Flexible Citizenship for a Global Society

Politics, Philosophy & Economics

Volumn 2, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 93-114

  Frey, Bruno S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

citizenship; clubs; globalization; nations; political competition; public goods

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041437749     PISSN: 1470594X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1470594X03002001425     Document Type: Article

References (42)

1. See, for example, Vito Tanzi, ‘Globalization, Tax Competition and the Future of Tax Systems’, IMF Working Paper 96/14 (1996), Washington DC; Vito Tanzi, ‘Globalization, Technological Developments and the Work of Fiscal Termites’, IMF Working Paper 00/181 (2000), Washington DC. A theoretical survey of the theory of tax competition is given in John D. Wilson, ‘Theories of Tax Competition’, National Tax Journal 53 (1999): 269-304. Quantitative evidence on globalization is extensively collected in Günther G. Schulze and Heinrich W. Ursprung, ‘Globalization of the Economy and the Nation State’, World Economy 22 (1999): 295-352. More general aspects of globalization are discussed in Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone Too Far? (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 1997); Anthony Giddens, Runaway World: How Globalization is Reshaping Our Lives (London: Profile Books, 1999); or in the collection of articles in Patrick O'Meara, Howard D. Mehlinger and Matthew Krain, eds, Globalization and the Challenges of the New Century: A Reader (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000).
2. See, for example, Vito Tanzi and Ludger Schuhknecht, Public Spending in the 20th Century: A Global Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
3. See, for example, Thrainn Eggertsson, Economic Behaviour and Institutions: Principles of Neoinstitutional Economics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice II, second edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Dennis C. Mueller, Perspectives on Public Choice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
4. Instead of ‘empirialistic economics’ (see George J. Stigler, ‘Economics - The Imperial Science?’, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 86 (1984): 301-13; Edward Lazear, ‘Economic Imperialism’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 (2000): 99-146.), that is, introducing economic concepts into other disciplines, a concept from another discipline is imported into economics. This reverse movement is consistent with Hirshleifer's claim that empirialist economics runs into diminishing returns (Jack Hirshleifer, ‘The Expanding Domain of Economics’, American Economic Review 75 (1985): 53-68; see also Bruno S. Frey, Inspiring Economics. Human Motivation in Political Economy (Cheltenham, UK and Northhampton, USA: Edward Elgar, 2001)).
5. See, for instance, the recent books by Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, eds, Citizenship in Diverse Societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); David Batstone and Eduardo Mendieta, eds, The Good Citizen (London: Routledge, 1997); Richard Dagger, Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); William A. Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in a Liberal State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
6. For the sociological view, see the classical contributions by David Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950); Reinhard Bendix, Nation-building and Citizenship: Studies of our Changing Social Order (New York: Wiley, 1964); Seymour Martin Lipset, ‘Introduction’, in Class, Citizenship and Social Development, edited by T.H. Marshall (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964): v-xxii; Ralf Dahrendorf, ‘Citizenship and Beyond: The Social Dynamics of an Idea’, Social Research 41 (1974): 673-701; Ralf Dahrendorf, ‘The Changing Quality of Citizenship’, in The Condition of Citizenship, edited by Bart van Steenbergen (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1994): 10-19; or for more recent contributions, see Bryan S. Turner, Citizenship and Social Theory (London: Sage, 1993). For the political science view, see Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Boston: Little Brown, 1965); Carole Pateman, ‘The Patriarchal Welfare State’, in Democracy and the Welfare State, edited by Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Roberto Alejandro, Hermeneutics, Citizenship and the Public Sphere (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993). For an economic view, see Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Democracy and Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 1986).
7. See Gordon Scott, Controlling the State: Constitutionalism from Ancient Athens to Today (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1999).
8. Thomas Janoski, Citizenship and Civil Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) provides an extensive survey and classification of citizenship rights (pp. 29–45) and obligations (pp. 54–65), and relates these to the various strands of theoretical discourse and shows how far they apply empirically in the various countries.
9. These aspects are the subject of a large literature, mainly in political science. See, for example, Jane J. Mansbridge, ‘Public Spirit in Political Systems’, in Values and Public Policy, edited by Henry J. Aaron, Thomas E. Mann and Timothy Taylor (Washington: Brookings, 1994): 146-72; Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Property (New York: Free Press, 1995); Margaret Levi, Consent, Dissent and Patriotism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Robert D. Putnam, ‘Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America’, PS: Political Science and Politics 28 (1995): 664-83; Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000). For contributions in economics, see Steven Kelman, Making Public Policy: A Hopeful View of American Government (New York: Basic Books, 1987); Bruno S. Frey, ‘A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues’, Economic Journal 107(443) (1997): 1043-53. For law, see Robert D. Cooter, ‘Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalizing Legal Values’, Virginia Law Review (forthcoming). These aspects are also related to social trust, as discussed, for example, in psychology by Roderick M. Kramer and Tom R. Tyler, Trust in Organizations (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996).
10. See Erik Oddvar Eriksen and Jarle Weigard, ‘The End of Citizenship? New Roles Challenging the Political Order’, Arena Working Papers 99/26 (2000, http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/publications/wp99). Common identity and mutuality have in the context of citizenship been particularly emphasized by communitarian political theory, for example, Philip Selznik, The Moral Commonwealth (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); Amitai Etzioni, The Spirit of Community (New York: Crown, 1993).
11. See Janoski, Citizenship and Civil Society, p. 235; William Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).
12. However, it has been theoretically developed in the concept of ‘Cosmopolitan Democracy’ which indicates a model of political organization in which citizens have a voice and political representation in international affairs (see Daniele Archibugi and David Held, eds, Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), esp. pp. 12–15). Cosmopolitan citizenship is aware of the fact that ‘several of the events affecting [the] everyday life of citizens are beyond the scope of their political participation because of economic, social and cultural globalization of modern life’ (Daniele Archibugi, ‘From the United Nations to Cosmopolitan Democracy’, in Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order, edited by Daniele Archibugi and David Held (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p. 134). Unlike the proposal advanced in this article, cosmopolitan democracy seeks to overcome the respective problems by giving voice to citizens in a world community. See also the proposals discussed in Richard Falk, Robert C. Johansen and Samuel S. Kim, eds, The Constitutional Foundation of World Peace (New York: SUNY, 1993); David Held, ‘Democracy and the New International Order’, in Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order, edited by Daniele Archibugi and David Held (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995): 96-120.
13. See, for example, James Caporaso, ‘The European Union and Forms of State: Westphalian, Regulatory or Post-modern?’, Journal of Common Market Studies 34 (1996): 29-51; Gary Marks, Fritz W. Scharpf, Phillipe C. Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck, eds, Governance in the European Union (London: Sage Publications, 1996).
14. See Antje Wiener, European Citizenship Practice: Building Institutions of a Non- State (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998); Ulrich Preuss, ‘Problems of a Concept of European Citizenship’, European Law Journal 1 (1995): 267-81; Carlos Closa, ‘Citizenship of the Union and Nationality of Member State’, Common Market Law Review 32 (1995): 487-518.
15. See Markus Jachtenfuchs, ‘Theoretical Perspectives on European Governance’, European Law Journal 1 (1995): 115.
16. Different degrees of citizenship are also discussed in Dennis C. Mueller, Constitutional Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), where the author also distinguishes between a territorial and a cultural citizenship. Gordon Tullock, ‘Trading Citizenship’, Kyklos 50 (1997): 251-2, proposes that people should be allowed to exchange, or trade, citizenship. Several concepts of weighted voting have been developed in different contexts in the public choice literature, see, for example, Mueller, Public Choice II; Mueller, Perspectives on Public Choice.
17. Bruno S. Frey and Reiner Eichenberger, The New Democratic Federalism for Europe: Functional, Overlapping and Competing Jurisdictions (Cheltenham UK and Northhampton USA: Edward Elgar, 1999). For critiques, see Viktor J. Vanberg, ‘Functional Federalism: Communal or Individual Rights?’, Kyklos 53 (2000): 363-86; Roland Vaubel, ‘Internationaler Politischer Wettbewerb: Eine europäische Wettbewerbsaufsicht für Regierungen und die empirische Evidenz’, Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie 19 (2000): pp. 280–309.
18. The two voting principles can coexist perfectly well. This has been demonstrated by the formal codetermination rights that exist in Germany. In that country, in companies exceeding 2000 employees, the shareholders and the representatives of the employees hold the same number of seats in the Aufsichtsrat, the main decision-making body. This arrangement works quite well and is largely undisputed today.
19. See, for example, Dennis W. Organ, ‘The Motivational Basis of Organizational Citizenship Behavior’, Research in Organizational Behavior 12 (1990): 43-72; Linn Van Dyne, Jill W. Graham and Richard M. Dienesch, ‘Organizational Citizenship Behavior: Construct Redefinition, Measurement and Validation’, Journal of Management 34 (1994): 765-802.
20. See Denise M. Rousseau, Psychological Contracts in Organizations: Understanding Written and Unwritten Agreements (Thousand Oaks, CA, London and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1995).
21. As President John F. Kennedy said in his inaugural speech: ‘Ask not what your country does for you, rather ask what you can do for your country.’ But Kennedy restricts such behavior, and thus citizenship, to the national level. Needless to say, people's willingness to act in such an altruistic way toward the state has often been exploited by governments. The First World War provides a drastic example, and applied to all nations involved in this conflict.
22. For examples and overviews of the rational choice literature, see Gary S. Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1976); Lazear, Economic Imperialism Bruno S. Frey, Economics as a Science of Human Behaviour, second revised and extended edition (Boston and Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999). The traditional law and economics approach is presented in Richard A. Posner, The Economic Analysis of Law, third edition (Boston: Little & Brown, 1986); Fred Hirsch, The Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976). A contrasting perspective is given in Robert D. Cooter, ‘Prices and Sanctions’, Columbia Law Review 84 (1984): 1523-60; Robert D. Cooter and Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Economics (Reading, MA: Addison, Wesley, Longman, 2000).
23. Public goods are, for example, analyzed by Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965).
24. See, in particular, Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Elinor Ostrom, ‘Collective Norms and the Evolution of Social Norms’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 14 (2000): 137-58; Elinor Ostrom, ‘Crowding Out Citizenship’, Scandinavian Political Studies 23 (2000): 3-16; Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner and James Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994).
25. See, for instance, Samuel Bowles, ‘Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 36 (1998): 75-111; Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt, ‘A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (1999): 817-68; Ernst Fehr and Simon Gächter, ‘Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 14 (2000): 159-81; Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, ‘The Evolution of Strong Reciprocity’, Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
26. See, for example, Robyn M. Dawes, Jeanne McTavish and Harriet Shaklee, ‘Behavior, Communication, and Assumptions about other People's Behavior in a Commons Dilemma Situation’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 35 (1977): 1-11; John O. Ledyard, ‘Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research’, in Handbook of Experimental Economics, edited by John Kagel and Alvin E. Roth (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995): pp. 111–94; Iris Bohnet and Bruno S. Frey, ‘Rent Leaving’, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) 153 (1997): 711-21; Iris Bohnet and Bruno S. Frey, ‘Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games: Comment’, American Economic Review 89 (1999): 335-9.
27. For experimental evidence on conditional cooperation and reciprocity, see Claudia Keser and Frans van Winden, ‘Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods’, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 102 (2000): 23-39; Fehr and Gächter, ‘Fairness and Retaliation’. The theoretical background has been explored by, for example, Robert Sugden, ‘Reciprocity: The Supply of Public Goods through Voluntary Contributions’, Economic Journal 94 (1984): 772-87; Matthew Rabin, ‘Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics’, American Economic Review 83 (1993): 1281-302.
28. See Putnam, Making Democracy Work; Putnam, Bowling Alone; James S. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).
29. One may add that this also holds for relationships within firms, see Margit Osterloh and Bruno S. Frey, ‘Motivation, Knowledge Transfer and Organizational Forms’, Organization Science 11 (2000): 538-50.
30. The experimental literature from social psychology is surveyed in Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, Intrinsic Motivation and Self-Determination in Human Behavior (New York: Plenum Press, 1985); Edward L. Deci, Richard Koestner and Richard M. Ryan, ‘A Meta-analytic Review of Experiments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation’, Psychological Bulletin 125 (1999): 627-68. For field research in economics, see Bruno S. Frey, Not Just for the Money: An Economic Theory of Personal Motivation (Cheltenham, UK and Brookfield, USA: Edward Elgar, 1997); or the survey in Bruno S. Frey and Reto Jegen, ‘Motivation Crowding Theory: A Survey of Empirical Evidence’, Journal of Economic Surveys 15 (2001): 589-611.
31. Emotions, or visceral factors, are a topic economists have only most recently become aware of. Prominent examples are Robert H. Frank, Passions with Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions (New York: Norton, 1988); George Loewenstein, ‘Emotions in Economic Theory and Economic Behavior’, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 90 (2000): pp. 426–32; George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton, ‘Economics and Identity’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 (2000): 715-53.
32. See, for example, Mueller, Public Choice II.
33. The vanishing borders between ‘private’ and ‘public’ are discussed in the case of charitable, cultural and health organizations, in Burton A. Weisbrod, ed., To Profit or Not to Profit: The Dilemma of Commercializing the Non-Profit Sector (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
34. See James M. Buchanan, ‘An Economic Theory of Clubs’, Economica 32 (1965): 1-14.
35. Amin Maalouf, Les identités meurtrières (Paris: Grasset & Fasquelle, 1998), pp. 7–8. Translation provided by Bruno S. Frey.
36. But when Manchester United play foreign clubs, all English football fans tend to support them, that is, national identification takes over. (I owe this point to an anonymous referee.) However, this is less so for Bayern München. Many German football fans identifying with other teams like to see this club lose in international games.
37. See the surveys by James Andreoni, Brian Erard and Jonathan Feinstein, ‘Tax Compliance’, Journal of Economic Literature 36 (1998): 818-60; Joel Slemrod, ed., Why People Pay Taxes: Tax Compliance and Enforcement (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992), as well as the studies by Michael J. Graetz and Louis L. Wilde, ‘The Economics of Tax Compliance: Facts and Fantasy’, National Tax Journal 38 (1985): 355-63; Jonathan Skinner and Joel Slemrod, ‘An Economic Perspective on Tax Evasion’, National Tax Journal 38 (1985): 345-53; Bruno S. Frey, Ein neuer Federalismus für Europa: Die Idee der FOCJ (Mohr Siebeck: Tübingen, 1997).
38. See James Alm, Gary McClelland and William D. Schulze, ‘Why Do People Pay Taxes?’, Journal of Public Economics 48 (1992): 22.
39. See Kirsten R. Monroe, ‘Morality and a Sense of Self: The Importance of Identity and Categorization for Moral Action’, American Journal of Political Science 45 (2001): 491-507; Kirsten R. Monroe, James Hankin and Renée Van Vechten, ‘The Psychological Foundation of Identity Politics’, Annual Review of Political Science 3 (2000): 419-47; Henri Tajfel, ‘Experiments in Intergroup Discrimination’, Scientific American 223 (1970): 96-102.
40. In ancient Rome, there already existed ‘full’ and ‘partial’ citizenship. The latter had the same legal status as the former in all private matters, but they could not vote in the assemblies or stand for office. See, for example, Scott Gordon, Controlling the State, p. 93.
41. Personal communication, Dennis Mueller, 25 September 2000.
42. Personal communication, Elinor Ostrom, 2 October 2000.