An aggregate model of firm specific capital with and without commitment

Journal of Monetary Economics

Volumn 48, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 217-237

  Kwok, Claudian ^a  

^a CITY UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

Agency problems; Aggregate fluctuations; Asset specificity; E22; E32

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041407153     PISSN: 03043932     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3932(01)00068-X     Document Type: Article

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