Pure eclecticism - The tool kit of the constitutional economist

Constitutional Political Economy

Volumn 7, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 177-196

  Voigt, Stefan ^a  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN HISTORY   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041448088     PISSN: 10434062     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF00128161     Document Type: Review

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