Exchanging nuclear secrets: Laying the foundations of the Anglo-American nuclear relationship

Diplomatic History

Volumn 25, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 33-61

  Baylis, John ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0041409867     PISSN: 01452096     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0145-2096.00248     Document Type: Article

References (158)

1. The full title is Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America for Co-operation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes. The claim that the agreement is "one of the most remarkable" ever reached between two sovereign states is based on the range and depth of nuclear collaboration that developed between the two states.
2. Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 1956-1959 (London, 1971), 313-41. In recent years, a wide range of archival material dealing with atomic energy matters has been released on a continuing basis in both the United States and Britain. A number of major studies have appeared based on some of this new archival material. These include Timothy J. Botti, The Long Wait: The Forging of the Anglo-American Nuclear Alliance, 1945-1958 (New York, 1984); Jan Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership: Britain, the United States, and the Making of an Ambiguous Alliance, 1952-1959 (Gronigen, 1993); Gunnar Skogmar, Nuclear Triangle: Relations between the United States, Great Britain, and France in the Atomic Energy Field, 1939-1950 (Copenhagen, 1993); Ian Clark and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1955 (Oxford, 1989); Ian Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain's Deterrent and America, 1957-1962 (Oxford, 1994); and John Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1964 (Oxford, 1995). John Simpson's authoritative study of The Independent Nuclear State: The United States, Britain, and the Military Atom (London, 1986) was based on extensive confidential interviews. The most authoritative study on the subject, however, is Lorna Arnold with Katherine Pyne, Britain and the H-Bomb (London, 2001). This study is based on a range of hitherto classified UKAE and AWRE files and is effectively the "official history" of the British H-Bomb project. This article uses further archival evidence that has been released since 1996 as well as a number of confidential interviews.
3. Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 1956-1959 (London, 1971), 313-41. In recent years, a wide range of archival material dealing with atomic energy matters has been released on a continuing basis in both the United States and Britain. A number of major studies have appeared based on some of this new archival material. These include Timothy J. Botti, The Long Wait: The Forging of the Anglo-American Nuclear Alliance, 1945-1958 (New York, 1984); Jan Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership: Britain, the United States, and the Making of an Ambiguous Alliance, 1952-1959 (Gronigen, 1993); Gunnar Skogmar, Nuclear Triangle: Relations between the United States, Great Britain, and France in the Atomic Energy Field, 1939-1950 (Copenhagen, 1993); Ian Clark and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1955 (Oxford, 1989); Ian Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain's Deterrent and America, 1957-1962 (Oxford, 1994); and John Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1964 (Oxford, 1995). John Simpson's authoritative study of The Independent Nuclear State: The United States, Britain, and the Military Atom (London, 1986) was based on extensive confidential interviews. The most authoritative study on the subject, however, is Lorna Arnold with Katherine Pyne, Britain and the H-Bomb (London, 2001). This study is based on a range of hitherto classified UKAE and AWRE files and is effectively the "official history" of the British H-Bomb project. This article uses further archival evidence that has been released since 1996 as well as a number of confidential interviews.
4. Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 1956-1959 (London, 1971), 313-41. In recent years, a wide range of archival material dealing with atomic energy matters has been released on a continuing basis in both the United States and Britain. A number of major studies have appeared based on some of this new archival material. These include Timothy J. Botti, The Long Wait: The Forging of the Anglo-American Nuclear Alliance, 1945-1958 (New York, 1984); Jan Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership: Britain, the United States, and the Making of an Ambiguous Alliance, 1952-1959 (Gronigen, 1993); Gunnar Skogmar, Nuclear Triangle: Relations between the United States, Great Britain, and France in the Atomic Energy Field, 1939-1950 (Copenhagen, 1993); Ian Clark and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1955 (Oxford, 1989); Ian Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain's Deterrent and America, 1957-1962 (Oxford, 1994); and John Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1964 (Oxford, 1995). John Simpson's authoritative study of The Independent Nuclear State: The United States, Britain, and the Military Atom (London, 1986) was based on extensive confidential interviews. The most authoritative study on the subject, however, is Lorna Arnold with Katherine Pyne, Britain and the H-Bomb (London, 2001). This study is based on a range of hitherto classified UKAE and AWRE files and is effectively the "official history" of the British H-Bomb project. This article uses further archival evidence that has been released since 1996 as well as a number of confidential interviews.
5. Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 1956-1959 (London, 1971), 313-41. In recent years, a wide range of archival material dealing with atomic energy matters has been released on a continuing basis in both the United States and Britain. A number of major studies have appeared based on some of this new archival material. These include Timothy J. Botti, The Long Wait: The Forging of the Anglo-American Nuclear Alliance, 1945-1958 (New York, 1984); Jan Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership: Britain, the United States, and the Making of an Ambiguous Alliance, 1952-1959 (Gronigen, 1993); Gunnar Skogmar, Nuclear Triangle: Relations between the United States, Great Britain, and France in the Atomic Energy Field, 1939-1950 (Copenhagen, 1993); Ian Clark and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1955 (Oxford, 1989); Ian Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain's Deterrent and America, 1957-1962 (Oxford, 1994); and John Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1964 (Oxford, 1995). John Simpson's authoritative study of The Independent Nuclear State: The United States, Britain, and the Military Atom (London, 1986) was based on extensive confidential interviews. The most authoritative study on the subject, however, is Lorna Arnold with Katherine Pyne, Britain and the H-Bomb (London, 2001). This study is based on a range of hitherto classified UKAE and AWRE files and is effectively the "official history" of the British H-Bomb project. This article uses further archival evidence that has been released since 1996 as well as a number of confidential interviews.
6. Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 1956-1959 (London, 1971), 313-41. In recent years, a wide range of archival material dealing with atomic energy matters has been released on a continuing basis in both the United States and Britain. A number of major studies have appeared based on some of this new archival material. These include Timothy J. Botti, The Long Wait: The Forging of the Anglo-American Nuclear Alliance, 1945-1958 (New York, 1984); Jan Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership: Britain, the United States, and the Making of an Ambiguous Alliance, 1952-1959 (Gronigen, 1993); Gunnar Skogmar, Nuclear Triangle: Relations between the United States, Great Britain, and France in the Atomic Energy Field, 1939-1950 (Copenhagen, 1993); Ian Clark and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1955 (Oxford, 1989); Ian Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain's Deterrent and America, 1957-1962 (Oxford, 1994); and John Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1964 (Oxford, 1995). John Simpson's authoritative study of The Independent Nuclear State: The United States, Britain, and the Military Atom (London, 1986) was based on extensive confidential interviews. The most authoritative study on the subject, however, is Lorna Arnold with Katherine Pyne, Britain and the H-Bomb (London, 2001). This study is based on a range of hitherto classified UKAE and AWRE files and is effectively the "official history" of the British H-Bomb project. This article uses further archival evidence that has been released since 1996 as well as a number of confidential interviews.
7. Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 1956-1959 (London, 1971), 313-41. In recent years, a wide range of archival material dealing with atomic energy matters has been released on a continuing basis in both the United States and Britain. A number of major studies have appeared based on some of this new archival material. These include Timothy J. Botti, The Long Wait: The Forging of the Anglo-American Nuclear Alliance, 1945-1958 (New York, 1984); Jan Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership: Britain, the United States, and the Making of an Ambiguous Alliance, 1952-1959 (Gronigen, 1993); Gunnar Skogmar, Nuclear Triangle: Relations between the United States, Great Britain, and France in the Atomic Energy Field, 1939-1950 (Copenhagen, 1993); Ian Clark and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1955 (Oxford, 1989); Ian Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain's Deterrent and America, 1957-1962 (Oxford, 1994); and John Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1964 (Oxford, 1995). John Simpson's authoritative study of The Independent Nuclear State: The United States, Britain, and the Military Atom (London, 1986) was based on extensive confidential interviews. The most authoritative study on the subject, however, is Lorna Arnold with Katherine Pyne, Britain and the H-Bomb (London, 2001). This study is based on a range of hitherto classified UKAE and AWRE files and is effectively the "official history" of the British H-Bomb project. This article uses further archival evidence that has been released since 1996 as well as a number of confidential interviews.
8. Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 1956-1959 (London, 1971), 313-41. In recent years, a wide range of archival material dealing with atomic energy matters has been released on a continuing basis in both the United States and Britain. A number of major studies have appeared based on some of this new archival material. These include Timothy J. Botti, The Long Wait: The Forging of the Anglo-American Nuclear Alliance, 1945-1958 (New York, 1984); Jan Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership: Britain, the United States, and the Making of an Ambiguous Alliance, 1952-1959 (Gronigen, 1993); Gunnar Skogmar, Nuclear Triangle: Relations between the United States, Great Britain, and France in the Atomic Energy Field, 1939-1950 (Copenhagen, 1993); Ian Clark and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1955 (Oxford, 1989); Ian Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain's Deterrent and America, 1957-1962 (Oxford, 1994); and John Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1964 (Oxford, 1995). John Simpson's authoritative study of The Independent Nuclear State: The United States, Britain, and the Military Atom (London, 1986) was based on extensive confidential interviews. The most authoritative study on the subject, however, is Lorna Arnold with Katherine Pyne, Britain and the H-Bomb (London, 2001). This study is based on a range of hitherto classified UKAE and AWRE files and is effectively the "official history" of the British H-Bomb project. This article uses further archival evidence that has been released since 1996 as well as a number of confidential interviews.
9. Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 1956-1959 (London, 1971), 313-41. In recent years, a wide range of archival material dealing with atomic energy matters has been released on a continuing basis in both the United States and Britain. A number of major studies have appeared based on some of this new archival material. These include Timothy J. Botti, The Long Wait: The Forging of the Anglo-American Nuclear Alliance, 1945-1958 (New York, 1984); Jan Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership: Britain, the United States, and the Making of an Ambiguous Alliance, 1952-1959 (Gronigen, 1993); Gunnar Skogmar, Nuclear Triangle: Relations between the United States, Great Britain, and France in the Atomic Energy Field, 1939-1950 (Copenhagen, 1993); Ian Clark and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1955 (Oxford, 1989); Ian Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain's Deterrent and America, 1957-1962 (Oxford, 1994); and John Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1964 (Oxford, 1995). John Simpson's authoritative study of The Independent Nuclear State: The United States, Britain, and the Military Atom (London, 1986) was based on extensive confidential interviews. The most authoritative study on the subject, however, is Lorna Arnold with Katherine Pyne, Britain and the H-Bomb (London, 2001). This study is based on a range of hitherto classified UKAE and AWRE files and is effectively the "official history" of the British H-Bomb project. This article uses further archival evidence that has been released since 1996 as well as a number of confidential interviews.
10. Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 1956-1959 (London, 1971), 313-41. In recent years, a wide range of archival material dealing with atomic energy matters has been released on a continuing basis in both the United States and Britain. A number of major studies have appeared based on some of this new archival material. These include Timothy J. Botti, The Long Wait: The Forging of the Anglo-American Nuclear Alliance, 1945-1958 (New York, 1984); Jan Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership: Britain, the United States, and the Making of an Ambiguous Alliance, 1952-1959 (Gronigen, 1993); Gunnar Skogmar, Nuclear Triangle: Relations between the United States, Great Britain, and France in the Atomic Energy Field, 1939-1950 (Copenhagen, 1993); Ian Clark and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1955 (Oxford, 1989); Ian Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain's Deterrent and America, 1957-1962 (Oxford, 1994); and John Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1964 (Oxford, 1995). John Simpson's authoritative study of The Independent Nuclear State: The United States, Britain, and the Military Atom (London, 1986) was based on extensive confidential interviews. The most authoritative study on the subject, however, is Lorna Arnold with Katherine Pyne, Britain and the H-Bomb (London, 2001). This study is based on a range of hitherto classified UKAE and AWRE files and is effectively the "official history" of the British H-Bomb project. This article uses further archival evidence that has been released since 1996 as well as a number of confidential interviews.
11. Given the renewed anxieties about nuclear proliferation after the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998, the issue of the relationships between these two countries and other nuclear states, involving the exchange of nuclear secrets, is of considerable contemporary importance.
12. This study supports some of the revisionist accounts of the Eisenhower administration. See Richard H. Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," Diplomatic History 14 (Summer 1990): 319-42; Stephen G Rabe, "Eisenhower Revisionism," ibid., 17 (Winter 1993): 97-115; Charles J. Pach, Jr. and Elmo Richardson, The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower (Lawrence, 1991); and Fred Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (New York, 1982).
13. This study supports some of the revisionist accounts of the Eisenhower administration. See Richard H. Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," Diplomatic History 14 (Summer 1990): 319-42; Stephen G Rabe, "Eisenhower Revisionism," ibid., 17 (Winter 1993): 97-115; Charles J. Pach, Jr. and Elmo Richardson, The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower (Lawrence, 1991); and Fred Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (New York, 1982).
14. This study supports some of the revisionist accounts of the Eisenhower administration. See Richard H. Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," Diplomatic History 14 (Summer 1990): 319-42; Stephen G Rabe, "Eisenhower Revisionism," ibid., 17 (Winter 1993): 97-115; Charles J. Pach, Jr. and Elmo Richardson, The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower (Lawrence, 1991); and Fred Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (New York, 1982).
15. This study supports some of the revisionist accounts of the Eisenhower administration. See Richard H. Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," Diplomatic History 14 (Summer 1990): 319-42; Stephen G Rabe, "Eisenhower Revisionism," ibid., 17 (Winter 1993): 97-115; Charles J. Pach, Jr. and Elmo Richardson, The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower (Lawrence, 1991); and Fred Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (New York, 1982).
16. For a study of the Anglo-American nuclear relationship during the Second World War see M. Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939-1945 (London, 1964).
17. For a discussion of the British decision to develop nuclear weapons see M. Gowing, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952. Vol 1, Policy Making (London, 1974).
18. Under the agreement the United States was to receive all the supplies of raw materials from the Belgian Congo for the two years and would receive up to 2,547 tons of the British stockpile if the amount received from the Belgian Congo was not enough. As far as information exchanges were concerned, the United States and Britain agreed to cooperate in nine areas. These included topics for immediate declassification, health and safety, radioisotopes, fundamental nuclear and extra-nuclear properties, detection of a distant nuclear explosion, design of natural uranium reactors, and general research experience with named low-power reactors. See Gowing, Independence and Deterrence, 248-49.
19. See Simon Duke, US Defence Bases in the United Kingdom: A Matter for Joint Decision? (London, 1987); and John Baylis, "American Bases in Britain: 'The Truman-Attlee Understandings,'" The World Today, Aug.-Sept. 1986.
20. See Simon Duke, US Defence Bases in the United Kingdom: A Matter for Joint Decision? (London, 1987); and John Baylis, "American Bases in Britain: 'The Truman-Attlee Understandings,'" The World Today, Aug.-Sept. 1986.
21. See Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 315-16. Some American officials argued that the Soviet test in August 1953 was not a true thermonuclear test. As a result it is often argued that the first real Russian H-Bomb test did not take place until November 1956 (Joe 19). It seems likely, however, that 1953 was a true thermonuclear weapon test, but the device was not the same type that the Americans were testing.
22. For a detailed discussion of Project E and Anglo-American cooperation in the mid-1950s see Stephen Twigge and Len Scott, Planning Armageddon: Britain, the United States, and Command and Control of Western Nuclear Forces, 1945-1964 (Reading, England, forthcoming); and Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence.
23. For a detailed discussion of Project E and Anglo-American cooperation in the mid-1950s see Stephen Twigge and Len Scott, Planning Armageddon: Britain, the United States, and Command and Control of Western Nuclear Forces, 1945-1964 (Reading, England, forthcoming); and Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence.
24. See Botti, The Long Wait.
25. Memorandum for chairman JCS, Washington, 22 March 1956, CCS 381 (Military Strategy and Posture), RG 218, Chairman's File, Admiral Radford, 1953-1957, Modern Military Branch, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland.
26. In January 1956 Attorney General Herbert Brownell ruled that the administration could legally negotiate to transmit nuclear submarine propulsion information to the British. Hearings before Subcommittee, JCAE, 1958, (85th Cong., 2d sess, 1958, 516-19; Botti, The Long Wait, 160; Simpson, The Independent Nuclear State, 117.
27. In January 1956 Attorney General Herbert Brownell ruled that the administration could legally negotiate to transmit nuclear submarine propulsion information to the British. Hearings before Subcommittee, JCAE, 1958, (85th Cong., 2d sess, 1958, 516-19; Botti, The Long Wait, 160; Simpson, The Independent Nuclear State, 117.
28. In January 1956 Attorney General Herbert Brownell ruled that the administration could legally negotiate to transmit nuclear submarine propulsion information to the British. Hearings before Subcommittee, JCAE, 1958, (85th Cong., 2d sess, 1958, 516-19; Botti, The Long Wait, 160; Simpson, The Independent Nuclear State, 117.
29. Hearings before Subcommittee, JCAE, 1958, 513-19.
30. U.K. Parliament, 554 H.C. Deb., 5s, 554, 1406.
31. Melissen has argued that during this period "British negotiators were forced to swallow one deception after another." The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, 9.
32. Hearings before Subcommittee, JCAE, 1958, 513-19.
33. To make matters worse the president had to go into the Walter Reed Hospital in Bethesda, Maryland on 8 June for an emergency operation for ileitis.
34. Botti, The Long Wait, 164.
35. See John Baylis, "The Development of Britain's Thermonuclear Capability 1954-61: Myth or Reality?" Contemporary Record 8 (September 1994). By far the best account of the "Grapple" Tests is contained in Arnold, Britain and the H-Bomb.
36. See John Baylis, "The Development of Britain's Thermonuclear Capability 1954-61: Myth or Reality?" Contemporary Record 8 (September 1994). By far the best account of the "Grapple" Tests is contained in Arnold, Britain and the H-Bomb.
37. Washington tel. to Foreign Office, 1 January, 1957, FO 371/126682, AU 1051/26, Public Record Office (PRO), Kew, England.
38. Botti. The Long Wait, 171-75. See also an excellent article by Jan Melissen, "The Restoration of the Nuclear Alliance: Great Britain and Atomic Negotiations with the United States, 1957-8," Contemporary Record 6 (Summer 1992).
39. Botti. The Long Wait, 171-75. See also an excellent article by Jan Melissen, "The Restoration of the Nuclear Alliance: Great Britain and Atomic Negotiations with the United States, 1957-8," Contemporary Record 6 (Summer 1992).
40. Eden's government fell on 9 January 1917, and on 22 January Eisenhower directed the U.S. embassy in London to invite the new prime minister, Harold Macmillan, to a conference on 21-24 March in either Washington or Bermuda. See Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 240-42.
41. Logan to Forward, 23 January 1957, FO 371/126707, AU 11913/1. See also Sandys tel. to Macmillan and Lloyd, 28 January 1957, FO 371/126683, AU 1051/28G.
42. Dulles calls Radford, 17 June 1957, Minutes of Telephone Conversations of John Foster Dulles and Christian Herter, 1953-1961 (Frederick, MD, 1980), reel 6, 216-17; M.H. Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation: Thor-Jupiter Controversy (New York, 1969), 183-85; Defence: Outline of Future Policy (Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1957), Cmnd. No. 124; Martin Navias, Nuclear Weapons and British Strategic Planning, 1955-1958, (Oxford, 1991), 138.
43. Dulles calls Radford, 17 June 1957, Minutes of Telephone Conversations of John Foster Dulles and Christian Herter, 1953-1961 (Frederick, MD, 1980), reel 6, 216-17; M.H. Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation: Thor-Jupiter Controversy (New York, 1969), 183-85; Defence: Outline of Future Policy (Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1957), Cmnd. No. 124; Martin Navias, Nuclear Weapons and British Strategic Planning, 1955-1958, (Oxford, 1991), 138.
44. Dulles calls Radford, 17 June 1957, Minutes of Telephone Conversations of John Foster Dulles and Christian Herter, 1953-1961 (Frederick, MD, 1980), reel 6, 216-17; M.H. Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation: Thor-Jupiter Controversy (New York, 1969), 183-85; Defence: Outline of Future Policy (Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1957), Cmnd. No. 124; Martin Navias, Nuclear Weapons and British Strategic Planning, 1955-1958, (Oxford, 1991), 138.
45. Dulles calls Radford, 17 June 1957, Minutes of Telephone Conversations of John Foster Dulles and Christian Herter, 1953-1961 (Frederick, MD, 1980), reel 6, 216-17; M.H. Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation: Thor-Jupiter Controversy (New York, 1969), 183-85; Defence: Outline of Future Policy (Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1957), Cmnd. No. 124; Martin Navias, Nuclear Weapons and British Strategic Planning, 1955-1958, (Oxford, 1991), 138.
46. Hearings before Subcommittee on Agreements for Cooperation, JCAE, Amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1954: Exchange of Military Information and Material with Allies, 85th. Cong., 2d sess., 1958, 513-14. In a secret annex the two leaders also agreed to prior consultations on testing initiatives and a common policy toward French nuclear ambitions. See Lewis L. Strauss, Men and Decisions (London, 1962), 369-74.
47. Hearings before Subcommittee on Agreements for Cooperation, JCAE, Amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1954: Exchange of Military Information and Material with Allies, 85th. Cong., 2d sess., 1958, 513-14. In a secret annex the two leaders also agreed to prior consultations on testing initiatives and a common policy toward French nuclear ambitions. See Lewis L. Strauss, Men and Decisions (London, 1962), 369-74.
48. Contrary to the view of Melissen, Dombey, and Grove, Britain did explode a thermonuclear device in the Grapple test. Both "Short Granite" and "Purple Granite," detonated on 15 May and 19 June, respectively, were thermonuclear devices. The yields of 0.3 megatons and 0.2 megatons were disappointing, but these were only the first tests, and others were scheduled in November (Grapple X) to improve the yield. See Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, 35; N. Dombey and E. Grove, "Britain's Thermonuclear Bluff," London Review of Books 14 (22 October, 1992): 8-10; Baylis, "The Development of Britain's Thermonuclear Capability"; Botti, The Long Wait, 187; and Arnold, Britain and the H-Bomb, chap. 14.
49. Contrary to the view of Melissen, Dombey, and Grove, Britain did explode a thermonuclear device in the Grapple test. Both "Short Granite" and "Purple Granite," detonated on 15 May and 19 June, respectively, were thermonuclear devices. The yields of 0.3 megatons and 0.2 megatons were disappointing, but these were only the first tests, and others were scheduled in November (Grapple X) to improve the yield. See Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, 35; N. Dombey and E. Grove, "Britain's Thermonuclear Bluff," London Review of Books 14 (22 October, 1992): 8-10; Baylis, "The Development of Britain's Thermonuclear Capability"; Botti, The Long Wait, 187; and Arnold, Britain and the H-Bomb, chap. 14.
50. Contrary to the view of Melissen, Dombey, and Grove, Britain did explode a thermonuclear device in the Grapple test. Both "Short Granite" and "Purple Granite," detonated on 15 May and 19 June, respectively, were thermonuclear devices. The yields of 0.3 megatons and 0.2 megatons were disappointing, but these were only the first tests, and others were scheduled in November (Grapple X) to improve the yield. See Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, 35; N. Dombey and E. Grove, "Britain's Thermonuclear Bluff," London Review of Books 14 (22 October, 1992): 8-10; Baylis, "The Development of Britain's Thermonuclear Capability"; Botti, The Long Wait, 187; and Arnold, Britain and the H-Bomb, chap. 14.
51. Contrary to the view of Melissen, Dombey, and Grove, Britain did explode a thermonuclear device in the Grapple test. Both "Short Granite" and "Purple Granite," detonated on 15 May and 19 June, respectively, were thermonuclear devices. The yields of 0.3 megatons and 0.2 megatons were disappointing, but these were only the first tests, and others were scheduled in November (Grapple X) to improve the yield. See Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, 35; N. Dombey and E. Grove, "Britain's Thermonuclear Bluff," London Review of Books 14 (22 October, 1992): 8-10; Baylis, "The Development of Britain's Thermonuclear Capability"; Botti, The Long Wait, 187; and Arnold, Britain and the H-Bomb, chap. 14.
52. Contrary to the view of Melissen, Dombey, and Grove, Britain did explode a thermonuclear device in the Grapple test. Both "Short Granite" and "Purple Granite," detonated on 15 May and 19 June, respectively, were thermonuclear devices. The yields of 0.3 megatons and 0.2 megatons were disappointing, but these were only the first tests, and others were scheduled in November (Grapple X) to improve the yield. See Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, 35; N. Dombey and E. Grove, "Britain's Thermonuclear Bluff," London Review of Books 14 (22 October, 1992): 8-10; Baylis, "The Development of Britain's Thermonuclear Capability"; Botti, The Long Wait, 187; and Arnold, Britain and the H-Bomb, chap. 14.
53. 570 H. C. Deb. 5s., 567-69, 575-76, 1035-39.
54. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 301-4; Dulles call to Strauss, 17 June 1957, Telephone Conversations of John Foster Dulles and Christian Herter, 1953-1961, reel 6, 220.
55. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 301-4; Dulles call to Strauss, 17 June 1957, Telephone Conversations of John Foster Dulles and Christian Herter, 1953-1961, reel 6, 220.
56. Stassen had acted on his own initiative without the knowledge of the president or Dulles. See memorandum for Dulles by Eisenhower, 4 June 1957, Eisenhower's Papers as President/Ann Whitman File (AWF) Dulles-Herter series, Box 7, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas; and Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 301-4.
57. Stassen had acted on his own initiative without the knowledge of the president or Dulles. See memorandum for Dulles by Eisenhower, 4 June 1957, Eisenhower's Papers as President/Ann Whitman File (AWF) Dulles-Herter series, Box 7, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas; and Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 301-4.
58. I. Clark and D. Angell, "Britain, the United States and the Control of Nuclear Weapons: The Diplomacy of the Thor Deployment, 1957-1958," Diplomacy and Statecraft 2 (November 1991); Botti, The Long Wait, 194-95.
59. I. Clark and D. Angell, "Britain, the United States and the Control of Nuclear Weapons: The Diplomacy of the Thor Deployment, 1957-1958," Diplomacy and Statecraft 2 (November 1991); Botti, The Long Wait, 194-95.
60. Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation, 58-59.
61. See Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, 63-92.
62. J. R. Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (Cambridge, MA, 1982), 7.
63. Washington tel. to Foreign Office, 7 October 1957, PREM 11/2554.
64. Foreign Office tel. to United Kingdom Embassy in Washington, 10 October 1957, PREM 11/2554; Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 315-16. Shortly after Macmillan wrote to Eisenhower, a major fire broke out in the nuclear reactor at Windscale. Macmillan's diary reveals that he played down the dangers of the fire because he feared that "complete disclosure of the nuclear disaster might have alerted Congress and jeopardized his historic chance to secure atomic secrets from the United States." Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, 45; A. Horne, Harold Macmillan, Vol. 2, 1957-1986 (New York, 1989), 53-55.
65. Foreign Office tel. to United Kingdom Embassy in Washington, 10 October 1957, PREM 11/2554; Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 315-16. Shortly after Macmillan wrote to Eisenhower, a major fire broke out in the nuclear reactor at Windscale. Macmillan's diary reveals that he played down the dangers of the fire because he feared that "complete disclosure of the nuclear disaster might have alerted Congress and jeopardized his historic chance to secure atomic secrets from the United States." Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, 45; A. Horne, Harold Macmillan, Vol. 2, 1957-1986 (New York, 1989), 53-55.
66. Foreign Office tel. to United Kingdom Embassy in Washington, 10 October 1957, PREM 11/2554; Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 315-16. Shortly after Macmillan wrote to Eisenhower, a major fire broke out in the nuclear reactor at Windscale. Macmillan's diary reveals that he played down the dangers of the fire because he feared that "complete disclosure of the nuclear disaster might have alerted Congress and jeopardized his historic chance to secure atomic secrets from the United States." Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, 45; A. Horne, Harold Macmillan, Vol. 2, 1957-1986 (New York, 1989), 53-55.
67. Foreign Office tel. to United Kingdom Embassy in Washington, 10 October 1957, PREM 11/2554; Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 315-16. Shortly after Macmillan wrote to Eisenhower, a major fire broke out in the nuclear reactor at Windscale. Macmillan's diary reveals that he played down the dangers of the fire because he feared that "complete disclosure of the nuclear disaster might have alerted Congress and jeopardized his historic chance to secure atomic secrets from the United States." Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, 45; A. Horne, Harold Macmillan, Vol. 2, 1957-1986 (New York, 1989), 53-55.
68. Foreign Office tel. to United Kingdom Embassy in Washington, 10 October 1957, PREM 11/2554; Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 315-16. Shortly after Macmillan wrote to Eisenhower, a major fire broke out in the nuclear reactor at Windscale. Macmillan's diary reveals that he played down the dangers of the fire because he feared that "complete disclosure of the nuclear disaster might have alerted Congress and jeopardized his historic chance to secure atomic secrets from the United States." Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, 45; A. Horne, Harold Macmillan, Vol. 2, 1957-1986 (New York, 1989), 53-55.
69. Dulles call to Merchant, 17 October 1957, Telephone of John Foster Dulles and Christian Herter, 1953-1961, reel 6, 722.
70. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 320-23.
71. Memorandum of conversation, Macmillan Talks, by Dulles, 24 October 1957, AWF, International Series, box 20; Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, 44; Botti, The Long Wait, 201-2. Nine technical subcommittees were set up covering the following areas: nuclear materials exchange; nuclear warheads; nuclear propulsion; delivery systems; biological warfare, chemical warfare, and radiological defense; defense against ballistic missiles; aicraft and aeroengines; and electron tubes and infrared. At their Washington meeting, Macmillan and Eisenhower decided to adopt a neutral position on French attempts to develop nuclear weapons. This was a delicate issue, especially with the French seeking British, as well as Italian and West German, cooperation. The Anglo-American position was "neither to assist nor to actively hinder the French programme."
72. Memorandum of conversation, Macmillan Talks, by Dulles, 24 October 1957, AWF, International Series, box 20; Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, 44; Botti, The Long Wait, 201-2. Nine technical subcommittees were set up covering the following areas: nuclear materials exchange; nuclear warheads; nuclear propulsion; delivery systems; biological warfare, chemical warfare, and radiological defense; defense against ballistic missiles; aicraft and aeroengines; and electron tubes and infrared. At their Washington meeting, Macmillan and Eisenhower decided to adopt a neutral position on French attempts to develop nuclear weapons. This was a delicate issue, especially with the French seeking British, as well as Italian and West German, cooperation. The Anglo-American position was "neither to assist nor to actively hinder the French programme."
73. Memorandum of conversation, Macmillan Talks, by Dulles, 24 October 1957, AWF, International Series, box 20; Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, 44; Botti, The Long Wait, 201-2. Nine technical subcommittees were set up covering the following areas: nuclear materials exchange; nuclear warheads; nuclear propulsion; delivery systems; biological warfare, chemical warfare, and radiological defense; defense against ballistic missiles; aicraft and aeroengines; and electron tubes and infrared. At their Washington meeting, Macmillan and Eisenhower decided to adopt a neutral position on French attempts to develop nuclear weapons. This was a delicate issue, especially with the French seeking British, as well as Italian and West German, cooperation. The Anglo-American position was "neither to assist nor to actively hinder the French programme."
74. Memorandum for the president by Dulles, 21 October 1957, AWF, Dulles-Herter Series, box 7, folder Dulles Oct. 1957 (1).
75. Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, 12. For a discussion of the broader alliance context of Anglo-American negotiations see Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France, and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949-2000 (London, 1997).
76. Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, 12. For a discussion of the broader alliance context of Anglo-American negotiations see Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France, and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949-2000 (London, 1997).
77. See Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of a European Settlement, 1945-1963, (Princeton, 1999). For a discussion of plans for Franco-Italian-German (FIG) nuclear cooperation see Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, 149-50.
78. See Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of a European Settlement, 1945-1963, (Princeton, 1999). For a discussion of plans for Franco-Italian-German (FIG) nuclear cooperation see Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, 149-50.
79. It appears that the U.S. representatives at the Washington conference were making policy "on the hoof." The meeting to clarify what information should be given to the British took place on 25 October. Dulles calls to Quarles and Strauss, both 25 October 1957, Telephone Conversations of John Foster Dulles and Christian Herter, 1953-1961, reel 6, 674-75; Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, 45. When Eisenhower met Macmillan on 24 October, he told him that "there were a few about four, applications of such high secrecy that very few people in his own government knew about them and he did not think these could be the subject of joint pooling unless and until we were satisfied that the Soviets themselves knew about them. He said he thought there were about two of these the Soviets knew about now, which reduced to only about two the data which would continue to be restricted." Memorandum of conversation, 24 October 1958, Papers of John Foster Dulles, General Correspondence and Memoranda, box 1.
80. It appears that the U.S. representatives at the Washington conference were making policy "on the hoof." The meeting to clarify what information should be given to the British took place on 25 October. Dulles calls to Quarles and Strauss, both 25 October 1957, Telephone Conversations of John Foster Dulles and Christian Herter, 1953-1961, reel 6, 674-75; Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, 45. When Eisenhower met Macmillan on 24 October, he told him that "there were a few about four, applications of such high secrecy that very few people in his own government knew about them and he did not think these could be the subject of joint pooling unless and until we were satisfied that the Soviets themselves knew about them. He said he thought there were about two of these the Soviets knew about now, which reduced to only about two the data which would continue to be restricted." Memorandum of conversation, 24 October 1958, Papers of John Foster Dulles, General Correspondence and Memoranda, box 1.
81. It appears that the U.S. representatives at the Washington conference were making policy "on the hoof." The meeting to clarify what information should be given to the British took place on 25 October. Dulles calls to Quarles and Strauss, both 25 October 1957, Telephone Conversations of John Foster Dulles and Christian Herter, 1953-1961, reel 6, 674-75; Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, 45. When Eisenhower met Macmillan on 24 October, he told him that "there were a few about four, applications of such high secrecy that very few people in his own government knew about them and he did not think these could be the subject of joint pooling unless and until we were satisfied that the Soviets themselves knew about them. He said he thought there were about two of these the Soviets knew about now, which reduced to only about two the data which would continue to be restricted." Memorandum of conversation, 24 October 1958, Papers of John Foster Dulles, General Correspondence and Memoranda, box 1.
82. Botti, The Long Wait, 203.
83. Telegram by Powell to Hood, 11 November 1957, PREM 11/2554; telegram by Hood to Powell, 15 November 1957, PREM 11/2554; Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, 45; Botti, The Long Wait, 206. The best account of the US-UK Technical talks is contained in Arnold, Britain and the H-Bomb, chap. 14.
84. Telegram by Powell to Hood, 11 November 1957, PREM 11/2554; telegram by Hood to Powell, 15 November 1957, PREM 11/2554; Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, 45; Botti, The Long Wait, 206. The best account of the US-UK Technical talks is contained in Arnold, Britain and the H-Bomb, chap. 14.
85. Telegram by Powell to Hood, 11 November 1957, PREM 11/2554; telegram by Hood to Powell, 15 November 1957, PREM 11/2554; Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, 45; Botti, The Long Wait, 206. The best account of the US-UK Technical talks is contained in Arnold, Britain and the H-Bomb, chap. 14.
86. Telegram by Powell to Hood, 11 November 1957, PREM 11/2554; telegram by Hood to Powell, 15 November 1957, PREM 11/2554; Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, 45; Botti, The Long Wait, 206. The best account of the US-UK Technical talks is contained in Arnold, Britain and the H-Bomb, chap. 14.
87. Telegram by Powell to Hood, 11 November 1957, PREM 11/2554; telegram by Hood to Powell, 15 November 1957, PREM 11/2554; Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, 45; Botti, The Long Wait, 206. The best account of the US-UK Technical talks is contained in Arnold, Britain and the H-Bomb, chap. 14.
88. New York Times, 2 June 1957. During Rickover's visit on 27-30 May, the United States hoped to persuade the British to discuss the technology of their Calder Hall reactor and other developments in the commercial nuclear power field. The British, however, continued to demand that U.S. companies using the technology should pay royalties to the government.
89. R. G. Hewlett and F. Duncan, Nuclear Navy, 1946-1962 (Chicago, 1974); Hearings before Subcommittee, JCAE, 1958, 164.
90. R. G. Hewlett and F. Duncan, Nuclear Navy, 1946-1962 (Chicago, 1974); Hearings before Subcommittee, JCAE, 1958, 164.
91. These difficulties had included attempts by American officials to link the deployment of Thor missiles in Britain with NATO plans (agreed in December 1957) for an IRBM under SACEUR's control. The British remained determined to retain a bilateral agreement, but they were prepared to accept a vague commitment to link the missiles to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. For a discussion of the alliance discussion to the negotiations see Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, 45.
92. Dulles calls to Quarles, 4 November 1957, Telephone Conversations of John Foster Dulles and Christian Herter, reel 6, 223. The United States eventually deployed seven squadrons of Thor and Jupiter IRBMs in a number of NATO countries, including Britain, Italy, and Turkey. Despite criticisms by the chief of the air staff in Britain that the missiles were "highly vulnerable," the government accepted the agreement because of its political symbolism. See Ian Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain's Deterrent and America, 1957-1962 (Oxford, 1994), 53-54; and S. J. Ball, The Bomber in British Strategy: Doctrine, Strategy, and Britain's World Role, 1945-1960 (Boulder, 1995).
93. Dulles calls to Quarles, 4 November 1957, Telephone Conversations of John Foster Dulles and Christian Herter, reel 6, 223. The United States eventually deployed seven squadrons of Thor and Jupiter IRBMs in a number of NATO countries, including Britain, Italy, and Turkey. Despite criticisms by the chief of the air staff in Britain that the missiles were "highly vulnerable," the government accepted the agreement because of its political symbolism. See Ian Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain's Deterrent and America, 1957-1962 (Oxford, 1994), 53-54; and S. J. Ball, The Bomber in British Strategy: Doctrine, Strategy, and Britain's World Role, 1945-1960 (Boulder, 1995).
94. Dulles calls to Quarles, 4 November 1957, Telephone Conversations of John Foster Dulles and Christian Herter, reel 6, 223. The United States eventually deployed seven squadrons of Thor and Jupiter IRBMs in a number of NATO countries, including Britain, Italy, and Turkey. Despite criticisms by the chief of the air staff in Britain that the missiles were "highly vulnerable," the government accepted the agreement because of its political symbolism. See Ian Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain's Deterrent and America, 1957-1962 (Oxford, 1994), 53-54; and S. J. Ball, The Bomber in British Strategy: Doctrine, Strategy, and Britain's World Role, 1945-1960 (Boulder, 1995).
95. Strauss to Eisenhower, 19 December 1957, enclosure: Interim Report to the President and the Prime Minister from Strauss, Quarles, Plowden, and Powell, AWF, Administration Series, box 4, folder AEC 1957(1).
96. The Soviet government had just completed a series of tests, and Britain still had a number of important tests planned in April, August, and September.
97. D. Cambell, The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier: American Military Power in Britain (London, 1984), 55-57.
98. Denis Healey quoted in the House of Commons a statement made by Dulles on 19 November 1957 in which he said that there was "no question of a veto on the use of [American] nuclear weapons being exercised by other countries. No government could legally cast a veto against a decision of another government taken for its own defense." 578 H.C. Deb. 5s., 1152-54; 579 H.C., Deb. 5s., 212-17, 371-73.
99. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 474-75; Botti, The Long Wait, 223.
100. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 474-75; Botti, The Long Wait, 223.
101. When Macmillan visited Washington on 7 June 1958, he raised the issue once again about the use of American bases in Britain. As a result, a new agreement was initialed by the prime minister and the president that replaced "the loose arrangement made by Attlee and Churchill." This agreement, however, has never been made public. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 494.
102. By this stage the president had convinced the chairman of the JCAE, Senator Carl Durham (D-NC), of the need to cooperate more effectively in the nuclear field with U.S. allies.
103. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Agreements for Cooperation, JCAE, Amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1954-Exchange of Military Information and Materials with Allies, 85th Cong., 2d sess., 1958, 102 (emphasis added). See also R. W. Dyke and F. X. Gannon, Chet Hollifield: Master Legislator and Nuclear Statesman (Washington, 1996).
104. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Agreements for Cooperation, JCAE, Amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1954-Exchange of Military Information and Materials with Allies, 85th Cong., 2d sess., 1958, 102 (emphasis added). See also R. W. Dyke and F. X. Gannon, Chet Hollifield: Master Legislator and Nuclear Statesman (Washington, 1996).
105. The Calder Hall reactors were primarily for producing military plutonium, but they were also dual-purpose reactors that, as a by-product, would generate electricity for the national grid. They would also serve as prototypes for the civil nuclear power stations Britain planned to build.
106. The U.S. position was undermined by splits between the different agencies involved in the negotiations. The DOD, in particular, was opposed to introducing a "civilian consideration" into an essentially military agreement. Hearings before Subcommittee, JCAE, 1958, 501-3.
107. Public Law 479, 85th Cong., 68 Stat. 276.
108. Agreement between Government of the United Kingdom of Great Briatin and Northern Ireland and Government of United States of America for Co-operation on Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes, Washington, 3 July 1958, U.S. Department of State, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements 9 (Washington, 1959), 1028.
109. Amendment to 1958 Atomic Energy Agreement, Washington, 2 May 1959, U.S. Department of State, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, 10:1274.
110. Botti, The Long Wait, 248 (emphasis added).
111. Telegram from Foreign Office to Washington, 20 August 1958, FO 371/135551, ZE 120/87G.
112. Outline of Information to be Initially Exchanged with the UK, undated, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, (OSS) Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, box 5, DDEL. The report suggested that the following kinds of information should not be revealed to the British at that stage: information concerning the use of the two-stage principle, propagation burning, radiation flow, or any other information concerning the TN secondary or unique case design; information concerning the internal design revealing general or specific dimensions or configurations of the nuclear components (of the Mk. 15/39 weapon); and information about the fission-fusion ratio of nuclear efficiencies.
113. Conference with the president, 20 August 1958, White House Office, OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, box 4.
114. Memorandum of conversation between the president and Dr. Libby, 21 August 1958, White House Office, OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, box 4. Initially, Libby was not inclined to share information with other states (including Britain), but in 1953 he took charge of Project Sunshine, designed to evaluate the global effects of nuclear testing. During this exercise it became clear to American officials that the United States should enlist the British in this evaluation. Libby appears to have become more sympathetic to the British during the implementation of Project Sunshine.
115. Telegram from Herter to embassy in London, Presidential Handling, 20 August 1958, International Series, box 21, folder Macmillan-President 6/1/58-9/30/58(4), DDEL; memorandum of conference with the president on 21 August 1958 by Goodpaster, 23 August 1958, White House Office, OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, box 3, folder AEC Vol. 11 (4) (August-September 1958).
116. Telegram from Herter to embassy in London, Presidential Handling, 20 August 1958, International Series, box 21, folder Macmillan-President 6/1/58-9/30/58(4), DDEL; memorandum of conference with the president on 21 August 1958 by Goodpaster, 23 August 1958, White House Office, OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, box 3, folder AEC Vol. 11 (4) (August-September 1958).
117. The two documents were United States Nuclear Weapons Systems Data (for Initial Information Exchange with the United Kingdom) Compiled by the Division of Military Application of the AEC, Reference Symbol, 7720(13), and US-UK Agreement on the Use of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence - Information Transmitted by the UK Representatives Compiled by Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, Reference CWD/4309. The U.S. delegation of thirteen included: Major General Herbert Loper, assistant to the secretary of defense for atomic energy; Brigadier General Alfred Starbird, director of military application, Atomic Energy Commission; Dr. Norris Bradbury, director of Los Alamos Laboratory; Dr James McRae, president of the Sandia Corporation; as well as Dr. Willard Libby, AEC commissioner. The UK delegation of eight included Sir William Penney, member of the Atomic Energy Authority; Sir William Cook, member of the Atomic Energy Authority; Mr. Edward Newley, chief of weapons development, Atomic Energy Research Establishment, Aldermaston; as well as Sir Frederick Brundrett, scientific adviser to the Ministry of Defence.
118. The UK gave the Americans information about the following designs: Green Grass, Flagpole, the Pendant and Burgee devices, a 6-inch gun shell; a 1,350-pound warhead; and 2200-pound device. White House Office, OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical subseries, box 5.
119. AEC Quarterly Progress Report to the JCAE, Part III - Weapons, July-September 1958, DOE/NOO, Progress Reports on Selected Programs, no. 73760, cited in Norris et al., British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 48. See also letter to the president, 26 September 1958, White House Office, OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, box 4. For a very useful analysis of these meetings see Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, 51-54. On 6 September Eisenhower authorized that fabrication prints and material specifications be furnished to the United Kingdom. AEC Quarterly Progress Report to the JAEC, Part III - Weapons, January-March 1959.
120. AEC Quarterly Progress Report to the JCAE, Part III - Weapons, July-September 1958, DOE/NOO, Progress Reports on Selected Programs, no. 73760, cited in Norris et al., British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 48. See also letter to the president, 26 September 1958, White House Office, OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, box 4. For a very useful analysis of these meetings see Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, 51-54. On 6 September Eisenhower authorized that fabrication prints and material specifications be furnished to the United Kingdom. AEC Quarterly Progress Report to the JAEC, Part III - Weapons, January-March 1959.
121. AEC Quarterly Progress Report to the JCAE, Part III - Weapons, July-September 1958, DOE/NOO, Progress Reports on Selected Programs, no. 73760, cited in Norris et al., British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 48. See also letter to the president, 26 September 1958, White House Office, OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, box 4. For a very useful analysis of these meetings see Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, 51-54. On 6 September Eisenhower authorized that fabrication prints and material specifications be furnished to the United Kingdom. AEC Quarterly Progress Report to the JAEC, Part III - Weapons, January-March 1959.
122. AEC Quarterly Progress Report to the JCAE, Part III - Weapons, July-September 1958, DOE/NOO, Progress Reports on Selected Programs, no. 73760, cited in Norris et al., British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 48. See also letter to the president, 26 September 1958, White House Office, OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, box 4. For a very useful analysis of these meetings see Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, 51-54. On 6 September Eisenhower authorized that fabrication prints and material specifications be furnished to the United Kingdom. AEC Quarterly Progress Report to the JAEC, Part III - Weapons, January-March 1959.
123. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 565. The United States, however, also recognized some weaknesses in the British program. According to an American account of the Washington meeting: "The British apparently do not have an appreciation that plutonium produced from uranium subjected to higher burn-up in their reactors is usable in weapons. This knowledge would be of great significance to their civilian power programs. In addition, they have apparently not exerted major effort toward making their weapons one-point safe." AEC, Quarterly Progress Report to the JCAE, Part III - Weapons, July-September 1958, 14.
124. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 565. The United States, however, also recognized some weaknesses in the British program. According to an American account of the Washington meeting: "The British apparently do not have an appreciation that plutonium produced from uranium subjected to higher burn-up in their reactors is usable in weapons. This knowledge would be of great significance to their civilian power programs. In addition, they have apparently not exerted major effort toward making their weapons one-point safe." AEC, Quarterly Progress Report to the JCAE, Part III - Weapons, July-September 1958, 14.
125. Program Status Report to the JCAE, Part III - Weapons, 13 December 1958, no. 73756. See "Record of the Second Meeting of the Technical Experts Held Pursuant to Section 11 of the Technical Annex to the 'Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes,'" White House Office, OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, box 5.
126. Program Status Report to the JCAE, Part III - Weapons, 13 December 1958, no. 73756. See "Record of the Second Meeting of the Technical Experts Held Pursuant to Section 11 of the Technical Annex to the 'Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes,'" White House Office, OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, box 5.
127. Telegram from Washington to Foreign Office, 25 September 1958, FO 371/135506, ZE 13/74.
128. Record of the Second Meeting of the Technical Experts, White House Office, OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, box 5.
129. This information has been obtained from Arnold, Britain and the H-Bomb.
130. Record of the Second Meeting of Experts.
131. Record of the Second Meeting of Experts. Discussions took place on a range of technical, scientific, and engineering issues, including weapon electronics, uranium and plutonium fabrication, high explosives, tritium, beryllium, solid fusion materials, plastics, rubber and adhesives, engineering, and weapons assembly. See Norris et al., British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 49.
132. Norris et al., British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 52. See Program Status Report to the JCAE, Part III - Weapons, 31 December 1958.
133. Norris et al., British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 52. See Program Status Report to the JCAE, Part III - Weapons, 31 December 1958.
134. Quarterly Progress Report to the JCAE, Part III - Weapons, January-March 1959, April-June 1959, no. 73764; Quarterly Progress Report to the JCAE, Part III - Weapons, July-September 1959, no. 73766; Progress Report on Selected Programs to the JCAE, Part III - Weapons, May 1960, no. 73768, cited in Norris et al., British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 49.
135. Quarterly Progress Report to the JCAE, Part III - Weapons, January-March 1959, April-June 1959, no. 73764; Quarterly Progress Report to the JCAE, Part III - Weapons, July-September 1959, no. 73766; Progress Report on Selected Programs to the JCAE, Part III - Weapons, May 1960, no. 73768, cited in Norris et al., British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 49.
136. Quarterly Progress Report to the JCAE, Part III - Weapons, January-March 1959, April-June 1959, no. 73764; Quarterly Progress Report to the JCAE, Part III - Weapons, July-September 1959, no. 73766; Progress Report on Selected Programs to the JCAE, Part III - Weapons, May 1960, no. 73768, cited in Norris et al., British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 49.
137. Arnold, Britain and the H-Bomb.
138. See Norris et al., British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 49.
139. There is some debate over whether the W47 or WE177 warheads were used on the Polaris SLBMs. AEC, Progress Report on Selected Programs to the JCAE, May 1960, Part III - Weapons, 15, suggests the W47 was used, while Peter Jones has argued that a WE177 warhead was used. See P. G. E. F. Jones, "Overview of History of U.K. Strategic Weapons," in The History of the U.K. Strategic Deterrent, Proceedings of the Royal Aeronautical Society (London, 1999).
140. There is some debate over whether the W47 or WE177 warheads were used on the Polaris SLBMs. AEC, Progress Report on Selected Programs to the JCAE, May 1960, Part III - Weapons, 15, suggests the W47 was used, while Peter Jones has argued that a WE177 warhead was used. See P. G. E. F. Jones, "Overview of History of U.K. Strategic Weapons," in The History of the U.K. Strategic Deterrent, Proceedings of the Royal Aeronautical Society (London, 1999).
141. Norris et al., British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 49. Other topics discussed included hydrodynamics and shock relations for problems with spherical and cylindrical symmetry, cross-sections, radiochemistry, atomic demolition munitions, warhead hardening, asymmetric detonations, terrorist nuclear threat response, nuclear weapons accidents and nuclear waste management.
142. See R. Ullman, "The Covert French Connection," Foreign Policy 75 (Summer 1989): 3-33.
143. D. Reynolds, "A 'Special Relationship'? America, Britain, and International Order since the Second World War," International Affairs 62 (Winter 1985-86): 1-20.
144. A. Pierre, Nuclear Politics: The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force, 1939-1970 (London, 1972); G. M. Dillon, Dependence and Deterrence Success and Civility in the Anglo-American Special Nuclear Relationship, 1962-1982 (London, 1983).
145. A. Pierre, Nuclear Politics: The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force, 1939-1970 (London, 1972); G. M. Dillon, Dependence and Deterrence Success and Civility in the Anglo-American Special Nuclear Relationship, 1962-1982 (London, 1983).
146. G. Ball, The Discipline of Power (London, 1968), 102, 93. For a discussion of the problems caused by the Anglo-American nuclear partnership for alliance cohesion see Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, 109-14.
147. G. Ball, The Discipline of Power (London, 1968), 102, 93. For a discussion of the problems caused by the Anglo-American nuclear partnership for alliance cohesion see Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, 109-14.
148. Pierre, Nuclear Politics, 316. Whether nuclear proliferation was encouraged and alliance cohesion undermined as a result of the 1958 act remains very difficult to prove one way or the other.
149. Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace.
150. Ball, The Discipline of Power.
151. The terms of the "Murphy-Dean Agreement" of 7 June 1958 confirmed the basic understanding that the use of bases in the UK by American forces would be a matter of joint decision by the two governments. Although the Murphy-Dean Agreement has not been declassified it is mentioned in a number of documents. See PRO CAB 21/4061 and AIR 8/2201; see also Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 494. Trachtenberg argues that the dual-key arrangements were in fact a deliberate fiction devised largely to convince Congress that there was effective control over American nuclear weapons. In practice, he argues, real control lay with the host state. Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace.
152. The terms of the "Murphy-Dean Agreement" of 7 June 1958 confirmed the basic understanding that the use of bases in the UK by American forces would be a matter of joint decision by the two governments. Although the Murphy-Dean Agreement has not been declassified it is mentioned in a number of documents. See PRO CAB 21/4061 and AIR 8/2201; see also Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 494. Trachtenberg argues that the dual-key arrangements were in fact a deliberate fiction devised largely to convince Congress that there was effective control over American nuclear weapons. In practice, he argues, real control lay with the host state. Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace.
153. The terms of the "Murphy-Dean Agreement" of 7 June 1958 confirmed the basic understanding that the use of bases in the UK by American forces would be a matter of joint decision by the two governments. Although the Murphy-Dean Agreement has not been declassified it is mentioned in a number of documents. See PRO CAB 21/4061 and AIR 8/2201; see also Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 494. Trachtenberg argues that the dual-key arrangements were in fact a deliberate fiction devised largely to convince Congress that there was effective control over American nuclear weapons. In practice, he argues, real control lay with the host state. Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace.
154. Statement by Mr. Frederick Jandrey, deputy assistant secretary for European affairs, American Foreign Policy Foreign Documents, 1958, Western Europe (Department of State Publications, 7522, 1962), 647.
155. See Norris et al., British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 111. Although Britain had decided not to buy Poseidon from the United States, there was still a need to work on the WE177 family of warheads.
156. Department of State, US-UK Relationship Enters a New Era (partially declassified and released under the FOIA), report No. 1125-AR, 10 July 1985. Quoted in ibid., 120
157. Department of State, US-UK Relationship Enters a New Era (partially declassified and released under the FOIA), report No. 1125-AR, 10 July 1985. Quoted in ibid., 120
158. Arnold, Britain and the H-Bomb. I am grateful to Lorna Arnold for showing me her "Notes for a Talk at Sandia," November 1997.