The importance of ideals

Journal of Value Inquiry

Volumn 31, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 23-37

  Van Der Burg, Wibren ^a  

^a Schoordijk Institute   (Netherlands)

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EID: 0041194649     PISSN: 00225363     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1004267831040     Document Type: Article

References (67)

1. "In the sphere of human endeavour we cannot properly explain and understand the reality about us without reference to motivating ideals." N. Rescher, A system of pragmatic idealism, vol. II: The validity of values (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 138.
2. Major proponents of these rule-oriented models are Kelsen, Hart, and more recently, Schauer.
3. Important critics are Shklar, Selznick, and Dworkin.
4. Two are Viehweg and Esser.
5. D. Lyons, "Moral aspects of legal theory," in M. Cohen (ed.), Ronald Dworkin and contemporary jurisprudence (London: Duckworth, 1984), pp. 49-69; E. Ph. Soper, "Legal theory and the obligation of a judge: The Hart/Dworkin dispute," in Cohen (ed.), Ronald Dworkin and contemporary jurisprudence, pp. 3-27.
6. D. Lyons, "Moral aspects of legal theory," in M. Cohen (ed.), Ronald Dworkin and contemporary jurisprudence (London: Duckworth, 1984), pp. 49-69; E. Ph. Soper, "Legal theory and the obligation of a judge: The Hart/Dworkin dispute," in Cohen (ed.), Ronald Dworkin and contemporary jurisprudence, pp. 3-27.
7. Major advocates of the importance of ideals are Fuller, Selznick and Peters. See on Fuller esp. K.I. Winston, "The ideal element in a definition of law," Law and Philosophy, 5 (1986): 89-111.
8. For rule-orientation see R.B. Brandt, A theory of the good and the right (Oxford: Clarendon, 1979); B. Gert, Morality: A new justification of the moral rules (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). For principle-orientation see T.L. Beauchamp and J.F. Childress, Principles of biomedical ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
9. For rule-orientation see R.B. Brandt, A theory of the good and the right (Oxford: Clarendon, 1979); B. Gert, Morality: A new justification of the moral rules (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). For principle-orientation see T.L. Beauchamp and J.F. Childress, Principles of biomedical ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
10. For rule-orientation see R.B. Brandt, A theory of the good and the right (Oxford: Clarendon, 1979); B. Gert, Morality: A new justification of the moral rules (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). For principle-orientation see T.L. Beauchamp and J.F. Childress, Principles of biomedical ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
11. A.R. Jonsen and S. Toulmin, The abuse of casuistry (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1988); T. van Willigenburg, Inside the ethical expert (Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1991).
12. A.R. Jonsen and S. Toulmin, The abuse of casuistry (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1988); T. van Willigenburg, Inside the ethical expert (Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1991).
13. N. Rescher, Ethical idealism: An inquiry into the nature and function of ideals (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1987); N. Rescher, The validity of values.
14. N. Rescher, Ethical idealism: An inquiry into the nature and function of ideals (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1987); N. Rescher, The validity of values.
15. A. MacIntyre, After virtue (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981); S. Macedo, Liberal virtues (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).
16. A. MacIntyre, After virtue (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981); S. Macedo, Liberal virtues (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).
17. S. Hampshire, Morality and conflict (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).
18. P. Selznick, The moral commonwealth: Social theory and the promise of community (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1992); W.A. Galston, Liberal purposes: Goods, virtues, and diversity in the liberal state (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1991); M. Walzer, "The communitarian critique of liberalism," Political Theory, 18 (1990): 6-23; Macedo, Liberal virtues.
19. P. Selznick, The moral commonwealth: Social theory and the promise of community (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1992); W.A. Galston, Liberal purposes: Goods, virtues, and diversity in the liberal state (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1991); M. Walzer, "The communitarian critique of liberalism," Political Theory, 18 (1990): 6-23; Macedo, Liberal virtues.
20. P. Selznick, The moral commonwealth: Social theory and the promise of community (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1992); W.A. Galston, Liberal purposes: Goods, virtues, and diversity in the liberal state (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1991); M. Walzer, "The communitarian critique of liberalism," Political Theory, 18 (1990): 6-23; Macedo, Liberal virtues.
21. P. Selznick, The moral commonwealth: Social theory and the promise of community (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1992); W.A. Galston, Liberal purposes: Goods, virtues, and diversity in the liberal state (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1991); M. Walzer, "The communitarian critique of liberalism," Political Theory, 18 (1990): 6-23; Macedo, Liberal virtues.
22. The word "ideal" is used by R. Dworkin in Taking rights seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978) and Law's empire (London: Fontana, 1986); see also P. Selznick "Sociology and natural law," Natural Law Forum, 6 (1961): 84-108; Rescher, Ethical idealism; K.I. Winston, Op. cit.; and A.A.G. Peters, "Law as critical discussion," in G. Teubner (ed.), Dilemmas of law in the welfare state (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1986), pp. 250-279.
23. The word "ideal" is used by R. Dworkin in Taking rights seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978) and Law's empire (London: Fontana, 1986); see also P. Selznick "Sociology and natural law," Natural Law Forum, 6 (1961): 84-108; Rescher, Ethical idealism; K.I. Winston, Op. cit.; and A.A.G. Peters, "Law as critical discussion," in G. Teubner (ed.), Dilemmas of law in the welfare state (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1986), pp. 250-279.
24. The word "ideal" is used by R. Dworkin in Taking rights seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978) and Law's empire (London: Fontana, 1986); see also P. Selznick "Sociology and natural law," Natural Law Forum, 6 (1961): 84-108; Rescher, Ethical idealism; K.I. Winston, Op. cit.; and A.A.G. Peters, "Law as critical discussion," in G. Teubner (ed.), Dilemmas of law in the welfare state (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1986), pp. 250-279.
25. The word "ideal" is used by R. Dworkin in Taking rights seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978) and Law's empire (London: Fontana, 1986); see also P. Selznick "Sociology and natural law," Natural Law Forum, 6 (1961): 84-108; Rescher, Ethical idealism; K.I. Winston, Op. cit.; and A.A.G. Peters, "Law as critical discussion," in G. Teubner (ed.), Dilemmas of law in the welfare state (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1986), pp. 250-279.
26. The word "ideal" is used by R. Dworkin in Taking rights seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978) and Law's empire (London: Fontana, 1986); see also P. Selznick "Sociology and natural law," Natural Law Forum, 6 (1961): 84-108; Rescher, Ethical idealism; K.I. Winston, Op. cit.; and A.A.G. Peters, "Law as critical discussion," in G. Teubner (ed.), Dilemmas of law in the welfare state (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1986), pp. 250-279.
27. The word "ideal" is used by R. Dworkin in Taking rights seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978) and Law's empire (London: Fontana, 1986); see also P. Selznick "Sociology and natural law," Natural Law Forum, 6 (1961): 84-108; Rescher, Ethical idealism; K.I. Winston, Op. cit.; and A.A.G. Peters, "Law as critical discussion," in G. Teubner (ed.), Dilemmas of law in the welfare state (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1986), pp. 250-279.
28. For the importance of these three elements of the concept of ideals, see W. van der Burg, Het democratisch perspectief (Arnhem: Gouda Quint, 1991), p. 24. Most of these elements are also suggested by Rescher, Ethical idealism, and The validity of values. Only the idea that an ideal is somehow grounded in reality is not found in Rescher, but in Selznick; see also J. Rawls, "Justice as fairness: Political not metaphysical," Philosophy and Public Affairs, 14 (1985): 223-251 and Dworkin, Law's empire, p. 409.
29. For the importance of these three elements of the concept of ideals, see W. van der Burg, Het democratisch perspectief (Arnhem: Gouda Quint, 1991), p. 24. Most of these elements are also suggested by Rescher, Ethical idealism, and The validity of values. Only the idea that an ideal is somehow grounded in reality is not found in Rescher, but in Selznick; see also J. Rawls, "Justice as fairness: Political not metaphysical," Philosophy and Public Affairs, 14 (1985): 223-251 and Dworkin, Law's empire, p. 409.
30. For the importance of these three elements of the concept of ideals, see W. van der Burg, Het democratisch perspectief (Arnhem: Gouda Quint, 1991), p. 24. Most of these elements are also suggested by Rescher, Ethical idealism, and The validity of values. Only the idea that an ideal is somehow grounded in reality is not found in Rescher, but in Selznick; see also J. Rawls, "Justice as fairness: Political not metaphysical," Philosophy and Public Affairs, 14 (1985): 223-251 and Dworkin, Law's empire, p. 409.
31. For the importance of these three elements of the concept of ideals, see W. van der Burg, Het democratisch perspectief (Arnhem: Gouda Quint, 1991), p. 24. Most of these elements are also suggested by Rescher, Ethical idealism, and The validity of values. Only the idea that an ideal is somehow grounded in reality is not found in Rescher, but in Selznick; see also J. Rawls, "Justice as fairness: Political not metaphysical," Philosophy and Public Affairs, 14 (1985): 223-251 and Dworkin, Law's empire, p. 409.
32. Cf. Rescher, The validity of values, pp. 130 and 137; P. Nonet and P. Selznick, Law and society in transition: Toward responsive law (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), pp. 47-48.
33. Cf. Rescher, The validity of values, pp. 130 and 137; P. Nonet and P. Selznick, Law and society in transition: Toward responsive law (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), pp. 47-48.
34. Cf. Rescher, The validity of values, pp. 131.
35. Both Rawls and Dworkin seem to combine neo-Kantian and pragmatist approaches to ideals.
36. In Law's empire, Dworkin is partially making a shift away from principles to ideals, but he is not really consistent in this.
37. Beauchamp and Childress, Op. cit.
38. For this problem, see Van Willigenburg, Op. cit.
39. Here I use the definition of principles as originally introduced by Dworkin, Taking rights seriously, p. 22-28.
40. Dworkin, Op. cit., p. 22 and 28.
41. This principle has a prima facie character and in some cases it may be overruled; therefore, it is a principle and not a rule.
42. This would be a model similar to that developed by Rescher in The validity of values, p. 192.
43. For a similar criticism on regarding the morality of aspiration as the foundation of all morality, see L.L. Fuller, The morality of law (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1969), p. 10
44. The idea of a wide reflective equilibrium has been at the core of the ethics research program at Utrecht University for the past years. See Van der Burg, Op. cit.; T. van Willigenburg and F.R. Heeger, "Rechtfertigung moralischer Urteile: ein Netzmodell," Zeitschrift für Evangelische Ethik, 35 (1991): 88-95.
45. The idea of a wide reflective equilibrium has been at the core of the ethics research program at Utrecht University for the past years. See Van der Burg, Op. cit.; T. van Willigenburg and F.R. Heeger, "Rechtfertigung moralischer Urteile: ein Netzmodell," Zeitschrift für Evangelische Ethik, 35 (1991): 88-95.
46. Four of these elements have the same names in law, morality and politics. Only the element of concrete intuitions in morality has different analogues in politics and law.
47. Cf. Van der Burg, Op. cit., p. 124.
48. Cf. Nonet and Selznick, Op. cit., p. 48.
49. Selznick, Op cit., p. 103.
50. Cf. Nonet and Selznick, Op. cit., for a dynamic analysis of due process, in terms of the values at stake in procedural protection.
51. Winston, Op. cit., p. 104; Selznick, Op. cit.
52. Winston, Op. cit., p. 104; Selznick, Op. cit.
53. Rescher, Ethical idealism, p. 123. See also Rescher, The validity of values, p. 135.
54. Rescher, Ethical idealism, p. 123. See also Rescher, The validity of values, p. 135.
55. For this example, see W. van der Burg et al., "The care of a good caregiver: Legal and ethical reflections on the good health care professional," Cambridge Quarterly of Health Care Ethics, 3 (1994): 38-48.
56. For a more thorough analysis, see Van der Burg, Het democratisch perspectief. The idea that democracy can only be defined in relation to an idealtype is developed by A. Ross, Why democracy? (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 86.
57. For a more thorough analysis, see Van der Burg, Het democratisch perspectief. The idea that democracy can only be defined in relation to an idealtype is developed by A. Ross, Why democracy? (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 86.
58. Nonet and Selznick, Op. cit., p. 80 ff., stress the role of purpose and principle in dealing with change.
59. Fuller, Op. cit.
60. Peters, Op. cit.
61. Nonet and Selznick, Op. cit., warn against the danger of regression of responsive law to repressive law, because the former is a highly precarious ideal.
62. Cf. Radbruch's idea that the three central legal values of Gerechtigkeit, Rechtssicherheit, and Zweckmäßigkeit are in constant competition, and that we should never lay too much emphasis on one of them at the cost of the other two central values.
63. Rescher, Ethical idealism, p. 123 ff.
64. Van der Burg, Het democratisch perspectief, ch. 1.
65. Rescher, Ethical idealism, pp. 16 and 123.
66. Cf. Nonet and Selznick, Op. cit., p. 91.
67. Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the universities of Tilburg and Utrecht (the Netherlands), and at the universities of Uppsala and Linköping, and the Ersta Institute for Health Care Ethics in Stockholm (Sweden). I would like to thank my colleagues at those institutes for their helpful comments. Special thanks are due to Bert van den Brink, Frans W.A. Brom, Robert Heeger, Bart van Klink, Bert van Roermund, Philip Selznick, Paul van Seters, Per Sundman, and Willem Witteveen.