Latin America's reactive assemblies and proactive presidents

Comparative Politics

Volumn 33, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 171-189

  Cox, Gary W ^a   Morgenstern, Scott ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040954745     PISSN: 00104159     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/422377     Document Type: Article

References (41)

1. Carl J. Friedrich, Man and His Government: An Empirical Theory of Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963).
2. Barry Ames, "A Theory of Legislative Parties in Brazil," in Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif, eds., Legislative Politics in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
3. Wayne A. Cornelius, Mexican Politics in Transition: The Breakdown of a One-Party-Dominant Regime (La Jolla: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1996).
4. Benito Nacif, "Legislative Parties in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies," in Morgenstern and Nacif, eds.
5. See Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, Game Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991). A Stackleberg equilibria is a game-theoretic concept taken from the study of duopolies. After the leading firm moves, the other firm reacts in full knowledge of the first firm's move.
6. See Scott Morgenstern, "Legislative Politics in Latin America," in Morgenstern and Nacif, ed., for more information about reelection rates.
7. Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
8. There are several other small leftist parties, none of which approaches 10 percent of the legislature.
9. John M. Carey and Matthew S. Shugart, "Calling Out the Tanks or Filling Out the Forms," in John M. Carey and Matthew S. Shugart, eds., Executive Decree Authority (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
10. In Argentina, for example, presidents can emit decrees that the congress can overturn only with statutory proposals; these proposals are themselves subject to the usual veto process.
11. Various authors have made similar points, about both Latin America and the U.S. For Latin America, see Ana Maria Mustapic, "Oficialistas and Diputados: Executive-Legislative Relations in Argentina," in Morgenstern and Nacif, eds.; Octavio Amorim-Neto, "Of Presidents, Parties, and Ministers: Cabinet Formation and Legislative Decision-making under Separation of Powers" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, San Diego, 1998). For the U.S., see Gary Cox and Samuel Kernell, eds., The Politics of Divided Government (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Charles Tiefer, The Semi-Sovereign Presidency (Boulder: Westview, 1994).
12. Various authors have made similar points, about both Latin America and the U.S. For Latin America, see Ana Maria Mustapic, "Oficialistas and Diputados: Executive-Legislative Relations in Argentina," in Morgenstern and Nacif, eds.; Octavio Amorim-Neto, "Of Presidents, Parties, and Ministers: Cabinet Formation and Legislative Decision-making under Separation of Powers" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, San Diego, 1998). For the U.S., see Gary Cox and Samuel Kernell, eds., The Politics of Divided Government (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Charles Tiefer, The Semi-Sovereign Presidency (Boulder: Westview, 1994).
13. Various authors have made similar points, about both Latin America and the U.S. For Latin America, see Ana Maria Mustapic, "Oficialistas and Diputados: Executive-Legislative Relations in Argentina," in Morgenstern and Nacif, eds.; Octavio Amorim-Neto, "Of Presidents, Parties, and Ministers: Cabinet Formation and Legislative Decision-making under Separation of Powers" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, San Diego, 1998). For the U.S., see Gary Cox and Samuel Kernell, eds., The Politics of Divided Government (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Charles Tiefer, The Semi-Sovereign Presidency (Boulder: Westview, 1994).
14. Various authors have made similar points, about both Latin America and the U.S. For Latin America, see Ana Maria Mustapic, "Oficialistas and Diputados: Executive-Legislative Relations in Argentina," in Morgenstern and Nacif, eds.; Octavio Amorim-Neto, "Of Presidents, Parties, and Ministers: Cabinet Formation and Legislative Decision-making under Separation of Powers" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, San Diego, 1998). For the U.S., see Gary Cox and Samuel Kernell, eds., The Politics of Divided Government (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Charles Tiefer, The Semi-Sovereign Presidency (Boulder: Westview, 1994).
15. For an exception, see Amorim-Neto.
16. Matthew Shugart, "The Inverse Relationship between Party Strength and Executive Strength," British Journal of Political Science, 28 (January 1998), 1-29.
17. We have excluded the impotent president here.
18. The preceding account was written to suggest optimal strategies and responses under certain pure types of legislature and president. To specify the equilibria we would have to take into account such variables as the range of unilateral and integrative powers available to the president, presidential preferences for quick action versus interbranch bargaining, the effect of the party system on the ability and willingness of the legislature to bargain, and the legislature's constitutional endowments of power. Matthew S Shugart and Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America: Rethinking the Terms of the Debate," in Scott Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart, eds., Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Morgenstern. Also, legislators have varying interests across policy issues. For example, while Allende faced a consistently recalcitrant legislature and thus played a single strategy during his whole (shortened) term, other presidents face legislatures that are less consistently recalcitrant and vary their strategies accordingly.
19. Grace Ivana Deheza, Gobiernos de Coalicion en el Sistema Presidencial: America Del Sur (Florence: European University Institute, 1997).
20. For example, Betancur's 99 percent level correctly implies that both primary parties gave some support to the president but ignores the lack of party discipline and the intense interparty rivalry (Betancur won only 47 percent of the vote). Similarly, the 41 percent support of Sanguinetti overestimates his support, as factions in his party frequently withheld support. However, her numbers lend weight to our hypothesis of shifting powers, as she breaks presidencies into periods and shows changing levels of support for the same president.
21. Even the one executive officer who has a constitutional mandate to participate in legislative affairs - the vice president (ex officio presiding officer of the senate) - is limited in his ability to participate. By constitutional prescription, the vice president can cast a vote only in the event of a tie, and partly for this reason he rarely appears in the chamber. Even when he appears, however, the senate has a long-standing custom that physically confines him to the dais. When Vice President Spiro Agnew unwittingly violated this rule, the senate expressed its displeasure at this violation of the separation of powers by passing a resolution specifically enforcing this restriction on Agnew's whereabouts.
22. See Jonathan Hartlyn, "Presidentialism and Colombian Politics," in Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), p. 301.
23. Samuel Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1986).
24. See, respectively, Amorim-Neto; Peter Siavelis, "Exaggerated Presidentialism and Moderate Presidents: Executive/Legislative Relations in Chile," in Morgenstern and Nacif, eds.; Mustapic.
25. On these two strategies, see Charles Cameron, Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and Tiefer.
26. Carey and Shugart, "Calling Out the Tanks or Filling Out the Forms.
27. See, for example, Siavelis.
28. Lisa Baldez and John Carey, "Presidential Agenda Control and Spending Policy: Lessons from General Pinochet's Constitution," American Journal of Political Science, 43 (January 1999), 29-55; Pilar Domingo and Scott Morgenstern, "The Success of Presidentialism? Breaking Gridlock in Presidential Regimes," CIDE Working Paper, 73 (1997).
29. Lisa Baldez and John Carey, "Presidential Agenda Control and Spending Policy: Lessons from General Pinochet's Constitution," American Journal of Political Science, 43 (January 1999), 29-55; Pilar Domingo and Scott Morgenstern, "The Success of Presidentialism? Breaking Gridlock in Presidential Regimes," CIDE Working Paper, 73 (1997).
30. In some parliamentary systems, such as Ireland, France, and the U.K., the government's control over the parliamentary agenda is clearly established in the standing orders. In other cases the government's powers are less clearly delineated, but the government nonetheless seems able to use its majority to dominate the agenda. Perhaps the case that least conforms to this generalization is Denmark. See Herbert Döring, "Time as a Scarce Resource: Government Control of the Agenda," in Herbert Döring, ed., Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus Verlag, 1995).
31. Cox and McCubbins.
32. The strength of the incentive to create separate party nuclei would appear to depend on the details of electoral law. Is the presidential election concurrent with the legislative? Is there a fused vote?
33. Moreover, the purpose of agenda power will not be to help keep a government, since governments can not fall on congressional votes. Instead, it will be to help establish a record on which the party can run in the next election. Cf. Cox and McCubbins.
34. Other differences, noted above, include the strength of the president's "imperial prerogatives."
35. See, for example, Siavelis; Maria Amparo Casar, "Executive-Legislative Relations: The Case Of Mexico," in Morgenstern and Nacif, eds.
36. U.S. presidents can not formally introduce legislation, but Congressional Quarterly tracks presidential success rates. While success rates above 70 percent have been common, every president since Nixon, with the exception of Carter, has had success rates of 50 to 59 percent or lower for one or more years.
37. In president-parliamentary regimes the president has unilateral appointment and dismissal power, but cabinets must also maintain parliamentary confidence. See Shugart and Casey.
38. See A. S. Foord, "The Waning of 'The Influence of the Crown,'" English Historical Review, 62 (1947), 484-507.
39. Betty Kemp, King and Commons, 1660-1832 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1957); Foord.
40. Jeffrey Weldon, "Legislative Delegation and the Budget Process in Mexico," in Morgenstern and Nacif, eds.
41. Martin Needler, "Cabinet Responsibility in a Presidential System: The Case of Peru," Parliamentary Affairs, 18 (Spring 1965), 156-61.