Alexis de Tocqueville on the covenantal tradition of American federal democracy

Publius: The Journal of Federalism

Volumn 28, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 1-23

  Allen, Barbara ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0040944268     PISSN: 00485950     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a029960     Document Type: Article

References (115)

1. Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor Books, [orig. pub. 1858] 1955), p. 254.
2. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Henry Reeves ([orig. pub. 1830-1835], New York: Vintage, 1945), 2:336.
3. Ibid., 1:298.
4. Ibid., 1:316.
5. Ibid., 1:26.
6. Ibid., 1:145.
7. Contemporary scholarship underscores the importance of the Calvinist and Puritan covenants and compacts at the heart of American constitutionalism. See Donald S. Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism (Baton Rouge: University of Louisiana Press, 1988); Daniel J. Elazar, The Covenant Tradition in Politics, I: Covenant and Polity in Biblical Israel (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1995); Daniel J. Elazar, The Covenant Tradition in Politics, II: Covenant and Commonwealth (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1996); Daniel J. Elazar, The Covenant Tradition in Politics, III: Covenant and Constitutionalism (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997); Vincent Ostrom, The Political Theory of the Compound Republic, 2nd ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987); Vincent Ostrom, The Meaning of American Federalism: Constituting a Self-Governing Society (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1991); Vincent Ostrom, The Meaning of Democracy and the Vulnerabilities of Democracy: A Response to Tocqueville's Challenge (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997). Articles that consider a variety of applications of covenant theory to questions of American constitutionalism and constitutional regimes more generally may be found in Daniel J. Elazar and John Kincaid, eds., Covenant, Polity, and Constitutionalism (forthcoming).
8. Contemporary scholarship underscores the importance of the Calvinist and Puritan covenants and compacts at the heart of American constitutionalism. See Donald S. Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism (Baton Rouge: University of Louisiana Press, 1988); Daniel J. Elazar, The Covenant Tradition in Politics, I: Covenant and Polity in Biblical Israel (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1995); Daniel J. Elazar, The Covenant Tradition in Politics, II: Covenant and Commonwealth (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1996); Daniel J. Elazar, The Covenant Tradition in Politics, III: Covenant and Constitutionalism (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997); Vincent Ostrom, The Political Theory of the Compound Republic, 2nd ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987); Vincent Ostrom, The Meaning of American Federalism: Constituting a Self-Governing Society (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1991); Vincent Ostrom, The Meaning of Democracy and the Vulnerabilities of Democracy: A Response to Tocqueville's Challenge (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997). Articles that consider a variety of applications of covenant theory to questions of American constitutionalism and constitutional regimes more generally may be found in Daniel J. Elazar and John Kincaid, eds., Covenant, Polity, and Constitutionalism (forthcoming).
9. Contemporary scholarship underscores the importance of the Calvinist and Puritan covenants and compacts at the heart of American constitutionalism. See Donald S. Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism (Baton Rouge: University of Louisiana Press, 1988); Daniel J. Elazar, The Covenant Tradition in Politics, I: Covenant and Polity in Biblical Israel (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1995); Daniel J. Elazar, The Covenant Tradition in Politics, II: Covenant and Commonwealth (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1996); Daniel J. Elazar, The Covenant Tradition in Politics, III: Covenant and Constitutionalism (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997); Vincent Ostrom, The Political Theory of the Compound Republic, 2nd ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987); Vincent Ostrom, The Meaning of American Federalism: Constituting a Self-Governing Society (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1991); Vincent Ostrom, The Meaning of Democracy and the Vulnerabilities of Democracy: A Response to Tocqueville's Challenge (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997). Articles that consider a variety of applications of covenant theory to questions of American constitutionalism and constitutional regimes more generally may be found in Daniel J. Elazar and John Kincaid, eds., Covenant, Polity, and Constitutionalism (forthcoming).
10. Contemporary scholarship underscores the importance of the Calvinist and Puritan covenants and compacts at the heart of American constitutionalism. See Donald S. Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism (Baton Rouge: University of Louisiana Press, 1988); Daniel J. Elazar, The Covenant Tradition in Politics, I: Covenant and Polity in Biblical Israel (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1995); Daniel J. Elazar, The Covenant Tradition in Politics, II: Covenant and Commonwealth (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1996); Daniel J. Elazar, The Covenant Tradition in Politics, III: Covenant and Constitutionalism (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997); Vincent Ostrom, The Political Theory of the Compound Republic, 2nd ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987); Vincent Ostrom, The Meaning of American Federalism: Constituting a Self-Governing Society (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1991); Vincent Ostrom, The Meaning of Democracy and the Vulnerabilities of Democracy: A Response to Tocqueville's Challenge (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997). Articles that consider a variety of applications of covenant theory to questions of American constitutionalism and constitutional regimes more generally may be found in Daniel J. Elazar and John Kincaid, eds., Covenant, Polity, and Constitutionalism (forthcoming).
11. Contemporary scholarship underscores the importance of the Calvinist and Puritan covenants and compacts at the heart of American constitutionalism. See Donald S. Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism (Baton Rouge: University of Louisiana Press, 1988); Daniel J. Elazar, The Covenant Tradition in Politics, I: Covenant and Polity in Biblical Israel (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1995); Daniel J. Elazar, The Covenant Tradition in Politics, II: Covenant and Commonwealth (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1996); Daniel J. Elazar, The Covenant Tradition in Politics, III: Covenant and Constitutionalism (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997); Vincent Ostrom, The Political Theory of the Compound Republic, 2nd ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987); Vincent Ostrom, The Meaning of American Federalism: Constituting a Self-Governing Society (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1991); Vincent Ostrom, The Meaning of Democracy and the Vulnerabilities of Democracy: A Response to Tocqueville's Challenge (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997). Articles that consider a variety of applications of covenant theory to questions of American constitutionalism and constitutional regimes more generally may be found in Daniel J. Elazar and John Kincaid, eds., Covenant, Polity, and Constitutionalism (forthcoming).
12. Contemporary scholarship underscores the importance of the Calvinist and Puritan covenants and compacts at the heart of American constitutionalism. See Donald S. Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism (Baton Rouge: University of Louisiana Press, 1988); Daniel J. Elazar, The Covenant Tradition in Politics, I: Covenant and Polity in Biblical Israel (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1995); Daniel J. Elazar, The Covenant Tradition in Politics, II: Covenant and Commonwealth (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1996); Daniel J. Elazar, The Covenant Tradition in Politics, III: Covenant and Constitutionalism (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997); Vincent Ostrom, The Political Theory of the Compound Republic, 2nd ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987); Vincent Ostrom, The Meaning of American Federalism: Constituting a Self-Governing Society (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1991); Vincent Ostrom, The Meaning of Democracy and the Vulnerabilities of Democracy: A Response to Tocqueville's Challenge (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997). Articles that consider a variety of applications of covenant theory to questions of American constitutionalism and constitutional regimes more generally may be found in Daniel J. Elazar and John Kincaid, eds., Covenant, Polity, and Constitutionalism (forthcoming).
13. Contemporary scholarship underscores the importance of the Calvinist and Puritan covenants and compacts at the heart of American constitutionalism. See Donald S. Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism (Baton Rouge: University of Louisiana Press, 1988); Daniel J. Elazar, The Covenant Tradition in Politics, I: Covenant and Polity in Biblical Israel (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1995); Daniel J. Elazar, The Covenant Tradition in Politics, II: Covenant and Commonwealth (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1996); Daniel J. Elazar, The Covenant Tradition in Politics, III: Covenant and Constitutionalism (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997); Vincent Ostrom, The Political Theory of the Compound Republic, 2nd ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987); Vincent Ostrom, The Meaning of American Federalism: Constituting a Self-Governing Society (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1991); Vincent Ostrom, The Meaning of Democracy and the Vulnerabilities of Democracy: A Response to Tocqueville's Challenge (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997). Articles that consider a variety of applications of covenant theory to questions of American constitutionalism and constitutional regimes more generally may be found in Daniel J. Elazar and John Kincaid, eds., Covenant, Polity, and Constitutionalism (forthcoming).
14. Contemporary scholarship underscores the importance of the Calvinist and Puritan covenants and compacts at the heart of American constitutionalism. See Donald S. Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism (Baton Rouge: University of Louisiana Press, 1988); Daniel J. Elazar, The Covenant Tradition in Politics, I: Covenant and Polity in Biblical Israel (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1995); Daniel J. Elazar, The Covenant Tradition in Politics, II: Covenant and Commonwealth (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1996); Daniel J. Elazar, The Covenant Tradition in Politics, III: Covenant and Constitutionalism (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997); Vincent Ostrom, The Political Theory of the Compound Republic, 2nd ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987); Vincent Ostrom, The Meaning of American Federalism: Constituting a Self-Governing Society (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1991); Vincent Ostrom, The Meaning of Democracy and the Vulnerabilities of Democracy: A Response to Tocqueville's Challenge (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997). Articles that consider a variety of applications of covenant theory to questions of American constitutionalism and constitutional regimes more generally may be found in Daniel J. Elazar and John Kincaid, eds., Covenant, Polity, and Constitutionalism (forthcoming).
15. Daniel J. Elazar distinguishes three related forms of agreement, covenant, compact, and contract. As foundations for consent-based societies, all three types of voluntary agreements can be contrasted with two alternative models of political foundings, conquest and organic evolution. Within the model of consent-based foundings, covenants and compacts can be contrasted with contract; all are instruments for creating voluntary agreements, but the principles and mental stance at the heart of covenants and compacts differ substantially from the mentality informing contracts. Elazar defines covenant as "a morally informed agreement or pact based upon voluntary consent, establishing by mutual oaths or promises, involving or witnessed by some transcendent higher authority, between peoples or parties having independent status, equal in connection with the purposes of the pact, that provides for joint action or obligation to achieve defined ends (limited or comprehensive) under conditions of mutual respect, which protect the individual integrities of all parties to it" Elazar, Covenant and Polity in Biblical Israel, pp. 22-23. Covenants establish enduring partnerships characterized by their moral and legal dimensions; in politics, covenants constitute relationships that may be institutionalized through establishing a constitution that includes a frame of government Ibid., p. 24. Compacts, Elazar explains, are secular creations, based on "mutual pledges rather than guarantees by or before a higher authority." Although compacts, like covenants, establish public, broadly reciprocal relationships, unlike covenants, their legal dimension is more prominent and more directly binding than their moral dimension. In contrast to these broadly reciprocal pacts of unlimited duration, contracts are narrow agreements designed to limit the obligations and liabilities of the parties to the specific duties designed to facilitate their private relationship. Ibid., 31. He finds that the terms covenant and compact were used interchangeably in the British North American colonies until 1791. Donald S. Lutz details the use of covenants and compacts, along with "a plethora of other terms in creating colonial frames of government." Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism, pp. 16-34. Contracts, Lutz shows, are agreements creating "mutual responsibilities on a specific point," while compacts were agreements or understandings working "more in the nature of a standing rule." Ibid., 16-17. Compacts might not enjoy the status of law, yet had that effect, influencing the public activities of entire communities. Covenants were formal agreements witnessed by the highest relevant authority, religious or civil. In his extensive analysis of colonial agreements, Lutz shows that the verb forms "to agree," "to compact," and "to covenant" are used interchangeably and that covenants may form secular or religious bodies. Given that American colonial documents do not always distinguish covenants from compacts on the basis of their secular or religious content, this article will follow Lutz in simply indicating whether we are speaking of secular or religious foundings, regardless of the terminology.
16. Daniel J. Elazar distinguishes three related forms of agreement, covenant, compact, and contract. As foundations for consent-based societies, all three types of voluntary agreements can be contrasted with two alternative models of political foundings, conquest and organic evolution. Within the model of consent-based foundings, covenants and compacts can be contrasted with contract; all are instruments for creating voluntary agreements, but the principles and mental stance at the heart of covenants and compacts differ substantially from the mentality informing contracts. Elazar defines covenant as "a morally informed agreement or pact based upon voluntary consent, establishing by mutual oaths or promises, involving or witnessed by some transcendent higher authority, between peoples or parties having independent status, equal in connection with the purposes of the pact, that provides for joint action or obligation to achieve defined ends (limited or comprehensive) under conditions of mutual respect, which protect the individual integrities of all parties to it" Elazar, Covenant and Polity in Biblical Israel, pp. 22-23. Covenants establish enduring partnerships characterized by their moral and legal dimensions; in politics, covenants constitute relationships that may be institutionalized through establishing a constitution that includes a frame of government Ibid., p. 24. Compacts, Elazar explains, are secular creations, based on "mutual pledges rather than guarantees by or before a higher authority." Although compacts, like covenants, establish public, broadly reciprocal relationships, unlike covenants, their legal dimension is more prominent and more directly binding than their moral dimension. In contrast to these broadly reciprocal pacts of unlimited duration, contracts are narrow agreements designed to limit the obligations and liabilities of the parties to the specific duties designed to facilitate their private relationship. Ibid., 31. He finds that the terms covenant and compact were used interchangeably in the British North American colonies until 1791. Donald S. Lutz details the use of covenants and compacts, along with "a plethora of other terms in creating colonial frames of government." Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism, pp. 16-34. Contracts, Lutz shows, are agreements creating "mutual responsibilities on a specific point," while compacts were agreements or understandings working "more in the nature of a standing rule." Ibid., 16-17. Compacts might not enjoy the status of law, yet had that effect, influencing the public activities of entire communities. Covenants were formal agreements witnessed by the highest relevant authority, religious or civil. In his extensive analysis of colonial agreements, Lutz shows that the verb forms "to agree," "to compact," and "to covenant" are used interchangeably and that covenants may form secular or religious bodies. Given that American colonial documents do not always distinguish covenants from compacts on the basis of their secular or religious content, this article will follow Lutz in simply indicating whether we are speaking of secular or religious foundings, regardless of the terminology.
17. Daniel J. Elazar distinguishes three related forms of agreement, covenant, compact, and contract. As foundations for consent-based societies, all three types of voluntary agreements can be contrasted with two alternative models of political foundings, conquest and organic evolution. Within the model of consent-based foundings, covenants and compacts can be contrasted with contract; all are instruments for creating voluntary agreements, but the principles and mental stance at the heart of covenants and compacts differ substantially from the mentality informing contracts. Elazar defines covenant as "a morally informed agreement or pact based upon voluntary consent, establishing by mutual oaths or promises, involving or witnessed by some transcendent higher authority, between peoples or parties having independent status, equal in connection with the purposes of the pact, that provides for joint action or obligation to achieve defined ends (limited or comprehensive) under conditions of mutual respect, which protect the individual integrities of all parties to it" Elazar, Covenant and Polity in Biblical Israel, pp. 22-23. Covenants establish enduring partnerships characterized by their moral and legal dimensions; in politics, covenants constitute relationships that may be institutionalized through establishing a constitution that includes a frame of government Ibid., p. 24. Compacts, Elazar explains, are secular creations, based on "mutual pledges rather than guarantees by or before a higher authority." Although compacts, like covenants, establish public, broadly reciprocal relationships, unlike covenants, their legal dimension is more prominent and more directly binding than their moral dimension. In contrast to these broadly reciprocal pacts of unlimited duration, contracts are narrow agreements designed to limit the obligations and liabilities of the parties to the specific duties designed to facilitate their private relationship. Ibid., 31. He finds that the terms covenant and compact were used interchangeably in the British North American colonies until 1791. Donald S. Lutz details the use of covenants and compacts, along with "a plethora of other terms in creating colonial frames of government." Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism, pp. 16-34. Contracts, Lutz shows, are agreements creating "mutual responsibilities on a specific point," while compacts were agreements or understandings working "more in the nature of a standing rule." Ibid., 16-17. Compacts might not enjoy the status of law, yet had that effect, influencing the public activities of entire communities. Covenants were formal agreements witnessed by the highest relevant authority, religious or civil. In his extensive analysis of colonial agreements, Lutz shows that the verb forms "to agree," "to compact," and "to covenant" are used interchangeably and that covenants may form secular or religious bodies. Given that American colonial documents do not always distinguish covenants from compacts on the basis of their secular or religious content, this article will follow Lutz in simply indicating whether we are speaking of secular or religious foundings, regardless of the terminology.
18. Daniel J. Elazar distinguishes three related forms of agreement, covenant, compact, and contract. As foundations for consent-based societies, all three types of voluntary agreements can be contrasted with two alternative models of political foundings, conquest and organic evolution. Within the model of consent-based foundings, covenants and compacts can be contrasted with contract; all are instruments for creating voluntary agreements, but the principles and mental stance at the heart of covenants and compacts differ substantially from the mentality informing contracts. Elazar defines covenant as "a morally informed agreement or pact based upon voluntary consent, establishing by mutual oaths or promises, involving or witnessed by some transcendent higher authority, between peoples or parties having independent status, equal in connection with the purposes of the pact, that provides for joint action or obligation to achieve defined ends (limited or comprehensive) under conditions of mutual respect, which protect the individual integrities of all parties to it" Elazar, Covenant and Polity in Biblical Israel, pp. 22-23. Covenants establish enduring partnerships characterized by their moral and legal dimensions; in politics, covenants constitute relationships that may be institutionalized through establishing a constitution that includes a frame of government Ibid., p. 24. Compacts, Elazar explains, are secular creations, based on "mutual pledges rather than guarantees by or before a higher authority." Although compacts, like covenants, establish public, broadly reciprocal relationships, unlike covenants, their legal dimension is more prominent and more directly binding than their moral dimension. In contrast to these broadly reciprocal pacts of unlimited duration, contracts are narrow agreements designed to limit the obligations and liabilities of the parties to the specific duties designed to facilitate their private relationship. Ibid., 31. He finds that the terms covenant and compact were used interchangeably in the British North American colonies until 1791. Donald S. Lutz details the use of covenants and compacts, along with "a plethora of other terms in creating colonial frames of government." Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism, pp. 16-34. Contracts, Lutz shows, are agreements creating "mutual responsibilities on a specific point," while compacts were agreements or understandings working "more in the nature of a standing rule." Ibid., 16-17. Compacts might not enjoy the status of law, yet had that effect, influencing the public activities of entire communities. Covenants were formal agreements witnessed by the highest relevant authority, religious or civil. In his extensive analysis of colonial agreements, Lutz shows that the verb forms "to agree," "to compact," and "to covenant" are used interchangeably and that covenants may form secular or religious bodies. Given that American colonial documents do not always distinguish covenants from compacts on the basis of their secular or religious content, this article will follow Lutz in simply indicating whether we are speaking of secular or religious foundings, regardless of the terminology.
19. Daniel J. Elazar distinguishes three related forms of agreement, covenant, compact, and contract. As foundations for consent-based societies, all three types of voluntary agreements can be contrasted with two alternative models of political foundings, conquest and organic evolution. Within the model of consent-based foundings, covenants and compacts can be contrasted with contract; all are instruments for creating voluntary agreements, but the principles and mental stance at the heart of covenants and compacts differ substantially from the mentality informing contracts. Elazar defines covenant as "a morally informed agreement or pact based upon voluntary consent, establishing by mutual oaths or promises, involving or witnessed by some transcendent higher authority, between peoples or parties having independent status, equal in connection with the purposes of the pact, that provides for joint action or obligation to achieve defined ends (limited or comprehensive) under conditions of mutual respect, which protect the individual integrities of all parties to it" Elazar, Covenant and Polity in Biblical Israel, pp. 22-23. Covenants establish enduring partnerships characterized by their moral and legal dimensions; in politics, covenants constitute relationships that may be institutionalized through establishing a constitution that includes a frame of government Ibid., p. 24. Compacts, Elazar explains, are secular creations, based on "mutual pledges rather than guarantees by or before a higher authority." Although compacts, like covenants, establish public, broadly reciprocal relationships, unlike covenants, their legal dimension is more prominent and more directly binding than their moral dimension. In contrast to these broadly reciprocal pacts of unlimited duration, contracts are narrow agreements designed to limit the obligations and liabilities of the parties to the specific duties designed to facilitate their private relationship. Ibid., 31. He finds that the terms covenant and compact were used interchangeably in the British North American colonies until 1791. Donald S. Lutz details the use of covenants and compacts, along with "a plethora of other terms in creating colonial frames of government." Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism, pp. 16-34. Contracts, Lutz shows, are agreements creating "mutual responsibilities on a specific point," while compacts were agreements or understandings working "more in the nature of a standing rule." Ibid., 16-17. Compacts might not enjoy the status of law, yet had that effect, influencing the public activities of entire communities. Covenants were formal agreements witnessed by the highest relevant authority, religious or civil. In his extensive analysis of colonial agreements, Lutz shows that the verb forms "to agree," "to compact," and "to covenant" are used interchangeably and that covenants may form secular or religious bodies. Given that American colonial documents do not always distinguish covenants from compacts on the basis of their secular or religious content, this article will follow Lutz in simply indicating whether we are speaking of secular or religious foundings, regardless of the terminology.
20. Even God's position in the agreement is a matter of some complexity. For many Independents (a type of Reformed Protestant), the idea that God had articulated a promise to a seventeenth-century people at all like the Noahide, Mosaic, or other covenants recorded in Scripture was preposterous or even blasphemous.
21. Perry Miller, Errand Into the Wilderness (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1956) p. 61.
22. Ibid., p. 67.
23. Ibid., p. 46. Miller is quoting John Robinson (a Separatist who was strongly influenced by Nonseparating Congregationalism and whose philosophical presentation of the discipline's main principles was transported to New England); Robert Ashton, ed., John Robinson's Works (Boston, MA: Doctrinal Tract & Books Society, 1851), 3:61.
24. Ibid., p. 46. Miller is quoting John Robinson (a Separatist who was strongly influenced by Nonseparating Congregationalism and whose philosophical presentation of the discipline's main principles was transported to New England); Robert Ashton, ed., John Robinson's Works (Boston, MA: Doctrinal Tract & Books Society, 1851), 3:61.
25. Ibid., pp. 20-31; See also Ralph B. Perry, Puritanism and Democracy (New York: The Vanguard Press, 1944).
26. Ibid., pp. 20-31; See also Ralph B. Perry, Puritanism and Democracy (New York: The Vanguard Press, 1944).
27. The Puritan conception of equality raises important concerns about gender, power, and authority. Works that consider equality and the conception of the individual as it relates to women include Janet Coleman, ed., The Individual in Political Theory and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford, CT: Stanford University Press, 1988). For a depiction of the colonial family, see John Demos, A Little Commonwealth: Family Life in Plymouth Colony (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970). This work suggests that the family functioned as an association guided by &federal liberty& laying out a political role for women that is similar to the important place held by women and family in Greek political thought. See Arlene Saxonhouse. Women in the History of Political Thought (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985).
28. The Puritan conception of equality raises important concerns about gender, power, and authority. Works that consider equality and the conception of the individual as it relates to women include Janet Coleman, ed., The Individual in Political Theory and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford, CT: Stanford University Press, 1988). For a depiction of the colonial family, see John Demos, A Little Commonwealth: Family Life in Plymouth Colony (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970). This work suggests that the family functioned as an association guided by &federal liberty& laying out a political role for women that is similar to the important place held by women and family in Greek political thought. See Arlene Saxonhouse. Women in the History of Political Thought (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985).
29. The Puritan conception of equality raises important concerns about gender, power, and authority. Works that consider equality and the conception of the individual as it relates to women include Janet Coleman, ed., The Individual in Political Theory and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford, CT: Stanford University Press, 1988). For a depiction of the colonial family, see John Demos, A Little Commonwealth: Family Life in Plymouth Colony (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970). This work suggests that the family functioned as an association guided by &federal liberty& laying out a political role for women that is similar to the important place held by women and family in Greek political thought. See Arlene Saxonhouse. Women in the History of Political Thought (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985).
30. The Puritan conception of equality raises important concerns about gender, power, and authority. Works that consider equality and the conception of the individual as it relates to women include Janet Coleman, ed., The Individual in Political Theory and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford, CT: Stanford University Press, 1988). For a depiction of the colonial family, see John Demos, A Little Commonwealth: Family Life in Plymouth Colony (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970). This work suggests that the family functioned as an association guided by &federal liberty& laying out a political role for women that is similar to the important place held by women and family in Greek political thought. See Arlene Saxonhouse. Women in the History of Political Thought (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985).
31. Elazar, Covenant and Commonwealth, p. 154.
32. Elazar, Covenant and Polity in Biblical Israel, p. 59.
33. Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism, p. 77.
34. See Elazar, Covenant and Commonwealth, pp. 153-154 on the covenantal reordering of Medieval civil society and the consequences for recasting a privatized polity in terms of res publica.
35. Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1:44-45.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.; Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism, p. 74, chronicles these two aspects of liberty, natural freedom and civil liberty in other founding documents, as well.
38. Ibid.; Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism, p. 74, chronicles these two aspects of liberty, natural freedom and civil liberty in other founding documents, as well.
39. Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1:44-45.
40. See Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism, pp. 25-31.
41. Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1:36.
42. See also Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism, pp. 25-26.
43. Ibid., p. 26.
44. Ibid., pp. 31-32.
45. Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1:44; Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism, pp. 18, 31-32.
46. Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1:44; Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism, pp. 18, 31-32.
47. Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1:67-68; 169-171.
48. Ibid., 1:67.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., 1:74, 70.
51. Ibid., 1:9.
52. Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism, p. 77; Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1:42-44, 2:129-135.
53. Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism, p. 77; Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1:42-44, 2:129-135.
54. Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism, p. 77; Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1:42-44, 2:129-135.
55. Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1:73-74.
56. Ibid., 1:310.
57. Ibid., 1:29.
58. Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism, p. 156.
59. Ibid.
60. Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1:12.
61. Ibid., 1:310.
62. Ibid., 2:154; See Barbara Allen, "Tocqueville's Analysis of Belief in a Transcendent Order, Enlightened Interest and Democracy," Journal of Theoretical Politics 8 (July 1996): 383-414.
63. Ibid., 2:154; See Barbara Allen, "Tocqueville's Analysis of Belief in a Transcendent Order, Enlightened Interest and Democracy," Journal of Theoretical Politics 8 (July 1996): 383-414.
64. Barbara Allen, "The Spiral of Silence & Institutional Design: Tocqueville's Analysis of Public Opinion & Democracy," Polity 24 (Winter 1991): 243-267.
65. Thomas Jefferson, "A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom," The Complete Jefferson, ed Saul K. Padover (New York: Duell, Sloan, & Pearce, 1943), pp. 946-947.
66. Drew R. McCoy, The Last of the Fathers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 239.
67. See also, Ralph L. Ketcham, "James Madison and Religion A New Hypothesis," The Writings of James Madison on Religious Liberty, ed. Robert S. Alley (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1985), pp. 175-196.
68. Robert S. Alley, ed., "To Frederick Beasley from Madison, November 20, 1823," James Madison On Religious Liberty (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1985), p. 85.
69. Ibid.
70. McCoy, The Last of the Fathers, p. 239.
71. James Madison, "A Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, 1785," The Writings, of James Madison on Religious Liberty, ed. Robert S. Alley (Buffalo: Promethcus Books, [orig. pub. 1785] 1985), p. 56.
72. Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, The Federalist (New York: Modern Library, n.d., orig. pub (1787-1788), p. 56.
73. Daniel J. Elazar, "The Role of Federalism," Federalism and Political Integration, ed. Daniel J. Elazar (Ramat Gan, Israel: Turtledove Publishing, 1979), p. 15.
74. Hamilton, Jay, and Madison, The Federalist, p 56.
75. Ibid., p. 337.
76. Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1:198.
77. Ibid., 1:205.
78. Ibid., 2:310.
79. Madison, "Memorial and Remonstrance," p. 56
80. Ibid., p. 56. For an historical analysis of Madison's writings on religion, see A. E. Dick Howard, "James Madison and the Founding of the Republic"; Alley, ed., The Writings of James Madison on Religious Liberty, pp. 21-34.
81. Ibid., p. 56. For an historical analysis of Madison's writings on religion, see A. E. Dick Howard, "James Madison and the Founding of the Republic"; Alley, ed., The Writings of James Madison on Religious Liberty, pp. 21-34.
82. McCoy, The Last of the Fathers, p. 239.
83. Ibid., pp. 50-51; Hamilton, Jay, and Madison, The Federalist, p. 331.
84. Ibid., pp. 50-51; Hamilton, Jay, and Madison, The Federalist, p. 331.
85. Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1:280.
86. Thomas Jefferson, "Aristocracy and Liberty (To John Adams), October 28, 1813," Padover, The Complete Jefferson, p. 284.
87. Thomas Jefferson, "Aristocracy and Liberty (To John Adams), October 28, 1813," Padover, The Complete Jefferson, p. 284.
88. Thomas Jefferson, "To Society of Methodist Episcopal Church," Padover, The Complete Jefferson, p. 554.
89. Thomas Jefferson, "To Society of Methodist Episcopal Church," Padover, The Complete Jefferson, p. 554.
90. Ibid., pp. 675-676.
91. Ibid.
92. Thomas Jefferson, "A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom," Padover, The Complete Jefferson, p. 946.
93. Thomas Jefferson, "A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom," Padover, The Complete Jefferson, p. 946.
94. Thomas Jefferson, "Freedom of Religion at the University of Virginia October 7, 1822," Padover, The Complete Jefferson, p. 957.
95. Thomas Jefferson, "Freedom of Religion at the University of Virginia October 7, 1822," Padover, The Complete Jefferson, p. 957.
96. Thomas Jefferson, "A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom,0" Padover, The Complete Jefferson, p. 947.
97. Thomas Jefferson, "A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom,0" Padover, The Complete Jefferson, p. 947.
98. Thomas Jefferson, "To Messrs. Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins, and Stephen S. Nelson, A Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association, in the State of Connecticut, January 1, 1802," Padover, The Complete Jefferson, p. 519.
99. Thomas Jefferson, "Aristocracy and Liberty, (letter to John Adams) October 28, 1813," Padover, The Complete Jefferson, p. 280.
100. Thomas Jefferson, "To the Members of the Baltimore Baptist Association, October 17, 1808," Padover, The Complete Jefferson, p. 537; "Christianity and Common Law c. 1765," Padover, The Complete Jefferson, p. 934, in which Jefferson concludes, "that Christianity neither is, nor ever was part of the common law."
101. Thomas Jefferson, "To the Members of the Baltimore Baptist Association, October 17, 1808," Padover, The Complete Jefferson, p. 537; "Christianity and Common Law c. 1765," Padover, The Complete Jefferson, p. 934, in which Jefferson concludes, "that Christianity neither is, nor ever was part of the common law."
102. Thomas Jefferson, "Notes on the State of Virginia, 1781-1785," Padover, The Complete Jefferson, p. 676.
103. Thomas Jefferson, "Notes on the State of Virginia, 1781-1785," Padover, The Complete Jefferson, p. 676.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid., p. 675.
106. Allen, "Tocqueville's Analysis of Belief in a Transcendent Order, Enlightened Interest and Democracy," 390-397.
107. Tocqueville, Democracy in America 2:274-275.
108. Ibid.
109. Ibid., 2:7.
110. Ibid., 2.222-223.
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid., 2:337.
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid., 1:275.
115. Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, The Federalist, p. 337.