Are transitions transitory? Two types of political change in Eastern Europe since 1989

East European Politics and Societies

Volumn 11, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 1-34

  Vachudová, Milada Anna ^a   Snyder, Tim ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0041857978     PISSN: 08883254     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0888325497011001001     Document Type: Article

References (89)

1. These revolutions were, in some measure, the work of extraordinary thinkers such as Václav Havel and Adam Michnik. But their ideas were eminently anticommunist and antipolitical and did not constitute a political program for a postcommunist world. See Jerzy Szacki, Liberalizm po komunizmie (Warsaw: Znak, 1994), 90-145.
2. In this way they were just the opposite of the Bolshevik Revolution, which had an enormous impact on the terms of discourse within European history and the social sciences. See François Furet, Le Passé d'une Illusion (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1995).
3. In 1989 the East European members of the Warsaw Pact were Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. This article considers Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia.
4. This kind of distinction is of old vintage. It recalls George Orwell's definitions of patriotism and nationalism. Our argument here is that nationalism could have taken on various forms, as a result of the choices of the political leaders who emerged from revolution. This view was anticipated by Casba Gyula Kiss in 1988; see his "Strední Evropa na konci druhého století nacionalismu," Středni Evropa, 10:37 (February 1994): 56. For an excellent study of the social origins of various incarnations of nationalism, see Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Paths to Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).
5. This kind of distinction is of old vintage. It recalls George Orwell's definitions of patriotism and nationalism. Our argument here is that nationalism could have taken on various forms, as a result of the choices of the political leaders who emerged from revolution. This view was anticipated by Casba Gyula Kiss in 1988; see his "Strední Evropa na konci druhého století nacionalismu," Středni Evropa, 10:37 (February 1994): 56. For an excellent study of the social origins of various incarnations of nationalism, see Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Paths to Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).
6. On these various groups before 1989, see Tony R. Judt, "The Dilemmas of Dissidence: The Politics of Opposition in East-Central Europe," East European Politics and Society 2:2 (Spring 1988): 185-240.
7. One example must stand for many: Jiří Dienstbier, Snění o Evropě (Prague: Lidové Noviny, 1990).
8. For one important example, see Taras Kuzio, "The Polish Opposition and the Ukrainian Question," Journal of Ukrainian Studies 12:2 (Winter 1987): 26-58.
9. . Although the works of Timothy Garton Ash and Roman Laba are often set against each other, they are in agreement on this key point. See, respectively, The Polish Revolution: Solidarity (London: Granta Books, 1991) and The Roots of Solidarity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).
10. . Although the works of Timothy Garton Ash and Roman Laba are often set against each other, they are in agreement on this key point. See, respectively, The Polish Revolution: Solidarity (London: Granta Books, 1991) and The Roots of Solidarity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).
11. Sometimes extremists came from abroad, as in the case of Stan Tyminski. He finished second in the first round of the 1990 Polish presidential elections, but he and his Party X have since fallen into obscurity and irrelevance. In Hungary, the anti-Semitic István Csurka commanded national attention and some political power before his influence dwindled as a result of his belated expulsion from the Hungarian Democratic Forum. For an early attempt to predict likely cleavages in East European party systems, see Herbert Kitschelt, "The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe," Politics and Society 20:1 (March 1992): 7-50.
12. The Slovak Public Against Violence was the counterpart of the Czech Civic Forum. But unlike the Civic Forum, Public Against Violence did not discriminate among possible members, and its few legitimate dissidents were eventually swamped by opportunists.
13. Leszek Kolakowski, "Amidst Moving Ruins," Daedalus 121:2 (Spring 1992): 52. Jerzy Szacki makes the same point; see his Liberalizm po komunizmie, 80. For examples of "bureaucratic nationalism," see Ivo Banac, "Political Change and National Diversity," in Stephen R. Graubard, ed., Eastern Europe . . . Central Europe . . . Europe (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 150-53. Twenty years before the revolutions of 1989, Emil Lengyel published a book entitled Nationalism, the Last Stage of Communism (New York: Funk and Wagnals, 1969).
14. Leszek Kolakowski, "Amidst Moving Ruins," Daedalus 121:2 (Spring 1992): 52. Jerzy Szacki makes the same point; see his Liberalizm po komunizmie, 80. For examples of "bureaucratic nationalism," see Ivo Banac, "Political Change and National Diversity," in Stephen R. Graubard, ed., Eastern Europe . . . Central Europe . . . Europe (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 150-53. Twenty years before the revolutions of 1989, Emil Lengyel published a book entitled Nationalism, the Last Stage of Communism (New York: Funk and Wagnals, 1969).
15. Leszek Kolakowski, "Amidst Moving Ruins," Daedalus 121:2 (Spring 1992): 52. Jerzy Szacki makes the same point; see his Liberalizm po komunizmie, 80. For examples of "bureaucratic nationalism," see Ivo Banac, "Political Change and National Diversity," in Stephen R. Graubard, ed., Eastern Europe . . . Central Europe . . . Europe (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 150-53. Twenty years before the revolutions of 1989, Emil Lengyel published a book entitled Nationalism, the Last Stage of Communism (New York: Funk and Wagnals, 1969).
16. As the recovery continues, economic growth in 1996 is predicted to reach 5.6 percent in the Czech Republic, 5.2 percent in Poland, 3-4 percent in Hungary, 4-5 percent in Slovakia, 3 percent in Bulgaria, and 4 percent in Romania. All economic statistics in this section are from reports by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) ViewsWire: on the Czech Republic: 12 February 1996; Poland: 19 April 1996; Hungary: 31 January 1996; Slovakia: 26 January and 15 February 1996; Bulgaria: 18 April 1996; and Romania: 23 February and 5 March 1996. For similar projections, see "Transition Report Update," (London: EBRD, 1996).
17. Some of the economic statistics presented here are of course controversial. The scenarios we will develop below, however, depend only upon broad differences in the success of economic reform and the level of economic prosperity. In order to evaluate economic prosperity, it is helpful to compare GNP per capita, which in 1994 was estimated at $2800 in the Czech Republic, $2400 in Poland, $3450 in Hungary, $1950 in Slovakia, $1180 in Bulgaria, and $1100 in Romania. See Philippe Lemarchand, ed., L'Europe Centrale et Balkanique (Paris: Editions Complex, 1995).
18. For a brief historical comparison of the region's economies, see Ian Jeffries, Socialist Economies and the Transition to the Market (London: Routledge, 1993), 235-54, 276-316. The locus classicus of the region's economic history is Michael Kaser's three-volume collection, The Economic History of Eastern Europe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985).
19. For a brief historical comparison of the region's economies, see Ian Jeffries, Socialist Economies and the Transition to the Market (London: Routledge, 1993), 235-54, 276-316. The locus classicus of the region's economic history is Michael Kaser's three-volume collection, The Economic History of Eastern Europe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985).
20. For discussions of these parties, see Joseph Rothschild, Return to Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 191-217, and Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Eastern Europe in the Postwar World (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 193-200. See also András Bozóki, "From Soft Communism to Post-Communism," in János Kovács, ed., Transition to Capitalism? (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1994), 124.
21. For discussions of these parties, see Joseph Rothschild, Return to Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 191-217, and Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Eastern Europe in the Postwar World (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 193-200. See also András Bozóki, "From Soft Communism to Post-Communism," in János Kovács, ed., Transition to Capitalism? (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1994), 124.
22. For discussions of these parties, see Joseph Rothschild, Return to Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 191-217, and Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Eastern Europe in the Postwar World (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 193-200. See also András Bozóki, "From Soft Communism to Post-Communism," in János Kovács, ed., Transition to Capitalism? (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1994), 124.
23. The bright young Communist Aleksander Kwaśniewski suggested the compromise that allowed semifree elections in People's Poland in June 1989; less than seven years later, he was president of the Polish Republic. For a characterization of the attitude of Communists to liberalism (which treats late Polish and Hungarian communism as exceptional), see Szacki, Liberalizm pa komunizmie, 78-89. On the Hungarian case, see Mihály Simai, "Hungarian Problems," Government and Opposition 27:1 (Winter 1992): 54. See also Alison Mahr and John Nagle, "Resurrection of the Successor Parties and Democrarization in Eastern Europe," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 28:4 (1995): 406-07. For an opposing view, see Anne Applebarm, "The Fall and Rise of the Communists," Foreign Affairs 93:6 (November-December 1994): 7-13.
24. The bright young Communist Aleksander Kwaśniewski suggested the compromise that allowed semifree elections in People's Poland in June 1989; less than seven years later, he was president of the Polish Republic. For a characterization of the attitude of Communists to liberalism (which treats late Polish and Hungarian communism as exceptional), see Szacki, Liberalizm pa komunizmie, 78-89. On the Hungarian case, see Mihály Simai, "Hungarian Problems," Government and Opposition 27:1 (Winter 1992): 54. See also Alison Mahr and John Nagle, "Resurrection of the Successor Parties and Democrarization in Eastern Europe," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 28:4 (1995): 406-07. For an opposing view, see Anne Applebarm, "The Fall and Rise of the Communists," Foreign Affairs 93:6 (November-December 1994): 7-13.
25. The bright young Communist Aleksander Kwaśniewski suggested the compromise that allowed semifree elections in People's Poland in June 1989; less than seven years later, he was president of the Polish Republic. For a characterization of the attitude of Communists to liberalism (which treats late Polish and Hungarian communism as exceptional), see Szacki, Liberalizm pa komunizmie, 78-89. On the Hungarian case, see Mihály Simai, "Hungarian Problems," Government and Opposition 27:1 (Winter 1992): 54. See also Alison Mahr and John Nagle, "Resurrection of the Successor Parties and Democrarization in Eastern Europe," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 28:4 (1995): 406-07. For an opposing view, see Anne Applebarm, "The Fall and Rise of the Communists," Foreign Affairs 93:6 (November-December 1994): 7-13.
26. The bright young Communist Aleksander Kwaśniewski suggested the compromise that allowed semifree elections in People's Poland in June 1989; less than seven years later, he was president of the Polish Republic. For a characterization of the attitude of Communists to liberalism (which treats late Polish and Hungarian communism as exceptional), see Szacki, Liberalizm pa komunizmie, 78-89. On the Hungarian case, see Mihály Simai, "Hungarian Problems," Government and Opposition 27:1 (Winter 1992): 54. See also Alison Mahr and John Nagle, "Resurrection of the Successor Parties and Democrarization in Eastern Europe," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 28:4 (1995): 406-07. For an opposing view, see Anne Applebarm, "The Fall and Rise of the Communists," Foreign Affairs 93:6 (November-December 1994): 7-13.
27. The Józef Oleksy spy scandal in Poland illustrates this point, in an ironic fashion. While Poland's postcommunist social democratic party elected the suspected KGB agent to be its leader, a new postcommunist government reemphasized its commitment to reform and to European integration. Indeed, even if Oleksy proves to have been a spy, there is no denying that his government (most of 1995) was reformist.
28. This point is conceded in an otherwise very optimistic account of the Romanian case; see Maria-Cristina Sîrbu, "Towards a Market Economy: The Romanian Effort," East European Quarterly 28:4 (January 1995): 471-72.
29. Because of the Slovak sovereignty movement and debate over independence (1989-1992), Slovakia is a special case. A reformist heir of the Slovak Communist party (the party of the Democratic Left) was indeed formed. But by the time this new party had consolidated itself, Vladimir Mečiar had succeeded in drawing both the left and the right into his nationalist Movement for a Democratic Slovakia. His movement seized the issue of the costs of economic reforms, portraying this as an instance of national oppression. For the purposes of our argument, his movement became the dominant "left alternative." See Martin Bútora and Zora Bútorová, "Slovakia After the Split," Journal of Democracy 4:2 (April 1993): 71-83.
30. Population statistics are cited after Janusz Bugajski, Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe: A Guide to Nationality Policies, Organizations, and Parties (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), unless otherwise noted.
31. For a succinct summary, see Jerzy Tomaszewski, Mniejszości narodowe w Polsce w XX wieku (Warsaw: Spotkania, 1991), 39-52.
32. Before 1989, the estimates ranged from over a million (German expellee organizations) to a few thousand (the Polish communist government). Since 1989, Polish governments have conceded that the German presence is in the hundreds of thousands. Until the next Polish census, all such figures will remain estimates. In the meantime, it is necessary to remember that minorities will provide higher estimates than governments, and that the German minority has been far better equipped since 1989 than, say, its Ukrainian or Belorusian counterparts to publicize its own numbers. Even after census figures are available, the issue will remain complex. Relatively few Polish citizens who self-identify as Germans speak German, and many are descended from Kashubs, Mazurs, and other small Slavic groups who were partially assimilated into German culture before 1945. At present, the choice of German ethnicity has advantages: Germany sends money to ethnic Germans who choose to remain in Poland, and German consulates will give German-EU passports to ethnic Germans who plan to remain in Poland. Of course, ethnic Germans who take these passports become German citizens, and are no longer part of a minority in any traditional sense.
33. The Roma (also known as "gypsies") remain the most despised of East Europeans, with low educational standards, high rates of unemployment, and almost no political power. No national state offers them refuge or protests on their behalf. Racism toward the Roma is present in all six countries, but Roma are considered to enjoy the greatest political rights and suffer the least discrimination in Poland and Hungary; their persecution is most severe in Slovakia and Romania. There are an estimated 30,000 Roma in Poland, 800,000 in Hungary, 300,000 in the Czech Republic, 800,000 in Bulgaria, 400,000 in Slovakia, and 2 million in Romania; see Zoltan Barany, "Grim Realities in Eastern Europe," Transition 1:4 (29 March 1995): 3-8, and Max van der Stoel, CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, speech on "Roma in the CSCE Region," Warsaw, 20 September 1994.
34. The Roma (also known as "gypsies") remain the most despised of East Europeans, with low educational standards, high rates of unemployment, and almost no political power. No national state offers them refuge or protests on their behalf. Racism toward the Roma is present in all six countries, but Roma are considered to enjoy the greatest political rights and suffer the least discrimination in Poland and Hungary; their persecution is most severe in Slovakia and Romania. There are an estimated 30,000 Roma in Poland, 800,000 in Hungary, 300,000 in the Czech Republic, 800,000 in Bulgaria, 400,000 in Slovakia, and 2 million in Romania; see Zoltan Barany, "Grim Realities in Eastern Europe," Transition 1:4 (29 March 1995): 3-8, and Max van der Stoel, CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, speech on "Roma in the CSCE Region," Warsaw, 20 September 1994.
35. Thirteen percent of the population consider themselves Moravians, but the Moravian movement is best considered a regional patriotism, rather than a minority nationalism.
36. The Polish, Hungarian, and Czech governments have all taken official stands against racism toward the Roma. However, Czechs, with the prominent exception of Václav Havel, deserve a critical mention. The Czech government of Václav Klaus responded to Roma migration from Slovakia by initially denying as many as 100,000 "Czechoslovak" Roma citizenship and largely ignored the rise of racially motivated crimes toward the Roma until 1995. Meanwhile, Bulgarian, Slovak, and Romanian governments have generally remained aloof. The situation is most alarming in Romania, which is home to some 2 million Roma. In March 1990, Roma who took the side of the Hungarians at Tîrgu-Mures were judged by "exceptional" courts. In June 1990, the miners who descended on Bucharest turned their shovels against Roma neighborhoods. In at least thirty instances, groups of Roma have been forced to leave their settlements. On the Czech case, see Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Human Rights and Democratization in the Czech Republic (Washington, D.C.: CSCE, September 1994), 18-27, and "Specter of Racism," Transition 1:10 (23 June 1995): 17. On the Romanian case, see Alain Reyniers, "En Roumanie, de l'esclavage à la démocratie," Hommes et Migrations (June-July 1995): 60-61, and (for a more hopeful account) Zoltan Barany, "Favorable Trends for Romania's Roma," Transition 1:19 (20 October 1995): 26-31.
37. The Polish, Hungarian, and Czech governments have all taken official stands against racism toward the Roma. However, Czechs, with the prominent exception of Václav Havel, deserve a critical mention. The Czech government of Václav Klaus responded to Roma migration from Slovakia by initially denying as many as 100,000 "Czechoslovak" Roma citizenship and largely ignored the rise of racially motivated crimes toward the Roma until 1995. Meanwhile, Bulgarian, Slovak, and Romanian governments have generally remained aloof. The situation is most alarming in Romania, which is home to some 2 million Roma. In March 1990, Roma who took the side of the Hungarians at Tîrgu-Mures were judged by "exceptional" courts. In June 1990, the miners who descended on Bucharest turned their shovels against Roma neighborhoods. In at least thirty instances, groups of Roma have been forced to leave their settlements. On the Czech case, see Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Human Rights and Democratization in the Czech Republic (Washington, D.C.: CSCE, September 1994), 18-27, and "Specter of Racism," Transition 1:10 (23 June 1995): 17. On the Romanian case, see Alain Reyniers, "En Roumanie, de l'esclavage à la démocratie," Hommes et Migrations (June-July 1995): 60-61, and (for a more hopeful account) Zoltan Barany, "Favorable Trends for Romania's Roma," Transition 1:19 (20 October 1995): 26-31.
38. The Polish, Hungarian, and Czech governments have all taken official stands against racism toward the Roma. However, Czechs, with the prominent exception of Václav Havel, deserve a critical mention. The Czech government of Václav Klaus responded to Roma migration from Slovakia by initially denying as many as 100,000 "Czechoslovak" Roma citizenship and largely ignored the rise of racially motivated crimes toward the Roma until 1995. Meanwhile, Bulgarian, Slovak, and Romanian governments have generally remained aloof. The situation is most alarming in Romania, which is home to some 2 million Roma. In March 1990, Roma who took the side of the Hungarians at Tîrgu-Mures were judged by "exceptional" courts. In June 1990, the miners who descended on Bucharest turned their shovels against Roma neighborhoods. In at least thirty instances, groups of Roma have been forced to leave their settlements. On the Czech case, see Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Human Rights and Democratization in the Czech Republic (Washington, D.C.: CSCE, September 1994), 18-27, and "Specter of Racism," Transition 1:10 (23 June 1995): 17. On the Romanian case, see Alain Reyniers, "En Roumanie, de l'esclavage à la démocratie," Hommes et Migrations (June-July 1995): 60-61, and (for a more hopeful account) Zoltan Barany, "Favorable Trends for Romania's Roma," Transition 1:19 (20 October 1995): 26-31.
39. The Polish, Hungarian, and Czech governments have all taken official stands against racism toward the Roma. However, Czechs, with the prominent exception of Václav Havel, deserve a critical mention. The Czech government of Václav Klaus responded to Roma migration from Slovakia by initially denying as many as 100,000 "Czechoslovak" Roma citizenship and largely ignored the rise of racially motivated crimes toward the Roma until 1995. Meanwhile, Bulgarian, Slovak, and Romanian governments have generally remained aloof. The situation is most alarming in Romania, which is home to some 2 million Roma. In March 1990, Roma who took the side of the Hungarians at Tîrgu-Mures were judged by "exceptional" courts. In June 1990, the miners who descended on Bucharest turned their shovels against Roma neighborhoods. In at least thirty instances, groups of Roma have been forced to leave their settlements. On the Czech case, see Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Human Rights and Democratization in the Czech Republic (Washington, D.C.: CSCE, September 1994), 18-27, and "Specter of Racism," Transition 1:10 (23 June 1995): 17. On the Romanian case, see Alain Reyniers, "En Roumanie, de l'esclavage à la démocratie," Hommes et Migrations (June-July 1995): 60-61, and (for a more hopeful account) Zoltan Barany, "Favorable Trends for Romania's Roma," Transition 1:19 (20 October 1995): 26-31.
40. Other provisions of the law include cultural autonomy, native language education, the use of the native language in all spheres of public life, parliamentary representation, and unrestricted relations with the "ethnic homeland." See István Ijgyártó, "Codification of Minority Rights," in Ian Cuthbertson and Jane Liebowitz, eds., Minorities: The New Europe's Old Issue (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 273-84.
41. concentrated; and territorial autonomy: more extensive self-government in a territorially defined district. The concept of autonomy is controversial, as it is based on the principle of collective rights which, unlike the principle of individual rights, has not been codified by the United Nations and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or accepted by Western states Consult J. F. Brown, Hopes and Shadows: Eastern Europe after Communism (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), 176-78,
42. and Bugajski, Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe, 17-23. See also Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996).
43. and Bugajski, Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe, 17-23. See also Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996).
44. R. J. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century (London: Routledge, 1994), 383-84.
45. Darina Vasileva, "Bulgarian Turkish Emigration and Return," International Migration Review 26:2 (1992): 347-349.
46. Ethnic Bulgarian Muslims known as "Pomaks" constitute another 3 percent of the population.
47. Luan Troxel, "Socialist Persistence in the Bulgarian Elections of 1990-1991," East European Quarterly 26:4 (January 1993): 413-16.
48. Ibid.: 422, 425. See also Plamen S. Tzvetkov, "The Politics of Transition in Bulgaria: Back to the Future?" Problems of Communism 41 (May-June 1992): 40-41.
49. Ibid.: 422, 425. See also Plamen S. Tzvetkov, "The Politics of Transition in Bulgaria: Back to the Future?" Problems of Communism 41 (May-June 1992): 40-41.
50. Kjell Engelbreckt, "Bulgaria," RFE/RL Research Report 3:16 (22 April 1994): 79.
51. Stefan Krause, "The White Book," Transition 1:10 (23 June 1995): 32-37.
52. Ivanka Nedeva, "Democracy Building in Ethnically Diverse Societies: The Cases of Bulgaria and Romania," in Cuthbertson and Liebowitz, Minorities, 123-50.
53. On the machinations of Czech and Slovak politicians that led to the split, see Fedor Gál, ed., Dnešní Kríze Česko-Slovenských Vztahů (Prague: Sociologické Nakladatelství, 1992), 20-39, and Jiří Musil, "Czechoslovakia in the Middle of Transition," Daedalus 121:2 (Spring 1992): 175-95. For and excellent account of Mečiar's first government, see Martin Bútora and Zora Bútorová, "Slovakia After the Split," Journal of Democracy 4:2 (April 1993): 71-83.
54. On the machinations of Czech and Slovak politicians that led to the split, see Fedor Gál, ed., Dnešní Kríze Česko-Slovenských Vztahů (Prague: Sociologické Nakladatelství, 1992), 20-39, and Jiří Musil, "Czechoslovakia in the Middle of Transition," Daedalus 121:2 (Spring 1992): 175-95. For and excellent account of Mečiar's first government, see Martin Bútora and Zora Bútorová, "Slovakia After the Split," Journal of Democracy 4:2 (April 1993): 71-83.
55. On the machinations of Czech and Slovak politicians that led to the split, see Fedor Gál, ed., Dnešní Kríze Česko-Slovenských Vztahů (Prague: Sociologické Nakladatelství, 1992), 20-39, and Jiří Musil, "Czechoslovakia in the Middle of Transition," Daedalus 121:2 (Spring 1992): 175-95. For and excellent account of Mečiar's first government, see Martin Bútora and Zora Bútorová, "Slovakia After the Split," Journal of Democracy 4:2 (April 1993): 71-83.
56. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Human Rights ana Democratization in Slovakia, (Washington, D.C.: CSCE, September 1993), 8-10.
57. In addition to political and cultural goals, ethnic Hungarians hoped that autonomy would accelerate economic growth: in 1993 the unemployment rate in several Hungarian-dominated regions reached 19 percent, the national average was of 13 percent.
58. Sharon Fisher, "Meeting of Slovakia's Hungarians Causes Stir," RFE/RL Research Report 3:4 (28 January 1994): 42-47.
59. One of the three Hungarian parties in parliament, Coexistence, reopened the issue of territotial autonomy in 1995.
60. The SNP was given the ministry of education and the ASW, that of privatization. See Fisher, "Slovakia: Turning Back?" Transition 1:1 (January 1995): 60-63.
61. On Slovakia's nationalist entrepreneurs, see Darina Malová, "The Re-emergence of Nationalism in Slovakia After 1989," unpublished manuscript, October 1995.
62. Mečiar's party opined that a November 1995 European Parliament resolution was "reminiscent of recent history, when the leader of Nazi Germany first sent démarches to states and then occupied them with tanks"; see Fisher, OMRI Daily Digest, 17 November 1995 and 27 November 1995, and Vincent Boland, "EU warns Slovakia over feud," The Financial Times, 26 October 1995, 2.
63. Mečiar's party opined that a November 1995 European Parliament resolution was "reminiscent of recent history, when the leader of Nazi Germany first sent démarches to states and then occupied them with tanks"; see Fisher, OMRI Daily Digest, 17 November 1995 and 27 November 1995, and Vincent Boland, "EU warns Slovakia over feud," The Financial Times, 26 October 1995, 2.
64. These remarks were made by agriculture minister Peter Baco; see Fisher, OMRI Daily Digest, 18 October 1995. See also "Slowcoach Slovakia: Has it got the democratic message?" The Economist, 18 November 1995, S19.
65. These remarks were made by agriculture minister Peter Baco; see Fisher, OMRI Daily Digest, 18 October 1995. See also "Slowcoach Slovakia: Has it got the democratic message?" The Economist, 18 November 1995, S19.
66. Martin Bǔtora and Zora Bǔtorovǎ, Seminar at the Center for European Studies, Harvard University, 10 April 1995.
67. For fear of being labeled "anti-Slovak," most opposition deputies reluctantly voted for the language law. Despite protests by the Hungarian parties (who voted against) and a constitutional complaint filed by the opposition Christian Democrats (who abstained), "language consultants" are at work implementing the law. See Fisher, OMRI Daily Digest, 17 November 1995, 29 November 1995, 1 December 1995, 2 February 1996, and 8 February 1996.
68. The Hungarian government as well as the Hungarian minority contend that these laws contravene the Slovak-Hungarian treaty. See Fisher, "Slovak Parliament Approves Territorial Arrangement Law," OMRI Analytical Brief 1:41 (25 March 1996); Fisher, "Slovak Parliament Approves Law on the Protection of the Republic," OMRI Analytical Brief 1:42 (27 March 1996); and Yves-Michel Riols, "L'isolement croissant de la Slovaqui de Vladimir Meciar," Le Monde, 30 March 1996, 2.
69. The Hungarian government as well as the Hungarian minority contend that these laws contravene the Slovak-Hungarian treaty. See Fisher, "Slovak Parliament Approves Territorial Arrangement Law," OMRI Analytical Brief 1:41 (25 March 1996); Fisher, "Slovak Parliament Approves Law on the Protection of the Republic," OMRI Analytical Brief 1:42 (27 March 1996); and Yves-Michel Riols, "L'isolement croissant de la Slovaqui de Vladimir Meciar," Le Monde, 30 March 1996, 2.
70. The Hungarian government as well as the Hungarian minority contend that these laws contravene the Slovak-Hungarian treaty. See Fisher, "Slovak Parliament Approves Territorial Arrangement Law," OMRI Analytical Brief 1:41 (25 March 1996); Fisher, "Slovak Parliament Approves Law on the Protection of the Republic," OMRI Analytical Brief 1:42 (27 March 1996); and Yves-Michel Riols, "L'isolement croissant de la Slovaqui de Vladimir Meciar," Le Monde, 30 March 1996, 2.
71. Hungarians also comprise 21 percent of the population of the Crişana Maramureş region and 7 percent of the Banat region. See George Schöpflin, Hungary and Its Neighbors, Chaillot Papers No. 7 (Paris: WEU, May 1993), 37, and Bugajski, Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe, 197.
72. Hungarians also comprise 21 percent of the population of the Crişana Maramureş region and 7 percent of the Banat region. See George Schöpflin, Hungary and Its Neighbors, Chaillot Papers No. 7 (Paris: WEU, May 1993), 37, and Bugajski, Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe, 197.
73. For an interesting note on the political culture that supports such claims, see Ioan Mihǎilescu, "Mental Stereotypes in Post-Totalitarian Romania," Government and Opposition 28:3 (Summer 1993): 315-24.
74. On the Romanian revolution, see Martyn Rady, Romania in Turmoil (New York: St Martin's Press, 1992), 91-144, and Matei Calinescu and Vladimir Tismaneanu, "The 1989 Revolution and Romania's Future," Problems of Communism 40:1 (January-April 1991): 42-59.
75. On the Romanian revolution, see Martyn Rady, Romania in Turmoil (New York: St Martin's Press, 1992), 91-144, and Matei Calinescu and Vladimir Tismaneanu, "The 1989 Revolution and Romania's Future," Problems of Communism 40:1 (January-April 1991): 42-59.
76. Rady, Romania in Turmoil, 145-59, 198.
77. Jonathan Eyal, "Romania," in Stephen Whitefield, ed., The New Institutional Architecture of Eastern Europe (London: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 136-37. On these elections and their immediate aftermath, see Katherine Verdery and Gail Kligman, "Romania after Ceausescu: Post-Communist Communism?" in Ivo Banac, ed., Eastern Europe in Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 122-40.
78. Jonathan Eyal, "Romania," in Stephen Whitefield, ed., The New Institutional Architecture of Eastern Europe (London: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 136-37. On these elections and their immediate aftermath, see Katherine Verdery and Gail Kligman, "Romania after Ceausescu: Post-Communist Communism?" in Ivo Banac, ed., Eastern Europe in Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 122-40.
79. The HDFR had called for territorial autonomy in the Cluj declaration of October 1992, but then changed its terminology substantially at Braşov in January 1993. By 1996, the mainstream of the HDFR spoke of local government and decentralization rather than of autonomy.
80. Michael Shafir, "Ruling Party Formalizes Relationship with Extremists," Transition 1:5 (14 April 1995): 41-46; and Shafir, "Agony and Death of an Opposition Alliance," Transition 1:8 (26 May 1995): 23.
81. Michael Shafir, "Ruling Party Formalizes Relationship with Extremists," Transition 1:5 (14 April 1995): 41-46; and Shafir, "Agony and Death of an Opposition Alliance," Transition 1:8 (26 May 1995): 23.
82. By January of 1996, Gheorghe Funar was accusing Iliescu of observing a secret agreement with the Hungarians, because Iliescu refused to ban the HDFR. See Shafir, "Anatomy of a Pre-Election Political Divorce," Transition 2:2 (26 January 1996): 45-49; Dan Ionescu, OMRI Daily Digest, 29 January 1996. On the general point, see Antonella Capelle-Pogàcean, "Quelques aspects de la crise Romano-Hongroise," L'Autre Europe 30-31 (1995): 209-231.
83. By January of 1996, Gheorghe Funar was accusing Iliescu of observing a secret agreement with the Hungarians, because Iliescu refused to ban the HDFR. See Shafir, "Anatomy of a Pre-Election Political Divorce," Transition 2:2 (26 January 1996): 45-49; Dan Ionescu, OMRI Daily Digest, 29 January 1996. On the general point, see Antonella Capelle-Pogàcean, "Quelques aspects de la crise Romano-Hongroise," L'Autre Europe 30-31 (1995): 209-231.
84. By January of 1996, Gheorghe Funar was accusing Iliescu of observing a secret agreement with the Hungarians, because Iliescu refused to ban the HDFR. See Shafir, "Anatomy of a Pre-Election Political Divorce," Transition 2:2 (26 January 1996): 45-49; Dan Ionescu, OMRI Daily Digest, 29 January 1996. On the general point, see Antonella Capelle-Pogàcean, "Quelques aspects de la crise Romano-Hongroise," L'Autre Europe 30-31 (1995): 209-231.
85. For election results, see http://www.omri.cz/elections/Romania.
86. On the impact of Western institutions on the evolution of Eastern states, see Milada Anna Vachudová, "Peaceful Transformations in East-Central Europe," in Michael Brown, ed., The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1996), 69-105.
87. On the peculiarities of the Slovak case, see Kieran Williams, "The Foreign Relations of Independent Slovakia," Slovo 8:2 (November 1995): 87-108.
88. It may be tempting to argue that one of these three factors determines the others, and that in fact our explanation can be reduced to a discussion of that factor. Neither of the usual candidates for one-factor explanations of ethnic nationalism in Eastern Europe, economics or ethnic geography, are supported by our evidence. The claim that a strong economy would be sufficient to avoid ethnic politics cannot be made, as we have no case in which an economy thrives under nationalist former Communists and/or in an ethnically heterogeneous country. Similarly, we cannot test the claim that the absence of large coherent minorities is sufficient to avoid ethnic politics, as we have no cases that combine ethnic homogeneity with economic failure and/or goverance by unreconstructed former Communists. We emphasize the importance of a period of governance by former dissidents and allow for its salutory effect upon the economy, but cannot conclude that this factor could suffice alone. Could post-Solidarity governments have accomplished what they did after 1989 had there been 4 million Germans or 4 million Ukrainians living in Poland? We cannot say. The aim of this paper was to distinguish two patterns of political change in Eastern Europe, and the three factors we cite are jointly sufficient to produce these patterns. Let A = regime change, B = economics, and C = ethnic geography. Let X = liberal politics, and Y = ethnic politics. We have shown chat (A1 + B1 + C1) = X (in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic), and that (A2 + B2 + C2) = Y (in Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria). This allows us to draw a useful distinction, and to discount some accounts of the role of ethnic nationalism, but not to speculate about what (to take the regime change example) (A1 + B2 + C2), or indeed (A1 + B1 + C2) or (A1 + B2 + C1) would yield.
89. A good recent statement of this position is Jack Snyder and Edward D. Mansfield, "Democratization and the Danger of War," International Security 20:1 (Summer 1995): 21-34.