Can democracy promote the general welfare?

Social Philosophy and Policy

Volumn 14, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 165-173

  Buchanan, James M ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041122296     PISSN: 02650525     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0265052500001862     Document Type: Article

References (7)

1. For elaboration of the analysis, see James M. Buchanan, "Foundational Concerns: A Criticism of Public Choice Theory," in Current Issues in Public Choice, ed. José Casas Pardo and Friedrich Schneider (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1995).
2. For an extended discussion of arguments made in this section, see James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962).
3. Ibid. For the seminal analysis, see Knut Wicksell, Finanztheoretische Untersuchungen (Jena: Fischer, 1896).
4. Ibid. For the seminal analysis, see Knut Wicksell, Finanztheoretische Untersuchungen (Jena: Fischer, 1896).
5. For extended discussion of the political efficiency of general taxation, see James M. Buchanan, "The Political Efficiency of General Taxation," National Tax Journal, vol. 44, no. 4 (1994), pp. 401-10.
6. Anthony de Jasay, The State (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985).
7. For a formal analysis of intergenerational exchange, see Paul A. Samuelson, "An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest with or without the Social Contrivance of Money," Journal of Political Economy, vol. 66, no. 6 (December 1958), pp. 467-82.