid. 41:523; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:198, 197 (emphasis added). See also Newton Baker to Wilson, with enclosure, 20 August 1917, ibid. 43:532-34. Wilson's negative view of the war aims of the Allies was probably reinforced by his knowledge of the secret treaties they made with each other dividing up territory. For a good discussion of this issue see Link, Revolution, War, and Pence, 78.
171. Wilson to Edward M. House, 21 July 1917, PWW 43:238; "War Message," 2 April 1917, ibid. 41:523; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:198, 197 (emphasis added). See also Newton Baker to Wilson, with enclosure, 20 August 1917, ibid. 43:532-34. Wilson's negative view of the war aims of the Allies was probably reinforced by his knowledge of the secret treaties they made with each other dividing up territory. For a good discussion of this issue see Link, Revolution, War, and Pence, 78.
172. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, PWW 45:536-37; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid., 197. Some of the most important recent studies of Wilson fail to note the punitive and constraining nature of the Fourteen Points upon Germany. See Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 34-36; Knock, To End All Wars, 143-45; and Link, Revolution, War, and Peace, 82-84. Schwabe recognizes that the Fourteen Points called for a decrease in German territory but does not explain why Wilson wanted to accomplish this objective; see Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 11-18. Levin also suggests that the Fourteen Points damaged Germany; see Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 84. His analysis of the motives behind Wilson's policies differs from mine, however; see below for my discussion of Levin's argument.
173. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, PWW 45:536-37; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid., 197. Some of the most important recent studies of Wilson fail to note the punitive and constraining nature of the Fourteen Points upon Germany. See Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 34-36; Knock, To End All Wars, 143-45; and Link, Revolution, War, and Peace, 82-84. Schwabe recognizes that the Fourteen Points called for a decrease in German territory but does not explain why Wilson wanted to accomplish this objective; see Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 11-18. Levin also suggests that the Fourteen Points damaged Germany; see Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 84. His analysis of the motives behind Wilson's policies differs from mine, however; see below for my discussion of Levin's argument.
174. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, PWW 45:536-37; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid., 197. Some of the most important recent studies of Wilson fail to note the punitive and constraining nature of the Fourteen Points upon Germany. See Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 34-36; Knock, To End All Wars, 143-45; and Link, Revolution, War, and Peace, 82-84. Schwabe recognizes that the Fourteen Points called for a decrease in German territory but does not explain why Wilson wanted to accomplish this objective; see Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 11-18. Levin also suggests that the Fourteen Points damaged Germany; see Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 84. His analysis of the motives behind Wilson's policies differs from mine, however; see below for my discussion of Levin's argument.
175. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, PWW 45:536-37; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid., 197. Some of the most important recent studies of Wilson fail to note the punitive and constraining nature of the Fourteen Points upon Germany. See Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 34-36; Knock, To End All Wars, 143-45; and Link, Revolution, War, and Peace, 82-84. Schwabe recognizes that the Fourteen Points called for a decrease in German territory but does not explain why Wilson wanted to accomplish this objective; see Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 11-18. Levin also suggests that the Fourteen Points damaged Germany; see Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 84. His analysis of the motives behind Wilson's policies differs from mine, however; see below for my discussion of Levin's argument.
176. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, PWW 45:536-37; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid., 197. Some of the most important recent studies of Wilson fail to note the punitive and constraining nature of the Fourteen Points upon Germany. See Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 34-36; Knock, To End All Wars, 143-45; and Link, Revolution, War, and Peace, 82-84. Schwabe recognizes that the Fourteen Points called for a decrease in German territory but does not explain why Wilson wanted to accomplish this objective; see Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 11-18. Levin also suggests that the Fourteen Points damaged Germany; see Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 84. His analysis of the motives behind Wilson's policies differs from mine, however; see below for my discussion of Levin's argument.
177. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, PWW 45:536-37; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid., 197. Some of the most important recent studies of Wilson fail to note the punitive and constraining nature of the Fourteen Points upon Germany. See Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 34-36; Knock, To End All Wars, 143-45; and Link, Revolution, War, and Peace, 82-84. Schwabe recognizes that the Fourteen Points called for a decrease in German territory but does not explain why Wilson wanted to accomplish this objective; see Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 11-18. Levin also suggests that the Fourteen Points damaged Germany; see Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 84. His analysis of the motives behind Wilson's policies differs from mine, however; see below for my discussion of Levin's argument.
178. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, PWW 45:536-37; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid., 197. Some of the most important recent studies of Wilson fail to note the punitive and constraining nature of the Fourteen Points upon Germany. See Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 34-36; Knock, To End All Wars, 143-45; and Link, Revolution, War, and Peace, 82-84. Schwabe recognizes that the Fourteen Points called for a decrease in German territory but does not explain why Wilson wanted to accomplish this objective; see Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 11-18. Levin also suggests that the Fourteen Points damaged Germany; see Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 84. His analysis of the motives behind Wilson's policies differs from mine, however; see below for my discussion of Levin's argument.
179. Wilson to Edward M. House, with enclosure, 25 August 1917, PWW 44:35; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, ibid. 45:536, 538; "An Interview with Foreign Correspondents," 8 April 1918, ibid. 47:287; "Address at Mount Vernon," 4 July 1918, ibid. 48:515; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, ibid. 45:536; and "A Message to Teachers," 28 June 1918, ibid. 48:4555. Link has a good analysis of Wilson's faith in American exceptionalism in Revolution, War, and Peace, 6-7.
180. Wilson to Edward M. House, with enclosure, 25 August 1917, PWW 44:35; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, ibid. 45:536, 538; "An Interview with Foreign Correspondents," 8 April 1918, ibid. 47:287; "Address at Mount Vernon," 4 July 1918, ibid. 48:515; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, ibid. 45:536; and "A Message to Teachers," 28 June 1918, ibid. 48:4555. Link has a good analysis of Wilson's faith in American exceptionalism in Revolution, War, and Peace, 6-7.
181. Wilson to Edward M. House, with enclosure, 25 August 1917, PWW 44:35; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, ibid. 45:536, 538; "An Interview with Foreign Correspondents," 8 April 1918, ibid. 47:287; "Address at Mount Vernon," 4 July 1918, ibid. 48:515; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, ibid. 45:536; and "A Message to Teachers," 28 June 1918, ibid. 48:4555. Link has a good analysis of Wilson's faith in American exceptionalism in Revolution, War, and Peace, 6-7.
182. Wilson to Edward M. House, with enclosure, 25 August 1917, PWW 44:35; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, ibid. 45:536, 538; "An Interview with Foreign Correspondents," 8 April 1918, ibid. 47:287; "Address at Mount Vernon," 4 July 1918, ibid. 48:515; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, ibid. 45:536; and "A Message to Teachers," 28 June 1918, ibid. 48:4555. Link has a good analysis of Wilson's faith in American exceptionalism in Revolution, War, and Peace, 6-7.
183. Wilson to Edward M. House, with enclosure, 25 August 1917, PWW 44:35; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, ibid. 45:536, 538; "An Interview with Foreign Correspondents," 8 April 1918, ibid. 47:287; "Address at Mount Vernon," 4 July 1918, ibid. 48:515; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, ibid. 45:536; and "A Message to Teachers," 28 June 1918, ibid. 48:4555. Link has a good analysis of Wilson's faith in American exceptionalism in Revolution, War, and Peace, 6-7.
184. Wilson to Edward M. House, with enclosure, 25 August 1917, PWW 44:35; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, ibid. 45:536, 538; "An Interview with Foreign Correspondents," 8 April 1918, ibid. 47:287; "Address at Mount Vernon," 4 July 1918, ibid. 48:515; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, ibid. 45:536; and "A Message to Teachers," 28 June 1918, ibid. 48:4555. Link has a good analysis of Wilson's faith in American exceptionalism in Revolution, War, and Peace, 6-7.
185. Wilson to Edward M. House, with enclosure, 25 August 1917, PWW 44:35; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, ibid. 45:536, 538; "An Interview with Foreign Correspondents," 8 April 1918, ibid. 47:287; "Address at Mount Vernon," 4 July 1918, ibid. 48:515; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, ibid. 45:536; and "A Message to Teachers," 28 June 1918, ibid. 48:4555. Link has a good analysis of Wilson's faith in American exceptionalism in Revolution, War, and Peace, 6-7.
186. "Address in the Metropolitan Opera House," 27 September 1918, PWW 51:129; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, ibid. 45:539; "Interview with Foreign Correspondents," 8 April 1918, ibid. 47:287; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:198; Sir William Wiseman to Lord Reading, 16 August 1918, ibid. 49:275-74; "Address in the Metropolitan Opera House," 27 September 1918, ibid. 51:129-130. For a pre-Brest-Litovsk statement by Wilson that he could not trust the Imperial German government see Wilson to Edward M. House, with enclosure, 23 August 1917, ibid. 44:35. Ambrosius wrongly suggests that Wilson would have negotiated with autocratic Germany. At the same time, he fails to see that Wilson was leaning in 1918 toward letting autocratic Germany into the League. See Wilsonian Statecraft, 117, 125; and Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 37, 46. Esposito also implies that Wilson would have negotiated with autocratic Germany, and then he ends up stressing Wilson's belief that democracies were peaceful; see Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 123, 136. Knock thinks that Wilson would only have given the Fourteen Points to a liberalized Germany; see To End All Wars, 141-43. Similarly, according to Levin, Wilson felt that German democratization was necessary for a new world order, implying that Wilson would not make peace with the existing German government. See Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 52. Link is unclear on this issue. If anything, he implies that Wilson only intended to give the Fourteen Points to a democratized Germany. See Revolution, War, and Peace, 80-85. Schwabe at first argues that Wilson would not have granted the Fourteen Points and League admission to autocratic Germany, then suggests the president would have done so; he never explains this apparent contradiction in his analysis. See Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 17, 27-28.
187. "Address in the Metropolitan Opera House," 27 September 1918, PWW 51:129; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, ibid. 45:539; "Interview with Foreign Correspondents," 8 April 1918, ibid. 47:287; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:198; Sir William Wiseman to Lord Reading, 16 August 1918, ibid. 49:275-74; "Address in the Metropolitan Opera House," 27 September 1918, ibid. 51:129-130. For a pre-Brest-Litovsk statement by Wilson that he could not trust the Imperial German government see Wilson to Edward M. House, with enclosure, 23 August 1917, ibid. 44:35. Ambrosius wrongly suggests that Wilson would have negotiated with autocratic Germany. At the same time, he fails to see that Wilson was leaning in 1918 toward letting autocratic Germany into the League. See Wilsonian Statecraft, 117, 125; and Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 37, 46. Esposito also implies that Wilson would have negotiated with autocratic Germany, and then he ends up stressing Wilson's belief that democracies were peaceful; see Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 123, 136. Knock thinks that Wilson would only have given the Fourteen Points to a liberalized Germany; see To End All Wars, 141-43. Similarly, according to Levin, Wilson felt that German democratization was necessary for a new world order, implying that Wilson would not make peace with the existing German government. See Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 52. Link is unclear on this issue. If anything, he implies that Wilson only intended to give the Fourteen Points to a democratized Germany. See Revolution, War, and Peace, 80-85. Schwabe at first argues that Wilson would not have granted the Fourteen Points and League admission to autocratic Germany, then suggests the president would have done so; he never explains this apparent contradiction in his analysis. See Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 17, 27-28.
188. "Address in the Metropolitan Opera House," 27 September 1918, PWW 51:129; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, ibid. 45:539; "Interview with Foreign Correspondents," 8 April 1918, ibid. 47:287; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:198; Sir William Wiseman to Lord Reading, 16 August 1918, ibid. 49:275-74; "Address in the Metropolitan Opera House," 27 September 1918, ibid. 51:129-130. For a pre-Brest-Litovsk statement by Wilson that he could not trust the Imperial German government see Wilson to Edward M. House, with enclosure, 23 August 1917, ibid. 44:35. Ambrosius wrongly suggests that Wilson would have negotiated with autocratic Germany. At the same time, he fails to see that Wilson was leaning in 1918 toward letting autocratic Germany into the League. See Wilsonian Statecraft, 117, 125; and Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 37, 46. Esposito also implies that Wilson would have negotiated with autocratic Germany, and then he ends up stressing Wilson's belief that democracies were peaceful; see Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 123, 136. Knock thinks that Wilson would only have given the Fourteen Points to a liberalized Germany; see To End All Wars, 141-43. Similarly, according to Levin, Wilson felt that German democratization was necessary for a new world order, implying that Wilson would not make peace with the existing German government. See Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 52. Link is unclear on this issue. If anything, he implies that Wilson only intended to give the Fourteen Points to a democratized Germany. See Revolution, War, and Peace, 80-85. Schwabe at first argues that Wilson would not have granted the Fourteen Points and League admission to autocratic Germany, then suggests the president would have done so; he never explains this apparent contradiction in his analysis. See Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 17, 27-28.
189. "Address in the Metropolitan Opera House," 27 September 1918, PWW 51:129; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, ibid. 45:539; "Interview with Foreign Correspondents," 8 April 1918, ibid. 47:287; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:198; Sir William Wiseman to Lord Reading, 16 August 1918, ibid. 49:275-74; "Address in the Metropolitan Opera House," 27 September 1918, ibid. 51:129-130. For a pre-Brest-Litovsk statement by Wilson that he could not trust the Imperial German government see Wilson to Edward M. House, with enclosure, 23 August 1917, ibid. 44:35. Ambrosius wrongly suggests that Wilson would have negotiated with autocratic Germany. At the same time, he fails to see that Wilson was leaning in 1918 toward letting autocratic Germany into the League. See Wilsonian Statecraft, 117, 125; and Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 37, 46. Esposito also implies that Wilson would have negotiated with autocratic Germany, and then he ends up stressing Wilson's belief that democracies were peaceful; see Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 123, 136. Knock thinks that Wilson would only have given the Fourteen Points to a liberalized Germany; see To End All Wars, 141-43. Similarly, according to Levin, Wilson felt that German democratization was necessary for a new world order, implying that Wilson would not make peace with the existing German government. See Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 52. Link is unclear on this issue. If anything, he implies that Wilson only intended to give the Fourteen Points to a democratized Germany. See Revolution, War, and Peace, 80-85. Schwabe at first argues that Wilson would not have granted the Fourteen Points and League admission to autocratic Germany, then suggests the president would have done so; he never explains this apparent contradiction in his analysis. See Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 17, 27-28.
190. "Address in the Metropolitan Opera House," 27 September 1918, PWW 51:129; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, ibid. 45:539; "Interview with Foreign Correspondents," 8 April 1918, ibid. 47:287; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:198; Sir William Wiseman to Lord Reading, 16 August 1918, ibid. 49:275-74; "Address in the Metropolitan Opera House," 27 September 1918, ibid. 51:129-130. For a pre-Brest-Litovsk statement by Wilson that he could not trust the Imperial German government see Wilson to Edward M. House, with enclosure, 23 August 1917, ibid. 44:35. Ambrosius wrongly suggests that Wilson would have negotiated with autocratic Germany. At the same time, he fails to see that Wilson was leaning in 1918 toward letting autocratic Germany into the League. See Wilsonian Statecraft, 117, 125; and Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 37, 46. Esposito also implies that Wilson would have negotiated with autocratic Germany, and then he ends up stressing Wilson's belief that democracies were peaceful; see Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 123, 136. Knock thinks that Wilson would only have given the Fourteen Points to a liberalized Germany; see To End All Wars, 141-43. Similarly, according to Levin, Wilson felt that German democratization was necessary for a new world order, implying that Wilson would not make peace with the existing German government. See Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 52. Link is unclear on this issue. If anything, he implies that Wilson only intended to give the Fourteen Points to a democratized Germany. See Revolution, War, and Peace, 80-85. Schwabe at first argues that Wilson would not have granted the Fourteen Points and League admission to autocratic Germany, then suggests the president would have done so; he never explains this apparent contradiction in his analysis. See Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 17, 27-28.
191. "Address in the Metropolitan Opera House," 27 September 1918, PWW 51:129; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, ibid. 45:539; "Interview with Foreign Correspondents," 8 April 1918, ibid. 47:287; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:198; Sir William Wiseman to Lord Reading, 16 August 1918, ibid. 49:275-74; "Address in the Metropolitan Opera House," 27 September 1918, ibid. 51:129-130. For a pre-Brest-Litovsk statement by Wilson that he could not trust the Imperial German government see Wilson to Edward M. House, with enclosure, 23 August 1917, ibid. 44:35. Ambrosius wrongly suggests that Wilson would have negotiated with autocratic Germany. At the same time, he fails to see that Wilson was leaning in 1918 toward letting autocratic Germany into the League. See Wilsonian Statecraft, 117, 125; and Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 37, 46. Esposito also implies that Wilson would have negotiated with autocratic Germany, and then he ends up stressing Wilson's belief that democracies were peaceful; see Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 123, 136. Knock thinks that Wilson would only have given the Fourteen Points to a liberalized Germany; see To End All Wars, 141-43. Similarly, according to Levin, Wilson felt that German democratization was necessary for a new world order, implying that Wilson would not make peace with the existing German government. See Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 52. Link is unclear on this issue. If anything, he implies that Wilson only intended to give the Fourteen Points to a democratized Germany. See Revolution, War, and Peace, 80-85. Schwabe at first argues that Wilson would not have granted the Fourteen Points and League admission to autocratic Germany, then suggests the president would have done so; he never explains this apparent contradiction in his analysis. See Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 17, 27-28.
192. "Address in the Metropolitan Opera House," 27 September 1918, PWW 51:129; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, ibid. 45:539; "Interview with Foreign Correspondents," 8 April 1918, ibid. 47:287; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:198; Sir William Wiseman to Lord Reading, 16 August 1918, ibid. 49:275-74; "Address in the Metropolitan Opera House," 27 September 1918, ibid. 51:129-130. For a pre-Brest-Litovsk statement by Wilson that he could not trust the Imperial German government see Wilson to Edward M. House, with enclosure, 23 August 1917, ibid. 44:35. Ambrosius wrongly suggests that Wilson would have negotiated with autocratic Germany. At the same time, he fails to see that Wilson was leaning in 1918 toward letting autocratic Germany into the League. See Wilsonian Statecraft, 117, 125; and Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 37, 46. Esposito also implies that Wilson would have negotiated with autocratic Germany, and then he ends up stressing Wilson's belief that democracies were peaceful; see Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 123, 136. Knock thinks that Wilson would only have given the Fourteen Points to a liberalized Germany; see To End All Wars, 141-43. Similarly, according to Levin, Wilson felt that German democratization was necessary for a new world order, implying that Wilson would not make peace with the existing German government. See Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 52. Link is unclear on this issue. If anything, he implies that Wilson only intended to give the Fourteen Points to a democratized Germany. See Revolution, War, and Peace, 80-85. Schwabe at first argues that Wilson would not have granted the Fourteen Points and League admission to autocratic Germany, then suggests the president would have done so; he never explains this apparent contradiction in his analysis. See Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 17, 27-28.
193. "Address in the Metropolitan Opera House," 27 September 1918, PWW 51:129; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, ibid. 45:539; "Interview with Foreign Correspondents," 8 April 1918, ibid. 47:287; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:198; Sir William Wiseman to Lord Reading, 16 August 1918, ibid. 49:275-74; "Address in the Metropolitan Opera House," 27 September 1918, ibid. 51:129-130. For a pre-Brest-Litovsk statement by Wilson that he could not trust the Imperial German government see Wilson to Edward M. House, with enclosure, 23 August 1917, ibid. 44:35. Ambrosius wrongly suggests that Wilson would have negotiated with autocratic Germany. At the same time, he fails to see that Wilson was leaning in 1918 toward letting autocratic Germany into the League. See Wilsonian Statecraft, 117, 125; and Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 37, 46. Esposito also implies that Wilson would have negotiated with autocratic Germany, and then he ends up stressing Wilson's belief that democracies were peaceful; see Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 123, 136. Knock thinks that Wilson would only have given the Fourteen Points to a liberalized Germany; see To End All Wars, 141-43. Similarly, according to Levin, Wilson felt that German democratization was necessary for a new world order, implying that Wilson would not make peace with the existing German government. See Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 52. Link is unclear on this issue. If anything, he implies that Wilson only intended to give the Fourteen Points to a democratized Germany. See Revolution, War, and Peace, 80-85. Schwabe at first argues that Wilson would not have granted the Fourteen Points and League admission to autocratic Germany, then suggests the president would have done so; he never explains this apparent contradiction in his analysis. See Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 17, 27-28.
194. "Address in the Metropolitan Opera House," 27 September 1918, PWW 51:129; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, ibid. 45:539; "Interview with Foreign Correspondents," 8 April 1918, ibid. 47:287; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:198; Sir William Wiseman to Lord Reading, 16 August 1918, ibid. 49:275-74; "Address in the Metropolitan Opera House," 27 September 1918, ibid. 51:129-130. For a pre-Brest-Litovsk statement by Wilson that he could not trust the Imperial German government see Wilson to Edward M. House, with enclosure, 23 August 1917, ibid. 44:35. Ambrosius wrongly suggests that Wilson would have negotiated with autocratic Germany. At the same time, he fails to see that Wilson was leaning in 1918 toward letting autocratic Germany into the League. See Wilsonian Statecraft, 117, 125; and Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 37, 46. Esposito also implies that Wilson would have negotiated with autocratic Germany, and then he ends up stressing Wilson's belief that democracies were peaceful; see Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 123, 136. Knock thinks that Wilson would only have given the Fourteen Points to a liberalized Germany; see To End All Wars, 141-43. Similarly, according to Levin, Wilson felt that German democratization was necessary for a new world order, implying that Wilson would not make peace with the existing German government. See Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 52. Link is unclear on this issue. If anything, he implies that Wilson only intended to give the Fourteen Points to a democratized Germany. See Revolution, War, and Peace, 80-85. Schwabe at first argues that Wilson would not have granted the Fourteen Points and League admission to autocratic Germany, then suggests the president would have done so; he never explains this apparent contradiction in his analysis. See Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 17, 27-28.
195. "Address in the Metropolitan Opera House," 27 September 1918, PWW 51:129; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, ibid. 45:539; "Interview with Foreign Correspondents," 8 April 1918, ibid. 47:287; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:198; Sir William Wiseman to Lord Reading, 16 August 1918, ibid. 49:275-74; "Address in the Metropolitan Opera House," 27 September 1918, ibid. 51:129-130. For a pre-Brest-Litovsk statement by Wilson that he could not trust the Imperial German government see Wilson to Edward M. House, with enclosure, 23 August 1917, ibid. 44:35. Ambrosius wrongly suggests that Wilson would have negotiated with autocratic Germany. At the same time, he fails to see that Wilson was leaning in 1918 toward letting autocratic Germany into the League. See Wilsonian Statecraft, 117, 125; and Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 37, 46. Esposito also implies that Wilson would have negotiated with autocratic Germany, and then he ends up stressing Wilson's belief that democracies were peaceful; see Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 123, 136. Knock thinks that Wilson would only have given the Fourteen Points to a liberalized Germany; see To End All Wars, 141-43. Similarly, according to Levin, Wilson felt that German democratization was necessary for a new world order, implying that Wilson would not make peace with the existing German government. See Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 52. Link is unclear on this issue. If anything, he implies that Wilson only intended to give the Fourteen Points to a democratized Germany. See Revolution, War, and Peace, 80-85. Schwabe at first argues that Wilson would not have granted the Fourteen Points and League admission to autocratic Germany, then suggests the president would have done so; he never explains this apparent contradiction in his analysis. See Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 17, 27-28.
196. "Address in the Metropolitan Opera House," 27 September 1918, PWW 51:129; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, ibid. 45:539; "Interview with Foreign Correspondents," 8 April 1918, ibid. 47:287; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:198; Sir William Wiseman to Lord Reading, 16 August 1918, ibid. 49:275-74; "Address in the Metropolitan Opera House," 27 September 1918, ibid. 51:129-130. For a pre-Brest-Litovsk statement by Wilson that he could not trust the Imperial German government see Wilson to Edward M. House, with enclosure, 23 August 1917, ibid. 44:35. Ambrosius wrongly suggests that Wilson would have negotiated with autocratic Germany. At the same time, he fails to see that Wilson was leaning in 1918 toward letting autocratic Germany into the League. See Wilsonian Statecraft, 117, 125; and Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 37, 46. Esposito also implies that Wilson would have negotiated with autocratic Germany, and then he ends up stressing Wilson's belief that democracies were peaceful; see Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 123, 136. Knock thinks that Wilson would only have given the Fourteen Points to a liberalized Germany; see To End All Wars, 141-43. Similarly, according to Levin, Wilson felt that German democratization was necessary for a new world order, implying that Wilson would not make peace with the existing German government. See Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 52. Link is unclear on this issue. If anything, he implies that Wilson only intended to give the Fourteen Points to a democratized Germany. See Revolution, War, and Peace, 80-85. Schwabe at first argues that Wilson would not have granted the Fourteen Points and League admission to autocratic Germany, then suggests the president would have done so; he never explains this apparent contradiction in his analysis. See Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 17, 27-28.
197. "Address in the Metropolitan Opera House," 27 September 1918, PWW 51:129; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, ibid. 45:539; "Interview with Foreign Correspondents," 8 April 1918, ibid. 47:287; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:198; Sir William Wiseman to Lord Reading, 16 August 1918, ibid. 49:275-74; "Address in the Metropolitan Opera House," 27 September 1918, ibid. 51:129-130. For a pre-Brest-Litovsk statement by Wilson that he could not trust the Imperial German government see Wilson to Edward M. House, with enclosure, 23 August 1917, ibid. 44:35. Ambrosius wrongly suggests that Wilson would have negotiated with autocratic Germany. At the same time, he fails to see that Wilson was leaning in 1918 toward letting autocratic Germany into the League. See Wilsonian Statecraft, 117, 125; and Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 37, 46. Esposito also implies that Wilson would have negotiated with autocratic Germany, and then he ends up stressing Wilson's belief that democracies were peaceful; see Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 123, 136. Knock thinks that Wilson would only have given the Fourteen Points to a liberalized Germany; see To End All Wars, 141-43. Similarly, according to Levin, Wilson felt that German democratization was necessary for a new world order, implying that Wilson would not make peace with the existing German government. See Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 52. Link is unclear on this issue. If anything, he implies that Wilson only intended to give the Fourteen Points to a democratized Germany. See Revolution, War, and Peace, 80-85. Schwabe at first argues that Wilson would not have granted the Fourteen Points and League admission to autocratic Germany, then suggests the president would have done so; he never explains this apparent contradiction in his analysis. See Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 17, 27-28.
198. "Address in the Metropolitan Opera House," 27 September 1918, PWW 51:129; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, ibid. 45:539; "Interview with Foreign Correspondents," 8 April 1918, ibid. 47:287; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:198; Sir William Wiseman to Lord Reading, 16 August 1918, ibid. 49:275-74; "Address in the Metropolitan Opera House," 27 September 1918, ibid. 51:129-130. For a pre-Brest-Litovsk statement by Wilson that he could not trust the Imperial German government see Wilson to Edward M. House, with enclosure, 23 August 1917, ibid. 44:35. Ambrosius wrongly suggests that Wilson would have negotiated with autocratic Germany. At the same time, he fails to see that Wilson was leaning in 1918 toward letting autocratic Germany into the League. See Wilsonian Statecraft, 117, 125; and Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 37, 46. Esposito also implies that Wilson would have negotiated with autocratic Germany, and then he ends up stressing Wilson's belief that democracies were peaceful; see Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 123, 136. Knock thinks that Wilson would only have given the Fourteen Points to a liberalized Germany; see To End All Wars, 141-43. Similarly, according to Levin, Wilson felt that German democratization was necessary for a new world order, implying that Wilson would not make peace with the existing German government. See Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 52. Link is unclear on this issue. If anything, he implies that Wilson only intended to give the Fourteen Points to a democratized Germany. See Revolution, War, and Peace, 80-85. Schwabe at first argues that Wilson would not have granted the Fourteen Points and League admission to autocratic Germany, then suggests the president would have done so; he never explains this apparent contradiction in his analysis. See Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 17, 27-28.
199. "Address in the Metropolitan Opera House," 27 September 1918, PWW 51:129; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 8 January 1918, ibid. 45:539; "Interview with Foreign Correspondents," 8 April 1918, ibid. 47:287; "Annual Message to Congress," 4 December 1917, ibid. 45:198; Sir William Wiseman to Lord Reading, 16 August 1918, ibid. 49:275-74; "Address in the Metropolitan Opera House," 27 September 1918, ibid. 51:129-130. For a pre-Brest-Litovsk statement by Wilson that he could not trust the Imperial German government see Wilson to Edward M. House, with enclosure, 23 August 1917, ibid. 44:35. Ambrosius wrongly suggests that Wilson would have negotiated with autocratic Germany. At the same time, he fails to see that Wilson was leaning in 1918 toward letting autocratic Germany into the League. See Wilsonian Statecraft, 117, 125; and Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 37, 46. Esposito also implies that Wilson would have negotiated with autocratic Germany, and then he ends up stressing Wilson's belief that democracies were peaceful; see Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 123, 136. Knock thinks that Wilson would only have given the Fourteen Points to a liberalized Germany; see To End All Wars, 141-43. Similarly, according to Levin, Wilson felt that German democratization was necessary for a new world order, implying that Wilson would not make peace with the existing German government. See Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 52. Link is unclear on this issue. If anything, he implies that Wilson only intended to give the Fourteen Points to a democratized Germany. See Revolution, War, and Peace, 80-85. Schwabe at first argues that Wilson would not have granted the Fourteen Points and League admission to autocratic Germany, then suggests the president would have done so; he never explains this apparent contradiction in his analysis. See Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 17, 27-28.
200. Wilson to Robert Lansing (to F. Oederlin), 23 October 1918, PWW 51:418; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918 ibid. 53:41; "A Memorandum by Sir William Wiseman," ca. 16 October 1918, ibid. 51:352; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918, ibid. 53:41. For the similarity of the military experts' preferred armistice terms and the final actual settlement, compare Tasker Howard Bliss to Robert Lansing and others, 8 October 1918, ibid. 51:272-75; and "Address to a joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918, ibid, 583-86. For Wilson's aversion to marching on Berlin see Diary of Josephus Daniels, 8 October 1918, ibid. 51:275; House Diary, 15 October 1918, ibid., 340-41; and "A Memorandum by Sir William Wiseman," ca. 16 October 1918, ibid, 347-48.
201. Wilson to Robert Lansing (to F. Oederlin), 23 October 1918, PWW 51:418; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918 ibid. 53:41; "A Memorandum by Sir William Wiseman," ca. 16 October 1918, ibid. 51:352; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918, ibid. 53:41. For the similarity of the military experts' preferred armistice terms and the final actual settlement, compare Tasker Howard Bliss to Robert Lansing and others, 8 October 1918, ibid. 51:272-75; and "Address to a joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918, ibid, 583-86. For Wilson's aversion to marching on Berlin see Diary of Josephus Daniels, 8 October 1918, ibid. 51:275; House Diary, 15 October 1918, ibid., 340-41; and "A Memorandum by Sir William Wiseman," ca. 16 October 1918, ibid, 347-48.
202. Wilson to Robert Lansing (to F. Oederlin), 23 October 1918, PWW 51:418; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918 ibid. 53:41; "A Memorandum by Sir William Wiseman," ca. 16 October 1918, ibid. 51:352; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918, ibid. 53:41. For the similarity of the military experts' preferred armistice terms and the final actual settlement, compare Tasker Howard Bliss to Robert Lansing and others, 8 October 1918, ibid. 51:272-75; and "Address to a joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918, ibid, 583-86. For Wilson's aversion to marching on Berlin see Diary of Josephus Daniels, 8 October 1918, ibid. 51:275; House Diary, 15 October 1918, ibid., 340-41; and "A Memorandum by Sir William Wiseman," ca. 16 October 1918, ibid, 347-48.
203. Wilson to Robert Lansing (to F. Oederlin), 23 October 1918, PWW 51:418; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918 ibid. 53:41; "A Memorandum by Sir William Wiseman," ca. 16 October 1918, ibid. 51:352; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918, ibid. 53:41. For the similarity of the military experts' preferred armistice terms and the final actual settlement, compare Tasker Howard Bliss to Robert Lansing and others, 8 October 1918, ibid. 51:272-75; and "Address to a joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918, ibid, 583-86. For Wilson's aversion to marching on Berlin see Diary of Josephus Daniels, 8 October 1918, ibid. 51:275; House Diary, 15 October 1918, ibid., 340-41; and "A Memorandum by Sir William Wiseman," ca. 16 October 1918, ibid, 347-48.
204. Wilson to Robert Lansing (to F. Oederlin), 23 October 1918, PWW 51:418; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918 ibid. 53:41; "A Memorandum by Sir William Wiseman," ca. 16 October 1918, ibid. 51:352; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918, ibid. 53:41. For the similarity of the military experts' preferred armistice terms and the final actual settlement, compare Tasker Howard Bliss to Robert Lansing and others, 8 October 1918, ibid. 51:272-75; and "Address to a joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918, ibid, 583-86. For Wilson's aversion to marching on Berlin see Diary of Josephus Daniels, 8 October 1918, ibid. 51:275; House Diary, 15 October 1918, ibid., 340-41; and "A Memorandum by Sir William Wiseman," ca. 16 October 1918, ibid, 347-48.
205. Wilson to Robert Lansing (to F. Oederlin), 23 October 1918, PWW 51:418; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918 ibid. 53:41; "A Memorandum by Sir William Wiseman," ca. 16 October 1918, ibid. 51:352; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918, ibid. 53:41. For the similarity of the military experts' preferred armistice terms and the final actual settlement, compare Tasker Howard Bliss to Robert Lansing and others, 8 October 1918, ibid. 51:272-75; and "Address to a joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918, ibid, 583-86. For Wilson's aversion to marching on Berlin see Diary of Josephus Daniels, 8 October 1918, ibid. 51:275; House Diary, 15 October 1918, ibid., 340-41; and "A Memorandum by Sir William Wiseman," ca. 16 October 1918, ibid, 347-48.
206. Wilson to Robert Lansing (to F. Oederlin), 23 October 1918, PWW 51:418; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918 ibid. 53:41; "A Memorandum by Sir William Wiseman," ca. 16 October 1918, ibid. 51:352; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918, ibid. 53:41. For the similarity of the military experts' preferred armistice terms and the final actual settlement, compare Tasker Howard Bliss to Robert Lansing and others, 8 October 1918, ibid. 51:272-75; and "Address to a joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918, ibid, 583-86. For Wilson's aversion to marching on Berlin see Diary of Josephus Daniels, 8 October 1918, ibid. 51:275; House Diary, 15 October 1918, ibid., 340-41; and "A Memorandum by Sir William Wiseman," ca. 16 October 1918, ibid, 347-48.
207. Wilson to Robert Lansing (to F. Oederlin), 23 October 1918, PWW 51:418; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918 ibid. 53:41; "A Memorandum by Sir William Wiseman," ca. 16 October 1918, ibid. 51:352; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918, ibid. 53:41. For the similarity of the military experts' preferred armistice terms and the final actual settlement, compare Tasker Howard Bliss to Robert Lansing and others, 8 October 1918, ibid. 51:272-75; and "Address to a joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918, ibid, 583-86. For Wilson's aversion to marching on Berlin see Diary of Josephus Daniels, 8 October 1918, ibid. 51:275; House Diary, 15 October 1918, ibid., 340-41; and "A Memorandum by Sir William Wiseman," ca. 16 October 1918, ibid, 347-48.
208. Wilson to Robert Lansing (to F. Oederlin), 23 October 1918, PWW 51:418; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918 ibid. 53:41; "A Memorandum by Sir William Wiseman," ca. 16 October 1918, ibid. 51:352; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918, ibid. 53:41. For the similarity of the military experts' preferred armistice terms and the final actual settlement, compare Tasker Howard Bliss to Robert Lansing and others, 8 October 1918, ibid. 51:272-75; and "Address to a joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918, ibid, 583-86. For Wilson's aversion to marching on Berlin see Diary of Josephus Daniels, 8 October 1918, ibid. 51:275; House Diary, 15 October 1918, ibid., 340-41; and "A Memorandum by Sir William Wiseman," ca. 16 October 1918, ibid, 347-48.
209. Edward M. House to Wilson, ca. 6 December 1918, PWW 53:325; "Comments to the Commission on the League of Nations," 11 February 1919, in David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant (New York, 1928), 2:295; Diary of Dr. Cary T. Grayson, 8 December 1918, PWW 53:339; Wilson to Jan Christian Smuts, 16 May 1919, ibid. 59:187. For a convenient summary of the treaty's terms see Felix Gilbert, The End of the European Era (New York, 1979), 187-87. For Wilson's resistance to France's extreme demands regarding Germany see, for example, Grayson Diary, 25 March 1919, PWW 56:247-48; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 26 March 1919, ibid., 289-90; Grayson Diary, 27 March 1919, ibid., 312-13; Diary entries by Dr. Grayson, Edward House, Robert Lansing, and Ray S. Baker, 28 March 1919, ibid., 347-54; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 28 March 1919, ibid., 365-70; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 8 April 1919, ibid. 57:128-30; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 9 April 1919, ibid., 150-51. For additional comments from Wilson about punishing Germany see "A Conversation with the American Peace Commission," 3 June 1919, ibid. 60:67 and "Address in Columbus," 4 September 1919, ibid. 63:8-9. Wilson considered the "preliminaries" of peace to be akin to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee marking up a bill before submitting it to the Senate for consideration. See Grayson Diary, 8 December 1918, ibid. 53:337; and "A Memorandum of the Imperial War Cabinet," 30 December 1918, ibid., 564.
210. Edward M. House to Wilson, ca. 6 December 1918, PWW 53:325; "Comments to the Commission on the League of Nations," 11 February 1919, in David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant (New York, 1928), 2:295; Diary of Dr. Cary T. Grayson, 8 December 1918, PWW 53:339; Wilson to Jan Christian Smuts, 16 May 1919, ibid. 59:187. For a convenient summary of the treaty's terms see Felix Gilbert, The End of the European Era (New York, 1979), 187-87. For Wilson's resistance to France's extreme demands regarding Germany see, for example, Grayson Diary, 25 March 1919, PWW 56:247-48; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 26 March 1919, ibid., 289-90; Grayson Diary, 27 March 1919, ibid., 312-13; Diary entries by Dr. Grayson, Edward House, Robert Lansing, and Ray S. Baker, 28 March 1919, ibid., 347-54; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 28 March 1919, ibid., 365-70; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 8 April 1919, ibid. 57:128-30; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 9 April 1919, ibid., 150-51. For additional comments from Wilson about punishing Germany see "A Conversation with the American Peace Commission," 3 June 1919, ibid. 60:67 and "Address in Columbus," 4 September 1919, ibid. 63:8-9. Wilson considered the "preliminaries" of peace to be akin to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee marking up a bill before submitting it to the Senate for consideration. See Grayson Diary, 8 December 1918, ibid. 53:337; and "A Memorandum of the Imperial War Cabinet," 30 December 1918, ibid., 564.
211. Edward M. House to Wilson, ca. 6 December 1918, PWW 53:325; "Comments to the Commission on the League of Nations," 11 February 1919, in David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant (New York, 1928), 2:295; Diary of Dr. Cary T. Grayson, 8 December 1918, PWW 53:339; Wilson to Jan Christian Smuts, 16 May 1919, ibid. 59:187. For a convenient summary of the treaty's terms see Felix Gilbert, The End of the European Era (New York, 1979), 187-87. For Wilson's resistance to France's extreme demands regarding Germany see, for example, Grayson Diary, 25 March 1919, PWW 56:247-48; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 26 March 1919, ibid., 289-90; Grayson Diary, 27 March 1919, ibid., 312-13; Diary entries by Dr. Grayson, Edward House, Robert Lansing, and Ray S. Baker, 28 March 1919, ibid., 347-54; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 28 March 1919, ibid., 365-70; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 8 April 1919, ibid. 57:128-30; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 9 April 1919, ibid., 150-51. For additional comments from Wilson about punishing Germany see "A Conversation with the American Peace Commission," 3 June 1919, ibid. 60:67 and "Address in Columbus," 4 September 1919, ibid. 63:8-9. Wilson considered the "preliminaries" of peace to be akin to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee marking up a bill before submitting it to the Senate for consideration. See Grayson Diary, 8 December 1918, ibid. 53:337; and "A Memorandum of the Imperial War Cabinet," 30 December 1918, ibid., 564.
212. Edward M. House to Wilson, ca. 6 December 1918, PWW 53:325; "Comments to the Commission on the League of Nations," 11 February 1919, in David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant (New York, 1928), 2:295; Diary of Dr. Cary T. Grayson, 8 December 1918, PWW 53:339; Wilson to Jan Christian Smuts, 16 May 1919, ibid. 59:187. For a convenient summary of the treaty's terms see Felix Gilbert, The End of the European Era (New York, 1979), 187-87. For Wilson's resistance to France's extreme demands regarding Germany see, for example, Grayson Diary, 25 March 1919, PWW 56:247-48; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 26 March 1919, ibid., 289-90; Grayson Diary, 27 March 1919, ibid., 312-13; Diary entries by Dr. Grayson, Edward House, Robert Lansing, and Ray S. Baker, 28 March 1919, ibid., 347-54; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 28 March 1919, ibid., 365-70; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 8 April 1919, ibid. 57:128-30; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 9 April 1919, ibid., 150-51. For additional comments from Wilson about punishing Germany see "A Conversation with the American Peace Commission," 3 June 1919, ibid. 60:67 and "Address in Columbus," 4 September 1919, ibid. 63:8-9. Wilson considered the "preliminaries" of peace to be akin to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee marking up a bill before submitting it to the Senate for consideration. See Grayson Diary, 8 December 1918, ibid. 53:337; and "A Memorandum of the Imperial War Cabinet," 30 December 1918, ibid., 564.
213. Edward M. House to Wilson, ca. 6 December 1918, PWW 53:325; "Comments to the Commission on the League of Nations," 11 February 1919, in David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant (New York, 1928),
214. Edward M. House to Wilson, ca. 6 December 1918, PWW 53:325; "Comments to the Commission on the League of Nations," 11 February 1919, in David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant (New York, 1928), 2:295; Diary of Dr. Cary T. Grayson, 8 December 1918, PWW 53:339; Wilson to Jan Christian Smuts, 16 May 1919, ibid. 59:187. For a convenient summary of the treaty's terms see Felix Gilbert, The End of the European Era (New York, 1979), 187-87. For Wilson's resistance to France's extreme demands regarding Germany see, for example, Grayson Diary, 25 March 1919, PWW 56:247-48; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 26 March 1919, ibid., 289-90; Grayson Diary, 27 March 1919, ibid., 312-13; Diary entries by Dr. Grayson, Edward House, Robert Lansing, and Ray S. Baker, 28 March 1919, ibid., 347-54; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 28 March 1919, ibid., 365-70; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 8 April 1919, ibid. 57:128-30; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 9 April 1919, ibid., 150-51. For additional comments from Wilson about punishing Germany see "A Conversation with the American Peace Commission," 3 June 1919, ibid. 60:67 and "Address in Columbus," 4 September 1919, ibid. 63:8-9. Wilson considered the "preliminaries" of peace to be akin to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee marking up a bill before submitting it to the Senate for consideration. See Grayson Diary, 8 December 1918, ibid. 53:337; and "A Memorandum of the Imperial War Cabinet," 30 December 1918, ibid., 564.
215. Edward M. House to Wilson, ca. 6 December 1918, PWW 53:325; "Comments to the Commission on the League of Nations," 11 February 1919, in David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant (New York, 1928), 2:295; Diary of Dr. Cary T. Grayson, 8 December 1918, PWW 53:339; Wilson to Jan Christian Smuts, 16 May 1919, ibid. 59:187. For a convenient summary of the treaty's terms see Felix Gilbert, The End of the European Era (New York, 1979), 187-87. For Wilson's resistance to France's extreme demands regarding Germany see, for example, Grayson Diary, 25 March 1919, PWW 56:247-48; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 26 March 1919, ibid., 289-90; Grayson Diary, 27 March 1919, ibid., 312-13; Diary entries by Dr. Grayson, Edward House, Robert Lansing, and Ray S. Baker, 28 March 1919, ibid., 347-54; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 28 March 1919, ibid., 365-70; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 8 April 1919, ibid. 57:128-30; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 9 April 1919, ibid., 150-51. For additional comments from Wilson about punishing Germany see "A Conversation with the American Peace Commission," 3 June 1919, ibid. 60:67 and "Address in Columbus," 4 September 1919, ibid. 63:8-9. Wilson considered the "preliminaries" of peace to be akin to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee marking up a bill before submitting it to the Senate for consideration. See Grayson Diary, 8 December 1918, ibid. 53:337; and "A Memorandum of the Imperial War Cabinet," 30 December 1918, ibid., 564.
216. Edward M. House to Wilson, ca. 6 December 1918, PWW 53:325; "Comments to the Commission on the League of Nations," 11 February 1919, in David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant (New York, 1928), 2:295; Diary of Dr. Cary T. Grayson, 8 December 1918, PWW 53:339; Wilson to Jan Christian Smuts, 16 May 1919, ibid. 59:187. For a convenient summary of the treaty's terms see Felix Gilbert, The End of the European Era (New York, 1979), 187-87. For Wilson's resistance to France's extreme demands regarding Germany see, for example, Grayson Diary, 25 March 1919, PWW 56:247-48; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 26 March 1919, ibid., 289-90; Grayson Diary, 27 March 1919, ibid., 312-13; Diary entries by Dr. Grayson, Edward House, Robert Lansing, and Ray S. Baker, 28 March 1919, ibid., 347-54; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 28 March 1919, ibid., 365-70; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 8 April 1919, ibid. 57:128-30; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 9 April 1919, ibid., 150-51. For additional comments from Wilson about punishing Germany see "A Conversation with the American Peace Commission," 3 June 1919, ibid. 60:67 and "Address in Columbus," 4 September 1919, ibid. 63:8-9. Wilson considered the "preliminaries" of peace to be akin to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee marking up a bill before submitting it to the Senate for consideration. See Grayson Diary, 8 December 1918, ibid. 53:337; and "A Memorandum of the Imperial War Cabinet," 30 December 1918, ibid., 564.
217. Edward M. House to Wilson, ca. 6 December 1918, PWW 53:325; "Comments to the Commission on the League of Nations," 11 February 1919, in David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant (New York, 1928), 2:295; Diary of Dr. Cary T. Grayson, 8 December 1918, PWW 53:339; Wilson to Jan Christian Smuts, 16 May 1919, ibid. 59:187. For a convenient summary of the treaty's terms see Felix Gilbert, The End of the European Era (New York, 1979), 187-87. For Wilson's resistance to France's extreme demands regarding Germany see, for example, Grayson Diary, 25 March 1919, PWW 56:247-48; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 26 March 1919, ibid., 289-90; Grayson Diary, 27 March 1919, ibid., 312-13; Diary entries by Dr. Grayson, Edward House, Robert Lansing, and Ray S. Baker, 28 March 1919, ibid., 347-54; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 28 March 1919, ibid., 365-70; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 8 April 1919, ibid. 57:128-30; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 9 April 1919, ibid., 150-51. For additional comments from Wilson about punishing Germany see "A Conversation with the American Peace Commission," 3 June 1919, ibid. 60:67 and "Address in Columbus," 4 September 1919, ibid. 63:8-9. Wilson considered the "preliminaries" of peace to be akin to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee marking up a bill before submitting it to the Senate for consideration. See Grayson Diary, 8 December 1918, ibid. 53:337; and "A Memorandum of the Imperial War Cabinet," 30 December 1918, ibid., 564.
218. Edward M. House to Wilson, ca. 6 December 1918, PWW 53:325; "Comments to the Commission on the League of Nations," 11 February 1919, in David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant (New York, 1928), 2:295; Diary of Dr. Cary T. Grayson, 8 December 1918, PWW 53:339; Wilson to Jan Christian Smuts, 16 May 1919, ibid. 59:187. For a convenient summary of the treaty's terms see Felix Gilbert, The End of the European Era (New York, 1979), 187-87. For Wilson's resistance to France's extreme demands regarding Germany see, for example, Grayson Diary, 25 March 1919, PWW 56:247-48; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 26 March 1919, ibid., 289-90; Grayson Diary, 27 March 1919, ibid., 312-13; Diary entries by Dr. Grayson, Edward House, Robert Lansing, and Ray S. Baker, 28 March 1919, ibid., 347-54; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 28 March 1919, ibid., 365-70; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 8 April 1919, ibid. 57:128-30; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 9 April 1919, ibid., 150-51. For additional comments from Wilson about punishing Germany see "A Conversation with the American Peace Commission," 3 June 1919, ibid. 60:67 and "Address in Columbus," 4 September 1919, ibid. 63:8-9. Wilson considered the "preliminaries" of peace to be akin to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee marking up a bill before submitting it to the Senate for consideration. See Grayson Diary, 8 December 1918, ibid. 53:337; and "A Memorandum of the Imperial War Cabinet," 30 December 1918, ibid., 564.
219. Edward M. House to Wilson, ca. 6 December 1918, PWW 53:325; "Comments to the Commission on the League of Nations," 11 February 1919, in David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant (New York, 1928), 2:295; Diary of Dr. Cary T. Grayson, 8 December 1918, PWW 53:339; Wilson to Jan Christian Smuts, 16 May 1919, ibid. 59:187. For a convenient summary of the treaty's terms see Felix Gilbert, The End of the European Era (New York, 1979), 187-87. For Wilson's resistance to France's extreme demands regarding Germany see, for example, Grayson Diary, 25 March 1919, PWW 56:247-48; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 26 March 1919, ibid., 289-90; Grayson Diary, 27 March 1919, ibid., 312-13; Diary entries by Dr. Grayson, Edward House, Robert Lansing, and Ray S. Baker, 28 March 1919, ibid., 347-54; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 28 March 1919, ibid., 365-70; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 8 April 1919, ibid. 57:128-30; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 9 April 1919, ibid., 150-51. For additional comments from Wilson about punishing Germany see "A Conversation with the American Peace Commission," 3 June 1919, ibid. 60:67 and "Address in Columbus," 4 September 1919, ibid. 63:8-9. Wilson considered the "preliminaries" of peace to be akin to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee marking up a bill before submitting it to the Senate for consideration. See Grayson Diary, 8 December 1918, ibid. 53:337; and "A Memorandum of the Imperial War Cabinet," 30 December 1918, ibid., 564.
220. Edward M. House to Wilson, ca. 6 December 1918, PWW 53:325; "Comments to the Commission on the League of Nations," 11 February 1919, in David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant (New York, 1928), 2:295; Diary of Dr. Cary T. Grayson, 8 December 1918, PWW 53:339; Wilson to Jan Christian Smuts, 16 May 1919, ibid. 59:187. For a convenient summary of the treaty's terms see Felix Gilbert, The End of the European Era (New York, 1979), 187-87. For Wilson's resistance to France's extreme demands regarding Germany see, for example, Grayson Diary, 25 March 1919, PWW 56:247-48; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 26 March 1919, ibid., 289-90; Grayson Diary, 27 March 1919, ibid., 312-13; Diary entries by Dr. Grayson, Edward House, Robert Lansing, and Ray S. Baker, 28 March 1919, ibid., 347-54; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 28 March 1919, ibid., 365-70; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 8 April 1919, ibid. 57:128-30; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 9 April 1919, ibid., 150-51. For additional comments from Wilson about punishing Germany see "A Conversation with the American Peace Commission," 3 June 1919, ibid. 60:67 and "Address in Columbus," 4 September 1919, ibid. 63:8-9. Wilson considered the "preliminaries" of peace to be akin to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee marking up a bill before submitting it to the Senate for consideration. See Grayson Diary, 8 December 1918, ibid. 53:337; and "A Memorandum of the Imperial War Cabinet," 30 December 1918, ibid., 564.
221. Edward M. House to Wilson, ca. 6 December 1918, PWW 53:325; "Comments to the Commission on the League of Nations," 11 February 1919, in David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant (New York, 1928), 2:295; Diary of Dr. Cary T. Grayson, 8 December 1918, PWW 53:339; Wilson to Jan Christian Smuts, 16 May 1919, ibid. 59:187. For a convenient summary of the treaty's terms see Felix Gilbert, The End of the European Era (New York, 1979), 187-87. For Wilson's resistance to France's extreme demands regarding Germany see, for example, Grayson Diary, 25 March 1919, PWW 56:247-48; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 26 March 1919, ibid., 289-90; Grayson Diary, 27 March 1919, ibid., 312-13; Diary entries by Dr. Grayson, Edward House, Robert Lansing, and Ray S. Baker, 28 March 1919, ibid., 347-54; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 28 March 1919, ibid., 365-70; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 8 April 1919, ibid. 57:128-30; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 9 April 1919, ibid., 150-51. For additional comments from Wilson about punishing Germany see "A Conversation with the American Peace Commission," 3 June 1919, ibid. 60:67 and "Address in Columbus," 4 September 1919, ibid. 63:8-9. Wilson considered the "preliminaries" of peace to be akin to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee marking up a bill before submitting it to the Senate for consideration. See Grayson Diary, 8 December 1918, ibid. 53:337; and "A Memorandum of the Imperial War Cabinet," 30 December 1918, ibid., 564.
222. Edward M. House to Wilson, ca. 6 December 1918, PWW 53:325; "Comments to the Commission on the League of Nations," 11 February 1919, in David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant (New York, 1928), 2:295; Diary of Dr. Cary T. Grayson, 8 December 1918, PWW 53:339; Wilson to Jan Christian Smuts, 16 May 1919, ibid. 59:187. For a convenient summary of the treaty's terms see Felix Gilbert, The End of the European Era (New York, 1979), 187-87. For Wilson's resistance to France's extreme demands regarding Germany see, for example, Grayson Diary, 25 March 1919, PWW 56:247-48; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 26 March 1919, ibid., 289-90; Grayson Diary, 27 March 1919, ibid., 312-13; Diary entries by Dr. Grayson, Edward House, Robert Lansing, and Ray S. Baker, 28 March 1919, ibid., 347-54; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 28 March 1919, ibid., 365-70; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 8 April 1919, ibid. 57:128-30; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 9 April 1919, ibid., 150-51. For additional comments from Wilson about punishing Germany see "A Conversation with the American Peace Commission," 3 June 1919, ibid. 60:67 and "Address in Columbus," 4 September 1919, ibid. 63:8-9. Wilson considered the "preliminaries" of peace to be akin to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee marking up a bill before submitting it to the Senate for consideration. See Grayson Diary, 8 December 1918, ibid. 53:337; and "A Memorandum of the Imperial War Cabinet," 30 December 1918, ibid., 564.
223. Edward M. House to Wilson, ca. 6 December 1918, PWW 53:325; "Comments to the Commission on the League of Nations," 11 February 1919, in David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant (New York, 1928), 2:295; Diary of Dr. Cary T. Grayson, 8 December 1918, PWW 53:339; Wilson to Jan Christian Smuts, 16 May 1919, ibid. 59:187. For a convenient summary of the treaty's terms see Felix Gilbert, The End of the European Era (New York, 1979), 187-87. For Wilson's resistance to France's extreme demands regarding Germany see, for example, Grayson Diary, 25 March 1919, PWW 56:247-48; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 26 March 1919, ibid., 289-90; Grayson Diary, 27 March 1919, ibid., 312-13; Diary entries by Dr. Grayson, Edward House, Robert Lansing, and Ray S. Baker, 28 March 1919, ibid., 347-54; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 28 March 1919, ibid., 365-70; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 8 April 1919, ibid. 57:128-30; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 9 April 1919, ibid., 150-51. For additional comments from Wilson about punishing Germany see "A Conversation with the American Peace Commission," 3 June 1919, ibid. 60:67 and "Address in Columbus," 4 September 1919, ibid. 63:8-9. Wilson considered the "preliminaries" of peace to be akin to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee marking up a bill before submitting it to the Senate for consideration. See Grayson Diary, 8 December 1918, ibid. 53:337; and "A Memorandum of the Imperial War Cabinet," 30 December 1918, ibid., 564.
224. Edward M. House to Wilson, ca. 6 December 1918, PWW 53:325; "Comments to the Commission on the League of Nations," 11 February 1919, in David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant (New York, 1928), 2:295; Diary of Dr. Cary T. Grayson, 8 December 1918, PWW 53:339; Wilson to Jan Christian Smuts, 16 May 1919, ibid. 59:187. For a convenient summary of the treaty's terms see Felix Gilbert, The End of the European Era (New York, 1979), 187-87. For Wilson's resistance to France's extreme demands regarding Germany see, for example, Grayson Diary, 25 March 1919, PWW 56:247-48; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 26 March 1919, ibid., 289-90; Grayson Diary, 27 March 1919, ibid., 312-13; Diary entries by Dr. Grayson, Edward House, Robert Lansing, and Ray S. Baker, 28 March 1919, ibid., 347-54; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 28 March 1919, ibid., 365-70; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 8 April 1919, ibid. 57:128-30; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 9 April 1919, ibid., 150-51. For additional comments from Wilson about punishing Germany see "A Conversation with the American Peace Commission," 3 June 1919, ibid. 60:67 and "Address in Columbus," 4 September 1919, ibid. 63:8-9. Wilson considered the "preliminaries" of peace to be akin to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee marking up a bill before submitting it to the Senate for consideration. See Grayson Diary, 8 December 1918, ibid. 53:337; and "A Memorandum of the Imperial War Cabinet," 30 December 1918, ibid., 564.
225. Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 158; "Minutes of a Plenary Session of a Meeting of the Inter-Allied Conference on the Preliminaries of Peace," 31 May 1919, PWW 59:628-29. See also Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 125-24, 156-58.
226. Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 158; "Minutes of a Plenary Session of a Meeting of the Inter-Allied Conference on the Preliminaries of Peace," 31 May 1919, PWW 59:628-29. See also Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 125-24, 156-58.
227. Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 158; "Minutes of a Plenary Session of a Meeting of the Inter-Allied Conference on the Preliminaries of Peace," 31 May 1919, PWW 59:628-29. See also Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 125-24, 156-58.
228. Ambrosius does not perceive any Wilsonian desire to control Germany's power even as he cites evidence indicating that the president wanted to do so. See Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 36, 48-50, 54, 71, 75, 82, 127-34. Esposito has little analysis of the armistice or the peace treaty; to the degree he does, he fails to see the president's impulse to restrain the Germans. See The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 127-29. Cooper, knock, Link, and Smith all have a similar interpretation of the president's policies during the armistice talks and at Paris; they have little to say about Wilson's efforts to curtail Germany's power and tend to portray the president as a moderate who was unable to achieve more lenient terms for the Germans because of a weak negotiating position, Allied pressure, and failing health. Knock does have relatively more awareness than the others of the considerations of power that moved Wilson during the armistice period. See Cooper, Warrior and the Priest, 337-40; Knock, To End All Wars, 172-75, 183-84, 248-51; Link, Revolution, War, and Peace, 86-101; and Smith, America's Mission, 96-102. Marc Trachtenberg, even more than Levin, recognizes that Wilson wanted to punish the Germans at Paris. Like Levin, however, he attributes this outlook to Wilson's moralism, not to the president's fears of Germany's strength. See Trachtenberg, "Versailles after Sixty Years," Journal of Contemporary History 17 (July 1982): 491-96. Schwabe's interpretation of Wilson's posture toward Germany and the Allies is quite close to mine. Schwabe never clearly explains the underlying conception of U.S. national security that motivated the president's policies, however; Wilson's view of America's stake in a lasting peace simply does not emerge in Schwabe's book. See Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 45-47, 51-54, 62-65, 68-69, 88, 177-79, 193-210, 215, 342, 368-69, 391, 397-99, 401-2, passim.
229. Ambrosius does not perceive any Wilsonian desire to control Germany's power even as he cites evidence indicating that the president wanted to do so. See Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 36, 48-50, 54, 71, 75, 82, 127-34. Esposito has little analysis of the armistice or the peace treaty; to the degree he does, he fails to see the president's impulse to restrain the Germans. See The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 127-29. Cooper, knock, Link, and Smith all have a similar interpretation of the president's policies during the armistice talks and at Paris; they have little to say about Wilson's efforts to curtail Germany's power and tend to portray the president as a moderate who was unable to achieve more lenient terms for the Germans because of a weak negotiating position, Allied pressure, and failing health. Knock does have relatively more awareness than the others of the considerations of power that moved Wilson during the armistice period. See Cooper, Warrior and the Priest, 337-40; Knock, To End All Wars, 172-75, 183-84, 248-51; Link, Revolution, War, and Peace, 86-101; and Smith, America's Mission, 96-102. Marc Trachtenberg, even more than Levin, recognizes that Wilson wanted to punish the Germans at Paris. Like Levin, however, he attributes this outlook to Wilson's moralism, not to the president's fears of Germany's strength. See Trachtenberg, "Versailles after Sixty Years," Journal of Contemporary History 17 (July 1982): 491-96. Schwabe's interpretation of Wilson's posture toward Germany and the Allies is quite close to mine. Schwabe never clearly explains the underlying conception of U.S. national security that motivated the president's policies, however; Wilson's view of America's stake in a lasting peace simply does not emerge in Schwabe's book. See Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 45-47, 51-54, 62-65, 68-69, 88, 177-79, 193-210, 215, 342, 368-69, 391, 397-99, 401-2, passim.
230. Ambrosius does not perceive any Wilsonian desire to control Germany's power even as he cites evidence indicating that the president wanted to do so. See Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 36, 48-50, 54, 71, 75, 82, 127-34. Esposito has little analysis of the armistice or the peace treaty; to the degree he does, he fails to see the president's impulse to restrain the Germans. See The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 127-29. Cooper, knock, Link, and Smith all have a similar interpretation of the president's policies during the armistice talks and at Paris; they have little to say about Wilson's efforts to curtail Germany's power and tend to portray the president as a moderate who was unable to achieve more lenient terms for the Germans because of a weak negotiating position, Allied pressure, and failing health. Knock does have relatively more awareness than the others of the considerations of power that moved Wilson during the armistice period. See Cooper, Warrior and the Priest, 337-40; Knock, To End All Wars, 172-75, 183-84, 248-51; Link, Revolution, War, and Peace, 86-101; and Smith, America's Mission, 96-102. Marc Trachtenberg, even more than Levin, recognizes that Wilson wanted to punish the Germans at Paris. Like Levin, however, he attributes this outlook to Wilson's moralism, not to the president's fears of Germany's strength. See Trachtenberg, "Versailles after Sixty Years," Journal of Contemporary History 17 (July 1982): 491-96. Schwabe's interpretation of Wilson's posture toward Germany and the Allies is quite close to mine. Schwabe never clearly explains the underlying conception of U.S. national security that motivated the president's policies, however; Wilson's view of America's stake in a lasting peace simply does not emerge in Schwabe's book. See Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 45-47, 51-54, 62-65, 68-69, 88, 177-79, 193-210, 215, 342, 368-69, 391, 397-99, 401-2, passim.
231. Ambrosius does not perceive any Wilsonian desire to control Germany's power even as he cites evidence indicating that the president wanted to do so. See Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 36, 48-50, 54, 71, 75, 82, 127-34. Esposito has little analysis of the armistice or the peace treaty; to the degree he does, he fails to see the president's impulse to restrain the Germans. See The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 127-29. Cooper, knock, Link, and Smith all have a similar interpretation of the president's policies during the armistice talks and at Paris; they have little to say about Wilson's efforts to curtail Germany's power and tend to portray the president as a moderate who was unable to achieve more lenient terms for the Germans because of a weak negotiating position, Allied pressure, and failing health. Knock does have relatively more awareness than the others of the considerations of power that moved Wilson during the armistice period. See Cooper, Warrior and the Priest, 337-40; Knock, To End All Wars, 172-75, 183-84, 248-51; Link, Revolution, War, and Peace, 86-101; and Smith, America's Mission, 96-102. Marc Trachtenberg, even more than Levin, recognizes that Wilson wanted to punish the Germans at Paris. Like Levin, however, he attributes this outlook to Wilson's moralism, not to the president's fears of Germany's strength. See Trachtenberg, "Versailles after Sixty Years," Journal of Contemporary History 17 (July 1982): 491-96. Schwabe's interpretation of Wilson's posture toward Germany and the Allies is quite close to mine. Schwabe never clearly explains the underlying conception of U.S. national security that motivated the president's policies, however; Wilson's view of America's stake in a lasting peace simply does not emerge in Schwabe's book. See Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 45-47, 51-54, 62-65, 68-69, 88, 177-79, 193-210, 215, 342, 368-69, 391, 397-99, 401-2, passim.
232. Ambrosius does not perceive any Wilsonian desire to control Germany's power even as he cites evidence indicating that the president wanted to do so. See Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 36, 48-50, 54, 71, 75, 82, 127-34. Esposito has little analysis of the armistice or the peace treaty; to the degree he does, he fails to see the president's impulse to restrain the Germans. See The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 127-29. Cooper, knock, Link, and Smith all have a similar interpretation of the president's policies during the armistice talks and at Paris; they have little to say about Wilson's efforts to curtail Germany's power and tend to portray the president as a moderate who was unable to achieve more lenient terms for the Germans because of a weak negotiating position, Allied pressure, and failing health. Knock does have relatively more awareness than the others of the considerations of power that moved Wilson during the armistice period. See Cooper, Warrior and the Priest, 337-40; Knock, To End All Wars, 172-75, 183-84, 248-51; Link, Revolution, War, and Peace, 86-101; and Smith, America's Mission, 96-102. Marc Trachtenberg, even more than Levin, recognizes that Wilson wanted to punish the Germans at Paris. Like Levin, however, he attributes this outlook to Wilson's moralism, not to the president's fears of Germany's strength. See Trachtenberg, "Versailles after Sixty Years," Journal of Contemporary History 17 (July 1982): 491-96. Schwabe's interpretation of Wilson's posture toward Germany and the Allies is quite close to mine. Schwabe never clearly explains the underlying conception of U.S. national security that motivated the president's policies, however; Wilson's view of America's stake in a lasting peace simply does not emerge in Schwabe's book. See Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 45-47, 51-54, 62-65, 68-69, 88, 177-79, 193-210, 215, 342, 368-69, 391, 397-99, 401-2, passim.
233. Ambrosius does not perceive any Wilsonian desire to control Germany's power even as he cites evidence indicating that the president wanted to do so. See Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 36, 48-50, 54, 71, 75, 82, 127-34. Esposito has little analysis of the armistice or the peace treaty; to the degree he does, he fails to see the president's impulse to restrain the Germans. See The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 127-29. Cooper, knock, Link, and Smith all have a similar interpretation of the president's policies during the armistice talks and at Paris; they have little to say about Wilson's efforts to curtail Germany's power and tend to portray the president as a moderate who was unable to achieve more lenient terms for the Germans because of a weak negotiating position, Allied pressure, and failing health. Knock does have relatively more awareness than the others of the considerations of power that moved Wilson during the armistice period. See Cooper, Warrior and the Priest, 337-40; Knock, To End All Wars, 172-75, 183-84, 248-51; Link, Revolution, War, and Peace, 86-101; and Smith, America's Mission, 96-102. Marc Trachtenberg, even more than Levin, recognizes that Wilson wanted to punish the Germans at Paris. Like Levin, however, he attributes this outlook to Wilson's moralism, not to the president's fears of Germany's strength. See Trachtenberg, "Versailles after Sixty Years," Journal of Contemporary History 17 (July 1982): 491-96. Schwabe's interpretation of Wilson's posture toward Germany and the Allies is quite close to mine. Schwabe never clearly explains the underlying conception of U.S. national security that motivated the president's policies, however; Wilson's view of America's stake in a lasting peace simply does not emerge in Schwabe's book. See Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 45-47, 51-54, 62-65, 68-69, 88, 177-79, 193-210, 215, 342, 368-69, 391, 397-99, 401-2, passim.
234. Ambrosius does not perceive any Wilsonian desire to control Germany's power even as he cites evidence indicating that the president wanted to do so. See Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 36, 48-50, 54, 71, 75, 82, 127-34. Esposito has little analysis of the armistice or the peace treaty; to the degree he does, he fails to see the president's impulse to restrain the Germans. See The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 127-29. Cooper, knock, Link, and Smith all have a similar interpretation of the president's policies during the armistice talks and at Paris; they have little to say about Wilson's efforts to curtail Germany's power and tend to portray the president as a moderate who was unable to achieve more lenient terms for the Germans because of a weak negotiating position, Allied pressure, and failing health. Knock does have relatively more awareness than the others of the considerations of power that moved Wilson during the armistice period. See Cooper, Warrior and the Priest, 337-40; Knock, To End All Wars, 172-75, 183-84, 248-51; Link, Revolution, War, and Peace, 86-101; and Smith, America's Mission, 96-102. Marc Trachtenberg, even more than Levin, recognizes that Wilson wanted to punish the Germans at Paris. Like Levin, however, he attributes this outlook to Wilson's moralism, not to the president's fears of Germany's strength. See Trachtenberg, "Versailles after Sixty Years," Journal of Contemporary History 17 (July 1982): 491-96. Schwabe's interpretation of Wilson's posture toward Germany and the Allies is quite close to mine. Schwabe never clearly explains the underlying conception of U.S. national security that motivated the president's policies, however; Wilson's view of America's stake in a lasting peace simply does not emerge in Schwabe's book. See Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 45-47, 51-54, 62-65, 68-69, 88, 177-79, 193-210, 215, 342, 368-69, 391, 397-99, 401-2, passim.
235. Ambrosius does not perceive any Wilsonian desire to control Germany's power even as he cites evidence indicating that the president wanted to do so. See Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 36, 48-50, 54, 71, 75, 82, 127-34. Esposito has little analysis of the armistice or the peace treaty; to the degree he does, he fails to see the president's impulse to restrain the Germans. See The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, 127-29. Cooper, knock, Link, and Smith all have a similar interpretation of the president's policies during the armistice talks and at Paris; they have little to say about Wilson's efforts to curtail Germany's power and tend to portray the president as a moderate who was unable to achieve more lenient terms for the Germans because of a weak negotiating position, Allied pressure, and failing health. Knock does have relatively more awareness than the others of the considerations of power that moved Wilson during the armistice period. See Cooper, Warrior and the Priest, 337-40; Knock, To End All Wars, 172-75, 183-84, 248-51; Link, Revolution, War, and Peace, 86-101; and Smith, America's Mission, 96-102. Marc Trachtenberg, even more than Levin, recognizes that Wilson wanted to punish the Germans at Paris. Like Levin, however, he attributes this outlook to Wilson's moralism, not to the president's fears of Germany's strength. See Trachtenberg, "Versailles after Sixty Years," Journal of Contemporary History 17 (July 1982): 491-96. Schwabe's interpretation of Wilson's posture toward Germany and the Allies is quite close to mine. Schwabe never clearly explains the underlying conception of U.S. national security that motivated the president's policies, however; Wilson's view of America's stake in a lasting peace simply does not emerge in Schwabe's book. See Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 45-47, 51-54, 62-65, 68-69, 88, 177-79, 193-210, 215, 342, 368-69, 391, 397-99, 401-2, passim.
236. Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 52, 24-26, 84, 48, 52-59, 126, 4-5, 2.
237. "Acceptance Speech," 7 August 1912, in A Crossroads of Freedom: The 1912 Campaign Speeches of Woodrow Wilson, ed. John Wells Davidson (New Haven, 1956), 33; "Press Conference Remarks," 1 June 1914, PWW 30:129; "Luncheon Address in Cincinnati," 26 October 1916, ibid. 38:528; Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 17; and, for example, "An Address," 4 July 1914, PWW 30:251.
238. "Acceptance Speech," 7 August 1912, in A Crossroads of Freedom: The 1912 Campaign Speeches of Woodrow Wilson, ed. John Wells Davidson (New Haven, 1956), 33; "Press Conference Remarks," 1 June 1914, PWW 30:129; "Luncheon Address in Cincinnati," 26 October 1916, ibid. 38:528; Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 17; and, for example, "An Address," 4 July 1914, PWW 30:251.
239. "Acceptance Speech," 7 August 1912, in A Crossroads of Freedom: The 1912 Campaign Speeches of Woodrow Wilson, ed. John Wells Davidson (New Haven, 1956), 33; "Press Conference Remarks," 1 June 1914, PWW 30:129; "Luncheon Address in Cincinnati," 26 October 1916, ibid. 38:528; Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 17; and, for example, "An Address," 4 July 1914, PWW 30:251.
240. "Acceptance Speech," 7 August 1912, in A Crossroads of Freedom: The 1912 Campaign Speeches of Woodrow Wilson, ed. John Wells Davidson (New Haven, 1956), 33; "Press Conference Remarks," 1 June 1914, PWW 30:129; "Luncheon Address in Cincinnati," 26 October 1916, ibid. 38:528; Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 17; and, for example, "An Address," 4 July 1914, PWW 30:251.
241. "Acceptance Speech," 7 August 1912, in A Crossroads of Freedom: The 1912 Campaign Speeches of Woodrow Wilson, ed. John Wells Davidson (New Haven, 1956), 33; "Press Conference Remarks," 1 June 1914, PWW 30:129; "Luncheon Address in Cincinnati," 26 October 1916, ibid. 38:528; Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 17; and, for example, "An Address," 4 July 1914, PWW 30:251.
242. "A Statement by Robert Lansing," 4 December 1917, PWW 45:205-6; "Address in St. Paul," 9 September 1919, ibid. 63:145; "Address in Billings," 1 September 1919, ibid., 174; "Comments in the Meeting of the Council of Ten," 16 January 1919, ibid. 54:102; "Address in Des Moines," 6 September 1919, ibid. 63:77; "Address in Kansas City," 6 September 1919, ibid., 70; "Address in Minneapolis," 9 September 1919, ibid., 134.
243. "A Statement by Robert Lansing," 4 December 1917, PWW 45:205-6; "Address in St. Paul," 9 September 1919, ibid. 63:145; "Address in Billings," 1 September 1919, ibid., 174; "Comments in the Meeting of the Council of Ten," 16 January 1919, ibid. 54:102; "Address in Des Moines," 6 September 1919, ibid. 63:77; "Address in Kansas City," 6 September 1919, ibid., 70; "Address in Minneapolis," 9 September 1919, ibid., 134.
244. "A Statement by Robert Lansing," 4 December 1917, PWW 45:205-6; "Address in St. Paul," 9 September 1919, ibid. 63:145; "Address in Billings," 1 September 1919, ibid., 174; "Comments in the Meeting of the Council of Ten," 16 January 1919, ibid. 54:102; "Address in Des Moines," 6 September 1919, ibid. 63:77; "Address in Kansas City," 6 September 1919, ibid., 70; "Address in Minneapolis," 9 September 1919, ibid., 134.
245. "A Statement by Robert Lansing," 4 December 1917, PWW 45:205-6; "Address in St. Paul," 9 September 1919, ibid. 63:145; "Address in Billings," 1 September 1919, ibid., 174; "Comments in the Meeting of the Council of Ten," 16 January 1919, ibid. 54:102; "Address in Des Moines," 6 September 1919, ibid. 63:77; "Address in Kansas City," 6 September 1919, ibid., 70; "Address in Minneapolis," 9 September 1919, ibid., 134.
246. "A Statement by Robert Lansing," 4 December 1917, PWW 45:205-6; "Address in St. Paul," 9 September 1919, ibid. 63:145; "Address in Billings," 1 September 1919, ibid., 174; "Comments in the Meeting of the Council of Ten," 16 January 1919, ibid. 54:102; "Address in Des Moines," 6 September 1919, ibid. 63:77; "Address in Kansas City," 6 September 1919, ibid., 70; "Address in Minneapolis," 9 September 1919, ibid., 134.
247. "A Statement by Robert Lansing," 4 December 1917, PWW 45:205-6; "Address in St. Paul," 9 September 1919, ibid. 63:145; "Address in Billings," 1 September 1919, ibid., 174; "Comments in the Meeting of the Council of Ten," 16 January 1919, ibid. 54:102; "Address in Des Moines," 6 September 1919, ibid. 63:77; "Address in Kansas City," 6 September 1919, ibid., 70; "Address in Minneapolis," 9 September 1919, ibid., 134.
248. "A Statement by Robert Lansing," 4 December 1917, PWW 45:205-6; "Address in St. Paul," 9 September 1919, ibid. 63:145; "Address in Billings," 1 September 1919, ibid., 174; "Comments in the Meeting of the Council of Ten," 16 January 1919, ibid. 54:102; "Address in Des Moines," 6 September 1919, ibid. 63:77; "Address in Kansas City," 6 September 1919, ibid., 70; "Address in Minneapolis," 9 September 1919, ibid., 134.
249. "A Memorandum by David Lloyd George," 25 March 1918, PWW 56:262, passim, "Mantoux's Notes of Two Meetings of the Council of Four," 26 March 1919, ibid., 290. See also Grayson Diary, 25 March 1919, ibid. 56:247-48; and Wilson to Robert Lansing, 1 April 1919, ibid., 512-13. In late 1919 Wilson also began to fear that even a non-Bolshevik Germany might start to intrigue with Russia. See "Address in Coeur D'Alene," 12 September 1919, ibid. 63:214. For Wilson's relative lack of concern that Bolshevik Russia by itself posed any serious threat to the West see "A Memorandum by Sir William Wiseman," ca. 16 October 1918, ibid. 51:347; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918, ibid. 53:42; Diary of William Christian Bullitt, 10 December 1918, ibid., 352; "Imperial War Cabinet Minutes," 30 December 1918, ibid., 560; "Meeting of the Council of Ten," 16 January 1919, ibid. 54:100-103; Grayson Diary, 27 March 1919, ibid. 56:312; Fridtjof Nansen to Wilson, with enclosure, 17 April 1919, ibid. 57:437-39; House Diary, with editorial notes, 19 April 1919, ibid., 504-5; Herbert Hoover to House, with enclosure, 19 April 1919, ibid., 505-8; House to Hoover, 20 April 1919, ibid., 529. Only occasionally did Wilson voice any fear about a Russian Bolshevik danger to the West. See Samuel Gompers to Wilson, with enclosure, 9 February 1918, ibid. 46:310-13; Wilson to Lansing, 13 February 1918, ibid., 334; "Meeting of the Council of Ten," 21 January 1919, ibid. 54:183-85; and Grayson Diary, 10 March 1919, ibid. 55:471.
250. "A Memorandum by David Lloyd George," 25 March 1918, PWW 56:262, passim, "Mantoux's Notes of Two Meetings of the Council of Four," 26 March 1919, ibid., 290. See also Grayson Diary, 25 March 1919, ibid. 56:247-48; and Wilson to Robert Lansing, 1 April 1919, ibid., 512-13. In late 1919 Wilson also began to fear that even a non-Bolshevik Germany might start to intrigue with Russia. See "Address in Coeur D'Alene," 12 September 1919, ibid. 63:214. For Wilson's relative lack of concern that Bolshevik Russia by itself posed any serious threat to the West see "A Memorandum by Sir William Wiseman," ca. 16 October 1918, ibid. 51:347; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918, ibid. 53:42; Diary of William Christian Bullitt, 10 December 1918, ibid., 352; "Imperial War Cabinet Minutes," 30 December 1918, ibid., 560; "Meeting of the Council of Ten," 16 January 1919, ibid. 54:100-103; Grayson Diary, 27 March 1919, ibid. 56:312; Fridtjof Nansen to Wilson, with enclosure, 17 April 1919, ibid. 57:437-39; House Diary, with editorial notes, 19 April 1919, ibid., 504-5; Herbert Hoover to House, with enclosure, 19 April 1919, ibid., 505-8; House to Hoover, 20 April 1919, ibid., 529. Only occasionally did Wilson voice any fear about a Russian Bolshevik danger to the West. See Samuel Gompers to Wilson, with enclosure, 9 February 1918, ibid. 46:310-13; Wilson to Lansing, 13 February 1918, ibid., 334; "Meeting of the Council of Ten," 21 January 1919, ibid. 54:183-85; and Grayson Diary, 10 March 1919, ibid. 55:471.
251. "A Memorandum by David Lloyd George," 25 March 1918, PWW 56:262, passim, "Mantoux's Notes of Two Meetings of the Council of Four," 26 March 1919, ibid., 290. See also Grayson Diary, 25 March 1919, ibid. 56:247-48; and Wilson to Robert Lansing, 1 April 1919, ibid., 512-13. In late 1919 Wilson also began to fear that even a non-Bolshevik Germany might start to intrigue with Russia. See "Address in Coeur D'Alene," 12 September 1919, ibid. 63:214. For Wilson's relative lack of concern that Bolshevik Russia by itself posed any serious threat to the West see "A Memorandum by Sir William Wiseman," ca. 16 October 1918, ibid. 51:347; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918, ibid. 53:42; Diary of William Christian Bullitt, 10 December 1918, ibid., 352; "Imperial War Cabinet Minutes," 30 December 1918, ibid., 560; "Meeting of the Council of Ten," 16 January 1919, ibid. 54:100-103; Grayson Diary, 27 March 1919, ibid. 56:312; Fridtjof Nansen to Wilson, with enclosure, 17 April 1919, ibid. 57:437-39; House Diary, with editorial notes, 19 April 1919, ibid., 504-5; Herbert Hoover to House, with enclosure, 19 April 1919, ibid., 505-8; House to Hoover, 20 April 1919, ibid., 529. Only occasionally did Wilson voice any fear about a Russian Bolshevik danger to the West. See Samuel Gompers to Wilson, with enclosure, 9 February 1918, ibid. 46:310-13; Wilson to Lansing, 13 February 1918, ibid., 334; "Meeting of the Council of Ten," 21 January 1919, ibid. 54:183-85; and Grayson Diary, 10 March 1919, ibid. 55:471.
252. "A Memorandum by David Lloyd George," 25 March 1918, PWW 56:262, passim, "Mantoux's Notes of Two Meetings of the Council of Four," 26 March 1919, ibid., 290. See also Grayson Diary, 25 March 1919, ibid. 56:247-48; and Wilson to Robert Lansing, 1 April 1919, ibid., 512-13. In late 1919 Wilson also began to fear that even a non-Bolshevik Germany might start to intrigue with Russia. See "Address in Coeur D'Alene," 12 September 1919, ibid. 63:214. For Wilson's relative lack of concern that Bolshevik Russia by itself posed any serious threat to the West see "A Memorandum by Sir William Wiseman," ca. 16 October 1918, ibid. 51:347; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918, ibid. 53:42; Diary of William Christian Bullitt, 10 December 1918, ibid., 352; "Imperial War Cabinet Minutes," 30 December 1918, ibid., 560; "Meeting of the Council of Ten," 16 January 1919, ibid. 54:100-103; Grayson Diary, 27 March 1919, ibid. 56:312; Fridtjof Nansen to Wilson, with enclosure, 17 April 1919, ibid. 57:437-39; House Diary, with editorial notes, 19 April 1919, ibid., 504-5; Herbert Hoover to House, with enclosure, 19 April 1919, ibid., 505-8; House to Hoover, 20 April 1919, ibid., 529. Only occasionally did Wilson voice any fear about a Russian Bolshevik danger to the West. See Samuel Gompers to Wilson, with enclosure, 9 February 1918, ibid. 46:310-13; Wilson to Lansing, 13 February 1918, ibid., 334; "Meeting of the Council of Ten," 21 January 1919, ibid. 54:183-85; and Grayson Diary, 10 March 1919, ibid. 55:471.
253. "A Memorandum by David Lloyd George," 25 March 1918, PWW 56:262, passim, "Mantoux's Notes of Two Meetings of the Council of Four," 26 March 1919, ibid., 290. See also Grayson Diary, 25 March 1919, ibid. 56:247-48; and Wilson to Robert Lansing, 1 April 1919, ibid., 512-13. In late 1919 Wilson also began to fear that even a non-Bolshevik Germany might start to intrigue with Russia. See "Address in Coeur D'Alene," 12 September 1919, ibid. 63:214. For Wilson's relative lack of concern that Bolshevik Russia by itself posed any serious threat to the West see "A Memorandum by Sir William Wiseman," ca. 16 October 1918, ibid. 51:347; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918, ibid. 53:42; Diary of William Christian Bullitt, 10 December 1918, ibid., 352; "Imperial War Cabinet Minutes," 30 December 1918, ibid., 560; "Meeting of the Council of Ten," 16 January 1919, ibid. 54:100-103; Grayson Diary, 27 March 1919, ibid. 56:312; Fridtjof Nansen to Wilson, with enclosure, 17 April 1919, ibid. 57:437-39; House Diary, with editorial notes, 19 April 1919, ibid., 504-5; Herbert Hoover to House, with enclosure, 19 April 1919, ibid., 505-8; House to Hoover, 20 April 1919, ibid., 529. Only occasionally did Wilson voice any fear about a Russian Bolshevik danger to the West. See Samuel Gompers to Wilson, with enclosure, 9 February 1918, ibid. 46:310-13; Wilson to Lansing, 13 February 1918, ibid., 334; "Meeting of the Council of Ten," 21 January 1919, ibid. 54:183-85; and Grayson Diary, 10 March 1919, ibid. 55:471.
254. "A Memorandum by David Lloyd George," 25 March 1918, PWW 56:262, passim, "Mantoux's Notes of Two Meetings of the Council of Four," 26 March 1919, ibid., 290. See also Grayson Diary, 25 March 1919, ibid. 56:247-48; and Wilson to Robert Lansing, 1 April 1919, ibid., 512-13. In late 1919 Wilson also began to fear that even a non-Bolshevik Germany might start to intrigue with Russia. See "Address in Coeur D'Alene," 12 September 1919, ibid. 63:214. For Wilson's relative lack of concern that Bolshevik Russia by itself posed any serious threat to the West see "A Memorandum by Sir William Wiseman," ca. 16 October 1918, ibid. 51:347; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918, ibid. 53:42; Diary of William Christian Bullitt, 10 December 1918, ibid., 352; "Imperial War Cabinet Minutes," 30 December 1918, ibid., 560; "Meeting of the Council of Ten," 16 January 1919, ibid. 54:100-103; Grayson Diary, 27 March 1919, ibid. 56:312; Fridtjof Nansen to Wilson, with enclosure, 17 April 1919, ibid. 57:437-39; House Diary, with editorial notes, 19 April 1919, ibid., 504-5; Herbert Hoover to House, with enclosure, 19 April 1919, ibid., 505-8; House to Hoover, 20 April 1919, ibid., 529. Only occasionally did Wilson voice any fear about a Russian Bolshevik danger to the West. See Samuel Gompers to Wilson, with enclosure, 9 February 1918, ibid. 46:310-13; Wilson to Lansing, 13 February 1918, ibid., 334; "Meeting of the Council of Ten," 21 January 1919, ibid. 54:183-85; and Grayson Diary, 10 March 1919, ibid. 55:471.
255. "A Memorandum by David Lloyd George," 25 March 1918, PWW 56:262, passim, "Mantoux's Notes of Two Meetings of the Council of Four," 26 March 1919, ibid., 290. See also Grayson Diary, 25 March 1919, ibid. 56:247-48; and Wilson to Robert Lansing, 1 April 1919, ibid., 512-13. In late 1919 Wilson also began to fear that even a non-Bolshevik Germany might start to intrigue with Russia. See "Address in Coeur D'Alene," 12 September 1919, ibid. 63:214. For Wilson's relative lack of concern that Bolshevik Russia by itself posed any serious threat to the West see "A Memorandum by Sir William Wiseman," ca. 16 October 1918, ibid. 51:347; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918, ibid. 53:42; Diary of William Christian Bullitt, 10 December 1918, ibid., 352; "Imperial War Cabinet Minutes," 30 December 1918, ibid., 560; "Meeting of the Council of Ten," 16 January 1919, ibid. 54:100-103; Grayson Diary, 27 March 1919, ibid. 56:312; Fridtjof Nansen to Wilson, with enclosure, 17 April 1919, ibid. 57:437-39; House Diary, with editorial notes, 19 April 1919, ibid., 504-5; Herbert Hoover to House, with enclosure, 19 April 1919, ibid., 505-8; House to Hoover, 20 April 1919, ibid., 529. Only occasionally did Wilson voice any fear about a Russian Bolshevik danger to the West. See Samuel Gompers to Wilson, with enclosure, 9 February 1918, ibid. 46:310-13; Wilson to Lansing, 13 February 1918, ibid., 334; "Meeting of the Council of Ten," 21 January 1919, ibid. 54:183-85; and Grayson Diary, 10 March 1919, ibid. 55:471.
256. "A Memorandum by David Lloyd George," 25 March 1918, PWW 56:262, passim, "Mantoux's Notes of Two Meetings of the Council of Four," 26 March 1919, ibid., 290. See also Grayson Diary, 25 March 1919, ibid. 56:247-48; and Wilson to Robert Lansing, 1 April 1919, ibid., 512-13. In late 1919 Wilson also began to fear that even a non-Bolshevik Germany might start to intrigue with Russia. See "Address in Coeur D'Alene," 12 September 1919, ibid. 63:214. For Wilson's relative lack of concern that Bolshevik Russia by itself posed any serious threat to the West see "A Memorandum by Sir William Wiseman," ca. 16 October 1918, ibid. 51:347; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918, ibid. 53:42; Diary of William Christian Bullitt, 10 December 1918, ibid., 352; "Imperial War Cabinet Minutes," 30 December 1918, ibid., 560; "Meeting of the Council of Ten," 16 January 1919, ibid. 54:100-103; Grayson Diary, 27 March 1919, ibid. 56:312; Fridtjof Nansen to Wilson, with enclosure, 17 April 1919, ibid. 57:437-39; House Diary, with editorial notes, 19 April 1919, ibid., 504-5; Herbert Hoover to House, with enclosure, 19 April 1919, ibid., 505-8; House to Hoover, 20 April 1919, ibid., 529. Only occasionally did Wilson voice any fear about a Russian Bolshevik danger to the West. See Samuel Gompers to Wilson, with enclosure, 9 February 1918, ibid. 46:310-13; Wilson to Lansing, 13 February 1918, ibid., 334; "Meeting of the Council of Ten," 21 January 1919, ibid. 54:183-85; and Grayson Diary, 10 March 1919, ibid. 55:471.
257. "A Memorandum by David Lloyd George," 25 March 1918, PWW 56:262, passim, "Mantoux's Notes of Two Meetings of the Council of Four," 26 March 1919, ibid., 290. See also Grayson Diary, 25 March 1919, ibid. 56:247-48; and Wilson to Robert Lansing, 1 April 1919, ibid., 512-13. In late 1919 Wilson also began to fear that even a non-Bolshevik Germany might start to intrigue with Russia. See "Address in Coeur D'Alene," 12 September 1919, ibid. 63:214. For Wilson's relative lack of concern that Bolshevik Russia by itself posed any serious threat to the West see "A Memorandum by Sir William Wiseman," ca. 16 October 1918, ibid. 51:347; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918, ibid. 53:42; Diary of William Christian Bullitt, 10 December 1918, ibid., 352; "Imperial War Cabinet Minutes," 30 December 1918, ibid., 560; "Meeting of the Council of Ten," 16 January 1919, ibid. 54:100-103; Grayson Diary, 27 March 1919, ibid. 56:312; Fridtjof Nansen to Wilson, with enclosure, 17 April 1919, ibid. 57:437-39; House Diary, with editorial notes, 19 April 1919, ibid., 504-5; Herbert Hoover to House, with enclosure, 19 April 1919, ibid., 505-8; House to Hoover, 20 April 1919, ibid., 529. Only occasionally did Wilson voice any fear about a Russian Bolshevik danger to the West. See Samuel Gompers to Wilson, with enclosure, 9 February 1918, ibid. 46:310-13; Wilson to Lansing, 13 February 1918, ibid., 334; "Meeting of the Council of Ten," 21 January 1919, ibid. 54:183-85; and Grayson Diary, 10 March 1919, ibid. 55:471.
258. "A Memorandum by David Lloyd George," 25 March 1918, PWW 56:262, passim, "Mantoux's Notes of Two Meetings of the Council of Four," 26 March 1919, ibid., 290. See also Grayson Diary, 25 March 1919, ibid. 56:247-48; and Wilson to Robert Lansing, 1 April 1919, ibid., 512-13. In late 1919 Wilson also began to fear that even a non-Bolshevik Germany might start to intrigue with Russia. See "Address in Coeur D'Alene," 12 September 1919, ibid. 63:214. For Wilson's relative lack of concern that Bolshevik Russia by itself posed any serious threat to the West see "A Memorandum by Sir William Wiseman," ca. 16 October 1918, ibid. 51:347; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918, ibid. 53:42; Diary of William Christian Bullitt, 10 December 1918, ibid., 352; "Imperial War Cabinet Minutes," 30 December 1918, ibid., 560; "Meeting of the Council of Ten," 16 January 1919, ibid. 54:100-103; Grayson Diary, 27 March 1919, ibid. 56:312; Fridtjof Nansen to Wilson, with enclosure, 17 April 1919, ibid. 57:437-39; House Diary, with editorial notes, 19 April 1919, ibid., 504-5; Herbert Hoover to House, with enclosure, 19 April 1919, ibid., 505-8; House to Hoover, 20 April 1919, ibid., 529. Only occasionally did Wilson voice any fear about a Russian Bolshevik danger to the West. See Samuel Gompers to Wilson, with enclosure, 9 February 1918, ibid. 46:310-13; Wilson to Lansing, 13 February 1918, ibid., 334; "Meeting of the Council of Ten," 21 January 1919, ibid. 54:183-85; and Grayson Diary, 10 March 1919, ibid. 55:471.
259. "A Memorandum by David Lloyd George," 25 March 1918, PWW 56:262, passim, "Mantoux's Notes of Two Meetings of the Council of Four," 26 March 1919, ibid., 290. See also Grayson Diary, 25 March 1919, ibid. 56:247-48; and Wilson to Robert Lansing, 1 April 1919, ibid., 512-13. In late 1919 Wilson also began to fear that even a non-Bolshevik Germany might start to intrigue with Russia. See "Address in Coeur D'Alene," 12 September 1919, ibid. 63:214. For Wilson's relative lack of concern that Bolshevik Russia by itself posed any serious threat to the West see "A Memorandum by Sir William Wiseman," ca. 16 October 1918, ibid. 51:347; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918, ibid. 53:42; Diary of William Christian Bullitt, 10 December 1918, ibid., 352; "Imperial War Cabinet Minutes," 30 December 1918, ibid., 560; "Meeting of the Council of Ten," 16 January 1919, ibid. 54:100-103; Grayson Diary, 27 March 1919, ibid. 56:312; Fridtjof Nansen to Wilson, with enclosure, 17 April 1919, ibid. 57:437-39; House Diary, with editorial notes, 19 April 1919, ibid., 504-5; Herbert Hoover to House, with enclosure, 19 April 1919, ibid., 505-8; House to Hoover, 20 April 1919, ibid., 529. Only occasionally did Wilson voice any fear about a Russian Bolshevik danger to the West. See Samuel Gompers to Wilson, with enclosure, 9 February 1918, ibid. 46:310-13; Wilson to Lansing, 13 February 1918, ibid., 334; "Meeting of the Council of Ten," 21 January 1919, ibid. 54:183-85; and Grayson Diary, 10 March 1919, ibid. 55:471.
260. "A Memorandum by David Lloyd George," 25 March 1918, PWW 56:262, passim, "Mantoux's Notes of Two Meetings of the Council of Four," 26 March 1919, ibid., 290. See also Grayson Diary, 25 March 1919, ibid. 56:247-48; and Wilson to Robert Lansing, 1 April 1919, ibid., 512-13. In late 1919 Wilson also began to fear that even a non-Bolshevik Germany might start to intrigue with Russia. See "Address in Coeur D'Alene," 12 September 1919, ibid. 63:214. For Wilson's relative lack of concern that Bolshevik Russia by itself posed any serious threat to the West see "A Memorandum by Sir William Wiseman," ca. 16 October 1918, ibid. 51:347; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918, ibid. 53:42; Diary of William Christian Bullitt, 10 December 1918, ibid., 352; "Imperial War Cabinet Minutes," 30 December 1918, ibid., 560; "Meeting of the Council of Ten," 16 January 1919, ibid. 54:100-103; Grayson Diary, 27 March 1919, ibid. 56:312; Fridtjof Nansen to Wilson, with enclosure, 17 April 1919, ibid. 57:437-39; House Diary, with editorial notes, 19 April 1919, ibid., 504-5; Herbert Hoover to House, with enclosure, 19 April 1919, ibid., 505-8; House to Hoover, 20 April 1919, ibid., 529. Only occasionally did Wilson voice any fear about a Russian Bolshevik danger to the West. See Samuel Gompers to Wilson, with enclosure, 9 February 1918, ibid. 46:310-13; Wilson to Lansing, 13 February 1918, ibid., 334; "Meeting of the Council of Ten," 21 January 1919, ibid. 54:183-85; and Grayson Diary, 10 March 1919, ibid. 55:471.
261. "A Memorandum by David Lloyd George," 25 March 1918, PWW 56:262, passim, "Mantoux's Notes of Two Meetings of the Council of Four," 26 March 1919, ibid., 290. See also Grayson Diary, 25 March 1919, ibid. 56:247-48; and Wilson to Robert Lansing, 1 April 1919, ibid., 512-13. In late 1919 Wilson also began to fear that even a non-Bolshevik Germany might start to intrigue with Russia. See "Address in Coeur D'Alene," 12 September 1919, ibid. 63:214. For Wilson's relative lack of concern that Bolshevik Russia by itself posed any serious threat to the West see "A Memorandum by Sir William Wiseman," ca. 16 October 1918, ibid. 51:347; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918, ibid. 53:42; Diary of William Christian Bullitt, 10 December 1918, ibid., 352; "Imperial War Cabinet Minutes," 30 December 1918, ibid., 560; "Meeting of the Council of Ten," 16 January 1919, ibid. 54:100-103; Grayson Diary, 27 March 1919, ibid. 56:312; Fridtjof Nansen to Wilson, with enclosure, 17 April 1919, ibid. 57:437-39; House Diary, with editorial notes, 19 April 1919, ibid., 504-5; Herbert Hoover to House, with enclosure, 19 April 1919, ibid., 505-8; House to Hoover, 20 April 1919, ibid., 529. Only occasionally did Wilson voice any fear about a Russian Bolshevik danger to the West. See Samuel Gompers to Wilson, with enclosure, 9 February 1918, ibid.
262. "A Memorandum by David Lloyd George," 25 March 1918, PWW 56:262, passim, "Mantoux's Notes of Two Meetings of the Council of Four," 26 March 1919, ibid., 290. See also Grayson Diary, 25 March 1919, ibid. 56:247-48; and Wilson to Robert Lansing, 1 April 1919, ibid., 512-13. In late 1919 Wilson also began to fear that even a non-Bolshevik Germany might start to intrigue with Russia. See "Address in Coeur D'Alene," 12 September 1919, ibid. 63:214. For Wilson's relative lack of concern that Bolshevik Russia by itself posed any serious threat to the West see "A Memorandum by Sir William Wiseman," ca. 16 October 1918, ibid. 51:347; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918, ibid. 53:42; Diary of William Christian Bullitt, 10 December 1918, ibid., 352; "Imperial War Cabinet Minutes," 30 December 1918, ibid., 560; "Meeting of the Council of Ten," 16 January 1919, ibid. 54:100-103; Grayson Diary, 27 March 1919, ibid. 56:312; Fridtjof Nansen to Wilson, with enclosure, 17 April 1919, ibid. 57:437-39; House Diary, with editorial notes, 19 April 1919, ibid., 504-5; Herbert Hoover to House, with enclosure, 19 April 1919, ibid., 505-8; House to Hoover, 20 April 1919, ibid., 529. Only occasionally did Wilson voice any fear about a Russian Bolshevik danger to the West. See Samuel Gompers to Wilson, with enclosure, 9 February 1918, ibid. 46:310-13; Wilson to Lansing, 13 February 1918, ibid., 334; "Meeting of the Council of Ten," 21 January 1919, ibid. 54:183-85; and Grayson Diary, 10 March 1919, ibid. 55:471.
263. "A Memorandum by David Lloyd George," 25 March 1918, PWW 56:262, passim, "Mantoux's Notes of Two Meetings of the Council of Four," 26 March 1919, ibid., 290. See also Grayson Diary, 25 March 1919, ibid. 56:247-48; and Wilson to Robert Lansing, 1 April 1919, ibid., 512-13. In late 1919 Wilson also began to fear that even a non-Bolshevik Germany might start to intrigue with Russia. See "Address in Coeur D'Alene," 12 September 1919, ibid. 63:214. For Wilson's relative lack of concern that Bolshevik Russia by itself posed any serious threat to the West see "A Memorandum by Sir William Wiseman," ca. 16 October 1918, ibid. 51:347; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918, ibid. 53:42; Diary of William Christian Bullitt, 10 December 1918, ibid., 352; "Imperial War Cabinet Minutes," 30 December 1918, ibid., 560; "Meeting of the Council of Ten," 16 January 1919, ibid. 54:100-103; Grayson Diary, 27 March 1919, ibid. 56:312; Fridtjof Nansen to Wilson, with enclosure, 17 April 1919, ibid. 57:437-39; House Diary, with editorial notes, 19 April 1919, ibid., 504-5; Herbert Hoover to House, with enclosure, 19 April 1919, ibid., 505-8; House to Hoover, 20 April 1919, ibid., 529. Only occasionally did Wilson voice any fear about a Russian Bolshevik danger to the West. See Samuel Gompers to Wilson, with enclosure, 9 February 1918, ibid. 46:310-13; Wilson to Lansing, 13 February 1918, ibid., 334; "Meeting of the Council of Ten," 21 January 1919, ibid. 54:183-85; and Grayson Diary, 10 March 1919, ibid. 55:471.
264. "A Memorandum by David Lloyd George," 25 March 1918, PWW 56:262, passim, "Mantoux's Notes of Two Meetings of the Council of Four," 26 March 1919, ibid., 290. See also Grayson Diary, 25 March 1919, ibid. 56:247-48; and Wilson to Robert Lansing, 1 April 1919, ibid., 512-13. In late 1919 Wilson also began to fear that even a non-Bolshevik Germany might start to intrigue with Russia. See "Address in Coeur D'Alene," 12 September 1919, ibid. 63:214. For Wilson's relative lack of concern that Bolshevik Russia by itself posed any serious threat to the West see "A Memorandum by Sir William Wiseman," ca. 16 October 1918, ibid. 51:347; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918, ibid. 53:42; Diary of William Christian Bullitt, 10 December 1918, ibid., 352; "Imperial War Cabinet Minutes," 30 December 1918, ibid., 560; "Meeting of the Council of Ten," 16 January 1919, ibid. 54:100-103; Grayson Diary, 27 March 1919, ibid. 56:312; Fridtjof Nansen to Wilson, with enclosure, 17 April 1919, ibid. 57:437-39; House Diary, with editorial notes, 19 April 1919, ibid., 504-5; Herbert Hoover to House, with enclosure, 19 April 1919, ibid., 505-8; House to Hoover, 20 April 1919, ibid., 529. Only occasionally did Wilson voice any fear about a Russian Bolshevik danger to the West. See Samuel Gompers to Wilson, with enclosure, 9 February 1918, ibid. 46:310-13; Wilson to Lansing, 13 February 1918, ibid., 334; "Meeting of the Council of Ten," 21 January 1919, ibid. 54:183-85; and Grayson Diary, 10 March 1919, ibid. 55:471.
265. "A Memorandum by David Lloyd George," 25 March 1918, PWW 56:262, passim, "Mantoux's Notes of Two Meetings of the Council of Four," 26 March 1919, ibid., 290. See also Grayson Diary, 25 March 1919, ibid. 56:247-48; and Wilson to Robert Lansing, 1 April 1919, ibid., 512-13. In late 1919 Wilson also began to fear that even a non-Bolshevik Germany might start to intrigue with Russia. See "Address in Coeur D'Alene," 12 September 1919, ibid. 63:214. For Wilson's relative lack of concern that Bolshevik Russia by itself posed any serious threat to the West see "A Memorandum by Sir William Wiseman," ca. 16 October 1918, ibid. 51:347; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918, ibid. 53:42; Diary of William Christian Bullitt, 10 December 1918, ibid., 352; "Imperial War Cabinet Minutes," 30 December 1918, ibid., 560; "Meeting of the Council of Ten," 16 January 1919, ibid. 54:100-103; Grayson Diary, 27 March 1919, ibid. 56:312; Fridtjof Nansen to Wilson, with enclosure, 17 April 1919, ibid. 57:437-39; House Diary, with editorial notes, 19 April 1919, ibid., 504-5; Herbert Hoover to House, with enclosure, 19 April 1919, ibid., 505-8; House to Hoover, 20 April 1919, ibid., 529. Only occasionally did Wilson voice any fear about a Russian Bolshevik danger to the West. See Samuel Gompers to Wilson, with enclosure, 9 February 1918, ibid. 46:310-13; Wilson to Lansing, 13 February 1918, ibid., 334; "Meeting of the Council of Ten," 21 January 1919, ibid. 54:183-85; and Grayson Diary, 10 March 1919, ibid. 55:471.
266. "A Memorandum by David Lloyd George," 25 March 1918, PWW 56:262, passim, "Mantoux's Notes of Two Meetings of the Council of Four," 26 March 1919, ibid., 290. See also Grayson Diary, 25 March 1919, ibid. 56:247-48; and Wilson to Robert Lansing, 1 April 1919, ibid., 512-13. In late 1919 Wilson also began to fear that even a non-Bolshevik Germany might start to intrigue with Russia. See "Address in Coeur D'Alene," 12 September 1919, ibid. 63:214. For Wilson's relative lack of concern that Bolshevik Russia by itself posed any serious threat to the West see "A Memorandum by Sir William Wiseman," ca. 16 October 1918, ibid. 51:347; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918, ibid. 53:42; Diary of William Christian Bullitt, 10 December 1918, ibid., 352; "Imperial War Cabinet Minutes," 30 December 1918, ibid., 560; "Meeting of the Council of Ten," 16 January 1919, ibid. 54:100-103; Grayson Diary, 27 March 1919, ibid. 56:312; Fridtjof Nansen to Wilson, with enclosure, 17 April 1919, ibid. 57:437-39; House Diary, with editorial notes, 19 April 1919, ibid., 504-5; Herbert Hoover to House, with enclosure, 19 April 1919, ibid., 505-8; House to Hoover, 20 April 1919, ibid., 529. Only occasionally did Wilson voice any fear about a Russian Bolshevik danger to the West. See Samuel Gompers to Wilson, with enclosure, 9 February 1918, ibid. 46:310-13; Wilson to Lansing, 13 February 1918, ibid., 334; "Meeting of the Council of Ten," 21 January 1919, ibid. 54:183-85; and Grayson Diary, 10 March 1919, ibid. 55:471.
267. "A Memorandum by David Lloyd George," 25 March 1918, PWW 56:262, passim, "Mantoux's Notes of Two Meetings of the Council of Four," 26 March 1919, ibid., 290. See also Grayson Diary, 25 March 1919, ibid. 56:247-48; and Wilson to Robert Lansing, 1 April 1919, ibid., 512-13. In late 1919 Wilson also began to fear that even a non-Bolshevik Germany might start to intrigue with Russia. See "Address in Coeur D'Alene," 12 September 1919, ibid. 63:214. For Wilson's relative lack of concern that Bolshevik Russia by itself posed any serious threat to the West see "A Memorandum by Sir William Wiseman," ca. 16 October 1918, ibid. 51:347; "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 11 November 1918, ibid. 53:42; Diary of William Christian Bullitt, 10 December 1918, ibid., 352; "Imperial War Cabinet Minutes," 30 December 1918, ibid., 560; "Meeting of the Council of Ten," 16 January 1919, ibid. 54:100-103; Grayson Diary, 27 March 1919, ibid. 56:312; Fridtjof Nansen to Wilson, with enclosure, 17 April 1919, ibid. 57:437-39; House Diary, with editorial notes, 19 April 1919, ibid., 504-5; Herbert Hoover to House, with enclosure, 19 April 1919, ibid., 505-8; House to Hoover, 20 April 1919, ibid., 529. Only occasionally did Wilson voice any fear about a Russian Bolshevik danger to the West. See Samuel Gompers to Wilson, with enclosure, 9 February 1918, ibid. 46:310-13; Wilson to Lansing, 13 February 1918, ibid., 334; "Meeting of the Council of Ten," 21 January 1919, ibid. 54:183-85; and Grayson Diary, 10 March 1919, ibid. 55:471.
268. Ambrosius has little comment about Wilson's view of Bolshevism and Germany, see Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 48-50. Link has nothing to say about it either; see his discussion of Bolshevism in Revolution, War, and Peace, 95-97. David S. Fogelsong's recent study of Wilson's policies toward Bolshevik Russia emphasizes that Wilson opposed Bolshevism because it assaulted his puritan values, might spur radicalism within the United States, and threatened U.S. access to the Russian market. Fogelsong also suggests, less clearly, that Wilson saw Bolshevism as a threat to his vision of a stable world order. He does not explain exactly how Wilson understood this threat, however, and ignores the president's concerns that the spread of Bolshevism to Germany might perpetuate the militarized kind of international politics Wilson considered threatening to the United States. See America's Secret War Against Bolshevism (Chapel Hill, 1995), 4-9, 25-28, 36-38, 45. For another analysis of Wilson's anti-Bolshevism that stresses the president's commitment to self-determination and the "Open Door" see Betty Miller Unterberger, "Woodrow Wilson and the Bolsheviks: The 'Acid Test' of Soviet-American Relations," Diplomatic History 11 (Spring 1987): 71-90. Schwabe rightly plays down Wilson's concerns about Bolshevism in Germany, arguing that they appeared chiefly during the armistice negotiations and in February-March 1919. See Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 45-47, 68-69, 88, 177-79, 193-210, 215, 397-98. As stated above, however, Schwabe has little analysis of the president's specific definition of U.S. national security in 1918 and 1919. Thus, the underlying rationale for the President's anti-Bolshevism is not clear in Schwabe's work.
269. Ambrosius has little comment about Wilson's view of Bolshevism and Germany, see Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 48-50. Link has nothing to say about it either; see his discussion of Bolshevism in Revolution, War, and Peace, 95-97. David S. Fogelsong's recent study of Wilson's policies toward Bolshevik Russia emphasizes that Wilson opposed Bolshevism because it assaulted his puritan values, might spur radicalism within the United States, and threatened U.S. access to the Russian market. Fogelsong also suggests, less clearly, that Wilson saw Bolshevism as a threat to his vision of a stable world order. He does not explain exactly how Wilson understood this threat, however, and ignores the president's concerns that the spread of Bolshevism to Germany might perpetuate the militarized kind of international politics Wilson considered threatening to the United States. See America's Secret War Against Bolshevism (Chapel Hill, 1995), 4-9, 25-28, 36-38, 45. For another analysis of Wilson's anti-Bolshevism that stresses the president's commitment to self-determination and the "Open Door" see Betty Miller Unterberger, "Woodrow Wilson and the Bolsheviks: The 'Acid Test' of Soviet-American Relations," Diplomatic History 11 (Spring 1987): 71-90. Schwabe rightly plays down Wilson's concerns about Bolshevism in Germany, arguing that they appeared chiefly during the armistice negotiations and in February-March 1919. See Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 45-47, 68-69, 88, 177-79, 193-210, 215, 397-98. As stated above, however, Schwabe has little analysis of the president's specific definition of U.S. national security in 1918 and 1919. Thus, the underlying rationale for the President's anti-Bolshevism is not clear in Schwabe's work.
270. Ambrosius has little comment about Wilson's view of Bolshevism and Germany, see Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 48-50. Link has nothing to say about it either; see his discussion of Bolshevism in Revolution, War, and Peace, 95-97. David S. Fogelsong's recent study of Wilson's policies toward Bolshevik Russia emphasizes that Wilson opposed Bolshevism because it assaulted his puritan values, might spur radicalism within the United States, and threatened U.S. access to the Russian market. Fogelsong also suggests, less clearly, that Wilson saw Bolshevism as a threat to his vision of a stable world order. He does not explain exactly how Wilson understood this threat, however, and ignores the president's concerns that the spread of Bolshevism to Germany might perpetuate the militarized kind of international politics Wilson considered threatening to the United States. See America's Secret War Against Bolshevism (Chapel Hill, 1995), 4-9, 25-28, 36-38, 45. For another analysis of Wilson's anti-Bolshevism that stresses the president's commitment to self-determination and the "Open Door" see Betty Miller Unterberger, "Woodrow Wilson and the Bolsheviks: The 'Acid Test' of Soviet-American Relations," Diplomatic History 11 (Spring 1987): 71-90. Schwabe rightly plays down Wilson's concerns about Bolshevism in Germany, arguing that they appeared chiefly during the armistice negotiations and in February-March 1919. See Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 45-47, 68-69, 88, 177-79, 193-210, 215, 397-98. As stated above, however, Schwabe has little analysis of the president's specific definition of U.S. national security in 1918 and 1919. Thus, the underlying rationale for the President's anti-Bolshevism is not clear in Schwabe's work.
271. Ambrosius has little comment about Wilson's view of Bolshevism and Germany, see Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 48-50. Link has nothing to say about it either; see his discussion of Bolshevism in Revolution, War, and Peace, 95-97. David S. Fogelsong's recent study of Wilson's policies toward Bolshevik Russia emphasizes that Wilson opposed Bolshevism because it assaulted his puritan values, might spur radicalism within the United States, and threatened U.S. access to the Russian market. Fogelsong also suggests, less clearly, that Wilson saw Bolshevism as a threat to his vision of a stable world order. He does not explain exactly how Wilson understood this threat, however, and ignores the president's concerns that the spread of Bolshevism to Germany might perpetuate the militarized kind of international politics Wilson considered threatening to the United States. See America's Secret War Against Bolshevism (Chapel Hill, 1995), 4-9, 25-28, 36-38, 45. For another analysis of Wilson's anti-Bolshevism that stresses the president's commitment to self-determination and the "Open Door" see Betty Miller Unterberger, "Woodrow Wilson and the Bolsheviks: The 'Acid Test' of Soviet-American Relations," Diplomatic History 11 (Spring 1987): 71-90. Schwabe rightly plays down Wilson's concerns about Bolshevism in Germany, arguing that they appeared chiefly during the armistice negotiations and in February-March 1919. See Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 45-47, 68-69, 88, 177-79, 193-210, 215, 397-98. As stated above, however, Schwabe has little analysis of the president's specific definition of U.S. national security in 1918 and 1919. Thus, the underlying rationale for the President's anti-Bolshevism is not clear in Schwabe's work.
272. Ambrosius has little comment about Wilson's view of Bolshevism and Germany, see Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 48-50. Link has nothing to say about it either; see his discussion of Bolshevism in Revolution, War, and Peace, 95-97. David S. Fogelsong's recent study of Wilson's policies toward Bolshevik Russia emphasizes that Wilson opposed Bolshevism because it assaulted his puritan values, might spur radicalism within the United States, and threatened U.S. access to the Russian market. Fogelsong also suggests, less clearly, that Wilson saw Bolshevism as a threat to his vision of a stable world order. He does not explain exactly how Wilson understood this threat, however, and ignores the president's concerns that the spread of Bolshevism to Germany might perpetuate the militarized kind of international politics Wilson considered threatening to the United States. See America's Secret War Against Bolshevism (Chapel Hill, 1995), 4-9, 25-28, 36-38, 45. For another analysis of Wilson's anti-Bolshevism that stresses the president's commitment to self-determination and the "Open Door" see Betty Miller Unterberger, "Woodrow Wilson and the Bolsheviks: The 'Acid Test' of Soviet-American Relations," Diplomatic History 11 (Spring 1987): 71-90. Schwabe rightly plays down Wilson's concerns about Bolshevism in Germany, arguing that they appeared chiefly during the armistice negotiations and in February-March 1919. See Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 45-47, 68-69, 88, 177-79, 193-210, 215, 397-98. As stated above, however, Schwabe has little analysis of the president's specific definition of U.S. national security in 1918 and 1919. Thus, the underlying rationale for the President's anti-Bolshevism is not clear in Schwabe's work.
273. Ambrosius has little comment about Wilson's view of Bolshevism and Germany, see Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 48-50. Link has nothing to say about it either; see his discussion of Bolshevism in Revolution, War, and Peace, 95-97. David S. Fogelsong's recent study of Wilson's policies toward Bolshevik Russia emphasizes that Wilson opposed Bolshevism because it assaulted his puritan values, might spur radicalism within the United States, and threatened U.S. access to the Russian market. Fogelsong also suggests, less clearly, that Wilson saw Bolshevism as a threat to his vision of a stable world order. He does not explain exactly how Wilson understood this threat, however, and ignores the president's concerns that the spread of Bolshevism to Germany might perpetuate the militarized kind of international politics Wilson considered threatening to the United States. See America's Secret War Against Bolshevism (Chapel Hill, 1995), 4-9, 25-28, 36-38, 45. For another analysis of Wilson's anti-Bolshevism that stresses the president's commitment to self-determination and the "Open Door" see Betty Miller Unterberger, "Woodrow Wilson and the Bolsheviks: The 'Acid Test' of Soviet-American Relations," Diplomatic History 11 (Spring 1987): 71-90. Schwabe rightly plays down Wilson's concerns about Bolshevism in Germany, arguing that they appeared chiefly during the armistice negotiations and in February-March 1919. See Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 45-47, 68-69, 88, 177-79, 193-210, 215, 397-98. As stated above, however, Schwabe has little analysis of the president's specific definition of U.S. national security in 1918 and 1919. Thus, the underlying rationale for the President's anti-Bolshevism is not clear in Schwabe's work.
274. "Address in Sioux Falls," 8 September 1919, PWW 63:111-12; "Address in Minneapolis," 9 September 1919, ibid., 132.
275. "Address in Sioux Falls," 8 September 1919, PWW 63:111-12; "Address in Minneapolis," 9 September 1919, ibid., 132.
276. "Covenant of the League of Nations," 28 April 1919, PWW 58:188-89; "Acceptance Speech," 2 September 1916, ibid. 38:136.
277. "Covenant of the League of Nations," 28 April 1919, PWW 58:188-89; "Acceptance Speech," 2 September 1916, ibid. 38:136.
278. "Address in San Francisco," 17 September 1919, PWW 63:317-18. Wilson also opposed the formation of an international commission to investigate compliance with any future arms control agreements because it "would seriously offend the susceptibilities of sovereign states." See "Comments to the Eleventh Meeting of the Commission on the League of Nations," 22 March 1919, in Miller, Drafting of the Covenant 2:343. Other examples of limits to the League's power include provisions allowing states to withdraw from the organization, denying the League any authority over a state's internal affairs, and endorsing the validity of America's Monroe Doctrine. The Covenant also failed to spell out a procedure for bringing economic sanctions into effect.
279. "Address in San Francisco," 17 September 1919, PWW 63:317-18. Wilson also opposed the formation of an international commission to investigate compliance with any future arms control agreements because it "would seriously offend the susceptibilities of sovereign states." See "Comments to the Eleventh Meeting of the Commission on the League of Nations," 22 March 1919, in Miller, Drafting of the Covenant 2:343. Other examples of limits to the League's power include provisions allowing states to withdraw from the organization, denying the League any authority over a state's internal affairs, and endorsing the validity of America's Monroe Doctrine. The Covenant also failed to spell out a procedure for bringing economic sanctions into effect.
280. "Address in San Francisco," 17 September 1919, PWW 63:317-18. Wilson also opposed the formation of an international commission to investigate compliance with any future arms control agreements because it "would seriously offend the susceptibilities of sovereign states." See "Comments to the Eleventh Meeting of the Commission on the League of Nations," 22 March 1919, in Miller, Drafting of the Covenant 2:343. Other examples of limits to the League's power include provisions allowing states to withdraw from the organization, denying the League any authority over a state's internal affairs, and endorsing the validity of America's Monroe Doctrine. The Covenant also failed to spell out a procedure for bringing economic sanctions into effect.
281. "Remarks to a Plenary Session of the Paris Peace Conference," 14 February 1919, in Miller, Drafting of the Covenant 2:563. Knock also emphasizes that Wilson saw the League as an institution that would evolve through experience; see To End All Wars, 207.
282. "Remarks to a Plenary Session of the Paris Peace Conference," 14 February 1919, in Miller, Drafting of the Covenant 2:563. Knock also emphasizes that Wilson saw the League as an institution that would evolve through experience; see To End All Wars, 207.
283. "Address in San Francisco," 17 September 1919, PWW 63:333; "Conference with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee," 19 August 1919, ibid. 62:389, 354 (emphasis added). Curiously, none of the enormous amount of literature about Wilson and the League of Nations spends much time analyzing how Wilson thought the League would work to deter aggression. Historians have instead focused much more on the issue of whether or not the League imposed stringent obligations upon its member states, and specifically upon the United States. See, for example, Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 73-78, 84, 108-15, 154-66; Knock, To End All Wars, 206-7, 214-25, 231-33, 257-62, 266-68; and Link, Revolution, War, and Peace, 109-20.
284. "Address in San Francisco," 17 September 1919, PWW 63:333; "Conference with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee," 19 August 1919, ibid. 62:389, 354 (emphasis added). Curiously, none of the enormous amount of literature about Wilson and the League of Nations spends much time analyzing how Wilson thought the League would work to deter aggression. Historians have instead focused much more on the issue of whether or not the League imposed stringent obligations upon its member states, and specifically upon the United States. See, for example, Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 73-78, 84, 108-15, 154-66; Knock, To End All Wars, 206-7, 214-25, 231-33, 257-62, 266-68; and Link, Revolution, War, and Peace, 109-20.
285. "Address in San Francisco," 17 September 1919, PWW 63:333; "Conference with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee," 19 August 1919, ibid. 62:389, 354 (emphasis added). Curiously, none of the enormous amount of literature about Wilson and the League of Nations spends much time analyzing how Wilson thought the League would work to deter aggression. Historians have instead focused much more on the issue of whether or not the League imposed stringent obligations upon its member states, and specifically upon the United States. See, for example, Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 73-78, 84, 108-15, 154-66; Knock, To End All Wars, 206-7, 214-25, 231-33, 257-62, 266-68; and Link, Revolution, War, and Peace, 109-20.
286. "Address in San Francisco," 17 September 1919, PWW 63:333; "Conference with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee," 19 August 1919, ibid. 62:389, 354 (emphasis added). Curiously, none of the enormous amount of literature about Wilson and the League of Nations spends much time analyzing how Wilson thought the League would work to deter aggression. Historians have instead focused much more on the issue of whether or not the League imposed stringent obligations upon its member states, and specifically upon the United States. See, for example, Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 73-78, 84, 108-15, 154-66; Knock, To End All Wars, 206-7, 214-25, 231-33, 257-62, 266-68; and Link, Revolution, War, and Peace, 109-20.
287. "Address in San Francisco," 17 September 1919, PWW 63:333; "Conference with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee," 19 August 1919, ibid. 62:389, 354 (emphasis added). Curiously, none of the enormous amount of literature about Wilson and the League of Nations spends much time analyzing how Wilson thought the League would work to deter aggression. Historians have instead focused much more on the issue of whether or not the League imposed stringent obligations upon its member states, and specifically upon the United States. See, for example, Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 73-78, 84, 108-15, 154-66; Knock, To End All Wars, 206-7, 214-25, 231-33, 257-62, 266-68; and Link, Revolution, War, and Peace, 109-20.
288. Grayson Diary, 8 December 1918, PWW 53:338. See also "Remarks to the Democratic National Committee," 28 February 1919, ibid. 55:317-18; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 10 May 1919, ibid. 59:6; "A Discussion of the American Peace Commission," 3 June 1919, ibid. 60:69; "Address in Indianapolis," 4 September 1919, ibid. 63:25; "Address to the French Chamber of Deputies," 3 February 1919; ibid. 54:465; "Notes of a Meeting of the Council of Ten," 28 January 1919, ibid., 325-26.
289. Grayson Diary, 8 December 1918, PWW 53:338. See also "Remarks to the Democratic National Committee," 28 February 1919, ibid. 55:317-18; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 10 May 1919, ibid. 59:6; "A Discussion of the American Peace Commission," 3 June 1919, ibid. 60:69; "Address in Indianapolis," 4 September 1919, ibid. 63:25; "Address to the French Chamber of Deputies," 3 February 1919; ibid. 54:465; "Notes of a Meeting of the Council of Ten," 28 January 1919, ibid., 325-26.
290. Grayson Diary, 8 December 1918, PWW 53:338. See also "Remarks to the Democratic National Committee," 28 February 1919, ibid. 55:317-18; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 10 May 1919, ibid. 59:6; "A Discussion of the American Peace Commission," 3 June 1919, ibid. 60:69; "Address in Indianapolis," 4 September 1919, ibid. 63:25; "Address to the French Chamber of Deputies," 3 February 1919; ibid. 54:465; "Notes of a Meeting of the Council of Ten," 28 January 1919, ibid., 325-26.
291. Grayson Diary, 8 December 1918, PWW 53:338. See also "Remarks to the Democratic National Committee," 28 February 1919, ibid. 55:317-18; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 10 May 1919, ibid. 59:6; "A Discussion of the American Peace Commission," 3 June 1919, ibid. 60:69; "Address in Indianapolis," 4 September 1919, ibid. 63:25; "Address to the French Chamber of Deputies," 3 February 1919; ibid. 54:465; "Notes of a Meeting of the Council of Ten," 28 January 1919, ibid., 325-26.
292. Grayson Diary, 8 December 1918, PWW 53:338. See also "Remarks to the Democratic National Committee," 28 February 1919, ibid. 55:317-18; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 10 May 1919, ibid. 59:6; "A Discussion of the American Peace Commission," 3 June 1919, ibid. 60:69; "Address in Indianapolis," 4 September 1919, ibid. 63:25; "Address to the French Chamber of Deputies," 3 February 1919; ibid. 54:465; "Notes of a Meeting of the Council of Ten," 28 January 1919, ibid., 325-26.
293. Grayson Diary, 8 December 1918, PWW 53:338. See also "Remarks to the Democratic National Committee," 28 February 1919, ibid. 55:317-18; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 10 May 1919, ibid. 59:6; "A Discussion of the American Peace Commission," 3 June 1919, ibid. 60:69; "Address in Indianapolis," 4 September 1919, ibid. 63:25; "Address to the French Chamber of Deputies," 3 February 1919; ibid. 54:465; "Notes of a Meeting of the Council of Ten," 28 January 1919, ibid., 325-26.
294. Grayson Diary, 8 December 1918, PWW 53:338. See also "Remarks to the Democratic National Committee," 28 February 1919, ibid. 55:317-18; "Mantoux Notes of the Council of Four," 10 May 1919, ibid. 59:6; "A Discussion of the American Peace Commission," 3 June 1919, ibid. 60:69; "Address in Indianapolis," 4 September 1919, ibid. 63:25; "Address to the French Chamber of Deputies," 3 February 1919; ibid. 54:465; "Notes of a Meeting of the Council of Ten," 28 January 1919, ibid., 325-26.
295. "Remarks to a Plenary Session of the Paris Peace Conference," 14 February 1919, in Miller, Drafting of the Covenant 2:565; "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, PWW 40:538. For an example of Wilson's continuing concern about armaments at Paris see his "Draft of the League Covenant," ca. 8 January 1919, ibid. 53:680. These proposals were resisted by the Europeans. See Miller, Drafting the Covenant 1:65-67, 286-89, 2:264.
296. "Remarks to a Plenary Session of the Paris Peace Conference," 14 February 1919, in Miller, Drafting of the Covenant 2:565; "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, PWW 40:538. For an example of Wilson's continuing concern about armaments at Paris see his "Draft of the League Covenant," ca. 8 January 1919, ibid. 53:680. These proposals were resisted by the Europeans. See Miller, Drafting the Covenant 1:65-67, 286-89, 2:264.
297. "Remarks to a Plenary Session of the Paris Peace Conference," 14 February 1919, in Miller, Drafting of the Covenant 2:565; "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, PWW 40:538. For an example of Wilson's continuing concern about armaments at Paris see his "Draft of the League Covenant," ca. 8 January 1919, ibid. 53:680. These proposals were resisted by the Europeans. See Miller, Drafting the Covenant 1:65-67, 286-89, 2:264.
298. "Remarks to a Plenary Session of the Paris Peace Conference," 14 February 1919, in Miller, Drafting of the Covenant 2:565; "Address to the Senate," 22 January 1917, PWW 40:538. For an example of Wilson's continuing concern about armaments at Paris see his "Draft of the League Covenant," ca. 8 January 1919, ibid. 53:680. These proposals were resisted by the Europeans. See Miller, Drafting the Covenant 1:65-67, 286-89, 2:264.
299. "Address in Boston," 24 February 1919, PWW 55:240. Link acknowledges the futility of Wilson's mediation efforts; see Revolution, War , and Peace, 48-51. On the unreality of Germany accepting Wilson's definition of "justice" see, for example, Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 154-55; Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 22-39, 55-58, 95-117, 185-90, 299-394; and Trachtenberg, "Versailles After Sixty Years," 494-97.
300. "Address in Boston," 24 February 1919, PWW 55:240. Link acknowledges the futility of Wilson's mediation efforts; see Revolution, War , and Peace, 48-51. On the unreality of Germany accepting Wilson's definition of "justice" see, for example, Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 154-55; Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 22-39, 55-58, 95-117, 185-90, 299-394; and Trachtenberg, "Versailles After Sixty Years," 494-97.
301. "Address in Boston," 24 February 1919, PWW 55:240. Link acknowledges the futility of Wilson's mediation efforts; see Revolution, War , and Peace, 48-51. On the unreality of Germany accepting Wilson's definition of "justice" see, for example, Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 154-55; Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 22-39, 55-58, 95-117, 185-90, 299-394; and Trachtenberg, "Versailles After Sixty Years," 494-97.
302. "Address in Boston," 24 February 1919, PWW 55:240. Link acknowledges the futility of Wilson's mediation efforts; see Revolution, War , and Peace, 48-51. On the unreality of Germany accepting Wilson's definition of "justice" see, for example, Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 154-55; Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 22-39, 55-58, 95-117, 185-90, 299-394; and Trachtenberg, "Versailles After Sixty Years," 494-97.
303. "Address in Boston," 24 February 1919, PWW 55:240. Link acknowledges the futility of Wilson's mediation efforts; see Revolution, War , and Peace, 48-51. On the unreality of Germany accepting Wilson's definition of "justice" see, for example, Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 154-55; Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 22-39, 55-58, 95-117, 185-90, 299-394; and Trachtenberg, "Versailles After Sixty Years," 494-97.
304. For Lodge's views see his "Address to the League to Enforce Peace," 26-27 May 1916, Washington, in Enforced Peace: Proceedings of the First Annual Assemblage of the League to Enforce Peace (New York, 1916), 164-66; Henry Cabot Lodge, War Addresses, 1915-1917 (New York, 1917), 41-42, 265-71; and Congressional Record, 65th Cong., 3d session, 21 December 1918, 727-28. See also William C. Widenor, Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy (Berkeley, 1980), 225-31, 295.
305. For Lodge's views see his "Address to the League to Enforce Peace," 26-27 May 1916, Washington, in Enforced Peace: Proceedings of the First Annual Assemblage of the League to Enforce Peace (New York, 1916), 164-66; Henry Cabot Lodge, War Addresses, 1915-1917 (New York, 1917), 41-42, 265-71; and Congressional Record, 65th Cong., 3d session, 21 December 1918, 727-28. See also William C. Widenor, Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy (Berkeley, 1980), 225-31, 295.
306. For Lodge's views see his "Address to the League to Enforce Peace," 26-27 May 1916, Washington, in Enforced Peace: Proceedings of the First Annual Assemblage of the League to Enforce Peace (New York, 1916), 164-66; Henry Cabot Lodge, War Addresses, 1915-1917 (New York, 1917), 41-42, 265-71; and Congressional Record, 65th Cong., 3d session, 21 December 1918, 727-28. See also William C. Widenor, Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy (Berkeley, 1980), 225-31, 295.
307. For Lodge's views see his "Address to the League to Enforce Peace," 26-27 May 1916, Washington, in Enforced Peace: Proceedings of the First Annual Assemblage of the League to Enforce Peace (New York, 1916), 164-66; Henry Cabot Lodge, War Addresses, 1915-1917 (New York, 1917), 41-42, 265-71; and Congressional Record, 65th Cong., 3d session, 21 December 1918, 727-28. See also William C. Widenor, Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy (Berkeley, 1980), 225-31, 295.
308. Newton Baker, "Testimony Before the House Military Affairs Committee" (23 September 1919), House of Representatives, Committee on Military Affairs, Army Reorganization Hearings (Washington, 1919), 1775.
309. On Truman see Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, 1992), 1-24, passim. For President Eisenhower's concerns about militarism see Richard H. Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," Diplomatic History 14 (Summer 1990): 322-41. Franklin Roosevelt's policies toward Nazi Germany were also structured to a significant degree by Wilson's ideas about U.S. national security. See Kennedy, "Uncertain Security," 647-75, 685-721.
310. On Truman see Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, 1992), 1-24, passim. For President Eisenhower's concerns about militarism see Richard H. Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," Diplomatic History 14 (Summer 1990): 322-41. Franklin Roosevelt's policies toward Nazi Germany were also structured to a significant degree by Wilson's ideas about U.S. national security. See Kennedy, "Uncertain Security," 647-75, 685-721.
311. On Truman see Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, 1992), 1-24, passim. For President Eisenhower's concerns about militarism see Richard H. Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," Diplomatic History 14 (Summer 1990): 322-41. Franklin Roosevelt's policies toward Nazi Germany were also structured to a significant degree by Wilson's ideas about U.S. national security. See Kennedy, "Uncertain Security," 647-75, 685-721.