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Volumn 17, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 835-852

Rent-setting in multiple winner rent-seeking contests

Author keywords

Collusion; Cournot competition; D72; Regulation; Rent seeking

Indexed keywords


EID: 0041407183     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(01)00058-1     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (17)

References (15)
  • 1
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    • Appelbaum E., Katz E. Seeking rents by setting rents: the political economy of rent seeking. The Economic Journal. 97:1987;685-699.
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    • Appelbaum, E.1    Katz, E.2
  • 2
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    • Rent seeking with multiple winners
    • Berry S.K. Rent seeking with multiple winners. Public Choice. 77:1993;437-443.
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    • Berry, S.K.1
  • 4
    • 21344456697 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • A multi-winner nested rent-seeking contest
    • Clark D.J., Riis C. A multi-winner nested rent-seeking contest. Public Choice. 87:1996;177-184.
    • (1996) Public Choice , vol.87 , pp. 177-184
    • Clark, D.J.1    Riis, C.2
  • 5
    • 0008549539 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Influence and the discretionary allocation of several prizes
    • Clark D.J., Riis C. Influence and the discretionary allocation of several prizes. European Journal of Political Economy. 14:1998;605-625.
    • (1998) European Journal of Political Economy , vol.14 , pp. 605-625
    • Clark, D.J.1    Riis, C.2
  • 6
    • 0002448998 scopus 로고
    • Entry dynamics with mixed strategies
    • L.G. Thomas. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books
    • Dixit A., Shapiro C. Entry dynamics with mixed strategies. Thomas L.G. The Economics of Strategic Planning. 1986;Lexington Books, Lexington, MA.
    • (1986) The Economics of Strategic Planning
    • Dixit, A.1    Shapiro, C.2
  • 8
    • 0001166092 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Risk aversion in rent-seeking and rent-augmenting games
    • Konrad K., Schlesinger H. Risk aversion in rent-seeking and rent-augmenting games. Economic Journal. 107:1997;1671-1683.
    • (1997) Economic Journal , vol.107 , pp. 1671-1683
    • Konrad, K.1    Schlesinger, H.2
  • 9
  • 11
    • 0041877794 scopus 로고
    • More potential entrants may lead to less competition
    • Nti K. More potential entrants may lead to less competition. Journal of Economics. 49:1989;47-70.
    • (1989) Journal of Economics , vol.49 , pp. 47-70
    • Nti, K.1
  • 12
    • 0041877793 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Potential competition and coordination in a market entry game
    • Nti K. Potential competition and coordination in a market entry game. Journal of Economics. 71:2000;149-165.
    • (2000) Journal of Economics , vol.71 , pp. 149-165
    • Nti, K.1
  • 14
    • 0002138949 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Rent seeking
    • D.C. Mueller. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
    • Tollison R.D. Rent seeking. Mueller D.C. Perspectives on Public Choice. 1997;506-525 Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge.
    • (1997) Perspectives on Public Choice , pp. 506-525
    • Tollison, R.D.1
  • 15
    • 0002782259 scopus 로고
    • Efficient rent-seeking
    • J.M. Buchanan, R.D. Tollison, & G. Tullock. College Station: Texas A&M Univ. Press
    • Tullock G. Efficient rent-seeking. Buchanan J.M., Tollison R.D., Tullock G. Towards a Theory of the Rent-seeking Society. 1980;97-112 Texas A&M Univ. Press, College Station.
    • (1980) Towards a Theory of the Rent-seeking Society , pp. 97-112
    • Tullock, G.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.