Public expenditure, corruption, and economic growth: The case of Italy

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 17, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 1-16

  Del Monte, Alfredo ^a   Papagni, Erasmo ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NAPLES FEDERICO II   (Italy)

^b SECOND UNIVERSITY OF NAPLES   (Italy)

Author keywords

Dynamic panel data; Government efficiency; H50; Italian economy; O10

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041407245     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(00)00025-2     Document Type: Article

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