Criminal offenders and right forfeiture

Journal of Social Philosophy

Volumn 32, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 78-89

  Lippke, Richard L ^a  

^a JAMES MADISON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041485830     PISSN: 00472786     EISSN: 14679833     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0047-2786.00080     Document Type: Article

References (15)

1. See Warren Quinn, "The Right to Threaten and the Right to Punish", Philosophy and Public Affairs 14(1985):327-73;
2. and Rex Martin, A System of Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993): 280-84.
3. Martin similarly argues that right forfeiture by criminal offenders is never automatic. See A System of Rights, 284.
4. Quinn, "The Right to Threaten and the Right to Punish", 332-33.
5. Martin, A System of Rights, 281.
6. See A. John Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1992);
7. and Christopher W. Morris, "Punishment and Loss of Moral Standing", Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21(1991):53-79.
8. Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights, 123-24.
9. Actually, as Simmons notes, there is a prior problem of indeterminate authority for the Lockean account of punishment. When individuals violate rights in the state of nature, is it only the direct victims of these violations that have the executive right to punish? Or do all individuals, whether direct victims or not, have the executive right to punish those who transgress the natural law? For Simmons's defense of the latter interpretation, see The Lockean Theory of Rights, 150-51.
10. Morris, "Punishment and Loss of Moral Standing", 68.
11. See The Realm of Rights (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 366.
12. Alan H. Goldman, "The Paradox of Punishment", Philosophy and Public Affairs 9(1979):45.
13. Goldman, "The Paradox of Punishment", 45.
14. Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Punishment, 153.
15. I borrow the notion of rights' being contoured from Quinn. See "The Right to Threaten and the Right to Punish", 346.