Towards a more diversified Canada: Economic arguments for re-confederation

Canadian Public Administration

Volumn 41, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 481-500

  Goldberg, Michael A ^a   Levi, Maurice D ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040919506     PISSN: 00084840     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1754-7121.1998.tb00218.x     Document Type: Article

References (60)

1. See Thomas J. Courchene, "ACCESS: A Convention On the Canadian Economic and Social Systems" (Kingston, Ont.: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen's University, 1996), p. 2, as well as his Social Canada in the Millennium: Reform Imperatives and Restructuring Principles, (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 1994).
2. The tenor of the discussion in the early 1990s can be gleaned from various federal proposals: See Government of Canada, Canadian Federalism and Economic Union: Partnership for Prosperity (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991); Government of Canada, Shaping Canada's Future Together: Proposals (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991); Government of Canada, Prosperity Through Competitiveness (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991); Government of Canada, Learning Well ... Living Well (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991). These in turn stimulated diverse responses: Robin W. Boadway, Thomas J. Courchene, and Douglas D. Purvis, eds., Economic Dimensions of Constitutional Change. Volumes 1 and 2 (Kingston, Ont.: John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy, Queen's University, 1991); Paul Boothe, ed., Alberta and the Economics of Constitutional Change (Edmonton: Western Centre for Economic Research, University of Alberta, 1992);
3. The tenor of the discussion in the early 1990s can be gleaned from various federal proposals: See Government of Canada, Canadian Federalism and Economic Union: Partnership for Prosperity (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991); Government of Canada, Shaping Canada's Future Together: Proposals (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991); Government of Canada, Prosperity Through Competitiveness (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991); Government of Canada, Learning Well ... Living Well (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991). These in turn stimulated diverse responses: Robin W. Boadway, Thomas J. Courchene, and Douglas D. Purvis, eds., Economic Dimensions of Constitutional Change. Volumes 1 and 2 (Kingston, Ont.: John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy, Queen's University, 1991); Paul Boothe, ed., Alberta and the Economics of Constitutional Change (Edmonton: Western Centre for Economic Research, University of Alberta, 1992);
4. The tenor of the discussion in the early 1990s can be gleaned from various federal proposals: See Government of Canada, Canadian Federalism and Economic Union: Partnership for Prosperity (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991); Government of Canada, Shaping Canada's Future Together: Proposals (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991); Government of Canada, Prosperity Through Competitiveness (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991); Government of Canada, Learning Well ... Living Well (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991). These in turn stimulated diverse responses: Robin W. Boadway, Thomas J. Courchene, and Douglas D. Purvis, eds., Economic Dimensions of Constitutional Change. Volumes 1 and 2 (Kingston, Ont.: John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy, Queen's University, 1991); Paul Boothe, ed., Alberta and the Economics of Constitutional Change (Edmonton: Western Centre for Economic Research, University of Alberta, 1992);
5. The tenor of the discussion in the early 1990s can be gleaned from various federal proposals: See Government of Canada, Canadian Federalism and Economic Union: Partnership for Prosperity (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991); Government of Canada, Shaping Canada's Future Together: Proposals (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991); Government of Canada, Prosperity Through Competitiveness (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991); Government of Canada, Learning Well ... Living Well (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991). These in turn stimulated diverse responses: Robin W. Boadway, Thomas J. Courchene, and Douglas D. Purvis, eds., Economic Dimensions of Constitutional Change. Volumes 1 and 2 (Kingston, Ont.: John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy, Queen's University, 1991); Paul Boothe, ed., Alberta and the Economics of Constitutional Change (Edmonton: Western Centre for Economic Research, University of Alberta, 1992);
6. The tenor of the discussion in the early 1990s can be gleaned from various federal proposals: See Government of Canada, Canadian Federalism and Economic Union: Partnership for Prosperity (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991); Government of Canada, Shaping Canada's Future Together: Proposals (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991); Government of Canada, Prosperity Through Competitiveness (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991); Government of Canada, Learning Well ... Living Well (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991). These in turn stimulated diverse responses: Robin W. Boadway, Thomas J. Courchene, and Douglas D. Purvis, eds., Economic Dimensions of Constitutional Change. Volumes 1 and 2 (Kingston, Ont.: John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy, Queen's University, 1991); Paul Boothe, ed., Alberta and the Economics of Constitutional Change (Edmonton: Western Centre for Economic Research, University of Alberta, 1992);
7. The tenor of the discussion in the early 1990s can be gleaned from various federal proposals: See Government of Canada, Canadian Federalism and Economic Union: Partnership for Prosperity (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991); Government of Canada, Shaping Canada's Future Together: Proposals (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991); Government of Canada, Prosperity Through Competitiveness (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991); Government of Canada, Learning Well ... Living Well (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991). These in turn stimulated diverse responses: Robin W. Boadway, Thomas J. Courchene, and Douglas D. Purvis, eds., Economic Dimensions of Constitutional Change. Volumes 1 and 2 (Kingston, Ont.: John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy, Queen's University, 1991); Paul Boothe, ed., Alberta and the Economics of Constitutional Change (Edmonton: Western Centre for Economic Research, University of Alberta, 1992);
8. and Economic Council of Canada, "Economic Aspects of Reconfederation," A joint Venture - The Economics of Constitutional Options. 28th Annual Review (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1991); Trudy Lancelyn, "Toward Pacific Northwest Competitiveness," Sounding Board [Vancouver Board of Trade] 31, no. 6 (December 1991), pp. WTC1-2. The related Quebec separation debates are captured by Constitutional Committee of the Quebec Liberral Party for Submission to the 25th Convention, A Quebec Free to Choose: Report (Quebec: Liberal Party of Quebec, 1991). Chaired by Jean Allaire; Quebec, Commission on the Political and Constitutional Future of Quebec, Report (Quebec City: Éditeur officiel du Québec, 1992). Chaired by Michel Bélanger and Jean Campeau; Patrick Grady, Consequences of Quebec Sovereignty (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1991); John McCallum and Chris Green, Parting as Friends: the Economic Consequences for Quebec (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1992); and Royal Bank of Canada, Unity or Disunity: An Economic Analysis of the Benefits and the Costs (Montreal: Royal Bank of Canada, Economics Department, 1992). Important background on regionalism and federalism are found in Roger Gibbins, Territorial Politics in Canada and the United States (Toronto: Butterworths, 1982); Samuel LaSelva, "Confederation and the Beginnings of Canadian Federalist Theory" (Vancouver: Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, 1993); and Robert Vipond, Liberty and Community: Canadian Federalism and the Failure of the Constitution (Albany, N.Y: SUNY Press, 1991). Finally, for insights into the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, see André Burelle, "A Renewed Canada Should Say Yes," Canada Opinion 4, no. 1 (Fall 1996), p. 1 and Richard Simeon, "The Lessons of Meech Lake and Charlottetown," Canada Watch 3, nos. 5/6, (March/April 1995).
9. and Economic Council of Canada, "Economic Aspects of Reconfederation," A joint Venture - The Economics of Constitutional Options. 28th Annual Review (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1991); Trudy Lancelyn, "Toward Pacific Northwest Competitiveness," Sounding Board [Vancouver Board of Trade] 31, no. 6 (December 1991), pp. WTC1-2. The related Quebec separation debates are captured by Constitutional Committee of the Quebec Liberral Party for Submission to the 25th Convention, A Quebec Free to Choose: Report (Quebec: Liberal Party of Quebec, 1991). Chaired by Jean Allaire; Quebec, Commission on the Political and Constitutional Future of Quebec, Report (Quebec City: Éditeur officiel du Québec, 1992). Chaired by Michel Bélanger and Jean Campeau; Patrick Grady, Consequences of Quebec Sovereignty (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1991); John McCallum and Chris Green, Parting as Friends: the Economic Consequences for Quebec (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1992); and Royal Bank of Canada, Unity or Disunity: An Economic Analysis of the Benefits and the Costs (Montreal: Royal Bank of Canada, Economics Department, 1992). Important background on regionalism and federalism are found in Roger Gibbins, Territorial Politics in Canada and the United States (Toronto: Butterworths, 1982); Samuel LaSelva, "Confederation and the Beginnings of Canadian Federalist Theory" (Vancouver: Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, 1993); and Robert Vipond, Liberty and Community: Canadian Federalism and the Failure of the Constitution (Albany, N.Y: SUNY Press, 1991). Finally, for insights into the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, see André Burelle, "A Renewed Canada Should Say Yes," Canada Opinion 4, no. 1 (Fall 1996), p. 1 and Richard Simeon, "The Lessons of Meech Lake and Charlottetown," Canada Watch 3, nos. 5/6, (March/April 1995).
10. and Economic Council of Canada, "Economic Aspects of Reconfederation," A joint Venture - The Economics of Constitutional Options. 28th Annual Review (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1991); Trudy Lancelyn, "Toward Pacific Northwest Competitiveness," Sounding Board [Vancouver Board of Trade] 31, no. 6 (December 1991), pp. WTC1-2. The related Quebec separation debates are captured by Constitutional Committee of the Quebec Liberral Party for Submission to the 25th Convention, A Quebec Free to Choose: Report (Quebec: Liberal Party of Quebec, 1991). Chaired by Jean Allaire; Quebec, Commission on the Political and Constitutional Future of Quebec, Report (Quebec City: Éditeur officiel du Québec, 1992). Chaired by Michel Bélanger and Jean Campeau; Patrick Grady, Consequences of Quebec Sovereignty (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1991); John McCallum and Chris Green, Parting as Friends: the Economic Consequences for Quebec (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1992); and Royal Bank of Canada, Unity or Disunity: An Economic Analysis of the Benefits and the Costs (Montreal: Royal Bank of Canada, Economics Department, 1992). Important background on regionalism and federalism are found in Roger Gibbins, Territorial Politics in Canada and the United States (Toronto: Butterworths, 1982); Samuel LaSelva, "Confederation and the Beginnings of Canadian Federalist Theory" (Vancouver: Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, 1993); and Robert Vipond, Liberty and Community: Canadian Federalism and the Failure of the Constitution (Albany, N.Y: SUNY Press, 1991). Finally, for insights into the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, see André Burelle, "A Renewed Canada Should Say Yes," Canada Opinion 4, no. 1 (Fall 1996), p. 1 and Richard Simeon, "The Lessons of Meech Lake and Charlottetown," Canada Watch 3, nos. 5/6, (March/April 1995).
11. and Economic Council of Canada, "Economic Aspects of Reconfederation," A joint Venture - The Economics of Constitutional Options. 28th Annual Review (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1991); Trudy Lancelyn, "Toward Pacific Northwest Competitiveness," Sounding Board [Vancouver Board of Trade] 31, no. 6 (December 1991), pp. WTC1-2. The related Quebec separation debates are captured by Constitutional Committee of the Quebec Liberral Party for Submission to the 25th Convention, A Quebec Free to Choose: Report (Quebec: Liberal Party of Quebec, 1991). Chaired by Jean Allaire; Quebec, Commission on the Political and Constitutional Future of Quebec, Report (Quebec City: Éditeur officiel du Québec, 1992). Chaired by Michel Bélanger and Jean Campeau; Patrick Grady, Consequences of Quebec Sovereignty (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1991); John McCallum and Chris Green, Parting as Friends: the Economic Consequences for Quebec (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1992); and Royal Bank of Canada, Unity or Disunity: An Economic Analysis of the Benefits and the Costs (Montreal: Royal Bank of Canada, Economics Department, 1992). Important background on regionalism and federalism are found in Roger Gibbins, Territorial Politics in Canada and the United States (Toronto: Butterworths, 1982); Samuel LaSelva, "Confederation and the Beginnings of Canadian Federalist Theory" (Vancouver: Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, 1993); and Robert Vipond, Liberty and Community: Canadian Federalism and the Failure of the Constitution (Albany, N.Y: SUNY Press, 1991). Finally, for insights into the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, see André Burelle, "A Renewed Canada Should Say Yes," Canada Opinion 4, no. 1 (Fall 1996), p. 1 and Richard Simeon, "The Lessons of Meech Lake and Charlottetown," Canada Watch 3, nos. 5/6, (March/April 1995).
12. and Economic Council of Canada, "Economic Aspects of Reconfederation," A joint Venture - The Economics of Constitutional Options. 28th Annual Review (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1991); Trudy Lancelyn, "Toward Pacific Northwest Competitiveness," Sounding Board [Vancouver Board of Trade] 31, no. 6 (December 1991), pp. WTC1-2. The related Quebec separation debates are captured by Constitutional Committee of the Quebec Liberral Party for Submission to the 25th Convention, A Quebec Free to Choose: Report (Quebec: Liberal Party of Quebec, 1991). Chaired by Jean Allaire; Quebec, Commission on the Political and Constitutional Future of Quebec, Report (Quebec City: Éditeur officiel du Québec, 1992). Chaired by Michel Bélanger and Jean Campeau; Patrick Grady, Consequences of Quebec Sovereignty (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1991); John McCallum and Chris Green, Parting as Friends: the Economic Consequences for Quebec (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1992); and Royal Bank of Canada, Unity or Disunity: An Economic Analysis of the Benefits and the Costs (Montreal: Royal Bank of Canada, Economics Department, 1992). Important background on regionalism and federalism are found in Roger Gibbins, Territorial Politics in Canada and the United States (Toronto: Butterworths, 1982); Samuel LaSelva, "Confederation and the Beginnings of Canadian Federalist Theory" (Vancouver: Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, 1993); and Robert Vipond, Liberty and Community: Canadian Federalism and the Failure of the Constitution (Albany, N.Y: SUNY Press, 1991). Finally, for insights into the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, see André Burelle, "A Renewed Canada Should Say Yes," Canada Opinion 4, no. 1 (Fall 1996), p. 1 and Richard Simeon, "The Lessons of Meech Lake and Charlottetown," Canada Watch 3, nos. 5/6, (March/April 1995).
13. and Economic Council of Canada, "Economic Aspects of Reconfederation," A joint Venture - The Economics of Constitutional Options. 28th Annual Review (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1991); Trudy Lancelyn, "Toward Pacific Northwest Competitiveness," Sounding Board [Vancouver Board of Trade] 31, no. 6 (December 1991), pp. WTC1-2. The related Quebec separation debates are captured by Constitutional Committee of the Quebec Liberral Party for Submission to the 25th Convention, A Quebec Free to Choose: Report (Quebec: Liberal Party of Quebec, 1991). Chaired by Jean Allaire; Quebec, Commission on the Political and Constitutional Future of Quebec, Report (Quebec City: Éditeur officiel du Québec, 1992). Chaired by Michel Bélanger and Jean Campeau; Patrick Grady, Consequences of Quebec Sovereignty (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1991); John McCallum and Chris Green, Parting as Friends: the Economic Consequences for Quebec (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1992); and Royal Bank of Canada, Unity or Disunity: An Economic Analysis of the Benefits and the Costs (Montreal: Royal Bank of Canada, Economics Department, 1992). Important background on regionalism and federalism are found in Roger Gibbins, Territorial Politics in Canada and the United States (Toronto: Butterworths, 1982); Samuel LaSelva, "Confederation and the Beginnings of Canadian Federalist Theory" (Vancouver: Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, 1993); and Robert Vipond, Liberty and Community: Canadian Federalism and the Failure of the Constitution (Albany, N.Y: SUNY Press, 1991). Finally, for insights into the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, see André Burelle, "A Renewed Canada Should Say Yes," Canada Opinion 4, no. 1 (Fall 1996), p. 1 and Richard Simeon, "The Lessons of Meech Lake and Charlottetown," Canada Watch 3, nos. 5/6, (March/April 1995).
14. and Economic Council of Canada, "Economic Aspects of Reconfederation," A joint Venture - The Economics of Constitutional Options. 28th Annual Review (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1991); Trudy Lancelyn, "Toward Pacific Northwest Competitiveness," Sounding Board [Vancouver Board of Trade] 31, no. 6 (December 1991), pp. WTC1-2. The related Quebec separation debates are captured by Constitutional Committee of the Quebec Liberral Party for Submission to the 25th Convention, A Quebec Free to Choose: Report (Quebec: Liberal Party of Quebec, 1991). Chaired by Jean Allaire; Quebec, Commission on the Political and Constitutional Future of Quebec, Report (Quebec City: Éditeur officiel du Québec, 1992). Chaired by Michel Bélanger and Jean Campeau; Patrick Grady, Consequences of Quebec Sovereignty (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1991); John McCallum and Chris Green, Parting as Friends: the Economic Consequences for Quebec (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1992); and Royal Bank of Canada, Unity or Disunity: An Economic Analysis of the Benefits and the Costs (Montreal: Royal Bank of Canada, Economics Department, 1992). Important background on regionalism and federalism are found in Roger Gibbins, Territorial Politics in Canada and the United States (Toronto: Butterworths, 1982); Samuel LaSelva, "Confederation and the Beginnings of Canadian Federalist Theory" (Vancouver: Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, 1993); and Robert Vipond, Liberty and Community: Canadian Federalism and the Failure of the Constitution (Albany, N.Y: SUNY Press, 1991). Finally, for insights into the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, see André Burelle, "A Renewed Canada Should Say Yes," Canada Opinion 4, no. 1 (Fall 1996), p. 1 and Richard Simeon, "The Lessons of Meech Lake and Charlottetown," Canada Watch 3, nos. 5/6, (March/April 1995).
15. and Economic Council of Canada, "Economic Aspects of Reconfederation," A joint Venture - The Economics of Constitutional Options. 28th Annual Review (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1991); Trudy Lancelyn, "Toward Pacific Northwest Competitiveness," Sounding Board [Vancouver Board of Trade] 31, no. 6 (December 1991), pp. WTC1-2. The related Quebec separation debates are captured by Constitutional Committee of the Quebec Liberral Party for Submission to the 25th Convention, A Quebec Free to Choose: Report (Quebec: Liberal Party of Quebec, 1991). Chaired by Jean Allaire; Quebec, Commission on the Political and Constitutional Future of Quebec, Report (Quebec City: Éditeur officiel du Québec, 1992). Chaired by Michel Bélanger and Jean Campeau; Patrick Grady, Consequences of Quebec Sovereignty (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1991); John McCallum and Chris Green, Parting as Friends: the Economic Consequences for Quebec (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1992); and Royal Bank of Canada, Unity or Disunity: An Economic Analysis of the Benefits and the Costs (Montreal: Royal Bank of Canada, Economics Department, 1992). Important background on regionalism and federalism are found in Roger Gibbins, Territorial Politics in Canada and the United States (Toronto: Butterworths, 1982); Samuel LaSelva, "Confederation and the Beginnings of Canadian Federalist Theory" (Vancouver: Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, 1993); and Robert Vipond, Liberty and Community: Canadian Federalism and the Failure of the Constitution (Albany, N.Y: SUNY Press, 1991). Finally, for insights into the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, see André Burelle, "A Renewed Canada Should Say Yes," Canada Opinion 4, no. 1 (Fall 1996), p. 1 and Richard Simeon, "The Lessons of Meech Lake and Charlottetown," Canada Watch 3, nos. 5/6, (March/April 1995).
16. and Economic Council of Canada, "Economic Aspects of Reconfederation," A joint Venture - The Economics of Constitutional Options. 28th Annual Review (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1991); Trudy Lancelyn, "Toward Pacific Northwest Competitiveness," Sounding Board [Vancouver Board of Trade] 31, no. 6 (December 1991), pp. WTC1-2. The related Quebec separation debates are captured by Constitutional Committee of the Quebec Liberral Party for Submission to the 25th Convention, A Quebec Free to Choose: Report (Quebec: Liberal Party of Quebec, 1991). Chaired by Jean Allaire; Quebec, Commission on the Political and Constitutional Future of Quebec, Report (Quebec City: Éditeur officiel du Québec, 1992). Chaired by Michel Bélanger and Jean Campeau; Patrick Grady, Consequences of Quebec Sovereignty (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1991); John McCallum and Chris Green, Parting as Friends: the Economic Consequences for Quebec (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1992); and Royal Bank of Canada, Unity or Disunity: An Economic Analysis of the Benefits and the Costs (Montreal: Royal Bank of Canada, Economics Department, 1992). Important background on regionalism and federalism are found in Roger Gibbins, Territorial Politics in Canada and the United States (Toronto: Butterworths, 1982); Samuel LaSelva, "Confederation and the Beginnings of Canadian Federalist Theory" (Vancouver: Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, 1993); and Robert Vipond, Liberty and Community: Canadian Federalism and the Failure of the Constitution (Albany, N.Y: SUNY Press, 1991). Finally, for insights into the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, see André Burelle, "A Renewed Canada Should Say Yes," Canada Opinion 4, no. 1 (Fall 1996), p. 1 and Richard Simeon, "The Lessons of Meech Lake and Charlottetown," Canada Watch 3, nos. 5/6, (March/April 1995).
17. and Economic Council of Canada, "Economic Aspects of Reconfederation," A joint Venture - The Economics of Constitutional Options. 28th Annual Review (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1991); Trudy Lancelyn, "Toward Pacific Northwest Competitiveness," Sounding Board [Vancouver Board of Trade] 31, no. 6 (December 1991), pp. WTC1-2. The related Quebec separation debates are captured by Constitutional Committee of the Quebec Liberral Party for Submission to the 25th Convention, A Quebec Free to Choose: Report (Quebec: Liberal Party of Quebec, 1991). Chaired by Jean Allaire; Quebec, Commission on the Political and Constitutional Future of Quebec, Report (Quebec City: Éditeur officiel du Québec, 1992). Chaired by Michel Bélanger and Jean Campeau; Patrick Grady, Consequences of Quebec Sovereignty (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1991); John McCallum and Chris Green, Parting as Friends: the Economic Consequences for Quebec (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1992); and Royal Bank of Canada, Unity or Disunity: An Economic Analysis of the Benefits and the Costs (Montreal: Royal Bank of Canada, Economics Department, 1992). Important background on regionalism and federalism are found in Roger Gibbins, Territorial Politics in Canada and the United States (Toronto: Butterworths, 1982); Samuel LaSelva, "Confederation and the Beginnings of Canadian Federalist Theory" (Vancouver: Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, 1993); and Robert Vipond, Liberty and Community: Canadian Federalism and the Failure of the Constitution (Albany, N.Y: SUNY Press, 1991). Finally, for insights into the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, see André Burelle, "A Renewed Canada Should Say Yes," Canada Opinion 4, no. 1 (Fall 1996), p. 1 and Richard Simeon, "The Lessons of Meech Lake and Charlottetown," Canada Watch 3, nos. 5/6, (March/April 1995).
18. and Economic Council of Canada, "Economic Aspects of Reconfederation," A joint Venture - The Economics of Constitutional Options. 28th Annual Review (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1991); Trudy Lancelyn, "Toward Pacific Northwest Competitiveness," Sounding Board [Vancouver Board of Trade] 31, no. 6 (December 1991), pp. WTC1-2. The related Quebec separation debates are captured by Constitutional Committee of the Quebec Liberral Party for Submission to the 25th Convention, A Quebec Free to Choose: Report (Quebec: Liberal Party of Quebec, 1991). Chaired by Jean Allaire; Quebec, Commission on the Political and Constitutional Future of Quebec, Report (Quebec City: Éditeur officiel du Québec, 1992). Chaired by Michel Bélanger and Jean Campeau; Patrick Grady, Consequences of Quebec Sovereignty (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1991); John McCallum and Chris Green, Parting as Friends: the Economic Consequences for Quebec (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1992); and Royal Bank of Canada, Unity or Disunity: An Economic Analysis of the Benefits and the Costs (Montreal: Royal Bank of Canada, Economics Department, 1992). Important background on regionalism and federalism are found in Roger Gibbins, Territorial Politics in Canada and the United States (Toronto: Butterworths, 1982); Samuel LaSelva, "Confederation and the Beginnings of Canadian Federalist Theory" (Vancouver: Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, 1993); and Robert Vipond, Liberty and Community: Canadian Federalism and the Failure of the Constitution (Albany, N.Y: SUNY Press, 1991). Finally, for insights into the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, see André Burelle, "A Renewed Canada Should Say Yes," Canada Opinion 4, no. 1 (Fall 1996), p. 1 and Richard Simeon, "The Lessons of Meech Lake and Charlottetown," Canada Watch 3, nos. 5/6, (March/April 1995).
19. and Economic Council of Canada, "Economic Aspects of Reconfederation," A joint Venture - The Economics of Constitutional Options. 28th Annual Review (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1991); Trudy Lancelyn, "Toward Pacific Northwest Competitiveness," Sounding Board [Vancouver Board of Trade] 31, no. 6 (December 1991), pp. WTC1-2. The related Quebec separation debates are captured by Constitutional Committee of the Quebec Liberral Party for Submission to the 25th Convention, A Quebec Free to Choose: Report (Quebec: Liberal Party of Quebec, 1991). Chaired by Jean Allaire; Quebec, Commission on the Political and Constitutional Future of Quebec, Report (Quebec City: Éditeur officiel du Québec, 1992). Chaired by Michel Bélanger and Jean Campeau; Patrick Grady, Consequences of Quebec Sovereignty (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1991); John McCallum and Chris Green, Parting as Friends: the Economic Consequences for Quebec (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1992); and Royal Bank of Canada, Unity or Disunity: An Economic Analysis of the Benefits and the Costs (Montreal: Royal Bank of Canada, Economics Department, 1992). Important background on regionalism and federalism are found in Roger Gibbins, Territorial Politics in Canada and the United States (Toronto: Butterworths, 1982); Samuel LaSelva, "Confederation and the Beginnings of Canadian Federalist Theory" (Vancouver: Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, 1993); and Robert Vipond, Liberty and Community: Canadian Federalism and the Failure of the Constitution (Albany, N.Y: SUNY Press, 1991). Finally, for insights into the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, see André Burelle, "A Renewed Canada Should Say Yes," Canada Opinion 4, no. 1 (Fall 1996), p. 1 and Richard Simeon, "The Lessons of Meech Lake and Charlottetown," Canada Watch 3, nos. 5/6, (March/April 1995).
20. For details on the talks concerning Canada's social union, see The Council for Canadian Unity, "Quick Guide - Social Union," http://www.ccu-cuc.ca/en/library/socialunion.html, 24 October 1998. For details on the Framework Agreement on Canada's Social Union, see Canadian Intergovernmental Conference Secretariat (CICS), "Press Release - Framework Agreement on Canada's Social Union," 6 August 1998.
21. For details on the talks concerning Canada's social union, see The Council for Canadian Unity, "Quick Guide - Social Union," http://www.ccu-cuc.ca/en/library/socialunion.html, 24 October 1998. For details on the Framework Agreement on Canada's Social Union, see Canadian Intergovernmental Conference Secretariat (CICS), "Press Release - Framework Agreement on Canada's Social Union," 6 August 1998.
22. Two subsequent recent papers by Paul Boothe and Derek Hermanutz delve more deeply into the federal-provincial implications of Courchene's more decentralized federation under ACCESS. See Paul Boothe and Derek Hermanutz, "Paying for ACCESS: Financing Government in a Decentralized Federation," in T. Courchene, ed., The Nation State in a Global/Information Era: Policy Challenges (Kingston, Ont.: John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy, Queen's University, 1997), pp. 163-84; and Paul Boothe and Derek Hermanutz, "Paying for ACCESS: Province by Province" [mimeo] (Edmonton: Institute for Public Economics, University of Alberta, 1998).
23. Two subsequent recent papers by Paul Boothe and Derek Hermanutz delve more deeply into the federal-provincial implications of Courchene's more decentralized federation under ACCESS. See Paul Boothe and Derek Hermanutz, "Paying for ACCESS: Financing Government in a Decentralized Federation," in T. Courchene, ed., The Nation State in a Global/Information Era: Policy Challenges (Kingston, Ont.: John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy, Queen's University, 1997), pp. 163-84; and Paul Boothe and Derek Hermanutz, "Paying for ACCESS: Province by Province" [mimeo] (Edmonton: Institute for Public Economics, University of Alberta, 1998).
24. Michael A. Goldberg and Maurice D. Levi "Growing together or apart: the risks and returns of alternative constitutions of Canada," Canadian Public Policy 20, no. 4 (December 1994), pp. 341-52.
25. See his superb thought-provoking essay, which confronts the need for flexibility in the global economy head on: Thomas J. Courchene, Celebrating Flexibility: An Interpretive Essay on the Evolution of Canadian Federalism (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1995).
26. Our focus is economic, but interesting parallels exist in political science. See the pathbreaking work by David Elkins, Beyond Sovereignty: Territory and Political Economy in the Twenty-First Century (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995).
27. See for example the recent works by Burelle, "A renewed Canada," Canada Opinion; and Michael Trebilcock and Daniel Schwanen, eds., Getting There: An Assessment of the Agreement on Internal Trade (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1995).
28. See for example the recent works by Burelle, "A renewed Canada," Canada Opinion; and Michael Trebilcock and Daniel Schwanen, eds., Getting There: An Assessment of the Agreement on Internal Trade (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1995).
29. See Goldberg and Levi, "Growing together or apart," Canadian Public Policy, wherein we developed portfolio management measures to assess the "portfolio" of ten "stocks" (i.e., provinces) that comprise Canada. More recently, we have applied this same kind of thinking to examine various configurations of the European Union from the perspective of their growth and growth-volatility characteristics. See Samy Ben-Jafaar, Michael A. Goldberg and Maurice D. Levi, "The Political Economy of Diversity: A Portfolio Analysis of Alternative Configurations of the European Union" [mimeo] (Vancouver: Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration, University of British Columbia, 1998).
30. See Goldberg and Levi, "Growing together or apart," Canadian Public Policy, wherein we developed portfolio management measures to assess the "portfolio" of ten "stocks" (i.e., provinces) that comprise Canada. More recently, we have applied this same kind of thinking to examine various configurations of the European Union from the perspective of their growth and growth-volatility characteristics. See Samy Ben-Jafaar, Michael A. Goldberg and Maurice D. Levi, "The Political Economy of Diversity: A Portfolio Analysis of Alternative Configurations of the European Union" [mimeo] (Vancouver: Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration, University of British Columbia, 1998).
31. In the heyday of the controversy on tight monetary policy, John Crow had often made similar points. See his "Memorandum on Bank of Canada Functions and Responsibilities Submitted to the House Standing Committee on Finance," 19 November 1991.
32. For closely related points, see William Mackness, Big Government and the Constitution Crisis (Toronto: The Mackenzie Institute, 1991).
33. Critiques of the 1991 constitutional proposals related to Meech Lake were aware of the issue. See James Dean, "Fiscal co-ordination is a challenge for Canada," Financial Post (Toronto) 4 December 1991, p. 12; David Bercuson, "Constitutional proposal seriously flawed," Financial Post (Toronto) 9 October 1991, p. 11; and John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy, Queen's University, "Economists Address Constitutional Impasse," Econotes 4, no. 2 (Autumn 1991), pp. 1, 5-7.
34. Critiques of the 1991 constitutional proposals related to Meech Lake were aware of the issue. See James Dean, "Fiscal co-ordination is a challenge for Canada," Financial Post (Toronto) 4 December 1991, p. 12; David Bercuson, "Constitutional proposal seriously flawed," Financial Post (Toronto) 9 October 1991, p. 11; and John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy, Queen's University, "Economists Address Constitutional Impasse," Econotes 4, no. 2 (Autumn 1991), pp. 1, 5-7.
35. Critiques of the 1991 constitutional proposals related to Meech Lake were aware of the issue. See James Dean, "Fiscal co-ordination is a challenge for Canada," Financial Post (Toronto) 4 December 1991, p. 12; David Bercuson, "Constitutional proposal seriously flawed," Financial Post (Toronto) 9 October 1991, p. 11; and John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy, Queen's University, "Economists Address Constitutional Impasse," Econotes 4, no. 2 (Autumn 1991), pp. 1, 5-7.
36. Albert Breton argued in these terms in his 1989 presidential address to the Canadian Economics Association and in Albert Breton, "The growth of competitive governments," Canadian Journal of Economics, 22, no. 4 (November 1989), pp. 717-50.
37. With the institutionalization of charity and the shift in charity from benevolence to social justice, the advantage of localization grows in importance. See Thomas Courchene, "Towards a protected society: the politicization of economic life," Canadian Journal of Economics 13, no. 4 (November 1989), pp. 556-77; and H. Scott Gordon, "The demand and supply of government: what we want and what we get." Discussion Paper No. 79 (Ottawa: The Economic Council of Canada, 1977).
38. With the institutionalization of charity and the shift in charity from benevolence to social justice, the advantage of localization grows in importance. See Thomas Courchene, "Towards a protected society: the politicization of economic life," Canadian Journal of Economics 13, no. 4 (November 1989), pp. 556-77; and H. Scott Gordon, "The demand and supply of government: what we want and what we get." Discussion Paper No. 79 (Ottawa: The Economic Council of Canada, 1977).
39. Related points, though in a somewhat different context, are made by Breton, "Growth of competitive governments," Canadian Journal of Economics.
40. This is the waste that results from differing marginal valuations and marginal costs over the levels of service provided. For locally provided services the marginal value placed by local consumers is much more likely to be close to the marginal cost of providing the services, as local consumers pay the associated marginal costs through the assigned levies or fees. Were the same services to be provided nationally at some "average" consumer's valuation of these services, it is highly unlikely that this average cost will in fact reflect the actual valuation placed on these services by consumers around the diverse regions of the country, the mismatch resulting in the "deadweight loss."
41. Breton, "Growth of competitive governments," Canadian Journal of Economics, pp. 732-33 makes this point quite strongly.
42. For details of the so-called "glocalization" argument, and for an array of highly relevant ideas on federalism and nation-states in today's global economy, see Courchene, Celebrating Flexibility.
43. For details of the MOU proposal and the pros and cons, see William H. Smith, Proposals for a Canadian Federal Securities Commission - Legal Update (Toronto: McCarthy Tétrault, 1996).
44. An excellent, balanced and very complete of the pros and cons of a national securities commission can be found in Peter G. MacIntosh, "A National Securities Commission for Canada?" in Thomas J. Courchene and Edwin H. Neave, eds., Reforming the Canadian Financial Sector: Canada in Global Perspective (Kingston, Ont.: John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy, Queen's University, 1997), pp. 185-239.
45. Courchene makes the same point in the context of standards for social programs when he notes that "any notion of identical standards across all provinces is a non-starter - much of the negotiation will have to be in terms of principles and 'equivalencies.'" See Courchene, "ACCESS," p. 5.
46. For the details and the context of Professor Romano's argument, see The Economist, 7 March 1998, p. 82, which cites her forthcoming article in Yale Law Journal, 1998.
47. For the details and the context of Professor Romano's argument, see The Economist, 7 March 1998, p. 82, which cites her forthcoming article in Yale Law Journal, 1998.
48. For details of the Alberta-British Columbia accord, see Alberta Securities Commission, "Letter of Accord Between Alberta Securities Commission (the ASC) and British Columbia Securities Commission (the BCSC)" (Calgary: Office of the Chair, Alberta Securities Commission, 1996); and Stephen Ewart, "Stock policing commissions merge," Calgary Herald, 10 December 1996, p. 18.
49. For details of the Alberta-British Columbia accord, see Alberta Securities Commission, "Letter of Accord Between Alberta Securities Commission (the ASC) and British Columbia Securities Commission (the BCSC)" (Calgary: Office of the Chair, Alberta Securities Commission, 1996); and Stephen Ewart, "Stock policing commissions merge," Calgary Herald, 10 December 1996, p. 18.
50. Two decades ago, one of the authors addressed similar issues in the debate on housing policy arising from the boom in house prices in Canada in the early 1970s. Michael A. Goldberg, "The BNA Act, NHA, CMHC, MSUA, etc.: 'Nymophobia' and the On-going Search for an Appropriate Canadian Housing and Urban Development Policy," in Michael Walker, ed. Canadian Confederation at the Crossroads (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1978). The conclusions and a good deal of the argument parallels Breton, "Growth of competitive governments," Canadian Journal of Economics written a decade later dealing with the more general issue of which levels of government are best suited to govern over the broad range of publicly provided goods and services.
51. Two decades ago, one of the authors addressed similar issues in the debate on housing policy arising from the boom in house prices in Canada in the early 1970s. Michael A. Goldberg, "The BNA Act, NHA, CMHC, MSUA, etc.: 'Nymophobia' and the On-going Search for an Appropriate Canadian Housing and Urban Development Policy," in Michael Walker, ed. Canadian Confederation at the Crossroads (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1978). The conclusions and a good deal of the argument parallels Breton, "Growth of competitive governments," Canadian Journal of Economics written a decade later dealing with the more general issue of which levels of government are best suited to govern over the broad range of publicly provided goods and services.
52. A growing literature on cities in a global economy applies here. See Michael A. Goldberg, "Urban Futures, Functions and Forms in a Global Setting," in Judith K. Bell and Steven Webber, eds., Urban Regions in a Global Context: Directions for the Greater Toronto Area (Toronto: Centre for Urban and Community Studies, University of Toronto, 1996) and Richard V. Knight, ed., Cities in a Global Society (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1989).
53. A growing literature on cities in a global economy applies here. See Michael A. Goldberg, "Urban Futures, Functions and Forms in a Global Setting," in Judith K. Bell and Steven Webber, eds., Urban Regions in a Global Context: Directions for the Greater Toronto Area (Toronto: Centre for Urban and Community Studies, University of Toronto, 1996) and Richard V. Knight, ed., Cities in a Global Society (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1989).
54. These "Monday morning" meetings are sufficiently well known and important in financial circles that they have given rise to the so-called "Monday effect" in capital markets. The importance of this sort of top-down and bottom-up coordination needs to be stressed as a result.
55. Once again, this point parallels closely points Courchene made when talking about integrating and managing social programs: "What is increasingly required is 'positive integration' -a pro-active meshing of provincial systems (skills transferability) and federal-provincial systems (consumption-tax harmonization). This cannot be done without the full participation of the provinces. Hence, delivering a full-blown socio-economic union requires both top-down (vertical) and bottom-up (horizontal) integration." See Courchene, "ACCESS," p. 5.
56. Mackness, Big Government, makes related points about decentralizing taxing and spending power to provinces, albeit in the context of an argument that is more focused, compared to our argument, on specifics of fiscal responsibility and the need for tighter control of budgetary processes.
57. Robert Young, "Defending Decentralization," Policy Options 18, no. 2 (March 1997), pp. 42-4.
58. See Alain Toulin, "Manley angry over BC snub to trade deal," Financial Post (Toronto) 5 February 1997, p. 10; Burelle, "A renewed Canada," Canada Opinion; and Trebilcock and Schwanen, Getting There.
59. See Alain Toulin, "Manley angry over BC snub to trade deal," Financial Post (Toronto) 5 February 1997, p. 10; Burelle, "A renewed Canada," Canada Opinion; and Trebilcock and Schwanen, Getting There.
60. See Alain Toulin, "Manley angry over BC snub to trade deal," Financial Post (Toronto) 5 February 1997, p. 10; Burelle, "A renewed Canada," Canada Opinion; and Trebilcock and Schwanen, Getting There.