Redistribution when avoidance behavior is heterogeneous

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 81, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 51-71

  Kopczuk, Wojciech ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

H21; H24; H26; Optimal income taxation; Tax administration; Tax avoidance

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041366042     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00121-3     Document Type: Article

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