Corporate performance and managerial remuneration. An empirical analysis

Journal of Accounting and Economics

Volumn 7, Issue 1-3, 1985, Pages 11-42

  Murphy, Kevin J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041412312     PISSN: 01654101     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0165-4101(85)90026-6     Document Type: Article

References (28)

1. The self-serving management hypothesis: Some evidence
2. The pricing of options and corporate liabilities
3. Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance: An empirical investigation
4. The determinants of executive salaries An econometric survey
5. Optimal managerial contracts and equilibrium security prices
6. Reform executive pay or congress will
7. Top executive compensation
8. Wage trends as performance displays productive potential A model and application to academic early retirement
9. A theory of wage dynamics
10. Moral hazard and observability
11. Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts
12. Managerial pay and corporate performance
13. The madness of executive compensation
14. Executive motivations earnings and consequent equity-performance
15. Executive compensation, taxes, and incentives
16. The optimal structure of incentives and authority within an organization
17. Ability, performance, and compensation: A theoretical and empirical investigation of executive labor contracts
18. Equilibrium warrant pricing models and accounting for executive stock options
19. Money income and sunspots Measuring economic relationships and the effects of differencing
20. Authority control and the distribution of earnings
21. The economic theory of agency: The principal's problem
22. Learning by observing the distribution of wages
23. Valuing employee stock option plans using option pricing models
24. Incentive risk and information Notes toward a theory of hierarchy