Fiscal and monetary policy in a monetary union: Credible inflation targets or monetized debt?

Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv

Volumn 132, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 27-53

  Krichel, Thomas ^a   Levine, Paul ^a   Pearlman, Joseph ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041115380     PISSN: 00432636     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/bf02707901     Document Type: Article

References (21)

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