Who wants an independent central bank? Monetary policy-making and politics

Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Volumn 102, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 621-643

  Ozkan, F Gulcin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF YORK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Cooperation; Independent central banks; Monetary and fiscal authorities; Partisan cycles

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040780602     PISSN: 03470520     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9442.00218     Document Type: Article

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