Why are married women working so hard?

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 18, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 41-49

  Parkman, Allen M ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0040944378     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0144-8188(97)00056-2     Document Type: Article

References (34)

1. See Robert T. Michael, "Consequences of the Rise in Female Labor Force Participation Rates: Questions and Probes," (1985) 3 J. Lab. Econ. S117; and Kevin M. Murphy and Finis Welsh, "Inequality and Relative Wages," (1993) 83 A. E. R 104.
2. See Robert T. Michael, "Consequences of the Rise in Female Labor Force Participation Rates: Questions and Probes," (1985) 3 J. Lab. Econ. S117; and Kevin M. Murphy and Finis Welsh, "Inequality and Relative Wages," (1993) 83 A. E. R 104.
3. Victor Fuchs, Women's Quest for Economic Equality, Harvard (1988), p. 77.
4. Sarah Fenstermaker Berk, The Gender Factory, Plenum (1985), p. 8.
5. For example, see Joseph H. Pleck, Working Wives/Working Husbands, Sage, (1985) and Beth Anne Shelton, Women, Men and Time, Greenwood (1992).
6. For example, see Joseph H. Pleck, Working Wives/Working Husbands, Sage, (1985) and Beth Anne Shelton, Women, Men and Time, Greenwood (1992).
7. See June Carbone and Margaret F. Brinig, "Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform," (1991) 65 Tulane L. R. 953; and Lloyd R. Cohen, "Rhetoric, the Unnatural Family, and Women's Work," (1995) 81 Va. L. R. 2275.
8. See June Carbone and Margaret F. Brinig, "Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform," (1991) 65 Tulane L. R. 953; and Lloyd R. Cohen, "Rhetoric, the Unnatural Family, and Women's Work," (1995) 81 Va. L. R. 2275.
9. Allen M. Parkman, No-Fault Divorce: What Went Wrong? Westview (1992).
10. Under both the fault and the no-fault grounds for divorce, private negotiations have been important as negotiations are often an attractive alternative to litigation. George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein, "The Selection of Disputes for Litigation," (1984) 13 J. Legal Studies 1. This is especially true in divorce cases. Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, "Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce," (1979) 88 Yale L. J. 950. Under fault divorce, approximately 90% of divorces were uncontested. Max Rheinstein, Marriage Stability, Divorce, and the Law, University of Chicago (1972), p. 248. A similar outcome was observed after the introduction of no-fault divorce. Mnookin and Kornhauser, supra p. 951. Therefore, the major change with no-fault divorce was not the percentage of cases settled but the reduction in the concessions that the divorcing spouse was willing to make to obtain the agreement of the other spouse, because it was easier for spouses to dissolve their marriage.
11. Under both the fault and the no-fault grounds for divorce, private negotiations have been important as negotiations are often an attractive alternative to litigation. George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein, "The Selection of Disputes for Litigation," (1984) 13 J. Legal Studies 1. This is especially true in divorce cases. Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, "Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce," (1979) 88 Yale L. J. 950. Under fault divorce, approximately 90% of divorces were uncontested. Max Rheinstein, Marriage Stability, Divorce, and the Law, University of Chicago (1972), p. 248. A similar outcome was observed after the introduction of no-fault divorce. Mnookin and Kornhauser, supra p. 951. Therefore, the major change with no-fault divorce was not the percentage of cases settled but the reduction in the concessions that the divorcing spouse was willing to make to obtain the agreement of the other spouse, because it was easier for spouses to dissolve their marriage.
12. Under both the fault and the no-fault grounds for divorce, private negotiations have been important as negotiations are often an attractive alternative to litigation. George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein, "The Selection of Disputes for Litigation," (1984) 13 J. Legal Studies 1. This is especially true in divorce cases. Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, "Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce," (1979) 88 Yale L. J. 950. Under fault divorce, approximately 90% of divorces were uncontested. Max Rheinstein, Marriage Stability, Divorce, and the Law, University of Chicago (1972), p. 248. A similar outcome was observed after the introduction of no-fault divorce. Mnookin and Kornhauser, supra p. 951. Therefore, the major change with no-fault divorce was not the percentage of cases settled but the reduction in the concessions that the divorcing spouse was willing to make to obtain the agreement of the other spouse, because it was easier for spouses to dissolve their marriage.
13. Under both the fault and the no-fault grounds for divorce, private negotiations have been important as negotiations are often an attractive alternative to litigation. George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein, "The Selection of Disputes for Litigation," (1984) 13 J. Legal Studies 1. This is especially true in divorce cases. Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, "Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce," (1979) 88 Yale L. J. 950. Under fault divorce, approximately 90% of divorces were uncontested. Max Rheinstein, Marriage Stability, Divorce, and the Law, University of Chicago (1972), p. 248. A similar outcome was observed after the introduction of no-fault divorce. Mnookin and Kornhauser, supra p. 951. Therefore, the major change with no-fault divorce was not the percentage of cases settled but the reduction in the concessions that the divorcing spouse was willing to make to obtain the agreement of the other spouse, because it was easier for spouses to dissolve their marriage.
14. Lenore J. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution, Free Press (1985).
15. Lloyd Cohen, "Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi Rents: or 'I Gave Him the Best Years of My Life,'" (1987) 16 J. Legal Studies 267.
16. Although more divorces are initiated by women than men, the greatest injustices tend to occur when middle-aged women in long-duration marriages are divorced. For a discussion of who initiates a divorce, see Sanford L. Braver, Marnie Whitley, and Christine Ng, "Who Divorces Whom? Methodological and Theoretical Issues," (1993) 20 J. Divorce Remarriage 1.
17. James P. Smith and Michael P. Ward, "Time-Series Growth in the Female Labor Force," (1985) 3 J. Lab. Econ. S59. The increase in the labor force participation of women reduced the gains from marriage for some adults by decreasing the gains from specialization during marriage. As marriage became less attractive, support for easier divorce processes developed that contributed to the introduction of no-fault divorce. See Parkman, No-Fault Divorce, op. cit. note 6, p. 58.
18. James P. Smith and Michael P. Ward, "Time-Series Growth in the Female Labor Force," (1985) 3 J. Lab. Econ. S59. The increase in the labor force participation of women reduced the gains from marriage for some adults by decreasing the gains from specialization during marriage. As marriage became less attractive, support for easier divorce processes developed that contributed to the introduction of no-fault divorce. See Parkman, No-Fault Divorce, op. cit. note 6, p. 58.
19. H. Elizabeth Peters, "Marriage and Divorce: Informational Constraints and Private Contracting." (1986) 76 A. E. R. 437 and Allen M. Parkman, "Unilateral Divorce and the Labor-Force Participation Rate of Married Women, Revisited," (1992) 82 A. E. R. 671 reach this conclusion with slightly different frameworks using 1979 data. Using data from 1972, William R Johnson and Jonathan Skinner, "Labor Supply and Marital Separation," (1986) 76 A. E. R. 455 found that the probability of divorce increases the labor force participation rate of married women, but they found that living in a no-fault divorce state had a negative effect on a married woman's labor supply. However, 1972 was probably too early in the no-fault divorce era to provide a reasonable test of its effect.
20. H. Elizabeth Peters, "Marriage and Divorce: Informational Constraints and Private Contracting." (1986) 76 A. E. R. 437 and Allen M. Parkman, "Unilateral Divorce and the Labor-Force Participation Rate of Married Women, Revisited," (1992) 82 A. E. R. 671 reach this conclusion with slightly different frameworks using 1979 data. Using data from 1972, William R Johnson and Jonathan Skinner, "Labor Supply and Marital Separation," (1986) 76 A. E. R. 455 found that the probability of divorce increases the labor force participation rate of married women, but they found that living in a no-fault divorce state had a negative effect on a married woman's labor supply. However, 1972 was probably too early in the no-fault divorce era to provide a reasonable test of its effect.
21. H. Elizabeth Peters, "Marriage and Divorce: Informational Constraints and Private Contracting." (1986) 76 A. E. R. 437 and Allen M. Parkman, "Unilateral Divorce and the Labor-Force Participation Rate of Married Women, Revisited," (1992) 82 A. E. R. 671 reach this conclusion with slightly different frameworks using 1979 data. Using data from 1972, William R Johnson and Jonathan Skinner, "Labor Supply and Marital Separation," (1986) 76 A. E. R. 455 found that the probability of divorce increases the labor force participation rate of married women, but they found that living in a no-fault divorce state had a negative effect on a married woman's labor supply. However, 1972 was probably too early in the no-fault divorce era to provide a reasonable test of its effect.
22. Gary S. Becker, A Treatise on the Family, Harvard (en1. ed.-1991).
23. Becker has argued that people do not maximize their utility by just buying goods, but instead that they accomplish that goal by combining the goods that they buy with their time to produce "commodities." Their budget constraint is their "full" income that would be realized if all time were devoted to market work. Gary S. Becker, "A Theory of the Allocation of Time," (1965) 75 Econ. J. 493.
24. Needless to say, this is not likely to be an explanation given by wives, especially to their spouse. The common rationale for the recent increase in the employment of married women, at least in the popular press, is financial necessity. Victor R. Fuchs, How we Live, Harvard (1983) p. 130 and Sam Ward, "Why Women Work," USA Today (June 22, 1990) p. A1. Before no-fault divorce, necessity provided an explanation for married women's labor force participation because the highest rate was for those married to low-income men (Fuchs, id.) It is less convincing for other women, because it is difficult for them to increase family income significantly, inasmuch as most married couples file joint federal and state individual income tax returns. As a result, there are no exemptions or deductions available to the second income earner plus their income is taxed at a high marginal rate. In addition, their social security contributions may not provide a pension that exceeds the spousal benefits for which they have already qualified. Last, there can be substantial employment-related expenses such as travel, clothing, meals, and child care that reduce disposable income. It is noteworthy that the largest increase in the labor force participation rate of married women since the advent of no-fault divorce has occurred among wives of middle-and high-income men. Marina Whitman, "Do women work because they have to?", Detroit News (February 16, 1997) p. B7. These women generally have higher education levels and, therefore, would sacrifice important investments in on-the job training that would increase their human capital, if they limited their career to providing domestic work. Gary S. Becker, Human Capital, Chicago (3rd ed. - 1993) p. 228. As noted above, these women would not be compensated in any systematic way at divorce for these sacrifices.
25. Needless to say, this is not likely to be an explanation given by wives, especially to their spouse. The common rationale for the recent increase in the employment of married women, at least in the popular press, is financial necessity. Victor R. Fuchs, How we Live, Harvard (1983) p. 130 and Sam Ward, "Why Women Work," USA Today (June 22, 1990) p. A1. Before no-fault divorce, necessity provided an explanation for married women's labor force participation because the highest rate was for those married to low-income men (Fuchs, id.) It is less convincing for other women, because it is difficult for them to increase family income significantly, inasmuch as most married couples file joint federal and state individual income tax returns. As a result, there are no exemptions or deductions available to the second income earner plus their income is taxed at a high marginal rate. In addition, their social security contributions may not provide a pension that exceeds the spousal benefits for which they have already qualified. Last, there can be substantial employment-related expenses such as travel, clothing, meals, and child care that reduce disposable income. It is noteworthy that the largest increase in the labor force participation rate of married women since the advent of no-fault divorce has occurred among wives of middle-and high-income men. Marina Whitman, "Do women work because they have to?", Detroit News (February 16, 1997) p. B7. These women generally have higher education levels and, therefore, would sacrifice important investments in on-the job training that would increase their human capital, if they limited their career to providing domestic work. Gary S. Becker, Human Capital, Chicago (3rd ed. - 1993) p. 228. As noted above, these women would not be compensated in any systematic way at divorce for these sacrifices.
26. Needless to say, this is not likely to be an explanation given by wives, especially to their spouse. The common rationale for the recent increase in the employment of married women, at least in the popular press, is financial necessity. Victor R. Fuchs, How we Live, Harvard (1983) p. 130 and Sam Ward, "Why Women Work," USA Today (June 22, 1990) p. A1. Before no-fault divorce, necessity provided an explanation for married women's labor force participation because the highest rate was for those married to low-income men (Fuchs, id.) It is less convincing for other women, because it is difficult for them to increase family income significantly, inasmuch as most married couples file joint federal and state individual income tax returns. As a result, there are no exemptions or deductions available to the second income earner plus their income is taxed at a high marginal rate. In addition, their social security contributions may not provide a pension that exceeds the spousal benefits for which they have already qualified. Last, there can be substantial employment-related expenses such as travel, clothing, meals, and child care that reduce disposable income. It is noteworthy that the largest increase in the labor force participation rate of married women since the advent of no-fault divorce has occurred among wives of middle-and high-income men. Marina Whitman, "Do women work because they have to?", Detroit News (February 16, 1997) p. B7. These women generally have higher education levels and, therefore, would sacrifice important investments in on-the job training that would increase their human capital, if they limited their career to providing domestic work. Gary S. Becker, Human Capital, Chicago (3rd ed. - 1993) p. 228. As noted above, these women would not be compensated in any systematic way at divorce for these sacrifices.
27. Needless to say, this is not likely to be an explanation given by wives, especially to their spouse. The common rationale for the recent increase in the employment of married women, at least in the popular press, is financial necessity. Victor R. Fuchs, How we Live, Harvard (1983) p. 130 and Sam Ward, "Why Women Work," USA Today (June 22, 1990) p. A1. Before no-fault divorce, necessity provided an explanation for married women's labor force participation because the highest rate was for those married to low-income men (Fuchs, id.) It is less convincing for other women, because it is difficult for them to increase family income significantly, inasmuch as most married couples file joint federal and state individual income tax returns. As a result, there are no exemptions or deductions available to the second income earner plus their income is taxed at a high marginal rate. In addition, their social security contributions may not provide a pension that exceeds the spousal benefits for which they have already qualified. Last, there can be substantial employment-related expenses such as travel, clothing, meals, and child care that reduce disposable income. It is noteworthy that the largest increase in the labor force participation rate of married women since the advent of no-fault divorce has occurred among wives of middle-and high-income men. Marina Whitman, "Do women work because they have to?", Detroit News (February 16, 1997) p. B7. These women generally have higher education levels and, therefore, would sacrifice important investments in on-the job training that would increase their human capital, if they limited their career to providing domestic work. Gary S. Becker, Human Capital, Chicago (3rd ed. - 1993) p. 228. As noted above, these women would not be compensated in any systematic way at divorce for these sacrifices.
28. Another reason may be that women have a stronger attraction to their children than their husbands, and they feel that an intact family is a preferred environment for raising those children. Fuchs, Women's Quest, op. cit., note 2.
29. The data used in this paper were made available by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. The data for Time Use Longitudinal Panel Study, 1975-1981, were originally collected by F. Thomas Juster, Martha S. Hill, Frank P. Stafford, and Jacquelynne Eccles Parsons of the Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, the University of Michigan. Neither the collector of the original data nor the Consortium bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here. For other uses of time budget surveys, see Jonathan Gershuny and John Robinson, "Historical Changes in the Household Division of Labor," (1988) 25 Demography 537 and F. Thomas Juster and Frank P. Stafford, "The Allocation of Time: Empirical Findings, Behavioral Models, and Problems of Measurement," (1991) 29 J. Econ. Lit. 471.
30. The data used in this paper were made available by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. The data for Time Use Longitudinal Panel Study, 1975-1981, were originally collected by F. Thomas Juster, Martha S. Hill, Frank P. Stafford, and Jacquelynne Eccles Parsons of the Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, the University of Michigan. Neither the collector of the original data nor the Consortium bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here. For other uses of time budget surveys, see Jonathan Gershuny and John Robinson, "Historical Changes in the Household Division of Labor," (1988) 25 Demography 537 and F. Thomas Juster and Frank P. Stafford, "The Allocation of Time: Empirical Findings, Behavioral Models, and Problems of Measurement," (1991) 29 J. Econ. Lit. 471.
31. The data used in this paper were made available by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. The data for Time Use Longitudinal Panel Study, 1975-1981, were originally collected by F. Thomas Juster, Martha S. Hill, Frank P. Stafford, and Jacquelynne Eccles Parsons of the Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, the University of Michigan. Neither the collector of the original data nor the Consortium bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here. For other uses of time budget surveys, see Jonathan Gershuny and John Robinson, "Historical Changes in the Household Division of Labor," (1988) 25 Demography 537 and F. Thomas Juster and Frank P. Stafford, "The Allocation of Time: Empirical Findings, Behavioral Models, and Problems of Measurement," (1991) 29 J. Econ. Lit. 471.
32. Because the property division at divorce varied among states based on legal standards such as community property and equitable distribution and on the amount of judicial discretion, equations were estimated that included those variables. None of those variables were significant, so they are not reported here.
33. In these states, a divorce could be obtained based on incompatibility, irretrievable breakdown, or living separately and apart for up to 2 years. The key to these grounds is the availability of a divorce based on the desires of one spouse and over which the other spouse has little or no control.
34. It is noteworthy that the no-fault divorce coefficient for the child-care equation is trivial and that its t-statistic is essentially zero, implying that whereas married women are willing to cut corners with housework, they are not willing to reduce the time spent with their children.