Insider trading and managerial incentives

Journal of Banking and Finance

Volumn 25, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 681-716

  Hu, Jie ^a   Noe, Thomas H ^b  

^a Bank Boston ^*  (Hong Kong)

^b TULANE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency; D23; D82; G38; Insider trading; Market efficiency; Regulation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041906897     PISSN: 03784266     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0378-4266(00)00098-4     Document Type: Article

References (12)

1. Aghion P., Dewatripont M., Rey P. Renegotiation design with unverifiable information. Econometrica. 62:1994;257-282.
2. Arrow, K., 1965. Aspects of the Theory of Risk-Bearing. Yrjo Jahnssonin saatio, Helsinki, lecture 2.
3. Ausubel L. Insider trading in a rational expectations economy. American Economic Review. 80:1990;1022-1041.
4. Bebchuk L., Fershtman C. Insider trading and the managerial choice among risky projects. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 29:1994;1-14.
5. Fishman M., Hagerty K. Insider trading and the efficiency of stock prices. RAND Journal of Economics. 23:1992;106-122.
6. Leland H. Insider trading: Should it be prohibited? Journal of Political Economy. 100:1992;859-887.
7. Hart O. Incomplete contracts and the theory of the firm. Journal of Law Economics and Organization. 4:1988;119-139.
8. Manne H. Insider Trading and the Stock Market. 1966;Free Press, New York.
9. Manove M. The harm from insider trading and informed speculation. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 104:1989;823-846.
10. Noe T. Insider trading and the problem of corporate agency. Journal of Law Economics and Organization. 13:1997;287-318.
11. Ramirez C. Did J.P. Morgan's men add liquidity? Corporate investment cash flow and financial at the turn of the 20th century. Journal of Finance. 50:1995;661-678.
12. Shin J. The optimal regulation of insider trading. Journal of Financial Intermediation. 5:1996;49-73.