Endogenous insecurity and economic development

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 72, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 1-29

  Lloyd Ellis, Huw ^a   Marceau, Nicolas ^b  

^a QUEEN S UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC À MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

Author keywords

Credit markets; Economic development; Insecurity

Indexed keywords

CAPITAL MARKET; CREDIT PROVISION; ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; INVESTMENT;

EID: 0041625817     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3878(03)00066-X     Document Type: Article

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