The alliance that failed: Moscow and the triple alliance negotiations, 1939

European History Quarterly

Volumn 26, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 383-414

  Roberts, Geoffrey ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE CORK   (Ireland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040714907     PISSN: 02656914     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/026569149602600303     Document Type: Article

References (118)

1. R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford 1961), 42
2. See G Roberts, 'The Soviet Decision for a Pact with Nazi Germany', Soviet Studies (January 1992), 57-78;
3. 'Infamous Encounter? The Merekalov-Weizsacker Meeting of 17 April 1939', The Historical Journal (December 1992), 921-6;
4. 'A Soviet Bid for Coexistence with Nazi Germany, 1935-1937: The Kandelaki Affair', The International History Review (August 1994), 441-60
5. The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War: Russo-German Relations and the Road to War, 1933-1941 (London 1995)
6. This theme - that Moscow was not flexible enough and did not try hard enough to achieve a triple alliance - is commensurate with the arguments of many Soviet historians during the Glasnost era. See, for example, the writings of Alexander Chubaryan: 'Avgust 1939 goda', Izvestiya, 1 July 1989; 'Revolution and Renewal in History', Britain-USSR, April (1990); and 'Was an Earlier Anti-Nazi Coalition Possible?', World Marxist Review, August (1989)
7. On the character of Soviet foreign policy during the collective security period see Roberts, The Unholy Alliance: Stalin's Pact with Hitler (London 1989)
8. T.J. Uldricks, 'Soviet Security Policy in the 1930s', in G. Gorodetsky, ed., Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1991 (London 1994)
9. R. Craig Nation, Black Earth, Red Star: A History of Soviet Security Policy, 1917-1991 (Ithaca, NY 1992)
10. and J. Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security in Europe, 1933-1939 (London 1984)
11. SPE docs 160 and 161
12. SPE doc. 161 and DVP 1939doc. 150. The latter is Litvinov's report to Stalin on his conversation with the British Ambassador. Also: DBFP Vol. 4, doc. 403
13. SPEdoc. 162 and DVP 1939 doc. 163; DBFP Vol. 4.doc. 421
14. DVP 1939 doc. 150. Whether the conference proposal was Litvinov's idea or came from Stalin or another source is unclear, but Litvinov made no such suggestion in his note to Stalin
15. SPEdoc. 164; DBFP Vol. 4, doc. 433
16. SPEdocs 176 and 177; DBFP Vol. 4, docs 446 and 461
17. SPE doc. 178; DBFP Vol. 4, doc. 490
18. SPE doc. 167. The full text of this letter is printed in DVP 1939 doc. 155
19. DVP 1939 doc. 157
20. SPE doc. 186. The text of Litvinov's statement corresponds to the draft he presented to Stalin on 20 March 1939 in DVP 1939 doc. 157
21. God Krizisa docs 220, 225, 233, 234 and 236 (Litvinov to Suritz, 29 March 1939). For British reports DBFP Vol. 4, docs 593 and 608
22. SPEdoc. 203; DBFP Vol. 4, doc. 597
23. Cited in International Affairs (Moscow) (July 1969), 81. Unfortunately, there is no date on this quote from the Soviet foreign policy archives, and the document from which it is taken has not so far been published
24. See SPE docs 182, 194, 199, 200, 204 and 205; God Krizisa doc. 239; DVP 1939 doc. 189
25. SPEdoc. 214 and God Krizisa doc. 255
26. SPE doc. 215
27. See also docs 212 and 216, DVP 1939 doc. 201 and DDF Vol. 15, doc. 263
28. DVP 1939 doc. 206
29. SPE doc. 220
30. DDF Vol. 15, doc. 349
31. SPE doc. 223
32. DVP 1939 doc. 199
33. SPE doc. 226
34. DVP 1939 docs 216 and 217
35. DVP 1939 doc. 216
36. SPE doc. 230
37. See the reports of conversations between Litvinov, Potemkin and the Rumanian ambassador in DVP 1939 docs 176, 186 and 203. Also DVP 1939 Vol. 2, n. 86, 537-8
38. SPE docs 228 and 229
39. SPE doc. 231; DBFP Vol. 5, docs 166 and 176
40. SPE doc. 232; DDF Vol. 15, doc. 387
41. SPE doc. 233. Also Seeds's report in DBFP Vol. 5, doc. 182 which gives a much more positive account of the meeting than Litvinov's
42. DVP 1939 doc. 223
43. DVP 1939 doc. 224
44. God Krizisa doc. 274; DBFP Vol. 5, doc. 193
45. DVP 1939 doc. 228
46. SPE doc. 238; DBFP Vol. 5, doc. 202
47. SPE doc. 239. The text is also reprinted as an Appendix to Roberts, The Unholy Alliance. Suritz presented the proposal to the French government on 19 April (DDF Vol. 15, doc. 447)
48. See SPE docs 171, 189, 207, 218, 222 and God Krizisa docs 224 and 261
49. I. Maisky, Who Helped Hitler? (London 1964), 120-1
50. SPE doc. 249
51. SPE doc. 256 (Suritz to Litvinov, 26 April 1939)
52. SPE docs 252 and 253. Also God Krizisa doc. 294 (Suritz to Litvinov, 25 April 1939)
53. See also DDF Vol. 15, doc. 487
54. SPE doc. 255
55. DVP 1939 doc. 259
56. SPE docs 261-3; DDF Vol. 15, doc. 523
57. But see the reports of a conversation between Halifax and Maisky on 29 April in God Krizisa doc. 303 and DBFP Vol. 5, doc. 316
58. SPE doc. 267
59. DVP 1939 doc. 267
60. I have argued this point at length in the works cited in n. 2 above
61. For my own contribution to the debate see "The Fall of Litvinov: A Revisionist View', Journal of Contemporary History (October 1992), 639-57. In that article I argued, as I do here, that Litvinov was not the enthusiast for a triple alliance portrayed in many accounts and that his dismissal from office was not a consequence of his pro-collective security views. I also speculated that Litvinov might in fact have been sacked because he was opposed or hostile to the triple alliance initiative. That hypothesis seems less likely to be true in the light of more detailed evidence of how the triple alliance proposal emerged and of Litvinov's role in that process. However, there remains the question of who (if anyone) Litvinov was arguing against in his many letters and telegrams in March and April opposing a new collective security initiative. To suggest that Litvinov may have had a negative attitude toward the triple alliance is not to argue that had he remained in office it woul have made no difference to the final outcome. Litvinov's diplomatic experience, his flexibility when it came to detailed negotiations and his openness to discussion about tactics and strategy might have contributed to a more positive Soviet approach to the triple alliance discussions
62. A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (London 1964), 284
63. There are many reports of the personal clash between Molotov and Litvinov. See for example Molotov's own reported comments in F. Chuev, Sto Sorok Beced s Molotovym (Moscow 1991), 95-8
64. DVP 1939 doc. 293
65. SPE doc. 285
66. Dokumenty i Materialy po Istorii Sovetsko-Polskikh Otnoshenii, Vol. 7 (Moscow 1973), doc. 66
67. See also DVP 1939 doc. 334. Beck's 5 May speech was extensively covered in the 6 May 1939 issue of Pravda
68. SPE docs 277 and 289; DVP 1939 docs 306, 347, 362; Documents on Polish - Soviet Relations 1939-1945, Vol. 1 (London 1961), 30; and The Polish White Book (London 1940), 208-9
69. SPE doc. 314, 72
70. William Strang, the Foreign Office's special negotiator in Moscow during the triple alliance talks, commented retrospectively: The history of the negotiations for the political agreement is the story of how the British government were driven step by step, under stress of Soviet argument, under pressure from Parliament and the press and public opinion polls, under advice from the Ambassador at Moscow, and under persuasion from the French, to move towards the Soviet position. One by one, they yielded points to the Russians. In the end they gave the Russians the main part of what they asked for. Everything in the essential structure of the draft agreement represented a concession to the Russians. (W. Strang, 'The Moscow Negotiations 1939', in D. Dilkes, ed., Retreat from Power, Vol. 1 (London 1981), 177)
71. SPE docs 278 and 279; DBFP Vol. 5, docs 397, 421 and 436
72. SPE doc 280 and DVP 1939 doc. 284
73. SPE doc. 281 and 283; DVP 1939 docs 290, 294 and 296
74. SPE doc. 291
75. SPE doc. 312
76. SPE doc. 311. For the British record of this meeting see DBFP Vol. 5, docs 648 and 657
77. DVP 1939 doc. 336. In his report of the meeting Seeds noted that Potemkin used the French draft of the joint proposal to translate into Russian and that 'Molotov had before him a paper on which he seemed to be checking M. Potemkin's translation'. (DBFP Vol. 5, doc. 657)
78. DVP 1939 doc. 333
79. SPE doc. 309
80. SPE doc. 311
81. DBFP Vol. 5, doc. 670 DDF Vol. 16, doc. 308. There is no Soviet record of the Seeds-Molotov meeting of 30 May 1939
82. SPE doc. 314
83. SPE doc. 315
84. See also DBFP Vol. 5, doc. 697 and DDF Vol. 16, doc. 335
85. SPE docs 316 and 322
86. SPE doc. 323
87. See G. Roberts, 'Soviet Policy and the Baltic States, 1939-1940', Diplomacy and Statecraft (November 1995), 674 and n. 5
88. SPE doc. 325
89. SPE doc. 330
90. SPE doc. 330. Also: DBFP Vol. 6, doc. 73
91. SPE doc. 331 (Molotov to Maisky and Suritz, 16 June 1938)
92. SPE docs 338-9. Also DBFP Vol. 6, docs 103, 123 and 126 and DDF Vol. 16, docs 496-7 and 507
93. SPE doc. 340 (Molotov to Maisky and Suritz, 23 June 1939)
94. SPE doc. 355
95. SPE doc. 357. Also DBFP Vol. 6, doc. 207
96. SPE docs 360-1
97. See Seeds's report in DBFP Vol. 6, doc. 207
98. SPE docs 366 (Anglo-French proposal 8 July 1939) and 367 (Soviet proposal 9 July 1939)
99. DBFP Vol. 6, doc. 338; DDF Vol. 17, docs 223-4. No Soviet record of this meeting has been published
100. SPE doc. 376 (Molotov to Suritz and Maisky, 17 June 1939)
101. DBFP Vol. 7, 115-20. Also DDF Vol. 17, doc. 282. No Soviet record of this meeting has been published
102. SPE doc. 384
103. SPE doc. 372. Also doc. 381
104. See L. Mosley, On Borrowed Time (London 1971), Chap. 12
105. God Krizisa doc. 527
106. SPE doc. 400
107. DVP 1939 doc. 453
108. See also Vol. 2, nn. 162 and 579
109. This issue is dealt with in depth by M. Carley, 'End of the "Low, Dishonest Decade": Failure of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet Alliance in 1939', Europe-Asia Studies, 45, 2 (1993)
110. See also his 'Down a Blind-Alley: Anglo-Franco-Soviet Relations, 1920-39', Canadian Journal of History (April 1994)
111. Records of the Meetings of the Military Missions of the USSR, Britain and France: SPE docs 411, 412, 413, 415, 417, 425, 429 and 437. The British records are in DBFP Vol. VII, 558-614
112. See also the interview with Alexander Ponomarev, an airforce officer who was one of the Soviet interpreters at the talks, in New Times, 34 (1989)
113. A.J.P. Taylor points out that Anglo-French involvement in the forthcoming war was the crucial point for Moscow: "The Russians ... did not fear a war in which they would bear an unequal burden; they feared a war which they would have to fight alone.' ("The Alliance that Failed', Europe: Grandeur and Decline (London 1967), 269)
114. On the pact and the Soviet turn to Germany see Roberts, 'The Soviet Decision for a Pact with Nazi Germany', op. cit.
115. and The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War, op. cit., Chaps. 5 and 6
116. Many historians of the Anglo-French side of the triple alliance negotiations argue that Moscow's fears were well-founded. See, for example, the Carley articles cited in n. 106 and R.A.C. Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War (London 1993)
117. See SPE docs 268, 284, 303, 371, 372, 377, 381, 385 and 395; DVP 1939 docs 335, 422 and 424
118. and God Krizisa doc. 377. Also a Pravda article of 18 August 1939: 'Popytka Novogo Munkhena' (Attempting a New Munich)