Models of executive politics: A framework for the study of executive power relations in parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes

Political Studies

Volumn 45, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 217-231

  Elgie, Robert ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0041195180     PISSN: 00323217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.00077     Document Type: Article

References (55)

1. See, inter alia, J. Mackintosh, The British Cabinet (London, Stevens, 2nd ed., 1968).
2. See, for example, E. N. Suleiman, 'Presidential Government in France' in E. N. Suleiman and R. Rose (eds), Presidents and Prime Ministers (Washington DC, American Enterprise Institute, 1980), pp. 94-138.
3. For an overview of and contributions to this debate, refer to S. Padgett (ed.), Adenauer to Kohl. The Development of the German Chancellorship (London, Hurst, 1994).
4. B. Farrell, Chairman or Chief? The Role of Taoiseach in Irish Government (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1971).
5. For Britain, see P. Dunleavy and R. A. W. Rhodes, 'Core executive studies in Britain', Public Administration, 68 (1990), 3-28. For France, see R. Elgie, The Role of the Prime Minister in France, 1981-91 (London, Macmillan, 1993). For Ireland, see B. O'Leary, 'An Taoiseach: the Irish Prime Minister', West European Politics, 14, 2 (1991), 133-62.
6. For Britain, see P. Dunleavy and R. A. W. Rhodes, 'Core executive studies in Britain', Public Administration, 68 (1990), 3-28. For France, see R. Elgie, The Role of the Prime Minister in France, 1981-91 (London, Macmillan, 1993). For Ireland, see B. O'Leary, 'An Taoiseach: the Irish Prime Minister', West European Politics, 14, 2 (1991), 133-62.
7. For Britain, see P. Dunleavy and R. A. W. Rhodes, 'Core executive studies in Britain', Public Administration, 68 (1990), 3-28. For France, see R. Elgie, The Role of the Prime Minister in France, 1981-91 (London, Macmillan, 1993). For Ireland, see B. O'Leary, 'An Taoiseach: the Irish Prime Minister', West European Politics, 14, 2 (1991), 133-62.
8. See M. Laver and K. A. Shepsle, 'Cabinet Minsters and Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies' in M. Laver and K. A. Shepsle (eds), Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 3-12.
9. The word 'regime' is being used to describe the formal, or constitutional, organization of institutional relations. The word 'system' will be used to describe the actual functioning of these relations. The English language definition of a semi-presidential, regime may be found in M. Duverger, 'A new political system model: semi-presidential government', European Journal of Political Research, 8 (1980), 165-87.
10. Dunleavy and Rhodes, 'Core executive studies in Britain'. Subsequently, this article has been amended and expanded by one of its authors, R. A. W. Rhodes, 'From Prime Ministerial Power to Core Executive' in R. A. W. Rhodes and P. Dunleavy (eds), Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive (London, Macmillan, 1995), pp. 11-37. Where there is overlap, references to both works will be cited.
11. Dunleavy and Rhodes, 'Core executive studies in Britain'. Subsequently, this article has been amended and expanded by one of its authors, R. A. W. Rhodes, 'From Prime Ministerial Power to Core Executive' in R. A. W. Rhodes and P. Dunleavy (eds), Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive (London, Macmillan, 1995), pp. 11-37. Where there is overlap, references to both works will be cited.
12. Dunleavy and Rhodes, 'Core executive studies in Britain', p. 4.
13. Dunleavy and Rhodes, 'Core executive studies in Britain', pp. 3-4.
14. Dunleavy and Rhodes, 'Core executive studies in Britain', p. 4. In Rhodes, 'From Prime Ministerial Power to Core Executive', p. 12, there is a slightly different, but substantially similar definition.
15. Dunleavy and Rhodes, 'Core executive studies in Britain', p. 4. In Rhodes, 'From Prime Ministerial Power to Core Executive', p. 12, there is a slightly different, but substantially similar definition.
16. Rhodes, 'From Prime Ministerial Power to Core Executive', p. 12.
17. Dunleavy and Rhodes, 'Core executive studies in Britain', pp. 5-16; Rhodes, 'From Prime Ministerial Power to Core Executive', pp. 15-26.
18. Dunleavy and Rhodes, 'Core executive studies in Britain', pp. 5-16; Rhodes, 'From Prime Ministerial Power to Core Executive', pp. 15-26.
19. Dunleavy and Rhodes, 'Core executive studies in Britain', p. 24.
20. O'Leary, 'An Taoiseach: the Irish Prime Minister', pp. 154-5.
21. Elgie, The Role of the Prime Minister in France, 1981-91, pp. 21-37.
22. W. Müller, 'Models of Government and the Austrian Cabinet' in M. Laver and K. A. Snepsle (eds), Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government, pp. 15-34.
23. Laver and Shepsle, 'Cabinet Ministers and Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies', p. 6.
24. Laver and Shepsle, 'Cabinet Ministers and Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies', p. 7. Müller, 'Models of Government and the Austrian Cabinet', p. 23. The original definition comes from R. Rose, The Problem of Party Government (London, Macmillan, 1974), p. 379.
25. Laver and Shepsle, 'Cabinet Ministers and Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies', p. 7. Müller, 'Models of Government and the Austrian Cabinet', p. 23. The original definition comes from R. Rose, The Problem of Party Government (London, Macmillan, 1974), p. 379.
26. Laver and Shepsle, 'Cabinet Ministers and Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies', p. 7. Müller, 'Models of Government and the Austrian Cabinet', p. 23. The original definition comes from R. Rose, The Problem of Party Government (London, Macmillan, 1974), p. 379.
27. In an excellent article by A. Criscitiello, 'Majority summits: decision making inside the cabinet and out: Italy, 1970-1990', West European Politics, 16, 4 (1993), 581-94, the impact of party is clearly seen to restrict the overall decision-making capacity of those in the Italian executive, but this does not mean that it is not possible to draw conclusions about the respective strengths of the actors within the executive: see, for example, D. Hine and R. Finocchi, 'The Italian Prime Minister', West European Politics, 14, 1 (1991), 79-96.
28. In an excellent article by A. Criscitiello, 'Majority summits: decision making inside the cabinet and out: Italy, 1970-1990', West European Politics, 16, 4 (1993), 581-94, the impact of party is clearly seen to restrict the overall decision-making capacity of those in the Italian executive, but this does not mean that it is not possible to draw conclusions about the respective strengths of the actors within the executive: see, for example, D. Hine and R. Finocchi, 'The Italian Prime Minister', West European Politics, 14, 1 (1991), 79-96.
29. Dunleavy and Rhodes, 'Core executive studies in Britain', pp. 5-8; Rhodes, 'From Prime Ministerial Power to Core Executive', p. 15.
30. Dunleavy and Rhodes, 'Core executive studies in Britain', pp. 5-8; Rhodes, 'From Prime Ministerial Power to Core Executive', p. 15.
31. T. A. Baylis, Governing by Committee. Collegial Leadership in Advanced Societies (Albany, NY, State University of New York Press, 1989), p. 7.
32. See, G. W. Jones, 'Presidentialization in a Parliamentary System?' in C. Campbell and M. J. Wyszomirski (eds), Executive Leadership in Anglo-American Systems (Pittsburg PA, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991), pp. 111-37.
33. G. W. Jones, 'Cabinet Government since Bagehot' in R. Blackburn (ed.) Constitutional Studies. Contemporary Issues and Controversies (London, Mansell, 1992), p. 21.
34. Laver and Shepsle, 'Cabinet ministers and government formation in parliamentary democracies', p. 8.
35. Dunleavy and Rhodes, 'Core executive studies in Britain', p. 12; Rhodes, 'From Prime Ministerial Power to Core Executive', p. 20.
36. Dunleavy and Rhodes, 'Core executive studies in Britain', p. 12; Rhodes, 'From Prime Ministerial Power to Core Executive', p. 20.
37. Müller, 'Models of Government and the Austrian Cabinet', p. 31.
38. J. Blondel 'Dual Leadership in the Contemporary World: a Step towards Executive and Regime Stability?' in D. Kavanagh and G. Peele (eds), Comparative Government and Politics. Essays in Honour of S. E. Finer (London, Heinemann, 1984), p. 75. Although the definition of shared government is taken from Blondel's work on dual leadership, the implications of the term here are significantly different to those which Blondel identified.
39. See, for example, T. Larsson, 'The Role and Position of Ministers of Finance' in J. Blondel and F. Müller Rommel (eds), Governing Together. The Extent and Limits of Joint Decision Making in Western European Cabinets (London, Macmillan, 1993), pp. 207-8.
40. R. H. S. Crossman, 'Prime Ministerial Government' in A. King (ed.), The British Prime Minister (London, Macmillan, 2nd ed., 1985), p. 189 (this author's emphasis).
41. M. Laver and K. A. Shepsle, 'Cabinet Government in Theoretical Perspective' in M. Laver and K. A. Shepsle (eds), Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 309.
42. G. Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering. An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes (London, Macmillan, 1994), p. 123.
43. See, inter alia, G. Jones, 'Mrs Thatcher and the power of the PM', Contemporary Record, 3, 4
44. M. J. Smith, 'The core executive and the resignation of Mrs Thatcher', Public Administration, 72, (1994), pp. 344-5.
45. See J. G. March and J. P. Olsen, 'The new institutionalism: organizational factors in political life', American Political Science Review, 78, 3 (1984), 734-49. It might be noted, though, that the 'strategic analysis of institutions', which was developed by French political scientists, such as Jean-Luc Parodi, predates the Anglo-Saxon revival of interest in institutionalism by at least a decade. For a mature example of this analysis, see J-L. Parodi, 'Imprévisible ou Inéluctable, l'Evolution de la Cinquième République?' in O. Duhamel and J-L. Parodi (eds), La Constitution de la Cinquième République (Paris, Presses de la FNSP, 1985), pp. 24-43.
46. See J. G. March and J. P. Olsen, 'The new institutionalism: organizational factors in political life', American Political Science Review, 78, 3 (1984), 734-49. It might be noted, though, that the 'strategic analysis of institutions', which was developed by French political scientists, such as Jean-Luc Parodi, predates the Anglo-Saxon revival of interest in institutionalism by at least a decade. For a mature example of this analysis, see J-L. Parodi, 'Imprévisible ou Inéluctable, l'Evolution de la Cinquième République?' in O. Duhamel and J-L. Parodi (eds), La Constitution de la Cinquième République (Paris, Presses de la FNSP, 1985), pp. 24-43.
47. See K. Thelen and S. Steinmo, 'Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics' in S. Steinmo, K. Thelen and F. Longstreth (eds), Structuring Politics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 1-32.
48. J. Pontusson, 'From comparative public policy to political economy: putting political institutions in their place and taking interests seriously', Comparative Political Studies, 28, 1 (1995) 122-3
49. Thelen and Steinmo, 'Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Polities', p. 2.
50. P. A. Hall, 'The Movement from Keynesianism to Monetarism: Institutional Analysis and British Economic Policy in the 1970s' in Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth (eds), Structuring Politics, p. 107.
51. This point was first made by Jean-Luc Parodi in the article entitled 'Sur quelques enseignements institutionnels de l'alternance àla française', Revue Politique et Parlementaire, 892 (1981), 42-9.
52. Clearly, even if the elections are coterminous, there is still the opportunity for a disjunction of presidential and parliamentary majorities to occur. This situation has not yet occurred under the Fifth Republic.
53. This is Angelo Panebianco's phrase in, Political Parties: Organisation and Power (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 143-62.
54. M. J. Smith, 'The core executive and the resignation of Mrs Thatcher', p. 348.
55. D. Kavanagh, Politics and Personalities (London, Macmillan, 1990), pp. 246-71.