Preference-based arguments for probabilism

Philosophy of Science

Volumn 68, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 356-376

  Christensen, David ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041330584     PISSN: 00318248     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/392889     Document Type: Article

References (15)

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