Britain's secret intelligence service in Asia during the Second World War

Modern Asian Studies

Volumn 32, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 179-217

  Aldrich, Richard J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0041169290     PISSN: 0026749X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0026749X9800290X     Document Type: Article

References (132)

1. Christopher Andrew and David Dilks (eds), The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century (London: Macmillan, 1984). See also John L. Gaddis, 'Intelligence, Espionage and Cold War Origins', Diplomatic History, 13, 2 (Spring 1989): 191-213; Donald Cameron Watt, 'Intelligence and the Historian', Diplomatic History, 14, 2 (Spring 1990): 199-205.
2. Christopher Andrew and David Dilks (eds), The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century (London: Macmillan, 1984). See also John L. Gaddis, 'Intelligence, Espionage and Cold War Origins', Diplomatic History, 13, 2 (Spring 1989): 191-213; Donald Cameron Watt, 'Intelligence and the Historian', Diplomatic History, 14, 2 (Spring 1990): 199-205.
3. Christopher Andrew and David Dilks (eds), The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century (London: Macmillan, 1984). See also John L. Gaddis, 'Intelligence, Espionage and Cold War Origins', Diplomatic History, 13, 2 (Spring 1989): 191-213; Donald Cameron Watt, 'Intelligence and the Historian', Diplomatic History, 14, 2 (Spring 1990): 199-205.
4. On British intelligence archives during the 1970s and 1980s see, Wesley K. Wark, 'In Never-Never Land? The British Archives on Intelligence', The Historical Journal, 35, 1 (Spring 1992): 195-202.
5. F. H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, Vol. 1 (London: HMSO, 1979).
6. Donald Cameron Watt, 'Intelligence Studies: The Emergence of a British School', Intelligence and National Security, 3, 2 (April 1988): 338-42.
7. See, for example, Zara Steiner, 'Deception and its Dividends', Times Literary Supplement, 7-13 Dec. 1990, p. 1,310. For a superb synthesis of the impact of intelligence on the European War see Ralph Bennett, Behind the Battle: Intelligence in the War with Germany, 1939-45 (London: Sinclair Stevenson, 1994).
8. See, for example, Zara Steiner, 'Deception and its Dividends', Times Literary Supplement, 7-13 Dec. 1990, p. 1,310. For a superb synthesis of the impact of intelligence on the European War see Ralph Bennett, Behind the Battle: Intelligence in the War with Germany, 1939-45 (London: Sinclair Stevenson, 1994).
9. There are two notable exceptions at the level of field operations. A good account of SIS activities in Malaya is given in Ian Trenowden, Operations Most Secret: SOE The Malayan Theatre (London: William Kimber, 1978), pp. 123-46. SIS also makes brief appearances in Terence O'Brien's partly autobiographical The Moonlight War: The Story of Clandestine Operations in South-East Asia, 1944-5 (London: Collins, 1987).
10. There are two notable exceptions at the level of field operations. A good account of SIS activities in Malaya is given in Ian Trenowden, Operations Most Secret: SOE The Malayan Theatre (London: William Kimber, 1978), pp. 123-46. SIS also makes brief appearances in Terence O'Brien's partly autobiographical The Moonlight War: The Story of Clandestine Operations in South-East Asia, 1944-5 (London: Collins, 1987).
11. Amongst the official historians of British intelligence the exception is Michael Howard who has included a chapter on the war against Japan in his volume on deception, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol. V. The most recent literature on Pearl Harbor includes David Kaiser, 'Conspiracy or Cock-up? Pearl Harbor Revisited', Intelligence and National Security, 9, 2 (April 1994): 354-72; D. C. S. Sissons, 'More on Pearl Harbor', ibid., pp. 373-80.
12. Amongst the official historians of British intelligence the exception is Michael Howard who has included a chapter on the war against Japan in his volume on deception, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol. V. The most recent literature on Pearl Harbor includes David Kaiser, 'Conspiracy or Cock-up? Pearl Harbor Revisited', Intelligence and National Security, 9, 2 (April 1994): 354-72; D. C. S. Sissons, 'More on Pearl Harbor', ibid., pp. 373-80.
13. Amongst the official historians of British intelligence the exception is Michael Howard who has included a chapter on the war against Japan in his volume on deception, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol. V. The most recent literature on Pearl Harbor includes David Kaiser, 'Conspiracy or Cock-up? Pearl Harbor Revisited', Intelligence and National Security, 9, 2 (April 1994): 354-72; D. C. S. Sissons, 'More on Pearl Harbor', ibid., pp. 373-80.
14. This most recent release is described in Louise Atherton, SOE Operations in the Far East: An Introductory Guide to the Newly Released Records (London: Public Record Office, 1993).
15. The classic account is Christopher M. Andrew, Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community (London: Heinemann, 1985), pp. 339-447.
16. Andrew, Secret Service, p. 467.
17. Robert Cecil, 'Philby's Spurious War', Intelligence and National Security, 9, 4 (October 1994): 764-8; E. D. R. Harrison, 'More Thoughts on Kim Philby's Silent War', Intelligence and National Security, 10, 3 (July 1995): 514-26.
18. Robert Cecil, 'Philby's Spurious War', Intelligence and National Security, 9, 4 (October 1994): 764-8; E. D. R. Harrison, 'More Thoughts on Kim Philby's Silent War', Intelligence and National Security, 10, 3 (July 1995): 514-26.
19. The classic work on SOE remains M. R. D. Foot, SOE in France (London: HMSO, 1966). On SOE-SIS rivalry see David Stafford, Britain and the European Resistance, 1940-45: A Survey of the Special Operations Executive with Documents (London: St Anthony's/Macmillan, 1980), pp. 38-56.
20. The classic work on SOE remains M. R. D. Foot, SOE in France (London: HMSO, 1966). On SOE-SIS rivalry see David Stafford, Britain and the European Resistance, 1940-45: A Survey of the Special Operations Executive with Documents (London: St Anthony's/Macmillan, 1980), pp. 38-56.
21. On Mountbatten and South East Asia Command, see Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War Against Japan, 1941-1945 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978); Philip Zeigler, Mountbatten: The Official Biography (London: Collins, 1985); Peter Dennis, Troubled Days of Peace: Mountbatten and South East Asia Command, 1945-46 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987). On Garnons-Williams, see Charles Cruickshank, SOE in the Far East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 88, 171.
22. On Mountbatten and South East Asia Command, see Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War Against Japan, 1941-1945 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978); Philip Zeigler, Mountbatten: The Official Biography (London: Collins, 1985); Peter Dennis, Troubled Days of Peace: Mountbatten and South East Asia Command, 1945-46 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987). On Garnons-Williams, see Charles Cruickshank, SOE in the Far East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 88, 171.
23. On Mountbatten and South East Asia Command, see Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War Against Japan, 1941-1945 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978); Philip Zeigler, Mountbatten: The Official Biography (London: Collins, 1985); Peter Dennis, Troubled Days of Peace: Mountbatten and South East Asia Command, 1945-46 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987). On Garnons-Williams, see Charles Cruickshank, SOE in the Far East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 88, 171.
24. On Mountbatten and South East Asia Command, see Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War Against Japan, 1941-1945 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978); Philip Zeigler, Mountbatten: The Official Biography (London: Collins, 1985); Peter Dennis, Troubled Days of Peace: Mountbatten and South East Asia Command, 1945-46 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987). On Garnons-Williams, see Charles Cruickshank, SOE in the Far East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 88, 171.
25. On inter-war imperial security intelligence, see Richard J. Popplewell, Intelligence and Imperial Defence: The Secret Service of the Indian Empire, 1904-1920 (London: Frank Cass, 1995); Frederick S. Litten, 'The Noulens Affair', The China Quarterly, 138 (June 1994): 492-512.
26. On inter-war imperial security intelligence, see Richard J. Popplewell, Intelligence and Imperial Defence: The Secret Service of the Indian Empire, 1904-1920 (London: Frank Cass, 1995); Frederick S. Litten, 'The Noulens Affair', The China Quarterly, 138 (June 1994): 492-512.
27. Wing Commander Wigglesworth (AI2), 'Notes on the tour of RAF and Combined Service Intelligence Organisations in the Far East', Part V: Shanghai, 30 June 1938, AIR 20/374, PRO. For a fleeting glimpse of Steptoe during the mid-1920s see Bernard Wasserstein, The Secret Lives of Trebitsch Lincoln (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), pp. 233-4, 244-5, 248-9.
28. Wing Commander Wigglesworth (AI2), 'Notes on the tour of RAF and Combined Service Intelligence Organisations in the Far East', Part V: Shanghai, 30 June 1938, AIR 20/374, PRO. For a fleeting glimpse of Steptoe during the mid-1920s see Bernard Wasserstein, The Secret Lives of Trebitsch Lincoln (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), pp. 233-4, 244-5, 248-9.
29. I am dependent on private information for insight into some of Steptoe's more colourful attributes. One of Steptoe's more notorious SIS colleagues offers a similarly low opinion of him: 'The near-mental case was Steptoe of Shanghai, who had covered the whole Far East for SIS between the wars. How it happened was still a mystery to me: I found it difficult to believe that he could hold any job for a week.' Kim Philby, My Silent War (London: MacGibbon and Key, 1968), p. 77.
30. Drysdale, 'British Intelligence Service in China', G-2 Report No. 8704, 6 Dec. 1933, 9944-A-190, RG 165, United States National Archives (hereafter USNA).
31. Wigglesworth Report, Part V: Shanghai, AIR 20/374, PRO.
32. On intelligence and Japan see also Wesley K. Wark, 'In Search of a Suitable Japan: British Naval Intelligence in the Pacific Before the Second World War', Intelligence and National Security, 1, 2 (April 1986): 189-212;
33. John Ferris,'"Worthy of Some Better Enemy": The British Estimate of the Imperial Japanese Army and the Fall of Singapore', Canadian Journal of History, 28, 2 (August 1993): 223-56;
34. Antony Best, 'Constructing an Image: British Intelligence and Whitehall's Perception of Japan, 1931-1939', Intelligence and National Security, 11, 3 (July 1996): 403-23.
35. On the fast-expanding Japanese clandestine network, see E. Bruce Reynolds, Thailand and Japan's Southern Advance, 1940-1945 (New York: St Martin's Press, 1994), pp. 177-81, 210-11, 221-3; Richard J. Aldrich, The Key to the South: Britain, the United States and Thailand During the Approach of the Pacific War, 1929-42 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 128, 185, 222-3, 340-1; Peter Elphick, Singapore: The Pregnable Fortress (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1994), pp. 27-44
36. On the fast-expanding Japanese clandestine network, see E. Bruce Reynolds, Thailand and Japan's Southern Advance, 1940-1945 (New York: St Martin's Press, 1994), pp. 177-81, 210-11, 221-3; Richard J. Aldrich, The Key to the South: Britain, the United States and Thailand During the Approach of the Pacific War, 1929-42 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 128, 185, 222-3, 340-1; Peter Elphick, Singapore: The Pregnable Fortress (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1994), pp. 27-44
37. On the fast-expanding Japanese clandestine network, see E. Bruce Reynolds, Thailand and Japan's Southern Advance, 1940-1945 (New York: St Martin's Press, 1994), pp. 177-81, 210-11, 221-3; Richard J. Aldrich, The Key to the South: Britain, the United States and Thailand During the Approach of the Pacific War, 1929-42 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 128, 185, 222-3, 340-1; Peter Elphick, Singapore: The Pregnable Fortress (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1994), pp. 27-44
38. Crosby to FO No. 562, 28 Dec. 1938, F206/204/40, FO 371/23589, PRO.
39. Wing Commander Wigglesworth (AI2), 'Notes on the tour of RAF and Combined Service Intelligence Organisations in the Far East', Part IV: Hong Kong, 30 June 1938, AIR 20/374, PRO.
40. C. in C. FE to COS, 6 June 1941, WO 193/920, PRO.
41. in C. FE to COS No. 13672, 17 June 1941, WO 193/920, PRO. See also (Hist) (DD), 'Dispatch on the Far East by Brooke-Popham', 1 June 1942, CAB 120/ 518, PRO. Denham was a director of Anglo-Dutch Plantations Ltd., a rubber conern in Java.
42. WO to C. in C. FE No. 70866, 7 June 1941, WO 193/607, PRO.
43. Brooke-Popham to FECB, 21 Aug. 1941, AIR 23/1865, PRO. See also (Hist) (DD), 'Dispatch on the Far East by Brooke-Popham', 1 June 1942, CAB 120/518, PRO.
44. See, for example, MI6 Political Report No. 111, 'A Statement of Japanese Policy: French Information from Shanghai', WO 208/895, PRO.
45. Steveni (MI6) to MI2c and MI3a, 17 April 1941, CX.37400/I/818 (untranslated), WO 208/1219A, PRO; Winterborn (MI2c) minute 28.12.40 on MI6 CX.37502/991, 21 Dec. 1940, ibid.
46. These agents were controlled by Major Rosher of SIS in Singapore, R. Gough, SOE Singapore, 1941-2 (London: William Kimber, 1985), pp.68-89.
47. FECB Intelligence Survey No. 1822, 'Warning of Attack by Japan', 9 Dec. 1940, WO 208/888, PRO.
48. Ferris, ' "Worthy of Some Better Enemy?"'.
49. On warning of an invasion by Japan, see Ong Chit Chung, 'Operation Matador and the Outbreak of the War in the Far East', Ph.D., University of London, 1985, PP. 372-90; Antony Best, Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor (London: Routledge, 1995). On Japanese clandestine activities, see Eric Robertson, The Japanese file: Pre-War Japanese Penetration in World War Two (Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia, 1979).
50. On warning of an invasion by Japan, see Ong Chit Chung, 'Operation Matador and the Outbreak of the War in the Far East', Ph.D., University of London, 1985, PP. 372-90; Antony Best, Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor (London: Routledge, 1995). On Japanese clandestine activities, see Eric Robertson, The Japanese file: Pre-War Japanese Penetration in World War Two (Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia, 1979).
51. On warning of an invasion by Japan, see Ong Chit Chung, 'Operation Matador and the Outbreak of the War in the Far East', Ph.D., University of London, 1985, PP. 372-90; Antony Best, Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor (London: Routledge, 1995). On Japanese clandestine activities, see Eric Robertson, The Japanese file: Pre-War Japanese Penetration in World War Two (Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia, 1979).
52. Steveni (SIS) to Baker, Ops/34, 17 March 1944, AIR 23/7679, PRO.
53. Crombie (IO) to Collier (FO), 4 Oct. 1939, (PZ/6153), L/P&S/12/308, IOLR; Steveni memorandum, 'Recent Events in Eastern Europe (through Soviet eyes)', 26 Sept. 1939, (WS 1201), L/WS/1/99, IOLR. The Soviet Export Department which contained many of Steveni's long-term contacts was based at Melbourne House, Aldwych, London.
54. Comments on the COS appreciation 'Russian Threat to India', 2 Oct. 1939, (WS 1201), L/WS/1/99, IOLR. This file is entitled 'Mise Reports Prepared by Major Steveni'.
55. Major Steveni (MI6), CX37065/1/186, to Ridsdale (MIzc), 12 Feb. 1941, WO 208/895, PRO.
56. See, for example, Lt Colonel Steveni (MI6) to MI2e, CX.65400/349, 25 June 1941, WO 208/1900, PRO; Lt Colonel Steveni (MI6b) to MI2c, CX.37400/577-9, 1 Sept. 1941, WO 208/254, PRO; Lt Colonel Steveni (MI6b) to MI2c, CX.28037/ 666, 19 Oct. 1941, ibid.
57. In early 1943 Denham was hoping to be made 'Inspector of our Australian organisation' in view of his good knowledge of Java. SIS Australia was then working into the Netherlands East Indies with Dutch co-operation. Entry for 19 March 1943, Wilkinson diary, 1/2, 2, Churchill College, Cambridge (hereafter CCC).
58. The local cover-names for clandestine organizations proliferated throughout the war. For ease of comprehension the terms SIS and SOE have been retained throughout this essay.
59. See, for example, Beddlington (SIS), Baroda House, Delhi, to Jones (London) concerning allocation of additional temporary and local ranks to SIS personnel, 6 Jan. 1944, WO 203/6383, PRO.
60. For example of GHQ-inspired operational intelligence gathering in Burma, see memorandum by Steveni (SIS) to Cawthorn (DMI GHQ India), 'Operation Buzzard-No. 40', Ops/40, 26 Oct. 1943, AIR 23/7682, PRO.
61. Entries for 7 and 9 July 1943, Wilkinson diary, 1/2, 2, CCC.
62. See, for example, the acrimonious discussions between Churchill, Eden, Selborne and the COS at DO (43) 7th mtg., 2 Aug. 1943, AIR 8/1749, PRO.
63. On the problems of RAF special duties during the war against Japan, see O'Brien, The Moonlight War; Air Vice Marshall Probert, The Forgotten Air Force: A History of the RAF in the War Against Japan (London: Brasseys, 1995).
64. On the problems of RAF special duties during the war against Japan, see O'Brien, The Moonlight War; Air Vice Marshall Probert, The Forgotten Air Force: A History of the RAF in the War Against Japan (London: Brasseys, 1995).
65. Mountbatten, writing to the COS in December 1943, welcomed the transfer of 9 battered Catalinas from West Africa for special duties, but stood firm against the use of Liberator bombers for this sort of work, SEACOS 50, 22 Dec. 1943, AIR 23/2132, PRO.
66. Steveni (SIS) to Jonas (RAF), Ops/Q/41, 17 Aug. 1943, fol. 4A, AIR 23/7678, PRO. See also Lalaltol (SIS) to Jonas (RAF), Ops/A/28, 3 June 1943, fol. 1A, ibid.
67. Steveni (SIS) to Jonas (RAF), Ops. A112, 23 Dec. 1943, fol. 21, AIR 23/7679, PRO.
68. Coleman memorandum, 'Clandestine Air Operations: A Brief History of Operations in South East Asia, 1 June 1942-31 May 1945', AIR 23/1950, PRO.
69. Minutes of P Division, 43rd mtg., 9 Jan. 1945, AIR 23/2137, PRO.
70. See, for example, the letter concerning the loss of two special duties aircraft sent by Steveni (SIS) to Baker (RAF), Ops/34, 17 March 1944, AIR 23/7679, PRO.
71. He continued: 'With this sort of information it will be possible to land OGs at selected points with the mission of not only exfiltrating desirable people but also with the additional mission of liquidating others, such as Jap Divisional Commanders and the like.' Richard Heppner, Chief of OSS SEAC, to Donovan, 18 July 1944, File 510, Box 512, Entry 110, RG 226, USNA.
72. Deak memorandum, 'Mahara Examination Centre, Ceylon', 18 July 1945, File 2694, Box 159, Entry 154, RG 226, USNA.
73. D of I (SEAC)'s 8th mtg., 10 Aug. 1944, AIR 40/2443, PRO.
74. D of I (SEAC)'s 7th mtg., 8 July 1944, ibid.
75. of I (India) to D of I (SEAC), DMI/6937, 16 Aug. 1944, ibid. C.f. C. D. Laurie, 'The "Sauerkrauts"; German POWs as OSS Agents, 1944-5', Prologue, 26 (Spring 1994): 49-60.
76. See, for example, the claims made for 3 Mahara detainees by Wing Commander Perkins of SIS recorded in minutes of P Division 50th mtg., 5 March 1945, AIR 23/2137, PRO.
77. Remarks of Colonel Tollemache (SOG) and Major Ferguson (SIS) in minutes of P-Division, 51st mtg., 12 March 1945, AIR 23/2137, PRO.
78. Memorandum by Brigadier Walsh (CGS ALFSEA), 'Clandestine and Special Organisations in ALFSEA', Appendix B: ISLD, April 1945, fol. 88, WO 203/55, PRO.
79. Slim, Defeat Into Victory (London: Cassel, 1956), pp. 191-2.
80. BGS (I) to BGS (O), 23 Oct. 1944, WO 203/367, PRO.
81. Deputy BGS (I) Main HQ to BGS GS (I), 17 Nov. 1944, ibid.
82. Account of meeting held at Barrackpore 4.1.45, ibid.
83. While there is no evidence of a connection between this issue and Barrackpore it had caused irritation at a high level in London. On the sacking of Slim see Ronald Lewin, Slim: The Standardbearer (London: Leo Cooper, 1977), pp. 237-47.
84. Letter of introduction for Commander Skyrme (SIS) from Air Vice Marshall Whitworth Jones (SEAC) to Air Marshall Sir Guy Garrod (ACSEA), 20 Sept. 1944, fol. 96, AIR 23/7678, PRO. See also 628 SD to Strategic Air Force (BAFSEA) 225 Grp, 3 Oct. 1944, ibid.
85. Wilkinson observed that Beddlington did not want to be far removed from the post-war opportunities of Europe when Germany was defeated, while Wilkinson himself was about to escape to Washington DC, entries for 7 and 9 July 1943, Wilkinson diary, 1/2, 1 CCC. See also Hughes memorandum, 'Colonel Wilkinson SIS', 15 Sept. 1943, File 446, Box 46, Entry 106, RG 226, UNSA.
86. Record of a conversation with 'Little Bill' Stephenson of British Security Coordination of New York, entry for 4 May 1944, Wilkinson diary, 1/2, 2, CCC. Wilkinson observed privately in his diary: 'How stupid and worthless of Brigadier B. to get himself and our organisation in this useless mess'. See also conversation with Colonel Charles Ellis, entry for 4 April 1944, ibid.
87. Garnons-Williams (HPD) to Mackenzie (SOE) and Bowden-Smith (SIS), P-Div. M/4/A, 16 April 1945, HS 1/304, PRO.
88. Mackenzie (SOE) to Garnons-Williams (HPD) G/425/3217, 19 April 1945, HS 1/304, PRO. Mackenzie's superiors in Baker Street were aware of his attempts at aggrandizement and on 21 April he warned them that Bowden-Smith had instructions from his own superiors at Broadway Buildings 'which practically prohibits their collaboration with us on our terms or any sensible terms', to A.D. Personal from B/ B 100, No. 256, 21 april 1945, ibid.
89. Memorandum, 'Summary of I.S.L.D. Reports', 8 Sept. 1945, HS 1/210, PRO.
90. See, for example, the report on a chemical warfare factory in Thailand at CX.37200/65/7859, 25 July 1945 to MI6b, WO 208/2238, PRO.
91. Bowden-Smith (SIS) to Garnons-Williams (HPD) ISLD/266, 25 April 1945, HS 1/304, PRO.
92. Appendix 'I.S.L.D. Intelligence Analysis', 24 April 1945, ibid.
93. JIC (45) 17, 'Allocation of Personnel with Knowledge of Far Eastern Languages', 14 Jan. 1945, WO 220/52, PRO.
94. Garnons-Williams (HPD) to Mackenzie (SOE) and Bowden-Smith (SIS), P-Div. P/1/A, 28 April 1945, HS 1/304, PRO. For examples of SIS control of signals intelligence see, for example,. S. G. Menzies, Chairman of the 'Y' Board, to Secretary of State for India, 16 May 1942, enclosing 'Reorganization of the "Y" Services in India and Ceylon', Broadway SW1, 7 May 1942 (WS 15136), L/WS/1/897, IOLR.
95. Meeting on Co-ordination of Clandestine Operations in South East Asia between Mackenzie, Bowden-Smith and Garnons-Williams, 10 May 1945, HS 1/ 103, PRO.
96. Minutes of a meeting held at HQ Force 136, 24 April 1945, HS 1/103, PRO.
97. Memorandum from Mackenzie (SOE) to Head of P Division, 'Subject: S.R.', 13 April 1945, HS 1/80, PRO. This document has been sanitized before release by the removal of one of its thirteen paragraphs.
98. Minutes of a meeting on SA and SR plans and commitments held with Force 136 and ISLD at HQ Force 136, 15 May 1945, File G425/3499, Quai d'Orsay, Paris. I am indebted to John W. Young for permitting me to see a copy of this document.
99. Mackenzie informed SR that its initial plan to insert groups of six agents was wrong and smaller groups were more appropriate for intelligence gathering, minutes of a meeting held at Kandy chaired by Mackenzie, 19 April 1945, to discuss SA and SR plans, File G 123, ibid. I am indebted to John W. Young for permitting me to see a copy of this document.
100. Minutes of a meeting held at ISLD on 8 Aug. 1945 between DGER, Force 136 and ISLD, HS 1/95, PRO.
101. Dening (CPA) to Cavendish-Bentinck (JIC) No. 1519, 11 May 1945, WO 203/ 5625, PRO.
102. SIS Calcutta to London No. 263, 12 July 1945, WO 203/4472, PRO.
103. Gage (Chungking) to Dening (SEAC), 10 Nov. 1943, WO 203/5606, PRO.
104. Steveni (SIS) to Jonas (RAF), Ops. A112, 23 Dec. 1943, fol. 21, AIR 23/7679, PRO. See also R28-45, 'British Intelligence in China', 16 Jan. 1945, File 1573, Box 496, Entry 190, RG 226, USNA.
105. JIC to SACSEA No. 92601 (MI17) 10 Nov. 1944, WO 203/367, PRO.
106. To P. from C.S.S. himself, No. 828, 14 Nov. 1944, WO 203/6451; Mountbatten to Wedemeyer 'eyes alone' (draft) presumed Nov. 1944, ibid.
107. MI6 Political Report No. 15 to FO, 8 April 1945, WO 208/474, PRO; see also MI6 Political Report No. 13 to FO, 3 April 1945, ibid.
108. MI6 Political Report (CX 28100) 'Chinese Economic Policy', 3 July 1945, WO 208/474, PRO.
109. MI6 Political Report No. 13 to FO, 3 April 1945, WO 208/474, PRO.
110. 'Interview with Prime Minister', entry for 15 March 1943, Wilkinson Diary, 1/ 2, 2, CCC. Sir Charles Portal (CAS) was also present. See also entry for 12 May 1943, ibid.
111. Entry for 24 Feb. 1943, 1/2, 2, Wilkinson diary, CCC.
112. R. Cecil, 'C's War', Intelligence and National Security, 1, 2 (April 1986): 82.
113. R. J. Aldrich, 'Unquiet in Death: The Post-war Survival of the Special Operations Executive', in A. Gorst, L. Johnman and W. S. Lucas (eds), Contemporary British History: Politics and the Limits of Policy (London: Pinter, 1991), pp. 201-2.
114. SACSEA to WO, 9 Feb. 1946, WO 203/4943, PRO.
115. Wilkinson to Dewing, 15 Feb. 1943, 1/4, Wilkinson papers, CCC. By September 1945 the role of Head of SIA had passed to Squadron Leader S. L. Britain. On this see Reports of General Headquarters, Far Eastern Command, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff (Vol. 4 Operations of AIB), Box 42, Unit Diaries, Histories and Reports, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.
116. Report of Special Mission to General Blarney, C. in C. AMF, for discussion into the future of SIA in Australia, NEFIS Organization in NEI, by G/Cpt W. H. Cliff, SEACU/G/P Div, 9 Oct. 1945, HS 1/303, PRO.
117. For Trevor-Wilson's unique employment in North Africa prior to the Second World War, see Desmond Bristow, A Game of Moles (London: Little and Brown and Company, 1993), pp. 18-19.
118. Report by Trevor-Wilson, 28 Dec. 1945, WO 203/5563, PRO, quoted in P. M. Dunn, The First Vietnam War (London: Hurst, 1985), pp. 328, 351-2.
119. COS (46) 155, 'SEAC: Re-organisation of HQ', 20 June 1946, AIR 20/2665, PRO. On Killearn see Tilman Remme, Britain and Regional Cooperation in South East Asia, 1945-49 (London: Routledge, 1994).
120. Scrivner (JIC Far East) to Foulds (Manila), 4/42/48, 1 May 1948, FO 964/44, PRO.
121. Some wartime officers, such as Trevor-Wilson, were retained on a part-time basis into the 1960s. Interview with former British special forces officer.
122. Debrief of Edmund S. Taylor (OSS SEAC) by Read, 21 Sept. 1944, Donovan Papers, US Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.
123. By 1945 many had become accustomed to the luxury of signals intelligence which arrived in 'real time'. By contrast, even when SIS secured valuable agent intelligence from Japanese occupied countries, it was often regarded as too tardy to be reliable. In August 1945 Captain Eric Northcott of SIS in London forwarded a recent report on railway destruction in Malaya to MI2, who noted that this material was nearly a month old, adding that if this material had been current it would be of real importance. But now it needed further confirmation. Northcott (MI6b) to MI2, CX 37400/63/331, 3 Aug. 1944 (information dated 18 July 1945), and minute by Mitchell of MI2, 14 Aug. 1945, WO 208/1539, PRO.
124. See, for example, JCS 1969/33, 'Command Relationship of CINCFE with CIA After Cease Fire and Armistice in Korea', 13 Oct. 1952, 385 (6-446) Sec. 49 SC Files, RG 218, USNA.
125. Payne (SIS) addressing a meeting held at the Air Ministry, 4 Jan. 1945, AIR 20/7968, PRO.
126. This material released into series HW1 at the PRO is discussed in Christopher Andrew, 'The Making of the Anglo-American SIGINT Alliance', in Hayden B. Peake and Samuel Halpern (eds), In the Name of Intelligence (Washington DC: NIBC Press, 1994), pp. 95-109. See also the essay by Katherine Brown, 'Intelligence and the Decision to Collect It: Churchill's Wartime Diplomatic Signals Intelligence', Intelligence and National Security, 10, 3 (July 1995): 449-67.
127. This material released into series HW1 at the PRO is discussed in Christopher Andrew, 'The Making of the Anglo-American SIGINT Alliance', in Hayden B. Peake and Samuel Halpern (eds), In the Name of Intelligence (Washington DC: NIBC Press, 1994), pp. 95-109. See also the essay by Katherine Brown, 'Intelligence and the Decision to Collect It: Churchill's Wartime Diplomatic Signals Intelligence', Intelligence and National Security, 10, 3 (July 1995): 449-67.
128. N.I.D. 12 memorandum entitled 'B.J. Series of Diplomatic Messages', n.d. (presumed c. 8 Oct. 1945), ADM 223/298, PRO; 'Report on S.I. Volume 2904-2930', N.I.D. 12, 8 Oct. 1945 ibid. This subject remains sensitive and the some documents relating to this subject, released in 1994, were nevertheless sanitized by the removal of certain paragraphs.
129. General Penney (D of I SEAC) noted that Garnons-Williams was now so nervy that he 'just can't stand being alone', Penney to Mrs Penney, 28 June 1945, 4/20, Penney papers, Liddel Hart Centre for Military Archives.
130. It is also clear that in the case of certain types of SIS operations, no written record was kept. See, for example, the remarks in 'Clandestine Air Operations: A Brief History of Operations in South East Asia, 1 June 1942-31 May 1945', prepared by Squadron Leader Coleman, AIR 23/1950, PRO.
131. One of these officers was Commander Ian Fleming, entry for 13 July 1943, Wilkinson diary, 1/2, 2, CCC.
132. While a great deal of documentation has recently been released pertaining to British intelligence the author would be grateful to hear from practitioners who served in the period prior to 1960 at the Department of Politics, University of Nottingham, NG7 2RD, UK.