Toward stability or crisis?

Journal of Democracy

Volumn 8, Issue 1, 1997, Pages

  Shevtsova, Lilia ^a,b   Bruckner, Scott A ^a  

^a Carnegie Moscow Center   (Russian Federation)

^b RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES   (Russian Federation)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041045063     PISSN: 10455736     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (18)

1. Gorbachev's liberalization campaign was an attempt to civilize the regime and to increase his own power against hard-liners in the Communist Party through temporary alliances with moderate forces outside the elite. It is now clear that liberalization, as distinct from democratization, was never meant to be a means either for effecting the wholesale renewal of the elite or for permanently opening up the inner political circle to pressure from subelite interests. See Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
2. For instance, a public opinion poll conducted in September 1996 by the All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion showed that 57 percent of those polled regarded the introduction of freedom of speech as the most positive change since 1985. Moskovskii komsomolets, 14 October 1996.
3. Success in the regional polls could thrust the communist and nationalist opposition into a dominant position in the Federation Council (the Federal Assembly's upper house), giving them control over both houses of parliament.
4. The most outspoken proponent of this perspective is Anders Åslund. See, for instance, How Russia Became a Market Economy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995).
5. Turnout in the December 1995 parliamentary election, for instance, was 64.4 percent. In the first and second rounds of the 1996 presidential election, turnout was 69,7 percent and 68.8 percent, respectively.
6. Reactionary elements within the Communist Party were those who failed to understand the urgent need for systemic adjustments. As such, they represented the greatest threat to the preservation of the ruling elite's power. Pragmatists in the Communist Party were, therefore, interested in removing them. But moving reactionar- ies in the party out of the way was just as much an act of self-preservation for pragmatists as it was a raw grab for greater power.
7. A recent study of falsification estimates that vote fraud may have been as high as 15 percent. See A.A. Sobianin and B.G. Sukhovol'skii, Demokratiia, ogranichennaia fal'sifikatsiiami: Vybory I referendumy v Rossii v 1991-1993 gg (Democracy that is limited by falsification: Elections and referenda in Russia, 1991-1993) (Moscow: Proektnaia gruppa po pravam cheloveka, 1995).
8. Most estimates put Russian government expenditures on social programs at around 20 percent of GDP. Given the government's failure to meet revenue targets, these levels are impossible to sustain. For an estimated breakdown of government income and expenditures on social programs in Russia, see Mikhail Dmitriev, "Biudzhetnaia politika Rossii v usloviakh finansovoi stabilizatsii" (Russian budgetary politics during financial stabilization) (Carnegie Moscow Center, October 1996).
9. Russia's public expenditures on social programs are at least 10 to 15 percent higher than those for transitional economies at similar levels of development. For a comparison of levels of public expenditures in various transitional economies, see World Bank, World Development Report 1996: From Plan to Market (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), ch. 7.
10. As of mid-1995, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development estimated that the private-sector share of GDP in Russia was approximately 55 percent. Transition Report: Investment and Enterprise Development (London: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1995), as cited in World Economic Outlook (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1996), 84. By the end of summer 1996, that share had probably increased by another 5 percentage points.
11. As of mid-1995, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development estimated that the private-sector share of GDP in Russia was approximately 55 percent. Transition Report: Investment and Enterprise Development (London: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1995), as cited in World Economic Outlook (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1996), 84. By the end of summer 1996, that share had probably increased by another 5 percentage points.
12. During 1995, government subsidies to enterprises are estimated to have been around 7 percent of GDP. This figure, which is well above the level of subsidization of enterprises in other transitional economies of the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, does not even reflect indirect subsidies that are provided through tax amnesties. For estimates on the level of Russian government subsidies to enterprises for various years, see Dmitriev, "Biudzhetnaia politika Rossii v usloviakh finansovoi stabilizatsii."
13. Some of these attitudes are not unfounded. Many sectors of the economy have indeed been captured by criminal elements, and corruption is a perversely normal part of Russian business transacting. For a useful survey of crime and corruption in Russian economic affairs, see Stephen Handelman, Comrade Criminal: Russia's New Mafiya (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995).
14. This is not to deny that in Russia this practice is more extreme. One example is the central government's reluctance - until very recently - to punish the largest corporate tax evaders despite serious revenue shortfalls that have delayed wage and pension payments.
15. This type of development is frequently referred to as "path dependence." See Paul David, "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY," American Economic Review 75 (May 1985): 332-37. David's argument can be applied to the post-Soviet transition. See Scott A. Bruckner, "Beyond Soviet Studies: The New Institutional Alternative," in Daniel Orlovsky, ed., Beyond Soviet Studies (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), 198-221.
16. This type of development is frequently referred to as "path dependence." See Paul David, "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY," American Economic Review 75 (May 1985): 332-37. David's argument can be applied to the post-Soviet transition. See Scott A. Bruckner, "Beyond Soviet Studies: The New Institutional Alternative," in Daniel Orlovsky, ed., Beyond Soviet Studies (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), 198-221.
17. For a discussion of this problem, see Vladimir Lysenko, "Power Sharing and the Experience of the Russian Federation" (paper presented at a Carnegie Corporation conference on "Preventing Deadly Conflict: Strategies and Institutions," Moscow, 14-16 August 1996).
18. For a survey of popular attitudes in the wake of the 1996 presidential election, see Jerry F. Hough, Evelyn Davidheiser, and Susan Goodrich Lehmann, The 1996 Presidential Election (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1996).