International nuclear relations after the Indian and Pakistani test explosions

International Affairs

Volumn 74, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 505-528

  Walker, William ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040712213     PISSN: 00205850     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-2346.00031     Document Type: Review

References (58)

1. See J. Cherian, 'The BJP and the bomb', Frontline, 24 April 1998, pp. 4-9.
2. International relations theorists have given surprisingly little attention to the dynamic effects of shocks, except in regard to wars and major systemic changes like the end of the Cold War. John Mueller addresses some of the issues in Quiet cataclysm: reflections on the recent transformation of world politics (New York: HarperCollins, 1995).
3. This was the second Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the review conference of the NPT which will be held in 2000 (the first PrepCom was held a year previously). Under the NPT's strengthened review process agreed in 1995, the PrepCom was given an enhanced role, including rights to address issues of substance. As Rebecca Johnson noted in her summary of proceedings, the PrepCom 'ended after midnight on May 9 with no agreement on substance, recommendations or rules of procedure'. See Rebecca Johnson, 'The NPT Review Process', http://www.apc.org/acronym, 9 May 1998.
4. There is a narrow and a broad definition of nuclear arms control. The former refers to the efforts by weapon states (especially the United States and Soviet Union/Russia in the past) to regulate their strategic and political relationships. The latter refers to the above activity plus non-proliferation and disarmament policies.
5. Under the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START), the tens of thousands of deployed strategic warheads would be reduced to a few thousand apiece, with the components and materials from dismantled weapons being destroyed or removed from the military cycle. See J. Goldblat, Arms control: a guide to negotiations and agreements (London: Sage, 1996). For an analysis of the end of the Cold War, see J. L. Gaddis, The United States and the end of the Cold War: implications, reconsiderations and provocations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
6. Under the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START), the tens of thousands of deployed strategic warheads would be reduced to a few thousand apiece, with the components and materials from dismantled weapons being destroyed or removed from the military cycle. See J. Goldblat, Arms control: a guide to negotiations and agreements (London: Sage, 1996). For an analysis of the end of the Cold War, see J. L. Gaddis, The United States and the end of the Cold War: implications, reconsiderations and provocations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
7. For an overview of developments in non-proliferation policy up to the mid-1990s, see J. Simpson, 'Nuclear non-proliferation in the post-Cold War era', International Affairs 70: 1, January 1994, pp. 17-39.
8. Such attitudes were reinforced by speculation that warfare itself was becoming anachronistic in a 'globalizing' and 'democratizing' world. On the democratic peace, see M. Doyle, 'Liberalism and world politics', American Political Science Review 80: 4, December 1996, pp. 1151-69; B. Russett, Grasping the democratic peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). The recent aggressive actions of India, the world's largest democracy, and the vehement popular support for those actions, should give exponents of the democratic peace pause for thought.
9. Such attitudes were reinforced by speculation that warfare itself was becoming anachronistic in a 'globalizing' and 'democratizing' world. On the democratic peace, see M. Doyle, 'Liberalism and world politics', American Political Science Review 80: 4, December 1996, pp. 1151-69; B. Russett, Grasping the democratic peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). The recent aggressive actions of India, the world's largest democracy, and the vehement popular support for those actions, should give exponents of the democratic peace pause for thought.
10. J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the future: instability in Europe after the Cold War', International Security 15: 1, 1990, pp. 5-56.
11. Article X.2 of the NPT requires that in 1995 'a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an extended fixed period or periods'.
12. Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan also came to regard the conference as an opportunity to demonstrate their credentials as trustworthy members of the international community.
13. The Canberra Commission was appointed by the Australian government.
14. The Agreed Framework provided for the phased dismantlement of North Korea's weapon facilities, and the submission of its facilities and materials to international safeguards, in return for the supply of fuel oil and the construction of two nuclear power stations. See K. D. Kapur, Nuclear diplomacy in east Asia: US and the Korean crisis management (New Delhi: Lancers Books, 1995).
15. See J. D. Willis and T. Perry, 'Nunn-Lugar's unfinished agenda', Arms Control Today 27: 7, October 1997, pp. 14-22.
16. The CTBT's entry into force clause was deliberately drafted to require India, Pakistan and Israel to sign and ratify the treaty before it could come into effect. Israel has subsequently signed the treaty.
17. See J. Mendelsohn, 'The US-Russian strategic arms control agenda', Arms Control Today 27: 8, November/December 1997, pp. 12-16.
18. Foreign Minister Shimon Peres stated in 1995 that Israel would 'begin negotiation of a Middle East Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone two years after bilateral peace agreements are signed with all states, including Iran'. See G. M. Steinberg, 'Middle East peace and the NPT extension decision', The Nonproliferation Review 4: 1, Fall 1996, pp. 17-29.
19. I have heard it said that, prior to April 1998, threats from missile-launched chemical and biological weapons occupied more time in the bilateral meetings between President Clinton and Prime Minister Netanyahu than the peace process.
20. On security assurances, see G. Bunn and R. Timerbaev, 'Security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states: possible options for change', PPNN Issue Review 7, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton, September 1996. Negative security assurances granted by NWS to NNWS states parties to the NPT provide the latter with guarantees that they will not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons unless they breach their treaty undertakings or themselves attack the said NWS in alliance with another NWS. On nuclear security assurances and chemical and biological weapons, see V.A. Utgoff, Nuclear weapons and the deterrence of biological and chemical warfare, Occasional Paper 36, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC, October 1997; A. Kelle, Security in a nuclear weapons free world - how to cope with the nuclear, biological and chemical weapons threat, PRIF Report 50, Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt, April 1998.
21. On security assurances, see G. Bunn and R. Timerbaev, 'Security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states: possible options for change', PPNN Issue Review 7, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton, September 1996. Negative security assurances granted by NWS to NNWS states parties to the NPT provide the latter with guarantees that they will not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons unless they breach their treaty undertakings or themselves attack the said NWS in alliance with another NWS. On nuclear security assurances and chemical and biological weapons, see V.A. Utgoff, Nuclear weapons and the deterrence of biological and chemical warfare, Occasional Paper 36, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC, October 1997; A. Kelle, Security in a nuclear weapons free world - how to cope with the nuclear, biological and chemical weapons threat, PRIF Report 50, Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt, April 1998.
22. On security assurances, see G. Bunn and R. Timerbaev, 'Security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states: possible options for change', PPNN Issue Review 7, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton, September 1996. Negative security assurances granted by NWS to NNWS states parties to the NPT provide the latter with guarantees that they will not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons unless they breach their treaty undertakings or themselves attack the said NWS in alliance with another NWS. On nuclear security assurances and chemical and biological weapons, see V.A. Utgoff, Nuclear weapons and the deterrence of biological and chemical warfare, Occasional Paper 36, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC, October 1997; A. Kelle, Security in a nuclear weapons free world - how to cope with the nuclear, biological and chemical weapons threat, PRIF Report 50, Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt, April 1998.
23. A summary of the events and decisions that led to India's nuclear tests in May 1998 has been provided by K. Subrahmanyam, 'Politics of Shakti: new whine in an old bomb', Times of India, 26 May 1998. He asserts that the decision to launch a weaponization programme was taken by Rajiv Gandhi in 1990. For more detailed, but less up to date histories of the Indian nuclear programme see R. G. C. Thomas, Indian security policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Z. Moshaver, Nuclear weapons in the Indian subcontinent (London: Macmillan, 1991); and C. Smith, India's ad hoc arsenal (Oxford: Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1994). An excellent discussion of the interplay between Indian domestic politics and decision-making in nuclear and other security fields is S. Gupta, India redefines its role, Adelphi Paper 293 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995).
24. A summary of the events and decisions that led to India's nuclear tests in May 1998 has been provided by K. Subrahmanyam, 'Politics of Shakti: new whine in an old bomb', Times of India, 26 May 1998. He asserts that the decision to launch a weaponization programme was taken by Rajiv Gandhi in 1990. For more detailed, but less up to date histories of the Indian nuclear programme see R. G. C. Thomas, Indian security policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Z. Moshaver, Nuclear weapons in the Indian subcontinent (London: Macmillan, 1991); and C. Smith, India's ad hoc arsenal (Oxford: Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1994). An excellent discussion of the interplay between Indian domestic politics and decision-making in nuclear and other security fields is S. Gupta, India redefines its role, Adelphi Paper 293 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995).
25. A summary of the events and decisions that led to India's nuclear tests in May 1998 has been provided by K. Subrahmanyam, 'Politics of Shakti: new whine in an old bomb', Times of India, 26 May 1998. He asserts that the decision to launch a weaponization programme was taken by Rajiv Gandhi in 1990. For more detailed, but less up to date histories of the Indian nuclear programme see R. G. C. Thomas, Indian security policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Z. Moshaver, Nuclear weapons in the Indian subcontinent (London: Macmillan, 1991); and C. Smith, India's ad hoc arsenal (Oxford: Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1994). An excellent discussion of the interplay between Indian domestic politics and decision-making in nuclear and other security fields is S. Gupta, India redefines its role, Adelphi Paper 293 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995).
26. A summary of the events and decisions that led to India's nuclear tests in May 1998 has been provided by K. Subrahmanyam, 'Politics of Shakti: new whine in an old bomb', Times of India, 26 May 1998. He asserts that the decision to launch a weaponization programme was taken by Rajiv Gandhi in 1990. For more detailed, but less up to date histories of the Indian nuclear programme see R. G. C. Thomas, Indian security policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Z. Moshaver, Nuclear weapons in the Indian subcontinent (London: Macmillan, 1991); and C. Smith, India's ad hoc arsenal (Oxford: Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1994). An excellent discussion of the interplay between Indian domestic politics and decision-making in nuclear and other security fields is S. Gupta, India redefines its role, Adelphi Paper 293 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995).
27. A summary of the events and decisions that led to India's nuclear tests in May 1998 has been provided by K. Subrahmanyam, 'Politics of Shakti: new whine in an old bomb', Times of India, 26 May 1998. He asserts that the decision to launch a weaponization programme was taken by Rajiv Gandhi in 1990. For more detailed, but less up to date histories of the Indian nuclear programme see R. G. C. Thomas, Indian security policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Z. Moshaver, Nuclear weapons in the Indian subcontinent (London: Macmillan, 1991); and C. Smith, India's ad hoc arsenal (Oxford: Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1994). An excellent discussion of the interplay between Indian domestic politics and decision-making in nuclear and other security fields is S. Gupta, India redefines its role, Adelphi Paper 293 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995).
28. See W. Walker, 'India's nuclear labyrinth', The Nonproliferation Review 4: 1, Fall 1996, pp. 61-77.
29. I have been influenced in the observations that follow by a presentation given on 'The future of nuclear arms control' by Andrew Barlow at King's College, London on 18 February 1997 (unpublished mimeo). The numbers refer to the United States and Russia, plus China, France and Britain, plus India, Pakistan and Israel, plus the non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT (as of May 1998) together with Brazil and Cuba. These last two states have not joined the NPT (Brazil is expected to do so soon), but are bound to legal renunciations of nuclear weapons by the Treaty of Tlatelolco which has established a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America.
30. For details on these stocks, see D. Albright, F. Berkhout and W. Walker, Plutonium and highly enriched uranium 1996: world inventories, capabilities and policies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). Updated assessments on India and Pakistan are available from David Albright and Kevin O'Neill, Institute for Science and International Security, Washington DC.
31. See e.g. R. C. Karp, ed., Security without nuclear weapons? Different perspectives on non-nuclear security (Oxford-Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1992); J. Rotblat, J. Steinberger and B. Udgaonkar, eds, A nuclear-free world: Desirable? Feasible? (Boulder, CO, Oxford: Westview for Pugwash, 1993); M. MccGwire, 'Nuclear weapons revisited', International Affairs 70: 2, April 1994, pp. 211-28; M. Quinlan, 'The future of nuclear weapons in world affairs', Bulletin of the Atlantic Council 7: 9, November 1996; S. Fetter, Verifying nuclear disarmament, Occasional Paper 29, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC, October 1996.
32. See e.g. R. C. Karp, ed., Security without nuclear weapons? Different perspectives on non-nuclear security (Oxford-Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1992); J. Rotblat, J. Steinberger and B. Udgaonkar, eds, A nuclear-free world: Desirable? Feasible? (Boulder, CO, Oxford: Westview for Pugwash, 1993); M. MccGwire, 'Nuclear weapons revisited', International Affairs 70: 2, April 1994, pp. 211-28; M. Quinlan, 'The future of nuclear weapons in world affairs', Bulletin of the Atlantic Council 7: 9, November 1996; S. Fetter, Verifying nuclear disarmament, Occasional Paper 29, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC, October 1996.
33. See e.g. R. C. Karp, ed., Security without nuclear weapons? Different perspectives on non-nuclear security (Oxford-Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1992); J. Rotblat, J. Steinberger and B. Udgaonkar, eds, A nuclear-free world: Desirable? Feasible? (Boulder, CO, Oxford: Westview for Pugwash, 1993); M. MccGwire, 'Nuclear weapons revisited', International Affairs 70: 2, April 1994, pp. 211-28; M. Quinlan, 'The future of nuclear weapons in world affairs', Bulletin of the Atlantic Council 7: 9, November 1996; S. Fetter, Verifying nuclear disarmament, Occasional Paper 29, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC, October 1996.
34. See e.g. R. C. Karp, ed., Security without nuclear weapons? Different perspectives on non-nuclear security (Oxford-Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1992); J. Rotblat, J. Steinberger and B. Udgaonkar, eds, A nuclear-free world: Desirable? Feasible? (Boulder, CO, Oxford: Westview for Pugwash, 1993); M. MccGwire, 'Nuclear weapons revisited', International Affairs 70: 2, April 1994, pp. 211-28; M. Quinlan, 'The future of nuclear weapons in world affairs', Bulletin of the Atlantic Council 7: 9, November 1996; S. Fetter, Verifying nuclear disarmament, Occasional Paper 29, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC, October 1996.
35. See e.g. R. C. Karp, ed., Security without nuclear weapons? Different perspectives on non-nuclear security (Oxford-Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1992); J. Rotblat, J. Steinberger and B. Udgaonkar, eds, A nuclear-free world: Desirable? Feasible? (Boulder, CO, Oxford: Westview for Pugwash, 1993); M. MccGwire, 'Nuclear weapons revisited', International Affairs 70: 2, April 1994, pp. 211-28; M. Quinlan, 'The future of nuclear weapons in world affairs', Bulletin of the Atlantic Council 7: 9, November 1996; S. Fetter, Verifying nuclear disarmament, Occasional Paper 29, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC, October 1996.
36. As I have suggested elsewhere, the main reason (inertia aside) why policy elites in the NWS have so far resisted disarmament is that satisfactory answers have yet to be given to three fundamental questions. Would nuclear disarmament increase or decrease regional and global security? What exactly is entailed by nuclear disarmament - what is being disarmed, and when has whatever is being disarmed finally been disarmed? And how can states get from here to there safely and securely, and once disarmament has been achieved how can they collectively ensure that they all stay there? (That is, how can they guard against the possibility of 'break-out'?) See W. Walker, 'Evolutionary versus planned approaches to nuclear disarmament', Disarmament Diplomacy 15, May 1997, pp. 2-4.
37. On epistemic communities, see Peter Haas, guest ed., 'Knowledge, power and international policy coordination' International Organization 46: 1, 1992.
38. As in the 1970s, the NWS' possession of nuclear arms has in the 1990s also come to symbolize broader inequalities in the international system.
39. See e.g. H. Müller, 'An incremental strategy for nuclear disarmament: rationale and practical considerations', PPNN Issue Review 12, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton, April 1998.
40. Sensitive issues pertaining to nuclear weapon designs and production processes could not, in any case, be discussed with NNWS without breaching Article I of the NPT.
41. On non-weaponized or 'virtual' deterrence, see G. Perkovich, 'A nuclear third way in south Asia', Foreign Policy 91, Summer 1993, pp. 85-104. Weaponization refers to the insertion of warheads in operational delivery systems.
42. Not since 1945, when the United States immediately weaponized after the Trinity test, has there been such a rush to turn a capability into an operational nuclear force.
43. China's long commitment to a 'no first use' policy on nuclear weapons may also have been adopted partly to avoid provoking India.
44. Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's reference to 'settling the score with India' (at six all, including India's test at Pokhran in 1974) on 28 May expressed this parity. It is still possible that India may react with another one or two tests, bringing a matching Pakistani response, but the testing would probably peter out with honour satisfied on both sides.
45. Under the Nuclear Proliferation Act of 1994, the United States is obliged to impose economic sanctions on any non-nuclear weapon state which conducts nuclear explosive tests. As Pakistan is much more dependent on US aid and trade than India, the affects of the sanctions will not be equal.
46. However, any transfers of expertise would have to be consistent with Article I of the NPT which obliges NWS parties 'not in anyway to assist...any non-nuclear weapon State to manipulate or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons'.
47. The statement went on to say: 'But this cannot obviously be done in a vacuum. It would necessarily be an evolutionary process from concept to commitment and would depend on a number of reciprocal activities.'
48. Opponents of this and other arms control treaties in the US Congress will no doubt try to derail the CTBT when it comes to the Senate for ratification. They should not be allowed to succeed. For a proponent's view, see Paul Warnke, 'The unratified treaty', New York Times, 14 May 1998; for an opponent's view, see Mac Thornberry, 'Test of our deterrence', Washington Times, 15 May 1998. There is also need for confidence-building measures to provide assurance that computer simulation and other techniques are not being used to develop new warhead designs.
49. Opponents of this and other arms control treaties in the US Congress will no doubt try to derail the CTBT when it comes to the Senate for ratification. They should not be allowed to succeed. For a proponent's view, see Paul Warnke, 'The unratified treaty', New York Times, 14 May 1998; for an opponent's view, see Mac Thornberry, 'Test of our deterrence', Washington Times, 15 May 1998. There is also need for confidence-building measures to provide assurance that computer simulation and other techniques are not being used to develop new warhead designs.
50. For discussions of the FMCT, see Albright et al., Plutonium and highly enriched uranium 1996, ch. 15; A. Schaper, 'A treaty on the cutoff of fissile material for nuclear weapons: What to cover? How to verify?', PRIF Report 48, Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt, July 1997.
51. For discussions of the FMCT, see Albright et al., Plutonium and highly enriched uranium 1996, ch. 15; A. Schaper, 'A treaty on the cutoff of fissile material for nuclear weapons: What to cover? How to verify?', PRIF Report 48, Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt, July 1997.
52. The reason is that all facilities for producing or separating fissile materials would have to be placed under IAEA safeguards, thereby ending the production of additional unsafeguarded material The drawback is that existing unsafeguarded materials would still escape safeguards, a situation that full-scope safeguards are intended to avoid. However, the political reality is that a pool of unsafeguarded material is going to be kept in military cycle in India and Pakistan. An FMCT would also help equalize the trading conditions faced by the 'legal' and 'extra-legal' NWS, since the former are legally entitled to hold material stocks IAEA safeguards.
53. See Albright et al., Plutonium and highly enriched uranium 1996, ch. 15; W. Walker, 'Irreversibility, the cutoff treaty and fissile material stocks', presentation given at workshop sponsored by the Canadian Mission to the UN and the Institute for Science and International Security, Palais des Nations, Geneva, 27 April 1998, p. 10 (unpublished mimeo).
54. See Albright et al., Plutonium and highly enriched uranium 1996, ch. 15; W. Walker, 'Irreversibility, the cutoff treaty and fissile material stocks', presentation given at workshop sponsored by the Canadian Mission to the UN and the Institute for Science and International Security, Palais des Nations, Geneva, 27 April 1998, p. 10 (unpublished mimeo).
55. In explaining the abstention of France from voting in the UN General Assembly on the resolution commending the NPT in 1968, the French delegate stated officially that 'France...will behave in the future in this field exactly as the States adhering to the treaty'. See M. Shaker, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: origin and implementation, 1959-1979 (New York: Oceana Publications Inc., 1980), vol. II, p. 796.
56. This includes the Nuclear Suppliers' Guidelines and the Missile Technology Control Regime. For a discussion of trade controls, see H. Müller, 'National and international export control systems and supplier states' commitments under the NPT', PPNN Issue Review 8, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton, September 1996. In January 1998, the Indian government issued for domestic users an impressive set of 'Briefing notes on the system of control of exports from India' relating to all weapons of mass destruction.
57. I recall a Swedish diplomat saying to me years ago that 'the nuclear weapon states need the threshold states' (as they were then called). There has been a lot of truth in that remark.
58. In the Economic Times on 9 May 1998, the Chairman of India's Atomic Energy Commission, R. Chidambaram, asserted that 'India needs to build up its own industrial-military complex which can assure security on the one hand and catalyse development on the other. The greatest advantage of recognized strength is that you don't have to use it, and the greatest disadvantage of perceived weakness is that an enemy may become adventurist.' Add xenophobia, and this is but a short walk from Bismark's speech to the Prussian House of Deputies in January 1886: 'Place in the hands of the King of Prussia the strongest possible military power, then he will be able to carry out the policy you wish; this policy cannot succeed through speeches, and shooting-matches, and songs; it can only be carried out through blood and iron.' This sentimental led Germany, and the Soviet Union, to perpetrate the twentieth century's greatest disasters. The notion that a competitive and dynamic economy can best be established today through military programmes, and through 'the national laboratory system' as Dr Chidambaram calls it, is also profoundly mistaken, as well as self-serving.