Thinking about constitutionalism at the start of the twenty-first century

Publius: The Journal of Federalism

Volumn 30, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 115-126

  Lutz, Donald S ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041909774     PISSN: 00485950     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a030099     Document Type: Article

References (22)

1. The literature is so large that only a few can mentioned to exemplify its diversity. Daniel J. Elazar, Covenant and Constitutionalism (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998); Bernard Grofman and Donald Wittman, eds., The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism (New York: Agathon Press, 1989); Jan-Erik Lane Constitutions and Political Theory (New York: Manchester University Press, 1996); Arendt Lijphart and Carlos H. Waisman, eds., Institutional Design in New Democrats: Eastern Europe and Latin America (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996); Dennis C. Mueller, Constitutional Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Carlos Santiago Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996); Martin H. Redish, The Constitution as Political Structure (New York: Oxford University Press 1995); Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, eds., Do Institutions Matter? (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993); and Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering (London: MacMillan, 1994).
2. The literature is so large that only a few can mentioned to exemplify its diversity. Daniel J. Elazar, Covenant and Constitutionalism (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998); Bernard Grofman and Donald Wittman, eds., The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism (New York: Agathon Press, 1989); Jan-Erik Lane Constitutions and Political Theory (New York: Manchester University Press, 1996); Arendt Lijphart and Carlos H. Waisman, eds., Institutional Design in New Democrats: Eastern Europe and Latin America (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996); Dennis C. Mueller, Constitutional Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Carlos Santiago Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996); Martin H. Redish, The Constitution as Political Structure (New York: Oxford University Press 1995); Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, eds., Do Institutions Matter? (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993); and Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering (London: MacMillan, 1994).
3. The literature is so large that only a few can mentioned to exemplify its diversity. Daniel J. Elazar, Covenant and Constitutionalism (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998); Bernard Grofman and Donald Wittman, eds., The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism (New York: Agathon Press, 1989); Jan-Erik Lane Constitutions and Political Theory (New York: Manchester University Press, 1996); Arendt Lijphart and Carlos H. Waisman, eds., Institutional Design in New Democrats: Eastern Europe and Latin America (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996); Dennis C. Mueller, Constitutional Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Carlos Santiago Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996); Martin H. Redish, The Constitution as Political Structure (New York: Oxford University Press 1995); Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, eds., Do Institutions Matter? (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993); and Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering (London: MacMillan, 1994).
4. The literature is so large that only a few can mentioned to exemplify its diversity. Daniel J. Elazar, Covenant and Constitutionalism (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998); Bernard Grofman and Donald Wittman, eds., The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism (New York: Agathon Press, 1989); Jan-Erik Lane Constitutions and Political Theory (New York: Manchester University Press, 1996); Arendt Lijphart and Carlos H. Waisman, eds., Institutional Design in New Democrats: Eastern Europe and Latin America (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996); Dennis C. Mueller, Constitutional Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Carlos Santiago Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996); Martin H. Redish, The Constitution as Political Structure (New York: Oxford University Press 1995); Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, eds., Do Institutions Matter? (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993); and Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering (London: MacMillan, 1994).
5. The literature is so large that only a few can mentioned to exemplify its diversity. Daniel J. Elazar, Covenant and Constitutionalism (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998); Bernard Grofman and Donald Wittman, eds., The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism (New York: Agathon Press, 1989); Jan-Erik Lane Constitutions and Political Theory (New York: Manchester University Press, 1996); Arendt Lijphart and Carlos H. Waisman, eds., Institutional Design in New Democrats: Eastern Europe and Latin America (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996); Dennis C. Mueller, Constitutional Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Carlos Santiago Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996); Martin H. Redish, The Constitution as Political Structure (New York: Oxford University Press 1995); Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, eds., Do Institutions Matter? (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993); and Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering (London: MacMillan, 1994).
6. The literature is so large that only a few can mentioned to exemplify its diversity. Daniel J. Elazar, Covenant and Constitutionalism (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998); Bernard Grofman and Donald Wittman, eds., The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism (New York: Agathon Press, 1989); Jan-Erik Lane Constitutions and Political Theory (New York: Manchester University Press, 1996); Arendt Lijphart and Carlos H. Waisman, eds., Institutional Design in New Democrats: Eastern Europe and Latin America (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996); Dennis C. Mueller, Constitutional Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Carlos Santiago Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996); Martin H. Redish, The Constitution as Political Structure (New York: Oxford University Press 1995); Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, eds., Do Institutions Matter? (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993); and Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering (London: MacMillan, 1994).
7. The literature is so large that only a few can mentioned to exemplify its diversity. Daniel J. Elazar, Covenant and Constitutionalism (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998); Bernard Grofman and Donald Wittman, eds., The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism (New York: Agathon Press, 1989); Jan-Erik Lane Constitutions and Political Theory (New York: Manchester University Press, 1996); Arendt Lijphart and Carlos H. Waisman, eds., Institutional Design in New Democrats: Eastern Europe and Latin America (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996); Dennis C. Mueller, Constitutional Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Carlos Santiago Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996); Martin H. Redish, The Constitution as Political Structure (New York: Oxford University Press 1995); Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, eds., Do Institutions Matter? (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993); and Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering (London: MacMillan, 1994).
8. The literature is so large that only a few can mentioned to exemplify its diversity. Daniel J. Elazar, Covenant and Constitutionalism (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998); Bernard Grofman and Donald Wittman, eds., The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism (New York: Agathon Press, 1989); Jan-Erik Lane Constitutions and Political Theory (New York: Manchester University Press, 1996); Arendt Lijphart and Carlos H. Waisman, eds., Institutional Design in New Democrats: Eastern Europe and Latin America (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996); Dennis C. Mueller, Constitutional Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Carlos Santiago Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996); Martin H. Redish, The Constitution as Political Structure (New York: Oxford University Press 1995); Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, eds., Do Institutions Matter? (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993); and Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering (London: MacMillan, 1994).
9. The literature is so large that only a few can mentioned to exemplify its diversity. Daniel J. Elazar, Covenant and Constitutionalism (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998); Bernard Grofman and Donald Wittman, eds., The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism (New York: Agathon Press, 1989); Jan-Erik Lane Constitutions and Political Theory (New York: Manchester University Press, 1996); Arendt Lijphart and Carlos H. Waisman, eds., Institutional Design in New Democrats: Eastern Europe and Latin America (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996); Dennis C. Mueller, Constitutional Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Carlos Santiago Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996); Martin H. Redish, The Constitution as Political Structure (New York: Oxford University Press 1995); Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, eds., Do Institutions Matter? (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993); and Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering (London: MacMillan, 1994).
10. The literature is so large that only a few can mentioned to exemplify its diversity. Daniel J. Elazar, Covenant and Constitutionalism (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998); Bernard Grofman and Donald Wittman, eds., The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism (New York: Agathon Press, 1989); Jan-Erik Lane Constitutions and Political Theory (New York: Manchester University Press, 1996); Arendt Lijphart and Carlos H. Waisman, eds., Institutional Design in New Democrats: Eastern Europe and Latin America (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996); Dennis C. Mueller, Constitutional Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Carlos Santiago Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996); Martin H. Redish, The Constitution as Political Structure (New York: Oxford University Press 1995); Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, eds., Do Institutions Matter? (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993); and Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering (London: MacMillan, 1994).
11. One might want to compare this curve with one developed by Robert A. Dahl in his On Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), p. 8.
12. The "performance criteria" used here might be compared to other criteria for defining an operational democracy. See, for example, Dahl, On Democracy, pp. 84-86; Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), pp. 7-13; and Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklaoma Press, 1991), pp. 5-13. Huntington's criteria are closest to those used here, and his approach is typical of the electoral perspective most used by political scientists. Dahl and Diamond provide useful critiques of such an approach.
13. The "performance criteria" used here might be compared to other criteria for defining an operational democracy. See, for example, Dahl, On Democracy, pp. 84-86; Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), pp. 7-13; and Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklaoma Press, 1991), pp. 5-13. Huntington's criteria are closest to those used here, and his approach is typical of the electoral perspective most used by political scientists. Dahl and Diamond provide useful critiques of such an approach.
14. The "performance criteria" used here might be compared to other criteria for defining an operational democracy. See, for example, Dahl, On Democracy, pp. 84-86; Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), pp. 7-13; and Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklaoma Press, 1991), pp. 5-13. Huntington's criteria are closest to those used here, and his approach is typical of the electoral perspective most used by political scientists. Dahl and Diamond provide useful critiques of such an approach.
15. Counting democracies is an exercise heavily conditioned by the criteria used. Dahl counts 56 in his On Democracy (p. 198) as of 1998, which is not much different from the 62 counted here. Most lists of democratic countries use looser criteria, which usually produce a count exceeding 100. Some count as few as 39. The list produced here, then, is toward the conservative end of such counts, especially since the number 62 includes the many "microdemocracies" often ignored. The relatively conservative count results from incorporating some of Dahl's and Diamond's critiques into Huntington's electoral criteria in the criteria used here.
16. See, for example, the discussion in Arendt Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy (New Haven: Yale Universiity Press, 1999), pp. 154-157, where Lijphart rehearses a few of the consequences of population size, including effects on legislative size and the number of political parties.
17. At one time, the matter of diffusion, whether related to ideas, institutions, or policies, was widely discussed, especially among the U.S. states. Cross-nationally, the systematic study of the diffusion of established institutions or of innovation is notable for its absence. An examination of 47 books on cross-national constitutionalism and/or democracy reveals not a single instance of the matter being discussed even though the phenomenon is widely and clearly observed.
18. Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 2.
19. Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies, p. 3.
20. Donald S. Lutz, "Popular Sovereignty, Separation of Powers, and Principles of Constitutional Design" (unpublished manuscript), ch. 4.
21. See Daniel J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1987), especially chapters 6 and 7.
22. Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies, pp. 38-43.