Playing base politics in a global strategic theater: Futenma relocation, the G-8 summit, and Okinawa

Critical Asian Studies

Volumn 33, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 70-95

  Yonetani, Julia ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GEOPOLITICS; PEACE PROCESS; SECURITY THREAT;

JAPAN; UNITED STATES;

EID: 0040971801     PISSN: 14672715     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/14672710123012     Document Type: Article

References (66)

1. The proposed site for the U.S. Marine airbase is within Camp Schwab's territorial waters, adjacent to the village of Henoko, Nago City Municipality.
2. The Japan Times, Thursday, 18 April 1996, 1.
3. As Ota repeatedly pointed out to the national press and to the Supreme Court during the subsequent trial, 70 percent of all existing U.S. military facilities in Japan are placed in Okinawa, which makes up less than 1 percent of Japan's total land mass. Almost 20 percent of the main island of Okinawa is occupied by the U.S. military.
4. See Yoichi Funabashi in Alliance Adrift (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), 35-45.
5. Makishi Yōichi, "Naze ka kieta kaigai isetsu keikaku" (The plan to relocate overseas that somehow disappeared), Shūkan kinyōbi, 7 April 2000, 16-19.
6. This view is supported by former U.S. Marine Corps artillery battery commander Robert V. Hamilton, "An Idea and Policy that Just Won't Float," JPRI Working Paper, no. 28 (January 1997), also extensively cited in Chalmers Johnson, "The Heliport, Nago, and the End of the Ota Era," in Okinawa: Cold War Island, ed. Chalmers Johnson (Cardiff, Calif: Japan Policy Research Institute, 1999), 215-32. Various logistical hurdles, such as controlling aircraft erosion through extra wash facilities, fuel supply and the danger of fuel spillage, over-capacity of Camp Schwab sewage facilities, and disposing of oil water spill-off are considered in "SBF Sea-Based Facility: Functional Analysis and Concept of Operations," MCAS Futenma Relocation, FACD, Vol. 1, Executive Report, compiled by the U.S. Department of Defense. One issue not examined in this report is possible damage from the typhoons that hit Okinawa frequently. "Anyone who has ever experienced a major typhoon on Okinawa," Hamilton observes, "will realize that such a typhoon would turn Okinawa's first floating air facility into Okinawa's first underwater facility, with the greatest sinking of U.S. military assets into the Pacific Ocean since Pearl Harbor." (Hamilton, "An Idea and Policy that Just Won't Float.") A report compiled by the U.S. General Accounting Office on behalf of Republican Congressman Duncan Hunter in March 1998 on the feasibility of the proposed airbase, admitted that "the semi-submersible sea-based facility relies on technology that does not yet exist" (cited in Johnson, Okinawa, 229).
7. This view is supported by former U.S. Marine Corps artillery battery commander Robert V. Hamilton, "An Idea and Policy that Just Won't Float," JPRI Working Paper, no. 28 (January 1997), also extensively cited in Chalmers Johnson, "The Heliport, Nago, and the End of the Ota Era," in Okinawa: Cold War Island, ed. Chalmers Johnson (Cardiff, Calif: Japan Policy Research Institute, 1999), 215-32. Various logistical hurdles, such as controlling aircraft erosion through extra wash facilities, fuel supply and the danger of fuel spillage, over-capacity of Camp Schwab sewage facilities, and disposing of oil water spill-off are considered in "SBF Sea-Based Facility: Functional Analysis and Concept of Operations," MCAS Futenma Relocation, FACD, Vol. 1, Executive Report, compiled by the U.S. Department of Defense. One issue not examined in this report is possible damage from the typhoons that hit Okinawa frequently. "Anyone who has ever experienced a major typhoon on Okinawa," Hamilton observes, "will realize that such a typhoon would turn Okinawa's first floating air facility into Okinawa's first underwater facility, with the greatest sinking of U.S. military assets into the Pacific Ocean since Pearl Harbor." (Hamilton, "An Idea and Policy that Just Won't Float.") A report compiled by the U.S. General Accounting Office on behalf of Republican Congressman Duncan Hunter in March 1998 on the feasibility of the proposed airbase, admitted that "the semi-submersible sea-based facility relies on technology that does not yet exist" (cited in Johnson, Okinawa, 229).
8. This view is supported by former U.S. Marine Corps artillery battery commander Robert V. Hamilton, "An Idea and Policy that Just Won't Float," JPRI Working Paper, no. 28 (January 1997), also extensively cited in Chalmers Johnson, "The Heliport, Nago, and the End of the Ota Era," in Okinawa: Cold War Island, ed. Chalmers Johnson (Cardiff, Calif: Japan Policy Research Institute, 1999), 215-32. Various logistical hurdles, such as controlling aircraft erosion through extra wash facilities, fuel supply and the danger of fuel spillage, over-capacity of Camp Schwab sewage facilities, and disposing of oil water spill-off are considered in "SBF Sea-Based Facility: Functional Analysis and Concept of Operations," MCAS Futenma Relocation, FACD, Vol. 1, Executive Report, compiled by the U.S. Department of Defense. One issue not examined in this report is possible damage from the typhoons that hit Okinawa frequently. "Anyone who has ever experienced a major typhoon on Okinawa," Hamilton observes, "will realize that such a typhoon would turn Okinawa's first floating air facility into Okinawa's first underwater facility, with the greatest sinking of U.S. military assets into the Pacific Ocean since Pearl Harbor." (Hamilton, "An Idea and Policy that Just Won't Float.") A report compiled by the U.S. General Accounting Office on behalf of Republican Congressman Duncan Hunter in March 1998 on the feasibility of the proposed airbase, admitted that "the semi-submersible sea-based facility relies on technology that does not yet exist" (cited in Johnson, Okinawa, 229).
9. This view is supported by former U.S. Marine Corps artillery battery commander Robert V. Hamilton, "An Idea and Policy that Just Won't Float," JPRI Working Paper, no. 28 (January 1997), also extensively cited in Chalmers Johnson, "The Heliport, Nago, and the End of the Ota Era," in Okinawa: Cold War Island, ed. Chalmers Johnson (Cardiff, Calif: Japan Policy Research Institute, 1999), 215-32. Various logistical hurdles, such as controlling aircraft erosion through extra wash facilities, fuel supply and the danger of fuel spillage, over-capacity of Camp Schwab sewage facilities, and disposing of oil water spill-off are considered in "SBF Sea-Based Facility: Functional Analysis and Concept of Operations," MCAS Futenma Relocation, FACD, Vol. 1, Executive Report, compiled by the U.S. Department of Defense. One issue not examined in this report is possible damage from the typhoons that hit Okinawa frequently. "Anyone who has ever experienced a major typhoon on Okinawa," Hamilton observes, "will realize that such a typhoon would turn Okinawa's first floating air facility into Okinawa's first underwater facility, with the greatest sinking of U.S. military assets into the Pacific Ocean since Pearl Harbor." (Hamilton, "An Idea and Policy that Just Won't Float.") A report compiled by the U.S. General Accounting Office on behalf of Republican Congressman Duncan Hunter in March 1998 on the feasibility of the proposed airbase, admitted that "the semi-submersible sea-based facility relies on technology that does not yet exist" (cited in Johnson, Okinawa, 229).
10. The SACO final report recommended that the replacement "sea-based facilities" be "located off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa," and connected to land by a "pier or causeway." "The SACO Final Report on Futenma Air Station (an integral part of the SACO Final Report)," Tokyo, 2 December 1996.
11. See Gavan McCormack, "Nationalism and Identity in Post-Cold War Japan," PacificaReview 12, no. 3 (August 2000): 249-65, and Kobayashi Yōichi et al., "Datsu 'parasaito nashonarizumu'!" (Breaking out of parasite nationalism), Sekai, no. 679 (August 2000): 189-208.
12. See Gavan McCormack, "Nationalism and Identity in Post-Cold War Japan," PacificaReview 12, no. 3 (August 2000): 249-65, and Kobayashi Yōichi et al., "Datsu 'parasaito nashonarizumu'!" (Breaking out of parasite nationalism), Sekai, no. 679 (August 2000): 189-208.
13. Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 3-4.
14. Ota Masahide, Okinawa no ketsudan (Okinawa's decision) (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 2000), 207-08.
15. See Aurelia George Mulgan, "Managing the U.S. Base Issue in Okinawa: A Test for Japanese Democracy," Japanese Studies 20, no. 2 (September 2000): 159-77.
16. On June 13, the Okinawan branch of the Liberal Democratic Party announced its opposition to a prefecture-wide plebiscite on the base issue. Though the LDP cited "disavowal of the democratic parliamentary system" as the reason, Egami Takayoshi observes that "the true fact was that they took the return of Futenma and the SACO Interim Report as a positive outcome, turning against the progressive party initiated prefectural plebiscite in order to actively cooperate with the government." In turn, Hashimoto's support was essential to secure revitalization of the prefecture's dwindling conservative support base. Egami Takayoshi, "Okinawa no kenmin tōhyō," Seisaku gakka kokusai kankei ronshū, University of the Ryūkyūs, March 1998, 7.
17. The initial draft of Ota's paper appeared in 1994. See "The Shape of Okinawa" (English version), compiled by the Department of Planning and Development, Okinawa Prefectural Government, 1998, and "Okinawa no shin gurando dezain to kokusai toshi keisei bijion-gaiyōsho" (Japanese), Okinawa-ken kikaku kaihatsubu (Department of Planning and Development, Okinawa Prefectural Government), 1994.
18. The initial draft of Ota's paper appeared in 1994. See "The Shape of Okinawa" (English version), compiled by the Department of Planning and Development, Okinawa Prefectural Government, 1998, and "Okinawa no shin gurando dezain to kokusai toshi keisei bijion-gaiyōsho" (Japanese), Okinawa-ken kikaku kaihatsubu (Department of Planning and Development, Okinawa Prefectural Government), 1994.
19. In 1998, 90 percent of centrally controlled Okinawa development funds were allocated to public works projects. See Kawase Mitsuyoshi, "Fukki seisaku to chihōjichi,̄ in Okinawa - 21 seiki no chosen (Okinawa: Challenges for the twenty-first century), ed. Miyamoto Kenichi and Sasaki Masayuki (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2000), 54. In 1997, the construction industry provided twice as many jobs as manufacturing, which as a percentage of gross prefectural product has halved from already low levels since reversion, from 12.1 percent in 1972 to 6.3 percent in 1996. See Kaneko Masaru, "Kirisakareru Okinawa - 'Kioku' to 'shukusai' no hazamade nani wo kangaeru beki na no ka" (Okinawa falls apart: Gauging between "memory" and "festival"), Sekai, no. 678 (August 2000): 142.
20. In 1998, 90 percent of centrally controlled Okinawa development funds were allocated to public works projects. See Kawase Mitsuyoshi, "Fukki seisaku to chihōjichi,̄ in Okinawa - 21 seiki no chosen (Okinawa: Challenges for the twenty-first century), ed. Miyamoto Kenichi and Sasaki Masayuki (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2000), 54. In 1997, the construction industry provided twice as many jobs as manufacturing, which as a percentage of gross prefectural product has halved from already low levels since reversion, from 12.1 percent in 1972 to 6.3 percent in 1996. See Kaneko Masaru, "Kirisakareru Okinawa - 'Kioku' to 'shukusai' no hazamade nani wo kangaeru beki na no ka" (Okinawa falls apart: Gauging between "memory" and "festival"), Sekai, no. 678 (August 2000): 142.
21. See Gavan McCormack in "From Number One to Number Nothing: Japan's Fin de Siècle Blues," Japanese Studies 18, no. 1 (May 1998): 31.
22. Mulgan, "Managing the U.S. Base Issue in Okinawa."
23. Kin Town has the highest ratio of base-related subsidies to total revenue, at 33 percent in 1997, not including extra revenue from post-1995 compensation sources. See Kawase, "Fukki seisaku to chihōjichi," 60. Though the area of land occupied by U.S. military facilities has decreased 15 percent since Reversion, the total amount of compensatory funding has continually increased in real terms. Pay-outs to the owners of land occupied by the military exceeded gross agricultural and fisheries product income for the prefecture for the first time in 1994, and currently stand at three to four times average market rental prices. Compensation to the owners of land occupied by U.S. military facilities increased eightfold in the first three years of reversion. Ibid., 62.
24. Kin Town has the highest ratio of base-related subsidies to total revenue, at 33 percent in 1997, not including extra revenue from post-1995 compensation sources. See Kawase, "Fukki seisaku to chihōjichi," 60. Though the area of land occupied by U.S. military facilities has decreased 15 percent since Reversion, the total amount of compensatory funding has continually increased in real terms. Pay-outs to the owners of land occupied by the military exceeded gross agricultural and fisheries product income for the prefecture for the first time in 1994, and currently stand at three to four times average market rental prices. Compensation to the owners of land occupied by U.S. military facilities increased eightfold in the first three years of reversion. Ibid., 62.
25. Ibid., p. 59.
26. See the testimonies of Okamoto Yukio, Shimada Haruo, and Ota Masahide in Ota Masahide, Okinawa no ketsudan, 247-50.
27. "Okinawa beigun kichi shozai shichōson ni kan suru kondankai teigen," 19 November 1996. URL: 〈http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/okinawa-1127.html〉 (downloaded August 2000).
28. Former journalist and editor of the Okinawa Times, Arakawa Akira also observes that the fact that the presidents of both of Okinawa's local newspapers were members of Shima-kon is "an act of suicide" for an organ of public opinion. See Arakawa Akira, "Kokka wo sōtaiteki ni toraeyo," Shūkan kinyōbi, 9 June 2000. Debate about the significance of Shimada-kon in both of these newspapers has been sparse.
29. Former journalist and editor of the Okinawa Times, Arakawa Akira also observes that the fact that the presidents of both of Okinawa's local newspapers were members of Shima-kon is "an act of suicide" for an organ of public opinion. See Arakawa Akira, "Kokka wo sōtaiteki ni toraeyo," Shūkan kinyōbi, 9 June 2000. Debate about the significance of Shimada-kon in both of these newspapers has been sparse.
30. See Alan Christy, "The Making of Imperial Subjects in Okinawa," in Formations of Colonial Modernity in East Asia, ed. Tani E. Barlow (Durham, N.C., and London: Duke University Press, 1997), 141-70.
31. On 8 July 1999, the Japanese Diet passed amendments to 475 existing laws in accordance with recommendations of the "Decentralization Promotion Law" enacted in 1995 to supposedly "promote regional revitalization" and the "independence and self-reliance of local authorities." See Brendan F. D. Barret, "Decentralization in Japan: Negotiating the Transfer of Authority," Japanese Studies 20, no. 1 (May 2000): 33-34. In reality, however, reforms failed to promote increases in financial autonomy. In the case of Okinawa, previous powers entrusting the prefectural governor to act as proxy in the signing of leases of land utilized by U.S. military facilities were transferred to the central government in these amendments. With the complete centralization of this administrative function, the prefectural and local governments were no longer able to utilize the power of refusal to act as proxy for recalcitrant land owners as a bargaining chip with the government, as Ota had done in 1995.
32. Okinawan economist Makino Hirotaka criticizes the free trade zone concept in Saikō Okinawa keizai (Rethinking Okinawa's economy) (Naha: Okinawa Taimusu, 1996). For a summary of these and other criticisms of the Cosmopolitan City Concept, see Miyamoto Kenichi, "Okinawa no iji kanō na hatten no tame ni," in Miyatmoto, Okinawa, 1-29.
33. Okinawan economist Makino Hirotaka criticizes the free trade zone concept in Saikō Okinawa keizai (Rethinking Okinawa's economy) (Naha: Okinawa Taimusu, 1996). For a summary of these and other criticisms of the Cosmopolitan City Concept, see Miyamoto Kenichi, "Okinawa no iji kanō na hatten no tame ni," in Miyatmoto, Okinawa, 1-29.
34. Arakawa Akira, "Kokka wo sōtaiteki ni toraeyo."
35. This process is outlined by Egami Takayoshi in "Okinawa no kenmin tōhyō."
36. The series of events from the SACO final declaration in December 1996 to Ota's refusal to accept Futenma relocation to the waters of Camp Schwab in February 1998 is outlined in the booklet published by the Okinawa Times company, Mini to ketsudan - kaijō heripōto mondai to Nago shimin tōhyō (Naha: Okinawa Taimusu, 1998).
37. Ryūkyū Shimpo, 18 October 1997, morning edition.
38. Transcribed in "Okinawa wa Nihon no shokuminchi ka!," Shūkan kinyōbi, 28 July 2000, 24-29.
39. "Okinawa, Futenma kichi iten - Futatabi 'nago he' ni Okinawa no hangeki ga hajimatta" (The relocation of Futenma Base - Okinawa: Okinawa's counterattack against relocation to Nago begins once more), Shūkan Kinyōbi, no. 287 (15 October 1999): 29-33.
40. Okinawa Times, 4 December 1998, evening edition.
41. Learned from personal discussions with local activists. For a summary in English of the anti-base women's movement in Okinawa at this time, see Urashima Etsuko, "After Governor Ohta's Defeat: Women's Initiative for Base-free Okinawa," [sic], available at 〈http://rik.ne.jp/edic/nago/urashima.html〉.
42. Okinawa Times, 10 April 2000.
43. Tessa Morris-Suzuki, "For and against NGOs: The Politics of the Lived World," New Left Review 2 (March/April 2000): 63-84.
44. On the environment and public works in Okinawa, see Gavan McCormack, "Okinawan Dilemmas: Coral Islands or Concrete Islands," in Johnson, Okinawa.
45. The museum had been constructed to commemorate victims of war malaria, namely local inhabitants of die southern Yaeyama islands who had contracted the fatal virus after being expelled to malaria-infested areas by the Japanese army. A detailed account is of the local inhabitants of Hateruma Island is given in Ishihara Masaie, ed., Mō hitotsu no Okinawa-sen - mararia jigoku no Hateruma-jima (Naha: Okinawa Bunko, 1983).
46. For a summary of the politicization of peace in postwar Japan, see John W. Dower, "Peace and Democracy in Two Systems: External Policy and Internal Conflict," in Andrew Gordon, ed., Postwar Japan as History (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993).
47. Ota Masahide, Okinawa Heiwa no Ishiji (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1996), 25.
48. Ibid., ii.
49. Oshiro Masayasu, "Kenjū wa dare ni mukerareta ka," in Rekishi no Shinjitsu wa Yugamete wa Naranai, a special report on the Peace Museum issue edited by the Okinawa Prefecture History Teachers Association, Rekishi tojissen, no. 20 (December 1999).
50. Oshiro Masayasu, "Kenjū wa dare ni mukerareta ka," in Rekishi no Shinjitsu wa Yugamete wa Naranai, a special report on the Peace Museum issue edited by the Okinawa Prefecture History Teachers Association, Rekishi tojissen, no. 20 (December 1999).
51. For an examination of the Peace Museum issue, see Julia Yonetani, "On the Battlefield of Mabuni: Struggles over Peace and the Past in Contemporary Okinawa," East Asian History, no. 20 (December 2000): 145-68.
52. In October 1996, an LDP parliamentary committee report ordered by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto criticized various local peace museums for promoting a "biased ideology." Subsequent controversies over such museums and "historical revisonist" groups are outlined, for example, in Ueyama Kazuo, "Heiwa kinen shiryōkan mondai to zenkokuteki na kagai tenji he no kōgeki no ugoki," Keesbi Kaji, no. 25 (December 1999): 48-50, and Nakakita Ryūtarō, "Heiwa hakubutsukan he no kōgeki wo ika ni hanekaesu ka," Sekai, no. 674 (May 2000): 231-35.
53. In October 1996, an LDP parliamentary committee report ordered by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto criticized various local peace museums for promoting a "biased ideology." Subsequent controversies over such museums and "historical revisonist" groups are outlined, for example, in Ueyama Kazuo, "Heiwa kinen shiryōkan mondai to zenkokuteki na kagai tenji he no kōgeki no ugoki," Keesbi Kaji, no. 25 (December 1999): 48-50, and Nakakita Ryūtarō, "Heiwa hakubutsukan he no kōgeki wo ika ni hanekaesu ka," Sekai, no. 674 (May 2000): 231-35.
54. "Prime Minister's Commission on Japan's Goals in the Twenty-first Century," First Sub-Committee, "Japan's Place in the World," available at 〈http://www. kante.go.jp/jp/21century/999071summary.html〉.
55. Kurayoshi Takara, Tsuneo Oshiro, and Morisaka Maeshiro, "Toward an 'Okinawa Initiative': Possible Role for Okinawa in the Asia-Pacific Region," presented at the Asia Pacific Agenda Project, 25-26 March 2000, Naha, Okinawa.
56. "Okinawa Inishiatebu - Okinawa, Nihon, soshite sekai," a report of the Japan Productivity Center for Socio-Economic Development (JPC-SED), available at 〈http://www.jpc-sed.or.jp/teigen/index.html〉.
57. Gerald Figal explores these issues in "Historical Sense and Commemorative Sensibility at Okinawa's Cornerstone of Peace," positions: east asia cultures critique 5, no. 3 (winter 1997): 745-78.
58. "My Thoughts on Okinawa as Host," The Japan Times, 20 July 2000, B6.
59. URL: 〈http://www.cosmos.ne.jp/~usanc/Redcard-English1.htm.htm〉.
60. Kaneko Masaru, "Kirisakareru Okinawa."
61. Medoruma Shun, "Uminari no shima kara: Henoko o migoroshi ni suru na" (From the island where the oceans roar: Do not leave Henoko to die), Shūkan kinyōbi, no. 330 (8 September 2000): 24.
62. The JPC-SED "Okinawa Initiative" report states: "The Okinawa Summit geopolitically and historically holds the potential of being a highly significant event. We propose inviting China to the Summit as a direct strategy to realize such potential."
63. "By the end of the meeting," wrote Sydney Morning Herald correspondent Michael Millet on 24 July, "the cost of the whole exercise and the tight Japanese grip on its proceedings had become as much of an issue as the agenda itself." At the end of August 2000, several leading Republican figures in presidential candidate George W. Bush's inner circle released a report slamming the Okinawa summit, declaring it "shocking" that that much money was being spent on an event "the purpose of which is vague and the impact of which usually is negligible," The Japan Times, 27 August 2000.
64. "By the end of the meeting," wrote Sydney Morning Herald correspondent Michael Millet on 24 July, "the cost of the whole exercise and the tight Japanese grip on its proceedings had become as much of an issue as the agenda itself." At the end of August 2000, several leading Republican figures in presidential candidate George W. Bush's inner circle released a report slamming the Okinawa summit, declaring it "shocking" that that much money was being spent on an event "the purpose of which is vague and the impact of which usually is negligible," The Japan Times, 27 August 2000.
65. Twenty-third Question to the National Diet, "Jugon no hogo ni kan suru shitsumon shuisho" (Question sheet concerning the protection of dugong), submitted on 10 April 2000, by Teruya Kantoku, Member of the House of Representatives.
66. On 11 October 2000, a resolution sponsored by Japanese NGO environmental groups was passed unanimously at the International Union for the Conservation of Nature Second World Conference in Amman, Jordon, calling for the conservation of the eastern coast of Okinawa and upper northern Yambaru forest region. Both Japanese and U.S. government representatives abstained from the resolution vote.