Parties take the initiative (and vice versa)

Columbia Law Review

Volumn 100, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 731-

  Hasen, Richard L ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041759728     PISSN: 00101958     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1123500     Document Type: Article

References (5)

1. On the parties as intermediaries, see Samuel Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing Through Intermediaries, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1627 (1999).
2. See Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court Should Not Allow the States to Protect the Democrats and Republicans from Political Competition, 1997 Sup. Ct. Rev. 331, 366.
3. See Elisabeth R. Gerber, The Populist Paradox: Interest Group Influence and the Promise of Direct Legislation 16-17 (1999). The extent of the initiative power varies across states. See id. at 16-17.
4. This Article considers only the relationship between the Democratic and Republican parties and the initiative process. I do not consider the initiative process's effect on third parties. For the remainder of this Article, I refer to the major parties simply as "the parties" or "political parties."
5. For a book-length argument, see Arthur Lipow, Political Parties and Democracy: Explorations in History and Theory (1996), especially the introduction and chapters 1 and