Opposing negotiations: China and the Vietnam peace talks, 1965-1968

Pacific Historical Review

Volumn 68, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 21-49

  Zhai, Qiang ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0040888841     PISSN: 00308684     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3641868     Document Type: Article

References (132)

1. A notable exception is the three-volume study of the Vietnam War by R. B. Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War (3 vols., New York, 1983-1991).
2. John Murphy, Harvest of Fear: A History of Australia's Vietnam War (Boulder, Colo., 1993); Fredrik Logevall, "De Gaulle, Neutralization, and American Involvement in Vietnam, 1963-1964," Pacific Historical Review, 61 (1992), 69-102, and Logevall, "The Swedish-American Conflict over Vietnam," Diplomatic History, 17 (1993), 421-445; Ilya V. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago, 1996); Mari Olsen, Solidarity and National Revolution: The Soviet Union and the Vietnamese Communists, 1954-1960 (Oslo, 1997); Chen Jian, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-69," China Quarterly, 142 (1995), 357-387; Qiang Zhai, "Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1965: New Chinese Evidence," Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issues 6-7 (1995-1996), 233-250; Xiaoming Zhang, "The Vietnam War, 1964-1969: A Chinese Perspective," Journal of Military History, 60 (1996), 731-762; Ang Cheng Guan, Vietnamese Communists' Relations with China and the Second Indochina Conflict, 1956-1962 (Jefferson, N.C., 1997).
3. John Murphy, Harvest of Fear: A History of Australia's Vietnam War (Boulder, Colo., 1993); Fredrik Logevall, "De Gaulle, Neutralization, and American Involvement in Vietnam, 1963-1964," Pacific Historical Review, 61 (1992), 69-102, and Logevall, "The Swedish-American Conflict over Vietnam," Diplomatic History, 17 (1993), 421-445; Ilya V. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago, 1996); Mari Olsen, Solidarity and National Revolution: The Soviet Union and the Vietnamese Communists, 1954-1960 (Oslo, 1997); Chen Jian, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-69," China Quarterly, 142 (1995), 357-387; Qiang Zhai, "Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1965: New Chinese Evidence," Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issues 6-7 (1995-1996), 233-250; Xiaoming Zhang, "The Vietnam War, 1964-1969: A Chinese Perspective," Journal of Military History, 60 (1996), 731-762; Ang Cheng Guan, Vietnamese Communists' Relations with China and the Second Indochina Conflict, 1956-1962 (Jefferson, N.C., 1997).
4. John Murphy, Harvest of Fear: A History of Australia's Vietnam War (Boulder, Colo., 1993); Fredrik Logevall, "De Gaulle, Neutralization, and American Involvement in Vietnam, 1963-1964," Pacific Historical Review, 61 (1992), 69-102, and Logevall, "The Swedish-American Conflict over Vietnam," Diplomatic History, 17 (1993), 421-445; Ilya V. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago, 1996); Mari Olsen, Solidarity and National Revolution: The Soviet Union and the Vietnamese Communists, 1954-1960 (Oslo, 1997); Chen Jian, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-69," China Quarterly, 142 (1995), 357-387; Qiang Zhai, "Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1965: New Chinese Evidence," Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issues 6-7 (1995-1996), 233-250; Xiaoming Zhang, "The Vietnam War, 1964-1969: A Chinese Perspective," Journal of Military History, 60 (1996), 731-762; Ang Cheng Guan, Vietnamese Communists' Relations with China and the Second Indochina Conflict, 1956-1962 (Jefferson, N.C., 1997).
5. John Murphy, Harvest of Fear: A History of Australia's Vietnam War (Boulder, Colo., 1993); Fredrik Logevall, "De Gaulle, Neutralization, and American Involvement in Vietnam, 1963-1964," Pacific Historical Review, 61 (1992), 69-102, and Logevall, "The Swedish-American Conflict over Vietnam," Diplomatic History, 17 (1993), 421-445; Ilya V. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago, 1996); Mari Olsen, Solidarity and National Revolution: The Soviet Union and the Vietnamese Communists, 1954-1960 (Oslo, 1997); Chen Jian, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-69," China Quarterly, 142 (1995), 357-387; Qiang Zhai, "Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1965: New Chinese Evidence," Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issues 6-7 (1995-1996), 233-250; Xiaoming Zhang, "The Vietnam War, 1964-1969: A Chinese Perspective," Journal of Military History, 60 (1996), 731-762; Ang Cheng Guan, Vietnamese Communists' Relations with China and the Second Indochina Conflict, 1956-1962 (Jefferson, N.C., 1997).
6. John Murphy, Harvest of Fear: A History of Australia's Vietnam War (Boulder, Colo., 1993); Fredrik Logevall, "De Gaulle, Neutralization, and American Involvement in Vietnam, 1963-1964," Pacific Historical Review, 61 (1992), 69-102, and Logevall, "The Swedish-American Conflict over Vietnam," Diplomatic History, 17 (1993), 421-445; Ilya V. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago, 1996); Mari Olsen, Solidarity and National Revolution: The Soviet Union and the Vietnamese Communists, 1954-1960 (Oslo, 1997); Chen Jian, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-69," China Quarterly, 142 (1995), 357-387; Qiang Zhai, "Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1965: New Chinese Evidence," Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issues 6-7 (1995-1996), 233-250; Xiaoming Zhang, "The Vietnam War, 1964-1969: A Chinese Perspective," Journal of Military History, 60 (1996), 731-762; Ang Cheng Guan, Vietnamese Communists' Relations with China and the Second Indochina Conflict, 1956-1962 (Jefferson, N.C., 1997).
7. John Murphy, Harvest of Fear: A History of Australia's Vietnam War (Boulder, Colo., 1993); Fredrik Logevall, "De Gaulle, Neutralization, and American Involvement in Vietnam, 1963-1964," Pacific Historical Review, 61 (1992), 69-102, and Logevall, "The Swedish-American Conflict over Vietnam," Diplomatic History, 17 (1993), 421-445; Ilya V. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago, 1996); Mari Olsen, Solidarity and National Revolution: The Soviet Union and the Vietnamese Communists, 1954-1960 (Oslo, 1997); Chen Jian, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-69," China Quarterly, 142 (1995), 357-387; Qiang Zhai, "Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1965: New Chinese Evidence," Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issues 6-7 (1995-1996), 233-250; Xiaoming Zhang, "The Vietnam War, 1964-1969: A Chinese Perspective," Journal of Military History, 60 (1996), 731-762; Ang Cheng Guan, Vietnamese Communists' Relations with China and the Second Indochina Conflict, 1956-1962 (Jefferson, N.C., 1997).
8. John Murphy, Harvest of Fear: A History of Australia's Vietnam War (Boulder, Colo., 1993); Fredrik Logevall, "De Gaulle, Neutralization, and American Involvement in Vietnam, 1963-1964," Pacific Historical Review, 61 (1992), 69-102, and Logevall, "The Swedish-American Conflict over Vietnam," Diplomatic History, 17 (1993), 421-445; Ilya V. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago, 1996); Mari Olsen, Solidarity and National Revolution: The Soviet Union and the Vietnamese Communists, 1954-1960 (Oslo, 1997); Chen Jian, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-69," China Quarterly, 142 (1995), 357-387; Qiang Zhai, "Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1965: New Chinese Evidence," Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issues 6-7 (1995-1996), 233-250; Xiaoming Zhang, "The Vietnam War, 1964-1969: A Chinese Perspective," Journal of Military History, 60 (1996), 731-762; Ang Cheng Guan, Vietnamese Communists' Relations with China and the Second Indochina Conflict, 1956-1962 (Jefferson, N.C., 1997).
9. John Murphy, Harvest of Fear: A History of Australia's Vietnam War (Boulder, Colo., 1993); Fredrik Logevall, "De Gaulle, Neutralization, and American Involvement in Vietnam, 1963-1964," Pacific Historical Review, 61 (1992), 69-102, and Logevall, "The Swedish-American Conflict over Vietnam," Diplomatic History, 17 (1993), 421-445; Ilya V. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago, 1996); Mari Olsen, Solidarity and National Revolution: The Soviet Union and the Vietnamese Communists, 1954-1960 (Oslo, 1997); Chen Jian, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-69," China Quarterly, 142 (1995), 357-387; Qiang Zhai, "Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1965: New Chinese Evidence," Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issues 6-7 (1995-1996), 233-250; Xiaoming Zhang, "The Vietnam War, 1964-1969: A Chinese Perspective," Journal of Military History, 60 (1996), 731-762; Ang Cheng Guan, Vietnamese Communists' Relations with China and the Second Indochina Conflict, 1956-1962 (Jefferson, N.C., 1997).
10. John Murphy, Harvest of Fear: A History of Australia's Vietnam War (Boulder, Colo., 1993); Fredrik Logevall, "De Gaulle, Neutralization, and American Involvement in Vietnam, 1963-1964," Pacific Historical Review, 61 (1992), 69-102, and Logevall, "The Swedish-American Conflict over Vietnam," Diplomatic History, 17 (1993), 421-445; Ilya V. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago, 1996); Mari Olsen, Solidarity and National Revolution: The Soviet Union and the Vietnamese Communists, 1954-1960 (Oslo, 1997); Chen Jian, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-69," China Quarterly, 142 (1995), 357-387; Qiang Zhai, "Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1965: New Chinese Evidence," Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issues 6-7 (1995-1996), 233-250; Xiaoming Zhang, "The Vietnam War, 1964-1969: A Chinese Perspective," Journal of Military History, 60 (1996), 731-762; Ang Cheng Guan, Vietnamese Communists' Relations with China and the Second Indochina Conflict, 1956-1962 (Jefferson, N.C., 1997).
11. The studies by Jay Taylor and Eugene Lawson discuss briefly China's attitude toward the Vietnam peace talks. See Jay Taylor, China and Southeast Asia: Peking's Relations with Revolutionary Movements (New York, 1976), 61; and Eugene K. Lawson, The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict (New York, 1984), 208-217. But neither of these authors has used Chinese archival sources.
12. The studies by Jay Taylor and Eugene Lawson discuss briefly China's attitude toward the Vietnam peace talks. See Jay Taylor, China and Southeast Asia: Peking's Relations with Revolutionary Movements (New York, 1976), 61; and Eugene K. Lawson, The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict (New York, 1984), 208-217. But neither of these authors has used Chinese archival sources.
13. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War.
14. Chinese Foreign Ministry memo, "A Conversation Outline: Refuting the Argument that 'China blocked the Soviet Aid to Vietnam,'" April 1, 1965. Quanzonghao 3124, Juanhao 235, Jiangsu Provincial Archives, Nanjing; hereafter Q designates record group, J designates file, and JPA indicates the archives. This memo was distributed by the Foreign Affairs Office of the State Council on April 6, 1965, to provincial foreign affairs committees as an explanation of China's position on the Vietnam question. See also Xie Yixian, ed., Zhongguo waijiao shi: Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shiqi, 1949-1979 [A diplomatic history of China: The period of the People's Republic of China, 1949-1979] (Zhengzhou, 1988), 344.
15. Marilyn B. Young, The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990 (New York, 1991), 153.
16. According to a biographer of Harold Wilson, the Walker trip was designed "to distract attention from Britain's continuing support for the United States." The prime minister had a penchant for "activity" as opposed to real executive "action." Austen Morgan, Harold Wilson (London, 1992), 277.
17. Diplomatic History Research Office of the PRC Foreign Ministry, ed., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949-1975 [A chronology of Zhou Enlai's diplomatic activities, 1949-1975] (Beijing, 1993), 444; hereafter cited as Diplomatic History Research Office, ed., Zhou Enlai.
18. Diplomatic History Research Office of the PRC Foreign Ministry, ed., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949-1975 [A chronology of Zhou Enlai's diplomatic activities, 1949-1975] (Beijing, 1993), 444; hereafter cited as Diplomatic History Research Office, ed., Zhou Enlai.
19. Xie, ed., Zhongguo waijiao shi, 340.
20. Chester L. Cooper, The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam (New York, 1970), 329.
21. Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War, 3: 60-61, 105-109; George C. Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers (Austin, Tex., 1983), 829. The idea of convening an international conference on Cambodia dated back to 1962 in the wake of the border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand; Norodom Sihanouk wanted such a conference to guarantee the borders of Cambodia as defined on French maps of the nineteenth century. While China supported Sihanouk's proposal, the United States, Thailand, and South Vietnam opposed it. See Michael Leifer, "Cambodia and China: Neutralism, 'Neutrality,' and National Security," in A. M. Halpern, ed., Policies toward China: Views from Six Continents (New York, 1965), 345. At a banquet in Beijing on April 29 in honor of a Ghanaian government delegation, led by Foreign Minister Kojo Botsio, Zhou Enlai praised Sihanouk for his "wisdom in seeing through the American plot regarding an international conference on Cambodia." The Chinese premier pointed out that the real reason for "the Johnson administration's great interest in convening such a conference lies not in really guaranteeing the neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia but in continuing the plot of inducing the Vietnamese people into submission. Diplomatic History Research Office, ed., Zhou Enlai, 450.
22. Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War, 3: 60-61, 105-109; George C. Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers (Austin, Tex., 1983), 829. The idea of convening an international conference on Cambodia dated back to 1962 in the wake of the border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand; Norodom Sihanouk wanted such a conference to guarantee the borders of Cambodia as defined on French maps of the nineteenth century. While China supported Sihanouk's proposal, the United States, Thailand, and South Vietnam opposed it. See Michael Leifer, "Cambodia and China: Neutralism, 'Neutrality,' and National Security," in A. M. Halpern, ed., Policies toward China: Views from Six Continents (New York, 1965), 345. At a banquet in Beijing on April 29 in honor of a Ghanaian government delegation, led by Foreign Minister Kojo Botsio, Zhou Enlai praised Sihanouk for his "wisdom in seeing through the American plot regarding an international conference on Cambodia." The Chinese premier pointed out that the real reason for "the Johnson administration's great interest in convening such a conference lies not in really guaranteeing the neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia but in continuing the plot of inducing the Vietnamese people into submission. Diplomatic History Research Office, ed., Zhou Enlai, 450.
23. Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War, 3: 60-61, 105-109; George C. Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers (Austin, Tex., 1983), 829. The idea of convening an international conference on Cambodia dated back to 1962 in the wake of the border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand; Norodom Sihanouk wanted such a conference to guarantee the borders of Cambodia as defined on French maps of the nineteenth century. While China supported Sihanouk's proposal, the United States, Thailand, and South Vietnam opposed it. See Michael Leifer, "Cambodia and China: Neutralism, 'Neutrality,' and National Security," in A. M. Halpern, ed., Policies toward China: Views from Six Continents (New York, 1965), 345. At a banquet in Beijing on April 29 in honor of a Ghanaian government delegation, led by Foreign Minister Kojo Botsio, Zhou Enlai praised Sihanouk for his "wisdom in seeing through the American plot regarding an international conference on Cambodia." The Chinese premier pointed out that the real reason for "the Johnson administration's great interest in convening such a conference lies not in really guaranteeing the neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia but in continuing the plot of inducing the Vietnamese people into submission. Diplomatic History Research Office, ed., Zhou Enlai, 450.
24. Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War, 3: 60-61, 105-109; George C. Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers (Austin, Tex., 1983), 829. The idea of convening an international conference on Cambodia dated back to 1962 in the wake of the border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand; Norodom Sihanouk wanted such a conference to guarantee the borders of Cambodia as defined on French maps of the nineteenth century. While China supported Sihanouk's proposal, the United States, Thailand, and South Vietnam opposed it. See Michael Leifer, "Cambodia and China: Neutralism, 'Neutrality,' and National Security," in A. M. Halpern, ed., Policies toward China: Views from Six Continents (New York, 1965), 345. At a banquet in Beijing on April 29 in honor of a Ghanaian government delegation, led by Foreign Minister Kojo Botsio, Zhou Enlai praised Sihanouk for his "wisdom in seeing through the American plot regarding an international conference on Cambodia." The Chinese premier pointed out that the real reason for "the Johnson administration's great interest in convening such a conference lies not in really guaranteeing the neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia but in continuing the plot of inducing the Vietnamese people into submission. Diplomatic History Research Office, ed., Zhou Enlai, 450.
25. Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, 46. Robert S. McNamara recalled that the administration found Hanoi's terms acceptable, except the third point. See Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York, 1995), 181-182.
26. Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, 46. Robert S. McNamara recalled that the administration found Hanoi's terms acceptable, except the third point. See Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York, 1995), 181-182.
27. Xie, ed., Zhongguo waijiao shi, 338. For discussions of U Thant's peace moves between 1964 and 1965, see Cooper, The Lost Crusade, 327-328; George C. Herring, LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War (Austin, Tex., 1994), 91-94; Lloyd C. Gardner, Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam (Chicago, 1995), 145-146.
28. Xie, ed., Zhongguo waijiao shi, 338. For discussions of U Thant's peace moves between 1964 and 1965, see Cooper, The Lost Crusade, 327-328; George C. Herring, LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War (Austin, Tex., 1994), 91-94; Lloyd C. Gardner, Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam (Chicago, 1995), 145-146.
29. Xie, ed., Zhongguo waijiao shi, 338. For discussions of U Thant's peace moves between 1964 and 1965, see Cooper, The Lost Crusade, 327-328; George C. Herring, LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War (Austin, Tex., 1994), 91-94; Lloyd C. Gardner, Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam (Chicago, 1995), 145-146.
30. Xie, ed., Zhongguo waijiao shi, 338. For discussions of U Thant's peace moves between 1964 and 1965, see Cooper, The Lost Crusade, 327-328; George C. Herring, LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War (Austin, Tex., 1994), 91-94; Lloyd C. Gardner, Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam (Chicago, 1995), 145-146.
31. Renmin ribao, April 12, 1965.
32. Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, 49, 831; Xie, ed., Zhongguo waijiao shi, 339. For India's role in Indochina before 1964, see D. R. SarDesai, Indian Foreign Policy in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, 1947-1964 (Berkeley, 1968); Ramesh Thakur, Peacekeeping in Vietnam: Canada, India, Poland, and the International Commission (Edmonton, Alb., 1984).
33. Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, 49, 831; Xie, ed., Zhongguo waijiao shi, 339. For India's role in Indochina before 1964, see D. R. SarDesai, Indian Foreign Policy in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, 1947-1964 (Berkeley, 1968); Ramesh Thakur, Peacekeeping in Vietnam: Canada, India, Poland, and the International Commission (Edmonton, Alb., 1984).
34. Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, 49, 831; Xie, ed., Zhongguo waijiao shi, 339. For India's role in Indochina before 1964, see D. R. SarDesai, Indian Foreign Policy in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, 1947-1964 (Berkeley, 1968); Ramesh Thakur, Peacekeeping in Vietnam: Canada, India, Poland, and the International Commission (Edmonton, Alb., 1984).
35. Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, 49, 831; Xie, ed., Zhongguo waijiao shi, 339. For India's role in Indochina before 1964, see D. R. SarDesai, Indian Foreign Policy in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, 1947-1964 (Berkeley, 1968); Ramesh Thakur, Peacekeeping in Vietnam: Canada, India, Poland, and the International Commission (Edmonton, Alb., 1984).
36. Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, 45-47.
37. Jin Qiu, "The Vietnamese People Do Not Believe in 'Nice Words' and Do Not Fear Intimidation," Shijiezhishi [World Knowledge], 11 (June 10, 1965), 5-8.
38. (Shijie zhishi is a biweekly journal reflecting the views of the Chinese Foreign Ministry.) For Hanoi's response to the MAYFLOWER initiative, see Robert K. Brigham, "Vietnamese-American Peace Negotiations: The Failed 1965 Initiatives," Journal of American-East Asian Relations, 4 (1995), 377-395.
39. Xie, ed Zhongguo waijiao shi, 340-341; Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War, 3: 154; Morgan, Harold Wilson, 277; Harold Wilson, A Personal Record: The Labour Government, 1964-1970 (Boston, 1971), 108-113.
40. Xie, ed Zhongguo waijiao shi, 340-341; Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War, 3: 154; Morgan, Harold Wilson, 277; Harold Wilson, A Personal Record: The Labour Government, 1964-1970 (Boston, 1971), 108-113.
41. Xie, ed Zhongguo waijiao shi, 340-341; Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War, 3: 154; Morgan, Harold Wilson, 277; Harold Wilson, A Personal Record: The Labour Government, 1964-1970 (Boston, 1971), 108-113.
42. Xie, ed Zhongguo waijiao shi, 340-341; Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War, 3: 154; Morgan, Harold Wilson, 277; Harold Wilson, A Personal Record: The Labour Government, 1964-1970 (Boston, 1971), 108-113.
43. Xiong Xianghui, Lishi de Zhujiao: Huiyi Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai ji Silaoshuai [Historical Footnotes: Remembering Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai as well as Four Old Marshals] (Beijing, 1995), 151-157.
44. Xie, ed., Zhongguo waijiao shi, 341.
45. W. Scott Thompson, Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-1966: Diplomacy, Ideology, and the New State (Princeton, N.J., 1969), 409-411.
46. Chinese Foreign Ministry circular, "Talks between the Ghanaian Mission and the Vietnamese," Aug. 24, 1965, Q 3124, J 123, JPA. This circular, along with two other circulars quoted later in the text, was distributed by the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee to its regional bureaus and provincial committees as an instruction on China's position regarding peace negotiations over Vietnam.
47. Chinese Foreign Ministry circular, "Talks between the Ghanaian Mission and the Vietnamese," Aug. 3, 1965, ibid. The circular's summary of the Vietnamese position during the discussions with the Ghanaian mission was based on a Vietnamese report.
48. Thompson, Ghana's Foreign Policy, 411.
49. Yao Niangeng, "The British Labor Party: A Lackey in American Aggression against Vietnam," Shijie zhishi, 13 (July 10, 1965), 10-12.
50. Chinese Foreign Ministry circular, "On 'Peace Talk' Activities over Vietnam," Aug. 19, 1965, Q 3124, J 123, JPA.
51. Chinese Foreign Ministry circular, "Malraux's Visit to China," Aug. 12, 1965, ibid. For Malraux's account of his visit to China in 1965, see André Malraux, Anti-memoirs (NewYork, 1968), 325-380. But the book makes no mention of Malraux's suggestion of redividing Vietnam. In the words of French scholar Jean Lacouture, Malraux's proposal was "the most wildly improbable idea that ever emerged from the brain of a novelist." See Jean Lacouture, André Malraux, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York, 1975), 431.
52. Chinese Foreign Ministry circular, "Malraux's Visit to China," Aug. 12, 1965, ibid. For Malraux's account of his visit to China in 1965, see André Malraux, Anti-memoirs (NewYork, 1968), 325-380. But the book makes no mention of Malraux's suggestion of redividing Vietnam. In the words of French scholar Jean Lacouture, Malraux's proposal was "the most wildly improbable idea that ever emerged from the brain of a novelist." See Jean Lacouture, André Malraux, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York, 1975), 431.
53. Chinese Foreign Ministry circular, "Malraux's Visit to China," Aug. 12, 1965, ibid. For Malraux's account of his visit to China in 1965, see André Malraux, Anti-memoirs (NewYork, 1968), 325-380. But the book makes no mention of Malraux's suggestion of redividing Vietnam. In the words of French scholar Jean Lacouture, Malraux's proposal was "the most wildly improbable idea that ever emerged from the brain of a novelist." See Jean Lacouture, André Malraux, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York, 1975), 431.
54. Peking Review (Sept. 30, 1965), 29-31.
55. Herring, LBJ and Vietnam, 100.
56. Jerzy Michalowski, "Polish Secret Peace Initiatives in Vietnam," Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issues 6-7 (1995-1996), 241, 258-259; Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, 83-84; János Radványi, Delusion and Reality: Gambits, Hoaxes, & Diplomatic One-Upmanship in Vietnam (South Bend, Ind., 1978), 125-126.
57. Jerzy Michalowski, "Polish Secret Peace Initiatives in Vietnam," Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issues 6-7 (1995-1996), 241, 258-259; Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, 83-84; János Radványi, Delusion and Reality: Gambits, Hoaxes, & Diplomatic One-Upmanship in Vietnam (South Bend, Ind., 1978), 125-126.
58. Jerzy Michalowski, "Polish Secret Peace Initiatives in Vietnam," Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issues 6-7 (1995-1996), 241, 258-259; Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, 83-84; János Radványi, Delusion and Reality: Gambits, Hoaxes, & Diplomatic One-Upmanship in Vietnam (South Bend, Ind., 1978), 125-126.
59. For an excerpt of Michalowski's memoirs, see James G. Hershberg, ed., Central and East European Documents on the Vietnam War: Sample Materials from Polish, Hungarian, and East German Sources (Washington, D.C., 1997). See also Radványi, Delusion and Reality, 126-127.
60. For an excerpt of Michalowski's memoirs, see James G. Hershberg, ed., Central and East European Documents on the Vietnam War: Sample Materials from Polish, Hungarian, and East German Sources (Washington, D.C., 1997). See also Radványi, Delusion and Reality, 126-127.
61. Hershberg, ed., Central and East European Documents on the Vietnam War.
62. Michalowski believed that Ho's negative attitude toward negotiations was related to the strong Chinese pressure. See ibid.
63. Ibid.; Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, 84. No details have been revealed from either the Russian or Vietnamese archives regarding Alexander Shelepin's talks with the North Vietnamese. On this issue, János Radványi wrote: "there was . . . complete agreement between the Soviet and Vietnamese negotiators regarding the American peace proposal. When this question came up during negotiations, Ho Chi Minh explained . . . that the military situation in the South was not yet considered favorable for a start of negotiations with the Americans. He did not discount the possibility of future negotiations: he viewed diplomatic maneuvering as but another form of revolutionary fighting . . . and he hinted that possibly in two or three years the DRV might be ready to . . . start negotiations. Shelepin made no attempt to modify the Vietnamese position . . . he completely agreed with Ho." Radványi, Delusion and Reality, 165. Radványi based his account on reports by the Hungarian embassy in Hanoi as well as information Budapest received from Moscow through party channels.
64. Ibid.; Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, 84. No details have been revealed from either the Russian or Vietnamese archives regarding Alexander Shelepin's talks with the North Vietnamese. On this issue, János Radványi wrote: "there was . . . complete agreement between the Soviet and Vietnamese negotiators regarding the American peace proposal. When this question came up during negotiations, Ho Chi Minh explained . . . that the military situation in the South was not yet considered favorable for a start of negotiations with the Americans. He did not discount the possibility of future negotiations: he viewed diplomatic maneuvering as but another form of revolutionary fighting . . . and he hinted that possibly in two or three years the DRV might be ready to . . . start negotiations. Shelepin made no attempt to modify the Vietnamese position . . . he completely agreed with Ho." Radványi, Delusion and Reality, 165. Radványi based his account on reports by the Hungarian embassy in Hanoi as well as information Budapest received from Moscow through party channels.
65. Ibid.; Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, 84. No details have been revealed from either the Russian or Vietnamese archives regarding Alexander Shelepin's talks with the North Vietnamese. On this issue, János Radványi wrote: "there was . . . complete agreement between the Soviet and Vietnamese negotiators regarding the American peace proposal. When this question came up during negotiations, Ho Chi Minh explained . . . that the military situation in the South was not yet considered favorable for a start of negotiations with the Americans. He did not discount the possibility of future negotiations: he viewed diplomatic maneuvering as but another form of revolutionary fighting . . . and he hinted that possibly in two or three years the DRV might be ready to . . . start negotiations. Shelepin made no attempt to modify the Vietnamese position . . . he completely agreed with Ho." Radványi, Delusion and Reality, 165. Radványi based his account on reports by the Hungarian embassy in Hanoi as well as information Budapest received from Moscow through party channels.
66. Shijie zhishi, 2-3 (Feb. 10, 1966), 4-5; Peking Review (Feb. 18, 1966), 10.
67. Shijie zhishi, 2-3 (Feb. 10, 1966), 4-5; Peking Review (Feb. 18, 1966), 10.
68. Wang Bingnan's speech at the National Conference on foreign affairs, Feb. 11, 1966, Q 3124, J 270, JPA. Wang was a deputy foreign minister, who participated in the Li-Shelepin talks.
69. Radványi, Delusion and Reality, 167.
70. Masaru Kojima, ed., The Record of the Talks Between the Japanese Communist Party and the Communist Party of China: How Mao Zedong Scrapped the Joint Communiqué (Tokyo, 1980), 156-157.
71. Herring, LBJ and Vietnam, 104.
72. George C. Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (NewYork, 1996), 185.
73. Memo of conversation between Walter Stoessel and Jerzy Michalowski, Dec. 13, 14, 1967, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968 (34 vols., Washington, D.C., 1992-1998), 17: 359-360.
74. On September 3, 1965, Beijing published an article titled "Long Live the Victory of People's War!" under the name of Chinese Defense Minister Lin Biao. The essay stressed the inevitability of conflict between the northern industrialized regions of the world and the southern agrarian areas and pledged China's support for wars of national liberation. For a long time, the "People's War" article has been interpreted in the West as a veiled message to Hanoi not to rely on foreign aid, especially from Moscow, and to follow the Chinese model of self-reliance and self-sufficiency in resisting imperialism. But recently released Chinese sources reveal that, although published in Lin Biao's name, the article was actually prepared by the writing group organized by Luo Ruiqing, Chief of Staff of the People's Liberation Army. Its final version also incorporated opinions from the writing team led by Kang Sheng. (Operating in the Diaoyutai National Guest House, Kang's team was famous for writing the nine polemics against Soviet revisionism.) Although the article included some of Lin's previous statements, Lin himself was not involved in its writing. When Luo asked Lin for his instructions about the composition of the article, the defense minister said nothing. Zhou Enlai and other standing politburo members read the piece before its publication. The article was intended primarily to refute Soviet arguments on war and peace. See Zhai, "Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict," 239.
75. Diplomatic History Research Office, ed., Zhou Enlai, 460.
76. For a discussion of Mao's fear of Soviet-American domination of the world between 1963 and 1969, see John Garver, "The Tet Offensive and Sino-Vietnamese Relations," in Marc Jason Gilbert and William Head, eds., The Tet Offensive (Westport, Conn., 1996), 55-59.
77. For the English version of the commentary, see Peking Review (Feb. 18, 1966), 6-12.
78. For Mao's reaction to John Foster Dulles's policy, see Bo Yibo, Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu [Recollections of certain important decisions and events] (2 vols., Beijing, 1991-1993), 2: 1137-1157.
79. Kenneth Lieberthal, "The Great Leap Forward and the Split in the Yan'an Leadership, 1958-65," in Roderick MacFarquhar, ed., The Politics of China, 1949-1989 (Cambridge, Eng., 1993), 143.
80. Chen, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War," 361-365.
81. For further discussions of Hanoi's approach to negotiations, see Gareth Porter, A Peace Denied: The United States, Vietnam, and the Paris Agreement (Bloomington, Ind., 1975), 1-33; Allan E. Goodman, The Lost Peace: America's Search for a Negotiated Settlement of the Vietnam War (Stanford, Calif., 1978), 11-12; William J. Duiker, Sacred War: Nationalism and Revolution in a Divided Vietnam (New York, 1995), 191-192.
82. For further discussions of Hanoi's approach to negotiations, see Gareth Porter, A Peace Denied: The United States, Vietnam, and the Paris Agreement (Bloomington, Ind., 1975), 1-33; Allan E. Goodman, The Lost Peace: America's Search for a Negotiated Settlement of the Vietnam War (Stanford, Calif., 1978), 11-12; William J. Duiker, Sacred War: Nationalism and Revolution in a Divided Vietnam (New York, 1995), 191-192.
83. For further discussions of Hanoi's approach to negotiations, see Gareth Porter, A Peace Denied: The United States, Vietnam, and the Paris Agreement (Bloomington, Ind., 1975), 1-33; Allan E. Goodman, The Lost Peace: America's Search for a Negotiated Settlement of the Vietnam War (Stanford, Calif., 1978), 11-12; William J. Duiker, Sacred War: Nationalism and Revolution in a Divided Vietnam (New York, 1995), 191-192.
84. Brigham, "Vietnamese-American Peace Negotiations," 391-392.
85. Wallace J. Thies, When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1968 (Berkeley, 1980), 198; Herring, LBJ and Vietnam, 108; Don Oberdorfer, Tet! (Garden City, N.Y., 1971), 68-69.
86. Wallace J. Thies, When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1968 (Berkeley, 1980), 198; Herring, LBJ and Vietnam, 108; Don Oberdorfer, Tet! (Garden City, N.Y., 1971), 68-69.
87. Wallace J. Thies, When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1968 (Berkeley, 1980), 198; Herring, LBJ and Vietnam, 108; Don Oberdorfer, Tet! (Garden City, N.Y., 1971), 68-69.
88. Truong Nhu Tang, Journal of a Vietcong (London, 1985), 194. Truong Nhu Tang was Minister of Justice of the Provisional Revolutionary Government between 1969 and 1975.
89. Chinese Foreign Ministry circular, "On 'Peace Talk' Activities over Vietnam," Aug. 19, 1965, Q 3124, J 123, JPA.
90. Mao's talk with the DRV party and government delegation, Oct. 20, 1965, in the PRC Foreign Ministry and the CCP Central Documentary Research Department, eds., Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan [Selected diplomatic works of Mao Zedong] (Beijing, 1994), 570-573. Pham Van Dong came to Beijing after completing a visit to Moscow. It is possible that he had discussed with the Soviets the issue of negotiations and reported this discussion to Mao and other Chinese leaders.
91. Brigham, "Vietnamese-American Peace Negotiations," 385-389.
92. Kojima, ed., The Record of the Talks Between the Japanese Communist Party and the Communist Party of China, 116.
93. Diplomatic History Research Office, ed., Zhou Enlai (p. 487) mentions Zhou's talks with Nguyen Duy Trinh on December 18-19, 1965, but provides no detail of the talks.
94. Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, Stein Tonnesson, Nguyen Vu Tung, and James G. Hershberg, eds., "77 Conversations between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977," Cold War International History Project Working Paper (Washington, D.C., 1998); hereafter cited as Westad et al., eds., "77 Conversations." My thanks to Chen Jian for providing this material to me.
95. Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, Stein Tonnesson, Nguyen Vu Tung, and James G. Hershberg, eds., "77 Conversations between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977," Cold War International History Project Working Paper (Washington, D.C., 1998); hereafter cited as Westad et al., eds., "77 Conversations." My thanks to Chen Jian for providing this material to me.
96. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, 109. Diplomatic History Research Office, ed., Zhou Enlai, does not mention Zhou's talk with Le Duan in October-November 1966.
97. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, 109. Diplomatic History Research Office, ed., Zhou Enlai, does not mention Zhou's talk with Le Duan in October-November 1966.
98. Herring, America's Longest War, 185.
99. Zhou's talks with Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap, April 7, 1967, in Diplomatic History Research Office, ed., Zkou Enlai, 509-510.
100. The document consists of an unidentified cadre's notes taken from a high-level indoctrination course in 1967. Cited in Duiker, Sacred War, 193-194.
101. Zhou's talk with Pham Van Dong, April 10, 1967, in Diplomatic History Research Office, ed., Zhou Enlai, 510.
102. Zhou's talk with Pham Van Dong, April 11, 1967, in ibid., 510-511.
103. Herring, America's Longest War, 226-227; Duiker, Sacred War, 215-216.
104. Herring, America's Longest War, 226-227; Duiker, Sacred War, 215-216.
105. Herring, America's Longest War, 230; Duiker, Sacred War, 216.
106. Herring, America's Longest War, 230; Duiker, Sacred War, 216.
107. Hoang Van Hoan, Canghai yisu: Hoang Van Hoan geming huiyilu [A drop in the ocean: Hoang Van Hoan's revolutionary reminiscences] (Beijing, 1987), 308, and Hoan, "Distortion of Facts About Militant Friendship Between Viet Nam and China Is Impermissible," Beijing Review (Dec. 7, 1979), 18. Hoang Van Hoan was also in Beijing at the time for a rest cure. (Hoan was a member of the VWP Politburo. In 1979 he defected to China after the breakdown of Sino-Vietnamese relations.)
108. Hoang Van Hoan, Canghai yisu: Hoang Van Hoan geming huiyilu [A drop in the ocean: Hoang Van Hoan's revolutionary reminiscences] (Beijing, 1987), 308, and Hoan, "Distortion of Facts About Militant Friendship Between Viet Nam and China Is Impermissible," Beijing Review (Dec. 7, 1979), 18. Hoang Van Hoan was also in Beijing at the time for a rest cure. (Hoan was a member of the VWP Politburo. In 1979 he defected to China after the breakdown of Sino-Vietnamese relations.)
109. Westad et al., eds., "77 Conversations."
110. Zhou's talk with Xuan Thuy, May 7, 1968, in Diplomatic History Research Office, ed., Zhou Enlai, 524.
111. Herring, America's Longest War, 231.
112. Westad et al., eds., "77 Conversations."
113. Herring, America's Longest War, 237.
114. Westad et al., eds., "77 Conversations."
115. During this same period, Hanoi censored China's references to the "peace talks fraud" and the "bombing halt hoax." See Taylor, China and Southeast Asia, 61; Hoan, "Distortion of Facts About Militant Friendship Between Viet Nam and China Is Impermissible," 18.
116. During this same period, Hanoi censored China's references to the "peace talks fraud" and the "bombing halt hoax." See Taylor, China and Southeast Asia, 61; Hoan, "Distortion of Facts About Militant Friendship Between Viet Nam and China Is Impermissible," 18.
117. PRC Foreign Ministry and the CCP Central Documentary Research Department, eds., Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 580-583.
118. Lawson, The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict, 216; Taylor, China and Southeast Asia, 63.
119. Lawson, The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict, 216; Taylor, China and Southeast Asia, 63.
120. For a discussion of Moscow's efforts to improve relations with Japan, Afghanistan, and other countries in Southeast and South Asia in 1968, see F. Charles Parker IV, Vietnam: Strategy far a Stalemate (New York, 1989), 224.
121. Lawson, The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict, 216. Hanoi's endorsement of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia greatly upset the Chinese. The North Vietnamese delegation at Beijing's October 1 celebrations that year was ranked behind the Australian Communist Party. See Taylor, China and Southeast Asia, 61.
122. Lawson, The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict, 216. Hanoi's endorsement of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia greatly upset the Chinese. The North Vietnamese delegation at Beijing's October 1 celebrations that year was ranked behind the Australian Communist Party. See Taylor, China and Southeast Asia, 61.
123. Lawson, The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict, 217.
124. Zhou's talk with Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Sept. 7, 1969, in Diplomatic History Research Office, ed., Zhou Enlai, 538-539.
125. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, 75-78.
126. Ibid., 169.
127. Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston, 1979), 749. Between 1969 and 1972 Soviet diplomats in Paris met regularly with the DRV delegation to discuss developments in the peace negotiations. The North Vietnamese kept Moscow informed not only of the official sessions but also of private meetings between Xuan Thuy, Le Duc Tho, and Kissinger. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, 221.
128. Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston, 1979), 749. Between 1969 and 1972 Soviet diplomats in Paris met regularly with the DRV delegation to discuss developments in the peace negotiations. The North Vietnamese kept Moscow informed not only of the official sessions but also of private meetings between Xuan Thuy, Le Duc Tho, and Kissinger. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, 221.
129. Wilson, A Personal Record, 205-206.
130. The Department of State Bulletin, 54 (Feb. 7, 1966), 200.
131. For more discussions of the Chinese foreign policy setbacks in 1965 and their impact on China's internal development, see John W. Garver, Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1993), 152-157. China's encouragement of violent revolution frightened many moderate African and Asian governments, leading a number of them to sever diplomatic relations with mainland China. In June Ben Bella was overthrown, leading the Afro-Asian movement to lean in a more pro-Soviet direction due to the influence of India and Yugoslavia. The fall of Ben Bella frustrated Mao's bid for leadership in the Afro-Asian world through the holding of the "second Bandung" conference. In September war broke out between India and Pakistan, a Chinese ally, over the territory of Kashmir. China's effort to deter India's advance failed, and New Delhi won its conflict with Pakistan. The net result, strategically, was a gain for Moscow and a loss for Beijing. On September 30 Sukarno was toppled in a right-wing counter coup, derailing Mao's plan to maintain a militant "Beijing-Jakarta" axis.
132. McNamara, In Retrospect, 214-215.