Discussion of "Contracting theory and accounting"

Journal of Accounting and Economics

Volumn 32, Issue 1-3, 2001, Pages 89-96

  Magee, Robert P ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Contracting; D82; L14; M41; Managerial accounting

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041866513     PISSN: 01654101     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4101(01)00020-9     Document Type: Article

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