Military policy and reform in Ghana

Journal of Modern African Studies

Volumn 35, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 251-278

  Hutchful, Eboe ^a  

^a WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041361538     PISSN: 0022278X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0022278X97002450     Document Type: Article

References (41)

1. See Eboe Hutchful, 'Restructuring Civil-Military Relations and the Collapse of Democracy in Ghana, 1979-81', in African Affairs (London), forthcoming.
2. In addition to many arrests, the enfants terribles of 4 June 1979 executed eight senior active and retired officers, including three former Heads of State. Later, following the coup of 31 December 1981, three naval officers were murdered at Takoradi.
3. Kojo Yankah, The Trial of J. J. Rawlings: echoes of the 31st December revolution (Tema, Ghana Publishing Corporation, 1986).
4. Reported in the Daily Graphic (Accra), 9 June 1980.
5. Ghana Armed Forces, Regulations for Defence Committees in the Armed Forces, dated 1 January 1983, with subsequent revisions, p. 1.
6. The fact the President Jerry Rawlings himself quite possibly did not see these radical changes as inconsistent with 'professionalisation' in the narrowest sense - in terms of improving the combat capabilities of the Armed Forces - was suggested by his insistence on retaining the British joint services training team which the previous régime had requested.
7. Eboe Hutchful, Organizational Decomposition and Junior Ranks' Political Action in Ghana', in Hutchful and Abdoulaye Bathily, The Military and Militarism in Africa (Dakar, Codesria, forthcoming).
8. Report of the [Erskine] Commission of Enquiry, Structure of the Armed Forces, Accra, 1988.
9. Although the PNDC and its supporters tried to use these regional fora to propagate their opposition to a future system of multi-party politics, this was what was recommended by the National Commission for Democracy in its report in March 1991, an act of political courage that recalled that of the Koranteng Addow (or 'Union Government') Committee in 1978.
10. The new parties were the National Defence Congress (NDC), New Patriotic Party (NPP), National Convention Party (NCP), Every Ghanaian Living Everywhere (EGLE), Democratic Republican Party (DRP), People's Party for Democracy and Development (PPDD), National Justice Party (NJP), People's National Congress (PNC), Democratic People's Party (DPP), National Independence Party (NIP), People's Heritage Party (PHP), National Salvation Party (NSP), and the New Generation Party (NGP). The NDC and EGLE, which had both been sponsored by the PNDC, entered into a political alliance with the NCP, then considered to be one of the pro-Nkrumah parties (others were the PNC and the PHP). The NPP, which drew the second largest set of votes in the presidential elections, was the main pro-Busia party.
11. Eboe Hutchful, 'Restoring Civil Control of Military and Security Agencies in Democratic Transitions in Africa', Social Science Research Council Conference on 'Transitions in Africa: violence and the politics of participation', Niamey, Niger, 4-6 June 1996.
12. Major Courage Quashigah was arrested in September 1989, along with several army officers and civilians, all Ewes, for plotting the assassination of the Chairman of the PNDC. The conspiracy allegedly attempted to exploit the grievances of the Forces Reserve Battalion relating to poor conditions of service. The lenient treatment of Quashigah, who was merely dismissed from the Armed Forces, was perceived by some as an instance of Ewe favouritism.
13. National Commission for Democracy (NCD), Perceptions of Ghanaians on the Country's Political Future (Accra, January 1991), pp. 36-7.
14. This was confirmed by a visiting American assessment team on behalf of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems. See Laurie A. Cooper et al., Ghana: a pre-election assessment report (Washington, DC, 1 June 1992), p. 35.
15. According to 'Commandos, Militia Are a Threat', in The Vanguard (Accra), 9-15 July 1992, the presidential candidate of the NPP, Professor Adu Boahen, demanded the 'total disbandment of all paramilitary revolutionary organs' to prevent them from acting as 'armed gangs to terrorise innocent citizens'.
16. See The New Republic, 10-16 July 1992.
17. Section 2 of Article 212 of the 1992 constitution states that the 'President may, acting in accordance with the advice of the Armed Forces Council, appoint officers of the Armed Forces who shall be given such command as the [AFC] may determine', while Section 4 reposes in the President the power to 'appoint persons to hold or act in an office in the Armed Forces ... acting in accordance with the advice of the [AFC]'.
18. Interview, Ministry of Defence, 22 July 1995.
19. See Hutchful, 'Restructuring Civil-Military Relations and the Collapse of Democracy in Ghana', for a discussion of the efforts made by the Limann Government to reform the Ministry of Defence.
20. Interview, Ministry of Defence, 27 July 1995.
21. Interview with Alhaji Mahama Iddrisu, 23 August 1995.
22. Interview, Ministry of Defence, 27 July 1995.
23. See Simon Baynham, 'Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?: the case of Nkrumah's National Security Service' in The Journal of Modern African Studies, 21, 1 March 1985, pp. 96-9, and Kwesi Quantson, Chapters from a Career (Accra, Sedco Publishing, 1996), pp. 30-1. Kwame Nkrumah's attempt to take over control of the intelligence agencies not only helped to precipitate the coup against in him in February 1966, but also gave birth to subsequent rivalry between civilian governments and the security forces for control over these agencies.
24. See Simon Baynham, 'Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?: the case of Nkrumah's National Security Service' in The Journal of Modern African Studies, 21, 1 March 1985, pp. 96-9, and Kwesi Quantson, Chapters from a Career (Accra, Sedco Publishing, 1996), pp. 30-1. Kwame Nkrumah's attempt to take over control of the intelligence agencies not only helped to precipitate the coup against in him in February 1966, but also gave birth to subsequent rivalry between civilian governments and the security forces for control over these agencies.
25. International Monetary Fund, 'Ghana: statistical index', Washington, DC, 2 June 1994, Table 24, mimeographed.
26. Statement by the Director of Peacekeeping Operations at Army HQ, in Afnews (Accra), No. 84, 1995, p. 1.
27. Erskine Commission of Enquiry, 1988.
28. Interview, 23 August 1995.
29. Dr Kwesi Botchwey's statement to the meeting of the Ghana Consultative Group, Paris, 24-25 June 1993.
30. West Africa (London), 16-22 January 1995, p. 7.
31. As Director-General of Operations and Plans under the PNDC, Lieutenant-Colonel K. T. Donkor 'did not feel the presence of the Minister. Once it got to the CDS that was it'. Interview, 22 August 1995.
32. Interview, Ministry of Defence, 24 July 1995.
33. Interview with Donkor, 8 August 1995.
34. Interview with General Arnold Quainoo, 23 July 1992: 'the Armed Forces need professionalism. They should look for professionals and the Armed Forces should be run on professional lines.'
35. Interview, 23 August 1995.
36. Interview with a senior military officer, 31 May 1996.
37. Interview with two members of the Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Interior, May 1995.
38. Interview, 27 July 1995.
39. Interview with Donkor, 22 August 1995.
40. Hutchful, 'Organizational Decomposition and Junior Ranks' Political Action', p. 39. But how this 'political' ingredient is to be defined and integrated into the project of restructuring the Armed Forces at the present time seems to be less and less clear.
41. West Africa, 9-15 December 1996, pp. 1915-16.