An attempt to create a multidimensional theory of the firm: Taking a generalised perspective

Acta Oeconomica

Volumn 53, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 145-173

  Kapás, Judit ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF DEBRECEN   (Hungary)

Author keywords

Entrepreneurship; Firm; Knowledge co ordination; Market; Transaction cost

Indexed keywords

ENTREPRENEUR; FIRM OWNERSHIP; MARKET CONDITIONS; THEORETICAL STUDY; TRANSACTION COST;

EID: 0041826772     PISSN: 00016373     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1556/AOecon.53.2003.2.2     Document Type: Article

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