Party organisations and alliances in Italy in the 1990s: A revolution of sorts

West European Politics

Volumn 20, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 81-109

  Newell, James L ^a   Bull, Martin ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0040797773     PISSN: 01402382     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01402389708425176     Document Type: Article

References (38)

1. As one might expect, changes in the party superstructure have been accompanied by changes in the patterns of political recruitment, which amount to the effective removal and regeneration of an entire political class, and which have themselves had an impact on the features of the party system. Though important, this is not an issue dealt with here. It is explored by E. Recchi, 'Fishing from the Same Schools: Parliamentary Recruitment and Consociationalism in the First and Second Italian Republics', West European Politics 19/2 (April 1996) pp.340-59;
2. and Luca Verzichelli, 'I nuovi parlamentari', in P. Ignazi and R. S. Katz (eds) Politico in Italia. I fatti dell'anno e le interpretazioni. Edizione 95 (Bologna: Il Mulino 1995) pp.139-60.
3. On which see R. D'Alimonte and S.Bartolini, '"Electoral Transition"' and Party System Change in Italy' (this volume).
4. If one adds to these figures those who cast either blank or spoiled ballot papers, then one ends up with a rising trend in support for the so-called 'non-vote party' that by 1996 had reached 23.2 per cent - larger than the support given to any other party.
5. The period from the mid-1970s witnessed the emergence and growth of 'new-politics' parties such as the Radicals, Greens and Proletarian Democracy (whose combined share of votes and seats rose from 2.6 and 10, to 6.8 per cent and 34 respectively between 1976 and 1987).
6. See M.J. Bull, 'Whatever Happened to Italian Communism? Explaining the Dissolution of the Largest Communist Party in the West', West European Politics 14/4 (Oct. 1991) pp.96-120.
7. J.M. Foot, '"The Left Opposition" and the Crisis: Rifondazione Comunista and La Rete', in S. Gundle and S. Parker (eds.) The New Italian Republic: From the Fall of the Berlin Wall to Berlusconi (London: Routledge 1996) p.174.
8. V. Testa, 'Il piacere di bastonare Roma', La Repubblica, 1 Oct. 1992.
9. Foot, 'The "Left Opposition" and the Crisis' (note 6) p. 181.
10. Ibid, p.180.
11. J.L. Newell, "The Scottish National Party and the Italian Lega Nord: A lesson for their rivals?', European Journal of Political Research 26/2 (1994) pp.616-47.
12. See M.J. Bull and J.L. Newell, 'Italian Politics and the 1992 Elections: From "Stable Instability" to Instability and Change', Parliamentary Affairs 46/2 (1993) pp.203-27.
13. S. Waters, "Tangentopoli' and the Emergence of a New Political Order in Italy', West European Politics 17/1 (Jan. 1994) p.170.
14. D. Della Porta, 'La capitale immorale: le tangenti di Milano', in S. Hellman and G. Pasquino (eds.), Politico in Italia: I fatti dell'anno e le interpretazioni (Bologna: Il Mulino 1993) pp.219-40.
15. M. Calise, 'Remaking the Italian Party System: How Lijphart Got It Wrong by Saying it Right', West European Politics 16/4 (Oct. 1993) p.556.
16. For instance, if it had become an established practice that appointments to many of Italy's numerous public agencies would be made on a party basis, and if an appointee then used their position to collect bribes, the money so gathered could then be used to control packets of votes in the party's internal organs. This meant that the motives for joining a party were often largely self-regarding, which in turn meant that the rank-and-file tended to be highly passive.
17. M.J. Bull and J.L. Newell, 'The Italian Referenda of April 1993: Real Change at Last?', West European Politics 16/4 (Oct. 1993) pp.607-15.
18. Until the referendum, the electoral law for the Senate provided that any candidate who won more than 65 per cent of the votes in 237 single-member seats was automatically elected with any remaining seats being distributed proportionally. Abolishing the '65 per cent' clause means that these seats are distributed according to the plurality formula with votes then being aggregated at regional level in order to affect the proportional distribution of the region's share of the remaining 78 seats. For the Chamber, the voter has two votes - one for the plurality-distributed seats, the other for the proportionally distributed seats (the so-called 'List Vote'). For detailed accounts of the system's operation see R.S. Katz, 'Electoral Reform and the Transformation of Party Politics in Italy', Party Politics 2/1 (1996) pp.31-53; M.J. Bull and J.L. Newell, 'Electoral Reform in Italy: When Consequences Fail to Meet Expectations', Representation (Winter 1996) forthcoming ; R. D'Alimonte and A. Chiaramonte, 'Il nuovo sistema elettorale italiano: quali opportunità?', Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politico 22 (1993) pp.513-47; and A. Agosta, 'Maggoritario e proporzionale', in I. Diamanti and R. Mannheimer (eds.), Milano a Roma. Guida all'Italia elettorale del 1994 (Rome: Donzelli Editore 1994) pp.15-27.
19. Until the referendum, the electoral law for the Senate provided that any candidate who won more than 65 per cent of the votes in 237 single-member seats was automatically elected with any remaining seats being distributed proportionally. Abolishing the '65 per cent' clause means that these seats are distributed according to the plurality formula with votes then being aggregated at regional level in order to affect the proportional distribution of the region's share of the remaining 78 seats. For the Chamber, the voter has two votes - one for the plurality-distributed seats, the other for the proportionally distributed seats (the so-called 'List Vote'). For detailed accounts of the system's operation see R.S. Katz, 'Electoral Reform and the Transformation of Party Politics in Italy', Party Politics 2/1 (1996) pp.31-53; M.J. Bull and J.L. Newell, 'Electoral Reform in Italy: When Consequences Fail to Meet Expectations', Representation (Winter 1996) forthcoming ; R. D'Alimonte and A. Chiaramonte, 'Il nuovo sistema elettorale italiano: quali opportunità?', Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politico 22 (1993) pp.513-47; and A. Agosta, 'Maggoritario e proporzionale', in I. Diamanti and R. Mannheimer (eds.), Milano a Roma. Guida all'Italia elettorale del 1994 (Rome: Donzelli Editore 1994) pp.15-27.
20. Until the referendum, the electoral law for the Senate provided that any candidate who won more than 65 per cent of the votes in 237 single-member seats was automatically elected with any remaining seats being distributed proportionally. Abolishing the '65 per cent' clause means that these seats are distributed according to the plurality formula with votes then being aggregated at regional level in order to affect the proportional distribution of the region's share of the remaining 78 seats. For the Chamber, the voter has two votes - one for the plurality-distributed seats, the other for the proportionally distributed seats (the so-called 'List Vote'). For detailed accounts of the system's operation see R.S. Katz, 'Electoral Reform and the Transformation of Party Politics in Italy', Party Politics 2/1 (1996) pp.31-53; M.J. Bull and J.L. Newell, 'Electoral Reform in Italy: When Consequences Fail to Meet Expectations', Representation (Winter 1996) forthcoming ; R. D'Alimonte and A. Chiaramonte, 'Il nuovo sistema elettorale italiano: quali opportunità?', Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politico 22 (1993) pp.513-47; and A. Agosta, 'Maggoritario e proporzionale', in I. Diamanti and R. Mannheimer (eds.), Milano a Roma. Guida all'Italia elettorale del 1994 (Rome: Donzelli Editore 1994) pp.15-27.
21. Until the referendum, the electoral law for the Senate provided that any candidate who won more than 65 per cent of the votes in 237 single-member seats was automatically elected with any remaining seats being distributed proportionally. Abolishing the '65 per cent' clause means that these seats are distributed according to the plurality formula with votes then being aggregated at regional level in order to affect the proportional distribution of the region's share of the remaining 78 seats. For the Chamber, the voter has two votes - one for the plurality-distributed seats, the other for the proportionally distributed seats (the so-called 'List Vote'). For detailed accounts of the system's operation see R.S. Katz, 'Electoral Reform and the Transformation of Party Politics in Italy', Party Politics 2/1 (1996) pp.31-53; M.J. Bull and J.L. Newell, 'Electoral Reform in Italy: When Consequences Fail to Meet Expectations', Representation (Winter 1996) forthcoming ; R. D'Alimonte and A. Chiaramonte, 'Il nuovo sistema elettorale italiano: quali opportunità?', Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politico 22 (1993) pp.513-47; and A. Agosta, 'Maggoritario e proporzionale', in I. Diamanti and R. Mannheimer (eds.), Milano a Roma. Guida all'Italia elettorale del 1994 (Rome: Donzelli Editore 1994) pp.15-27.
22. The Prime Minister, Giuliano Amato, resigned after the result was known, announcing the 'death of a regime' and making way for a transitional government (headed by exGovernor of the Bank of Italy, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi) which governed Italy from April 1993 until the elections a year later. Amato's resignation marked the final end of governing coalitions dominated by the DC.
23. On the PSI meltdown see M. Rhodes, 'Reinventing the Left: The Origins of Italy's Progressive Alliance', in C. Mershon and G. Pasquino (eds.) Italian Politics: A Review Volume 9 (London: Pinter 1994) pp.113-34.
24. P. Ignazi, 'Alleanza Nazionale', in Diamanti and Mannheimer, Milano a Roma (note 17) pp.43-52.
25. P. McCarthy, 'Forza Italia: nascita e sviluppo di un partito virtuale', in Ignazi and Katz, Politico in Italia (note 1) pp.49-72.
26. P. McCarthy, 'Forza Italia: The New Politics and Old Values of a Changing Italy', in S. Gundle and Parker, New Italian Republic (note 6) p.137.
27. On the formation of the Progressive Alliance see M. Rhodes, 'Reinventing the Left' and M. J. Bull, 'The Reconstitution of the Political Left in Italy: Demise, Renewal, Realignment and ⋯ Defeat', in R. Gillespie (ed.) Mediterranean Politics:Volume 2 (London: Pinter 1996).
28. On the election results see M.J. Bull and J.L. Newell, 'Italy Changes Course? The 1994 Elections and the Victory of the Right', Parliamentary Affairs 48/1 (Jan. 1995) pp.72-99; and S. Bartolini and R. D'Alimonte, 'Plurality Competition and Party Realignment in Italy: the 1994 Parliamentary Elections', European Journal of Political Research 29/1 (Jan. 1996) pp. 515-59.
29. On the election results see M.J. Bull and J.L. Newell, 'Italy Changes Course? The 1994 Elections and the Victory of the Right', Parliamentary Affairs 48/1 (Jan. 1995) pp.72-99; and S. Bartolini and R. D'Alimonte, 'Plurality Competition and Party Realignment in Italy: the 1994 Parliamentary Elections', European Journal of Political Research 29/1 (Jan. 1996) pp. 515-59.
30. On the general collapse of the centre pole see L. Morlino, 'Crisis of Parties and Change of Party System in Italy', Party Politics 2/1 (1996) pp.5-30.
31. A. Di Virgilio, 'Dai partiti ai poli: la politica delle alleanze', Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politico 24/3 (Dec. 1994) pp.493-547.
32. See P. Ignazi and R.S. Katz, 'Introduzione. Ascesa e caduta del governo Berlusconi', in idem, Politica in Italia (note 1) pp.27-48.
33. See M.J. Bull, 'Il fallimento dell'Alleanza progressista' in ibid. pp.97-120 and M. Rhodes, 'The Italian Left between Crisis and Renewal', in R. Leonardi and R.Y. Nanetti (eds.) Italy: Politics and Policy, Vol.1 (Aldershot: Dartmouth 1996) pp. 108-33.
34. See M.J. Bull, 'Il fallimento dell'Alleanza progressista' in ibid. pp.97-120 and M. Rhodes, 'The Italian Left between Crisis and Renewal', in R. Leonardi and R.Y. Nanetti (eds.) Italy: Politics and Policy, Vol.1 (Aldershot: Dartmouth 1996) pp. 108-33.
35. On the results of the regional elections see, R. D'Alimonte, 'La transizione italiana: il voto regionale del 23 aprile', Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica 25/3 (1995) pp.515-59.
36. See J.L. Newell and M.J. Bull, 'The April 1996 Italian General Election: the Left on Top or on Tap?', Parliamentary Affairs 49/4 (Autumn 1996) pp.616-47.
37. See, for example, the interview with Veltroni, 'Veltroni: non può voltarsi indietro la sinistra del 2000', La Repubblica, 30 June 1996. Veltroni is careful not to commit himself to the idea of the Ulivo actually becoming a party, but the general drift of his ideas is clear.
38. See the interview with D'Alema, 'D'Alema: una rosa al posto di falce e martello', La Repubblica, 29 June 1996.